Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Focus Series)

Rating:
Summary: An Excellent Survey of the Subject
Review: Armstrong's book is what it promises: an opinionated introduction to the problem of universals, which in the most general terms is the problem of how to understand philosophically the phenomenon of similarity or resemblance between different things. Resemblance between things is the basis of classification and generalization, and it is presumably by noticing similarities among numerically distinct things that we form many abstract concepts and general terms. A realist about universals holds that similar things get to be similar by having some entity in common--repeatable features that are present identically in all of them, either as a constituent of the particular or as "instantiated" or "exemplified" by it in some mysterious way, without being in it. These repeatable features he calls "universals"--general things, as it were, to correspond to general terms, as names of particulars correspond to them. A nominalist denies that there are universals, and seeks to account for similarity without positing them. Armstrong spends most of the book comparing the relative merits of five different metaphysical accounts of similarity: natural class nominalism, resemblance nominalism, a realist "bundle theory" of particulars, a realist substance-attribute theory (his own favorite), and finally theories of tropes (that is, particular or non-repeatable properties and relations). Natural class nominalists take the notion of a "natural class", that is, a set of noticeably similar things, as primitive or undefined, and seek to account for similarity in terms of membership in a natural class. Resemblance nominalists take similarity among particulars as primitive instead, and seek to account for similarity among a class of things by way of resemblance to paradigm cases of such things. Both approaches suffer from serious defects, as Armstrong points out, not the least of which is that these are very awkward primitives to have. Next comes the extreme realist, who thinks universals are all there are, and that particulars are nothing but bundles of universals. This theory also has its share of difficulties, not the least of which is that it seems to be unable to explain what the bundling relation is. Next there is the substance-attribute realist, in which camp Armstrong belongs. Such a realist faces the problem of analyzing similarity in terms of identity of universals. Among particulars this is straightforward; the more universals they have in common, the more similar they are. But what about the universals themselves? Isn't the color red, say, more like orange than it is like green? Armstrong says he is working on this problem, but gives little indication how to solve it. Finally, there is the doctrine of tropes, that is, particular properties and relations which are in themselves simple, the doctrine I favor. The trope nominalist can readily substitute for universals equivalence classes of exactly resembling tropes. (No problems analyzing resemblance; unlike the realist, I don't think there is any hope of doing that, and trope nominalism doesn't attempt it.) These will do all the work without having the bizarre problems that beset universals, problem which Armstrong mentions but to which he does not, in my view, give fully satisfying solutions. But whether you agree or disagree, the book is well worth the time of any student of metaphysics.

Rating:
Summary: A lucid introduction to a neglected subject.
Review: D.M. Armstrong has written a charmingly opinionated introduction to a topic that is very much alive despite its seeming neglect: the problem of universals. ("Universals" are repeatable features of reality. The "problem" is: are there any? And if not, why do we seem to think there are?)

Armstrong has devoted a good deal of attention to this topic already (see his earlier work), but in this slim volume he makes some important additions and corrections to his previous views. It is a tribute to his clarity and organizational skills that he manages to do so _while_ he is providing a highly readable introduction to this subject.

For it _is_ highly readable; Armstrong has a gift for clear exposition, and his presentations of all the relevant positions are accurate and eminently fair. The reader may not agree with all of Armstrong's "opinionated" conclusions (I don't), but I don't know of a better introduction to the issues Armstrong is drawing those conclusions _about_.

Another nice volume to place alongside this one is the collection _Properties_, edited by D.H. Mellor (and also available through Amazon). The two together are the equivalent of a thorough undergraduate- or beginning-graduate-level course in the theory of universals.

For a more general introduction, try Michael Loux's _Metaphysics_. And, for a much-neglected attempted solution to the problem of universals, see Brand Blanshard's _Reason And Analysis_.

Rating:
Summary: A lucid introduction to a neglected subject.
Review: D.M. Armstrong has written a charmingly opinionated introduction to a topic that is very much alive despite its seeming neglect: the problem of universals. ("Universals" are repeatable features of reality. The "problem" is: are there any? And if not, why do we seem to think there are?)

Armstrong has devoted a good deal of attention to this topic already (see his earlier work), but in this slim volume he makes some important additions and corrections to his previous views. It is a tribute to his clarity and organizational skills that he manages to do so _while_ he is providing a highly readable introduction to this subject.

For it _is_ highly readable; Armstrong has a gift for clear exposition, and his presentations of all the relevant positions are accurate and eminently fair. The reader may not agree with all of Armstrong's "opinionated" conclusions (I don't), but I don't know of a better introduction to the issues Armstrong is drawing those conclusions _about_.

Another nice volume to place alongside this one is the collection _Properties_, edited by D.H. Mellor (and also available through Amazon). The two together are the equivalent of a thorough undergraduate- or beginning-graduate-level course in the theory of universals.

For a more general introduction, try Michael Loux's _Metaphysics_. And, for a much-neglected attempted solution to the problem of universals, see Brand Blanshard's _Reason And Analysis_.

Rating:
Summary: Readable Introduction
Review: If, like many people, your first introduction to philosophy came through the writings of Ayn Rand, you might have a significant amount of "unlearning" to do. Although Rand had some interesting things to say (generally limited to culture and politics), her writings in purely technical areas of philosophy are highly problematic and at times grossly ill informed. Her discussion of the "problem of universals" is paradigmatic.

