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Rating: 
Summary: A Great Tactical Primer on Mujahidin Operations
Review: Afghan Guerrilla Warfare is the counterpart to the earlier volume The Bear Went Over the Mountain that described Soviet tactics in Afghanistan. Lester Grau and Ali Ahmad traveled to Pakistan in the 1990s to interview about 40 Mujahidin (Holy Warrior) fighters about their perspectives on the war. This is a detailed tactical study intended for professional soldiers - not academics and not the general public, although some from each group may find this study interesting. The authors have amassed over one hundred interviews into a series of tactical vignettes that are organized by topics, such as ambushes, raids, urban combat and defending base camps. Most of the vignettes include a sketch map, along with references to the 1:100,000 map sheets consulted. The result is an impressive volume that acts essentially as the FM 100-5 Operations for Afghan insurgents. Although there is not a direct relationship between the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and the current Coalition experience in Iraq, there are enough tactical similarities to merit proper study of the lessons in these pages.
Afghan Guerrilla Warfare goes a long way towards dispelling many of the myths and misconceptions that have arisen about the Mujahidin, starting with the notion that they were tactical wizards of some sort. The authors detail the gamut of Mujahidin operations, and their execution ranges from professionally planned with successful outcomes to amateurish operations that end in catastrophe. Readers will be amazed to see how some Mujahidin groups used the same ambush spots over and over again, without the Soviets anticipating it or making any countermoves. On the other hand, it is interesting to read about the number of occasions where the mujahidin were caught by surprise or even asleep. It is also clear that the high degree of Soviet tactical incompetence enhanced the success of Mujahidin efforts, but on the rare occasions when the Soviets did their homework, the Muj suffered accordingly. The authors also make the point that the Mujahidin did not expect to win the war in the short term and consequently, their methods were geared toward protracted attrition warfare rather than achieving great operational objectives.
Many of the strengths of the Afghan Mujahidin - invisibility and mobility - are also strengths for the current insurgents in Iraq. The Afghan guerrillas excelled at hit-and-run raids in both mountainous and urban terrain, inflicting losses on Soviet convoys and then melting away before the Soviets replied with artillery and helicopter gunships (unlike the US, the Soviets replied mostly by fire, rather than maneuver). The guerrillas were also very good - or the Soviets were very bad - about cordon and search operations; these efforts usually ended up with the guerrillas slipping the noose. On the other hand, the Soviets were gradually able to impact Mujahidin logistics (by destroying villages and moving population), which forced the guerrillas to build large base camps in mountainous terrain. These "mountain fortresses," such as Tora Bora, were tough nuts to crack but the authors believe that they were something of a liability for the insurgents, tying down many troops in defensive roles and attractive Soviet firepower at a fixed target.
There are some useful lessons in these pages for US troops in Iraq and Afghanistan today. First, the guerrillas never developed an effective means of dealing with Soviet minefields around fortified bases - and it is likely that current guerrillas would be equally stymied by US antipersonnel mines and obstacles (although the US cannot politically afford to use mines indiscriminately as the Soviets did). Second, lack of a unified command structure made it difficult to crack the insurgency (i.e. leaders were replaceable) but it also made it nearly impossible for the insurgents to rise above the tactical level of warfare. Without a unified command, it is exceedingly difficult for guerrillas to fight warfare on the operational level - a necessary prerequisite for victory. Finally, the mujahidin in Afghanistan rarely used suicide tactics or targeted civilians - unlike the preference of Iraqi insurgents today. The Afghan insurgents enjoyed popular support in many areas because they were fighting a hated invader (who brought nothing but tyranny and devastation) and they focused their efforts on military targets. However, the current Iraqi insurgents display an insensitivity toward civilian casualties that undermines their ability to gather popular support, despite the presence of an invader. Ultimately, Grau's study sheds light on how one particular Muslim culture waged jihad against one particular foe, but the lessons are useful in a general sense for the types of conflict that the US is likely to see for years to come.
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Summary: Great Raw Material, Helpful Commentary, Missing Closure
Review:
It may not be obvious to the hurried shopper, so it is worth emphasizing up front that this book not only has the full support of the Foreign Military Studies Office of the U.S. Army, but is provided courtesy of the United States Marine Corps Studies and Analysis Division.
