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Summary: The Unipolar Moment?
Review: This collection of essays seeks to explain why, despite its overwhelming power, the world has not balanced against the United States. Several well-noted authors give varying answers. The first essay, appropriately enough, is written by the founder of Structural Realism, Kenneth Waltz. Waltz answer is simply that the world will eventually balance against American power, and in fact has started to do so already. Waltz explains that in an anarchic system,"overwhelming power repels, and leads others to balance against it." Furthermore, Waltz sees Unipolarity as unstable, as the hegemon may be tempted to overexpand. Waltz concludes that the unipolar moment is exactly that, a brief time in history that will be over the blink of an eye. But Waltz made much the same case in 1993. The world has not yet balanced against the US, and history has yet to prove him right. Taking the opposite approach, William C. Wohlforth argues that the current unipolar system is actually very stable. This is so due to several factors. First, Wohlforth notes that balancing is very difficult to successfully execute. Also, unlike previous hegemons, America's power is so great that it crosses the threshold where balancing against it becomes impossible. Also unlike previous hegemons, the US is not located geographically nearby the other powers. Therefore, it does not directly threaten most states as much as their neighbors do. It is therefore better for states to rely on the US for protection from its own neighbors, than to balance against America. Wohlforth thus sees a continuation of the peaceful relations that have existed since the end of the Cold War. These two essays are most likely the ones that will receive the most attention since they predict future events based on structure. But somewhat dissapointingly, neither addresses the argument made by John Mearsheimer in his book that other states will not necessarily balance against the United States itself, but against the United States in their respective regions. Mearsheimer, unlike Wohlforth, does not see the system as global but regional. Therefore China will balance against US power in the Far East, not against global US power and interests. Mearsheimers's argument fall somewhere between Waltz and Wohlforth. Its a shame neither one addresses it. The other articles in this book are more policy-oriented. Charles Kupchan claims that it will be very hard to sustain domestic support in America for the resources necessary to maintain unipolarity. He also believes the EU to be much farther along the road to unity than most realize, and he sees a balance of power between the US and EU in the future. Stephen Walt, advancing his balance of threat hypothesis, urges American policymakers to act and speak in a restrained manner, which will convince the world that the US does not have aggressive designs. Josef Joffe praises the US policy of overlapping alliances as a copy of Bismark's hub and spoke system, which he believes will serve to create a peaceful world, due to America's overwhelming capabilities. There are also some non-realist authors who make the case for other variables. John Ikenberry advances the importance of international institutions in creating a peaceful world, arguing that the "Western order has a structure of institutions and open polities that bind states together, thereby mitigating the implications of power assymetries and reducing the possibilities of the United States to abandon or dominate other states." Ikenberry argues that insitutions have a life of their own and make it difficult for states to do other than what the institutions specify. Its not a new theory, and realist critiques will most likely be the same: Instiutions do what states want them to do, not vice-versa. Although there are no realist critiques of the Ikenberry piece in this volume, it is hard to imagine any realist worth his weight in salt arguing otherwise.
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