War and the American Presidency

Rating:
Summary: A critical and timely assessment
Review:

If the American public is suffering from a lack of information about the history of the presidency and the balance of power, especially prior to a national election, I don't see how a discussion of specific historical incidents can do anything but add to the lively debate in assessing the Bush presidency and the preemptive doctrine that occasioned the invasion of Iraq.

In the current political climate, dissent is under fire, accused of increasing the danger for our troops in Iraq. Recent statements from Washington indicate that such dissent may border on the treasonous. Schlesinger's book is a timely response to such assertions, because the author sites specific incidents in American history, making a strong case for the necessity of open dialog in the service of the democratic process.

The current preemptive doctrine is worthy of careful consideration. Schlesinger posits that military might is no substitute for wisdom and can only accomplish limited goals. Peace through the prevention of war is replaced with peace via preventive war, an entirely different prospect, with its own inherent problems. Even Truman opined the foolhardiness of a concept that war can only be prevented by war, "You can't 'prevent' anything by war except peace."

Preventive war depends upon accurate intelligence; certainly, it is human nature to guess the future from the experiences of the past. But do we use the historic perspective to create insight or justification for our agenda? The future will not yield itself to the vision of one man or one nation; hence, extreme caution is imperative. We must constantly monitor the inherent dangers of power and the arrogance it breeds.

Nixon was the last president to exercise the concept of "imperial presidency", when the balance of power is upset by the executive branch, via foreign policy decisions, with a lack of congressional oversight and the aid of the attorney general. But Osama bin Laden reopened the doors of imperial presidency for our generation, John Ashcroft at the helm, promoting the Patriot Act I and II, which must allow open debate by the Congress before any restrictions are made on the freedoms we enjoy.

Certain question arise, in reading this book and considering the problems at hand; for example, if war does nurture the concept of the imperial presidency, and certainly the events of 9/11 have made the public more vulnerable and willing to take direction from our leaders, do a democratic people have a moral obligation to stop dissent during wartime? Is this the example shown by our forefathers? And, in a nation born of dissent, what is the nature of patriotism? Schlesinger answers all these questions in detail. The answers are surprisingly informative, certainly worth consideration.

Both popular and electoral votes were at issue in the last election and may be again, so the author includes the pros and cons of the arguments as the framers of the constitution grappled with the safest way to preserve the will of the people. There are also issues regarding the uninhibited pursuit of runaway capitalism and its inherent dangers, including the imminence of a complicated global economy.

Religious fanaticism breeds terrorism, yet people are drawn together in the comfort of spiritual identity, searching for meaning in their lives, so how do we achieve a balance that allows belief systems to coexist, without taking advantage of the obvious fear or one "God" trumping another? It is critical that we refuse to allow fanatics to usurp emotion-driven decisions that cause violence in the name of God.

These are difficult times with serious issues confronting the voters and debate is critical if we are to live within the intended framework of our democracy. "The great strength of democracy is its capacity for self-correction", whether in the global market, the pressures of race and assimilation or spiritual frustration caused by global anonymity. As citizens, we are intimately invested in a process that has so far been successful in safeguarding our values and democratic ideals, but we cannot avoid personal responsibility when electing those to best represent us.

In the final analysis, history documents the nature of dissent in this country and the fact that no president has been sacrosanct, whether the country is at war or not, is well established. Dissent is viable in a democracy, dialog the lifeblood of citizenship and critical to voters. Schlesinger's book suggests an appreciation of our rich history of dissent and the valuable lessons of experience, positive and negative. Stimulating curiosity in pursuit of lively discussion is never a waste of time. Luan Gaines/2004.


Rating:
Summary: A great Read
Review:
Finally we have a critical review of the Bush Presidency with out Prejudice. The book discusses opposing the President is not the same as opposing the country or the constitutions. It discusses how Attorney General is under mining the constitution. It gives a great analysis about the Bush Foreign Policy, the Bush Doctrine of prevention and how that is obsolete in the current age. It raises the question how to handle an imminent threat now that our credibility to the rest of the world is closed to zero.

