Causes of War

Rating:
Summary: An uncommonly useful contribution from academia
Review: As a policy maker involved in foreign policy, I am ususally dismayed by the lack of useful research from political scientists. This book is a profound exception.

Van Evera's book has clarified my thinking on many points; I recommend this book wholeheartedly.

Rating:
Summary: Causes of War?
Review: This book claims to offer a "master theory" explaining the causes of war. It also seeks to provide policy prescriptions to show soldiers and statesmen how to make conflict less likely. It is a lofty aim, but the book falls far short of its mark. Van Evera's book is a revision of part of a fifteen-year-old dissertation that must rank among the most widely cited unpublished works in history, It is a work of social science, and he takes great care to observe all the methodological conventions of the field. The resulting volume is thus of greater interest to students and professors than soldiers and statesmen. It is, at its core, a book about formulating and testing hypotheses. It is organized around five hypotheses: (1) "war is more likely when states fall prey to false optimism about its outcome," (2) "war is more likely when the advantage lies with the first side to mobilize or attack," (3) "war is more likely when the relative power of states fluctuates sharply," (4) "war is more likely when the control of resources enables the protection or acquisition of other resources," and (5) "war is more likely when conquest is easy." Van Evera devotes the first four chapters of the book to his first four hypotheses. These chapters collectively offer a useful survey of how power and perceptions of it can create incentives for war. At times, however, the book's search for a "master theory" clashes with the demands of careful scholarship. In some cases, Van Evera cites evidence supporting his hypotheses while omitting equally persuasive facts contradicting it. Elsewhere he draws upon ambiguous or contradictory cases to support his hypothesis. He also frequently makes assertions without supporting them. He claims, for example, that while striking first rarely confers a battlefield advantage, leaders often operate under the illusion that it does. (p. 71). He offers no basis for this conclusion. Instead, he merely lists cases that be believes support his contention. Moreover, the cases he examines in depth - World War I, China's entry into the Korean War, and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War - are at best ambiguous on this issue. He heart of the book examines the hypothesis that war is more likely when conquest is easy - in other words, when the offense is at a marked advantage. Van Evera argues that his formulation of offense-defense theory offers the master key that unlocks the causes of war. It is, however, little more than a re-tread of theories that grew out of nuclear deterrence theory and the study of the origins of World War I during the Cold War. There is scant evidence that statesmen actually decide to start wars because of a perceived offensive advantage. There is one potential exception, World War I, and Van Evera milks it for all that it is worth. There is, however, something methodologically suspect about using a case to prove a theory that grew out of a study of that very case. Thucydides believed that states go to war due to fear, honor, and self-interest. Van Evera apparently dismisses the third explanation, because nowhere does it appear in his hypotheses. Implicit in his book's overall argument is the assumption that states can never use war as a rational instrument to achieve political objectives. In fact, however, throughout history statesmen have found war preferable to other outcomes, and not merely due to misperception. The book's final chapter, which discusses nuclear strategy, is its weakest. Indeed, it seems out of place. It is a polemic against ballistic missile defense distinguished by assertion rather than argumentation. Whatever one's view of national missile defense, there are thoughtful arguments on both sides of the issue. These are, however, entirely absent from this book. Instead, what appears is a regurgitation of Cold War arguments about nuclear deterrence, ones that are by now worn and frayed.

Rating:
Summary: by George Shollenberger
Review: This book on the science of man's history (on the cause of war) is typical of all past books that deal with the science of human life. So, my one-star evaluation reflects the production of all past books on human science. The behavior of humans cannot reveal the root cause of war. To find the root cause of war, scientist must look for the root cause of all human behaviors, including the behavior of war. This is no different than seeking for the cause of everything and finding that God is the root cause. But, God is not the cause of war. Humans are free and are the cause of crime. Only by inderstanding how the mind works can any human scientist find the causes of human activities including the activity of war. Look at God, not at Chomsky and Skinner, for the answers and you will find the real cause of war.