The selection of stories may have been done by the Soviets from whom the work is borrowed, but in any event is quite good--16 vignettes on ambushes, 10 on raids, 2 on shelling attacks, 6 on attacking strong points, 2 on mine warfare, 6 on blocking enemy lines of communication, 2 on siege warfare, 4 on defending against raids, 3 on fighting heliborne insertions, 5 on defending against cordon and search, 14 on defending base camps, 6 on counterambushes, 3 on fighting an encirclement, and 14 on urban combat. One wonders if those responsible for inserting our forces into Afghanistan in the failed effort to capture the Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership intact, ever read this book. It is quite good. Although it provides very professional U.S. commentary after each vignette, commenting on both Soviet and Mujahideen behavior in the combat situations, it fails on two counts: the index is terrible (mostly an index of names, rather than combat lessons), and the final chapter is a whimper rather than a sonic boom--this book should be re-issued immediately with a proper index and a concluding chapter that pulls together the concise troop leading "bullets" for each of the 14 combat situations depicted by the vignettes ennumerated above. One final note: the availability of this book via Amazon.com deserves special commendation. I have been trying for years to get the U.S. Army's Strategic Studies Institute to get all of its very superior and valuable publications made available via Amazon.com so that its taxpayer-funded knowledge would be more widely available, and have simply not been able to get them off the dime. As 9-11 demonstrates, knowledge that is not shared can ultimately exact a great price--what our war colleges produce, at taxpayer expense, needs to be given broader dissemination, and Amazon.com is "the" portal for monograph and book form knowledge.
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Summary: Useful in a practical sense
Review: Before deploying to Afghanistan last year with a Special Forces battalion, I read this book (along with "Afghanstan's Endless War" - Goodson, "The Hidden War" - Borovik, and "The Soviet-Afghan War" - Grau & Gress, eds.) to prepare for battle. While a rough read that could stand better organization, it had very accurate, pertinent information that was useful for a warrior. I personnal went to about ten of the battle locations (some of them were hard to avoid) and was able to follow the battle on the ground by the descriptions in the book. Additionally, on the road to Gardez, was able to discuss some of the battles with locals, who concurred with details. Valuable to me.
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Summary: Not original. Free on the internet. Not very useful.
Review: I had already downloaded "The Other Side of the Mountain" and read it. Nowhere on this site is it mentioned that this book is simply a reprinting of that "FREE" work. It was not even spell checked or edited. Do a search and download the original. If you THEN want a printed copy, order this one. The only thing new and improved is the very nice cover. The book is basically about 94 very short and dry retellings of small battles between the two adversaries. Not much is useful or educational. Not even entertaining. I was looking for education and enterntainment. There is another FREE companion piece called "The Bear Went Over The Mountain". Do a web search on each and download. -Copernic.com is the best web searcher I've found.
Rating:
Summary: Not original. Free on the internet. Not very useful.
Review: I had already downloaded "The Other Side of the Mountain" and read it. Nowhere on this site is it mentioned that this book is simply a reprinting of that "FREE" work. It was not even spell checked or edited. Do a search and download the original. If you THEN want a printed copy, order this one. The only thing new and improved is the very nice cover. The book is basically about 94 very short and dry retellings of small battles between the two adversaries. Not much is useful or educational. Not even entertaining. I was looking for education and enterntainment. There is another FREE companion piece called "The Bear Went Over The Mountain". Do a web search on each and download. -Copernic.com is the best web searcher I've found.
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Summary: Informative Guerrilla Tactics
Review: I have a certain curiousity for Military Science and this was a great book that related to Guerrilla Warfare. There are a total of 15 Chapters, 14 of them with many different real life vignettes (around 92). As well many interviews with real life mujahideen fighters who were there. Anybody who posesses a distinct interest in Military Science or Guerrilla Warfare will certainly enjoy this book!
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Summary: It'll improve your Multiplayer Quake Frags
Review: This book delivers exactly what the title indicates. US Officer Lester Grau interviews many Afghan Mujahideen who fought the Soviet Aggressors during the early 80's. Out of those interviews Grau wrote three books, This one being the second (with Ahmed Jalali.) The book is broken into chapters like Raids, Ambushes, Defense etc... Each chapter has many individual "stories" or debriefings of the mission/situation. The Muj go into detail on what happened, who got shot and who didn't. As you progress through the 200 odd missions, you start reading a definite character to the overall war... All in all, as a non-military person, I found the book fascinating, entertaining, and above all educational. The diagrams for each mission are very helpful allowing the reader to visualize what happens in each battle. Overall, If you are interested in Guerilla or Afghan warfare tactics, I would recommend this book.
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