China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (The New Cold War History)

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Summary: Cooperation & Containment in Sino-Vietnamese Relations
Review: In the introduction to this scholarly and impassive, but very interesting, study of China's relations with Vietnam during the height of the Cold War, Author Qiang Zhai, professor of history at Auburn University Montgomery in Alabama, explains his rationale for writing this book: "The rise and fall of the Sino-Vietnamese alliance is one of the most crucial developments in the history of the Cold War in Asia in general and Chinese foreign relations in particular." According to Zhai, he drew on "fresh Chinese documents to present a full-length treatment of the evolution of the Sino-DRV relationship between the two Indochina wars, focusing on its strategic, political, and military aspects." During the course of his research, Zhai found "a complex blend of motives behind Beijing's Indochina policy," and one of his main premises is that the "Beijing-Hanoi relationship was composed of both agreements and contradictions, cooperation and confrontation."

China and Vietnam had a complicated relationship long before the Indochina wars of the mid-20th century. According to Zhai, the Vietnamese "had a tradition of looking to China for models and inspirations," but there also were "historical animosities between the two countries as a result of China's interventions in Vietnam." Zhai writes that Mao Zedong was "eager to aid Ho Chi Minh in 1950" because Mao believed "Indochina constituted one of the three fronts (the others being Korea and Taiwan) that Mao perceived as vulnerable to an invasion by imperialist countries headed by the United States." When the Viet Minh army headed toward the decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, they were accompanied by a Chinese "general military adviser," and China furnished the PAVN with antiaircraft guns, as well as engineering experts and large quantities of ammunition. The Viet Minh won the battle but were bitterly disappointed by the peace which followed. According to Zhai, China's approach to the Geneva conference was motivated by fear of the United States' designs in Indochina: "To prevent American intervention, [Zhou Enlai] was ready to compromise of the Laotian and Cambodian issue," and he formally proposed "withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops from Laos and Cambodia." Zhai writes: "For the Vietnamese Communists, the Geneva Conference served as a lesson about the nature and limits of Communist internationalism," and both Beijing and Moscow pressured the Viet Minh "to abandon its efforts to unify the whole of Vietnam."

Zhai makes the controversial assertion that, in 1961, President Kennedy "set out to increase U.S. commitment to the Saigon regime." In response, according to Zhai, Mao Zedong "expressed a general support for the armed struggle of the South Vietnamese people," but China's leaders "were uneasy about their Vietnamese comrades' tendency to conduct large-unit operations in the south." Zhai writes: "The period between 1961 and 1964 was a crucial one in the evolution of Sino-DRV relations....Its urgent need to resist American pressure increased its reliance on China's material assistance." According to Zhai: "The newly available Chinese documents clearly indicate that Beijing provided extensive support (short of volunteer pilots) to Hanoi during the Vietnam War and in doing so risked war with the United States." In Zhai's view, although Chinese leaders were "determined to avoid war with the United States," Beijing warned that "if the United States bombs China[,] that would mean war and there would be no limits to the war." According to Zhai: "Between 1965 and 1968, Beijing strongly opposed peace talks between Hanoi and Washington and rejected a number of international initiatives designed to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict." "Above all, Mao and his associates wanted the North Vietnamese to wage a protracted war to tie down the United States in Vietnam." When the Paris negotiations began in May 1968, Beijing was "unenthusiastic." In less than three years, the international situation changed. Zhai's lengthy discussion of the complicated internal and international events leading up to the crisis in Cambodia in 1970 is a case study in Machiavellian politics and diplomacy. By 1971, according to Zhai, Chinese leaders were "keen to see an early conclusion of the Vietnam War in order to preserve American power and contain Soviet influence." After President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972, according to Zhai, the North Vietnamese "drew a bitter lesson from Nixon's handshake with Mao that China's foreign policy was concerned less with Communist unity than with the pursuit of China's national interest." In Zhai';s view: "Nixon's decision to normalize relations with Beijing nullified the hitherto basic rationale of the Vietnam War, namely to contain and isolate Communist China." According to Zhai: "Mao and Zhou Enlai viewed with satisfaction the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreement." In September 1975, just a few months after Saigon fell and Vietnam was unified, Zhai writes that Mao told a Vietnamese visitor, in effect, "Hanoi should stop looking to China for assistance." "The long historical conflict between China and Vietnam...had returned to life."

In conclusion, Zhai asserts that "[t]here were two strands in China's policy toward Vietnam during the two Indochina wars: cooperation and containment;" "From the 1950s to 1968, the cooperation side of China's policy was predominant; and "From the late 1960s, particularly between 1972 and 1975, the containment side of China's policy became more prominent." In my opinion, the most important aspects of this book is its demonstration that international Communism was not monolithic in the 1960s and 1970s. Zhai makes clear that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China encouraged and aided Vietnam's struggle for independence from France and its war for national unification against the United States, but the Communist powers were motivated more by national interests than by revolutionary solidarity. The history of Chinese-Vietnamese relations between 1950 and 1975 must be viewed within the broader contexts of growing Sino-Soviet competition for primacy in the international Communist movement and of China's eventual, if only limited, rapprochement with the United States. Zhai's book is, therefore, an important contribution to the literature about the most controversial foreign war in American history.

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Summary: good summary but...
Review: Mr. Zhai's contribution to Cold War history is a worthy addition to any CW buff's collection, since China's role in the conflict has always been a mix of "Yellow Peril" paranoia, rumor and biased commentary. It is a sound summary of the initially cozy, then increasingly frosty relations between the two communist Asian nations. However, being familiar with many of the observations made in this book from other sources, I was hoping for a more cogent analysis of the synergy between the radicalization of Mao's vision of perpetual revolution and the Indochinese wars. For example, did the Cultural Revolution hinder or help the Vietnamese, and what were their perceptions? Did China encourage Pol Pot's intransigence vis-a-vis Hanoi because of ideological affinity or just plain spite? How did the Ussuri River clashes affect the Soviet supply link to Hanoi? This is a good volume for factual summary of the events, but a more profound reading of the new archival sources needs to follow.