American Empire : The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy

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Summary: An Excellent Analysis of American Foreign Policy
Review: In American Empire, Andrew Bacevich provides a fine and historically cogent analysis of American foreign policy. Bacevich writes with clarity, skill, and historical understanding as he argues that a new Pax American - an American Empire - is at hand. While the definition of empire and whether United States is in fact an imperial power is debatable, the real value of Bacevich's analysis is its identification of continuity in American foreign policy and grand strategy throughout the Twentieth-Century. American Empire does this by identifying U.S. attempts to promote and preserve "openness" around the world. While this sometimes leads Bacevich to overemphasize continuity (such as ignoring George W. Bush's willingness to ignore and alienate allies not just through policy but through diplomatic tone), it nevertheless reveals a coherent grand strategy organizing U.S. foreign policy. Bacevich is also sometimes too inclined to describe "globalization" as tantamount to "Americanization," but these minor flaws do not mar his overall analysis, which is excellent. Some have argued that this book is anti-American, but any serious reader will find that it is hardly that. It is, however, a subtle yet hard nosed analysis of the underlying assumptions and strategy of American foreign policy.

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Summary: Open doors and the militarization of American foreign policy
Review: To many cynics, a book like the "American Empire" might seem like an exercise in futility. Who could have trouble believing, after all, that America's primary strategic objective is to create a global marketplace without barriers to the movement of goods, capital, ideas and people? But what starts as an exposition of this argument soon branches into various themes of diverse interest yet equal importance.

Andrew Bacevich, a professor at Boston University, takes on conventional wisdom. For those who are baffled by the complexity of the post Cold War world and are dismayed by America's lack of a coherent strategy, Mr. Bacevich is reassuring: America's objective, now and in the past, has been to promote global openness; "this books finds continuity where others see discontinuity," he writes, parting ways with those who believe that globalization fundamentally reshaped American foreign policy priorities.

While this theme is ever-present, Mr. Bacevich covers a lot more ground. Perhaps his most telling contribution is the resurrection of Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams as trenchant observers of American foreign policy. Both Beard and Williams offer their own hypotheses about why America is driven to this ever increasing need for markets abroad. And, after this voyage into intellectual history comes Mr. Bacevich's own argument about why America is compelled to this strategy of openness.

All three reach the same conclusion: America's imperial quest is meant to overcome problems at home. Although Beard and Williams are polemic in their view that America's foreign adventures prologue the inevitable reckoning with domestic troubles, Mr. Bacevich adopts a more dispassionate view and offers merely a possible explanation: With America's national cohesiveness eroding, Mr. Bacevich writes, "an ever-expanding pie satisfying ever more expansive appetites was the only 'crusade' likely to command widespread and durable popular enthusiasm."

With this in place, Mr. Bacevich moves on to a different point: American military assets, he contends, are increasingly used to promote global openness. This heightened willingness to use coercion has elevated the role of the military in American politics, perhaps even more so than ever before. And, this increased militarization of American politics is playing a central, if underappreciated, role in formulating as well as executing foreign policy.

For sure, all this is food for thought. Surprisingly enough, Mr. Bacevich has refrained as much as possible from judgments; in fact, writing a book on such a topic whilst remaining neutral is a feat in itself. All the same, Mr. Bacevich's military mind is evident throughout. A book whose aim is to show that America's chief purpose is promoting globalization would have done well to pay heed to dollar diplomacy as much as it has to gunboat diplomacy. Yet this minor objection could not abate the appeal of an otherwise outstanding book.