The problem of universals is, contrary to Rand, a problem of metaphysics, not epistemology. Why's that? Because it concerns the nature of reality and whether or not there exists something beyond "particulars," something which "instantiates" these particulars. For example, there are many objects (particulars)that are red. But where (if anywhere) is "redness" (a universal)? That's a metaphysical, not an epistemological question. And, contrary to Rand, there are only two theories of universals: nominalism and realism. (Alternative theories, such as conceptualism, are versions of nominalism, generally speaking.) Rand's theory, it turns out, is best seen as a version of moderate nominalism.

I don't know of an introductory work on this subject that is suited for someone without much knowledge of philosophy. However, D.M. Armstrong's UNIVERSALS: AN OPINIONATED INTRODUCTION is a good place to start if you have some background in philosophy (or are willing to work a little harder than usual).

I've also purchased J.P. Moreland's UNIVERSALS which is even more advanced and takes issue with Armstrong on certain points.

Rating:
Summary: Readable Introduction
Review: If, like many people, your first introduction to philosophy came through the writings of Ayn Rand, you might have a significant amount of "unlearning" to do. Although Rand had some interesting things to say (generally limited to culture and politics), her writings in purely technical areas of philosophy are highly problematic and at times grossly ill informed. Her discussion of the "problem of universals" is paradigmatic.

The problem of universals is, contrary to Rand, a problem of metaphysics, not epistemology. Why's that? Because it concerns the nature of reality and whether or not there exists something beyond "particulars," something which "instantiates" these particulars. For example, there are many objects (particulars)that are red. But where (if anywhere) is "redness" (a universal)? That's a metaphysical, not an epistemological question. And, contrary to Rand, there are only two theories of universals: nominalism and realism. (Alternative theories, such as conceptualism, are versions of nominalism, generally speaking.) Rand's theory, it turns out, is best seen as a version of moderate nominalism.

I don't know of an introductory work on this subject that is suited for someone without much knowledge of philosophy. However, D.M. Armstrong's UNIVERSALS: AN OPINIONATED INTRODUCTION is a good place to start if you have some background in philosophy (or are willing to work a little harder than usual).

I've also purchased J.P. Moreland's UNIVERSALS which is even more advanced and takes issue with Armstrong on certain points.

Rating:
Summary: Solid Introduction
Review: Why are things the same? Known as the problem of universals, this question has ravaged philosophical battlefields for centuries. Realists assert two particulars share a single property when they agree in attribute, while nominalists advance a one-tier ontology of particulars alone. Armstrong began from an ontological perspective, showing that different tokens such as THE THE can be instances of the same type. Providing an account of types is hence the problem for the philosopher.

After laying the groundwork in an introductory chapter, Armstrong devoted two chapters to class nominalism and resemblance nominalism. A class nominalist explains type by claiming things fall under natural classes, while a resemblance nominalist claims we can account for types in the way things resemble each other. Armstrong was merciless in each assessment, deploying many arguments from the coextension problem to the failure of each to account for higher-order types.

In chapter four, Armstrong addressed bundle theories of universals. While some nominalists try to explain universals in terms of particulars, bundle theorists such as Russell and Blanshard tried to explain particulars as "bundles" of universals. Explaining compresence is always a problem for such a theory, and Armstrong followed this up with the bundle theory's fatal need for the Identity of Indiscernibles, a controversial idea not to be confused with Leibniz's Indiscernibility of Identicals.

Immanent and transcendent theories of universals as attributes are introduced in chapter five. These are known as layer cake theories, since we always have a particular-universal structure instead of a blob. A Platonic, or transcendent realist claims uninstantiated universals exist, while an Aristotelian, or immanent realist, denies this and sees universals as *ways* things are. Armstrong argued that conjunctive universals exist, while disjunctive and negative universals do not. After making a distinction between a priori and a posteriori realism, Armstrong introduced his ontology of states of affairs, otherwise known as facts. Armstrong then argued how realism escapes all of the objections previously levelled at nominalism.

In the penultimate chapter, Armstrong dealt with curious versions of nominalism known as trope theories. "Tropes" were first introduced by D.C. Williams, though they have been known as "abstract particulars," "concrete properties," "unit-properties," and "property-instances." Suppose the property 'mass' exists. If we say a specific proton has a mass, a trope nominalist says we mean *that* specific mass. This kind of nominalist argues the "property" isn't repeatable -- it is non-repeatable, and hence is particular-like. Trope theories come in bundle and attribute forms, each coming in class and resemblance variants. Armstrong argued all versions of the trope theory are superior to plain nominalism, and the resemblance layer-cake view is the best challenger to his immanent realism.

While I currently ally myself with realism, I found Armstrong's approach did not address the core motivation of nominalism. A nominalist such as Quine would not see predication as anything to be explained since he regarded it as a basic fact of the world. Nominalists will often tell us what makes a predicative sentence 'x is P' true is just that x is P. After all, the nominalist jests, what else would make statements like 'Socrates is wise' true? The sweet taste of blueberries? Given we forced to choose between two kinds of simplicity, the beginner, realist or nominalist, should investigate the problem of abstract reference. Philosophers such as Carnap and Sellars held metalinguistic nominalism, the most formidable kind, and no treatment at all is given in this book. I also believe Armstrong placed too much emphasis on states-of-affairs later in the book; if my belief that a defense of realism and the correspondence theory of truth does not require them is justified, Armstrong cannot use states-of-affairs to club his opponents.

This small book presents a focused array of arguments in a tight, succinct manner. The presentation is direct and to the point, and depth is not sacrificed. Though Armstrong's introduction summarized much of what he wrote in his _Universals and Scientific Realism_, it is valuable for the beginner and professional alike.