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Summary: Seems over long at <300 pages.
Review: Writing in the Summer 2002 issue of Parameters Andrew J. Bacevich observed in a book review "This is a book on considerable wisdom, larded with considerable nonsense. " The same criticism could be lodged against American Empire.
This book is part of a group of volumes in recent years, like Chalmers Johnson's Blowback and Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order which suggest that we should reevaluate the history of American foreign policy, pushing aside idealistic self-delusion and recognizing that a continuing driving need to open new markets abroad and forcing the international community to conform to policies of economic liberalism which make the world safe for American business interests. What differentiates this crop of criticism from that which came before is that is comes not from the traditional academic left, but from former cold-warriors and thinkers more closely associated with the political right.
Bacevich starts by reviewing the careers and theories of two diplomatic historians, Charles Beard and William Appleman Williams. Both theorists viewed U.S. foreign policy through an economic lens, tracing the source of American actions abroad to conditions at home. The both are in line with Bacevich in attacking the view of the United States as a "reluctant superpower." On Page 24 he quotes Beard "Empires are not built in fits of absent mindedness." The author acknowledge that both these individuals were largely discredited late in their carreers for failing to see the hostile ideology of the day as any kind of threat. Beard dismissed the rise of European Fascism, while Williams similarly ignored international communism. This is ironic for while Bacevich, with the advantage of hindsight, acknowledges Nazi and Stalinist/Maoist regimes as legitimate threat worthy of U.S. military intervention, he seems dismissive of the rising threat of violent religious fundamentalism.
After this section comes the highpoint of the book, an intriguing if slanted history of U.S. foreign policy of the post Cold War era. Working primarily from news reports, speeches and public documents, the author compiles an intriguing analysis of the events of the two Bush and Clinton administrations. While focusing on the last 14 years, he also tries to connect the actions to long-term trends in U.S. diplomacy dating back to at least the Spanish American War. Unfortunately this ambitious work of historical analysis is underplayed in favor of a survey of more recent events.
The usefulness of this portion as a reference is compromised by the fact that the events described are not ranged chronologically, but rather the author seems to be trying to group the material by theme in chapters titled "Globization and its Conceits" and "Policy by Default" among others. These themes are so repetitive however that that it is hard to pick out just what point a particular incident is supposed to evidence.
After this comes a series of out of place digressions on a variety of topics. Other readers have noted that the book at time reads more like a selection of separate essays tenuously connect rather than a unitary, flowing argument.
The chapter "Gunboats and Gurkas" discussing the reluctance of the U.S. to commit forces and its tendency to fight conflict either by proxy or through high-technology. This is followed directly by "Rise of the Proconsuls" which suggest that we as citizens should be wary of the foreign policy power invested in American military elites. "Proconsuls" is interesting in that a large portion of the chapter is devoted to GEN Wesley Clark's behavior in the NATO-Serbian war, with the material derived predominantly from Clark's own book. Despite the source, the text does not display the General in a positive light.
With the bulk of it appearing to have been written prior to the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the observations in this book about the Bush administration's foreign policy in regards to the Mid-east have not aged well. The Author makes reference to the war in Afghanistan; however he seems to feel that the events of that conflict did not signal a fundamental change in US foreign policy practice, or the alleged reluctance of America to commitment ground forces. The current occupation of Iraq makes some of his statement almost comical. For example: He suggests you can rate the administration commitment to the current conflict by the number of reserve component soldiers called up, stating "The president ordered modest numbers of national guardsmen to active duty-far less than in 1990-but most citizen-soldiers called to the colors were assigned duties no more hazardous than providing backup security inside airport terminals." With tens of thousands of Nation Guardsmen currently deployed around the world and 88 dead in Operation Iraqi Freedom alone, this line seems both flippant and naive. "(The Bush Team) made no preparations to take the fight to the Taliban...U.S. forces in (as opposed to above) Afghanistan was confined to a single raid by about a hundred Army Rangers, as inconsequential as it was brief." In light of subsequent events, one can only conclude that Dr. Bacevich severely misread the intentions of the Bush administration.
Interestingly, the sentence above is included verbatim in a National Review article Mr. Bacevich wrote nearly a year earlier. That piece made most of the same points as the "War for Imperium" chapter, in about the same number of pages. This would seem to lend credence to the theory that this piece was assembled out of previously existing essays or at least that he was mining the his existing works for material to flesh out the book.
Despite the merits of offering a diplomatic history of the post cold war era, American Empire as a whole is a largely unsatisfying work. The author's core thesis, while not irrefutable, is one worthy of further research and discussion, Overall, Bacevich offers a good attempt at contemporary diplomatic history and analysis and then sabotages it with a dearth of unnecessary and off topic material.