Great Read


Rating:
Summary: interesting history, less interesting opinions
Review: "War And The American Presidency" To supporters of President Bush's foreign policy the current conflict is known as the liberation of Iraq. To those neutral (both of them) or those trying to use neutral language, it is the war in Iraq. On the first page of the foreword to "War and the American Presidency" Arthur Schlesinger Jr. calls the war "the Iraq adventure" and thereby eliminates any uncertainty about where he stands or what this book is really about. He does, however, give a good survey of presidential history which does much to defeat the very views he espouses. In my opinion, the failings of this book are those of Schlesinger's logic and his obvious bias, not his historical exposition. He begins by explaining the view that America must be the master of its own fate that is conventionally termed isolationism. He goes on to say that America has been unilateralist as well as isolationist in almost all of her political dealings throughout history and quotes C. Vann Woodward in attributing our faith in unilateralism to the "free security" we enjoyed through the worldwide policing of the British Navy throughout the 19th century. He fails to see the modern equivalent "free lunch" the UN and EU multi-lateralists receive from our military dominance and at our expense as discussed by Robert Kagan in his book "Of Paradise and Power". He tells of the covert actions of Presidents Madison and Monroe in the annexation of Florida including the destruction of documents to prevent their request by Congress as well as the illegal Mexican war of President Polk. He goes into detail of how after the attack on Ft. Sumter, Lincoln, on his own and without Congressional approval, assembled the militia, enlarged the Army and Navy , called out volunteers, spent unappropriated funds and suspended habeas corpus. He also tells how Franklin Roosevelt in 1941, without Congressional approval, dispatched troops to Iceland and issued "shoot on sight" orders to the Navy with regards to German submarines. Instead of using these precedents to justify presidential prerogative for the current war in Iraq that had Congressional approval, Schlesinger excuses Lincoln and Roosevelt for their misconduct seemingly simply because they knew it was wrong. He excoriates Bush for his unilateralism and unashamed behavior. That these actions are within his executive powers seem to be less an issue to Schlesinger, than the lack of a larger public debate before the "rush to war". Truman's Congressionally unapproved commitment of troops to Korea as well as Johnson's and Nixon's similar commitments in excess of their mandates are seemingly minor infringements relative to the imagined excesses of George W. Bush. Chief in Schlesinger's list of Bush's excesses is Bush's lack of humility in his inability to achieve a popular majority in the 2000 election. Although John Quincy Adams, who cut a deal with Henry Clay making him Secretary of State in exchange for his electoral votes, Rutherford Hayes, and Benjamin Harrison, were all elected by an electoral rather than a popular majority; Bush's victory is, to Schlesinger, more grating. Wilson's 1916 election was won by 4,000 votes in California on a promise of keeping us out of WWI and the Carter-Ford election of 1976 was decided by 8,000 votes in two states, somehow none of this matters. Schlesinger "suspects" that George Bush dreams of making his place in history by converting the Arab world to representative democracy." This is the sort of dream that would be worthy of a Wilson (elected by 45 % in 1912) but not according to Schlesinger of a George W. Bush. Finally Mr. Schlesinger engages in hyperbole and ad hominem attacks that are unworthy of one with his credentials. He criticizes the Pentagon's desire for a "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator" that was temporarily deferred by an amendment by Senators Kennedy and Feinstein, as " reopening the nuclear door in a context of preventative war (that) may have the gravest possible consequences for the human race". This is a little melodramatic. As we have just lived through years of "Mutually Assured Destruction" whose premise of deterrence is now no longer viable as our enemies doubt we would use a nuclear weapon, but they would and are currently at work building them. It would seem that a useable weapon capable of reaching hardened installations that we might use, if not a sure deterrent, would at least give pause to those to those who would construct such facilities. Not so to Mr. Schlesinger. Anyone, meaning us, would have to be a "looney" to suggest such a thing. Capitalism comes under fire with the revelation that " Even premier capitalists are appalled by what runaway capitalism has wrought". Wrought indeed. And who is this premier capitalist? George Soros the angel of Moveon.com., but there is no disclaimer of implied agenda here. Schlesinger also says "Support for international institutions is especially strong among opinion-makers and among thoughtful persons in both parties" creating an obvious syllogism for those who don't support international institutions with sufficient strength. In sum the wealth of history Schlesinger presented was interesting and worthwhile, the author's views disappointing and poorly supported.

Rating:
Summary: Good for history novices
Review: Admittedly, my education in the area of American history is somewhat lacking--so my review is going to be a bit less critical than the others, simply for lack of much to compare it to. However, I can say that Schlesinger's writing style is witty, academic yet unprententious, with an almost lyrical flow to it--it's not dry reading though the subject matter is.
If you don't know much about American history beyond the major events or what has occurred over the past 60 years, you will learn things about American politics that you won't hear discussed on any talk show, news program or in the editorial section of the newspaper. For example, Schlesinger points out that the "unilateralism" favored by the Bush administration is nothing new to American history--in fact, the more internationally involved stance maintained during the Cold War was an anomaly. This is a crucial point that is almost never brought up in debates about current events; most people argue that the administration's standpoint is an egregious break with "American" foreign policy.
As for the author's personal political viewpoint, I think Schlesinger is quite honest about where he stands (liberal), but I don't think this is a problem. He is frank with the reader about his own beliefs; I think it's better he do this than pretend to have none at all, which is virtually impossible for any historian to do (though, obviously, there are more or less blatant ways of doing so). All historical accounts or analyses are filtered through an author's individual lens. I don't think the book suffers at all because of this.
There were a few times that the focus of the book seemed to be a bit all over the place, but generally I feel I learned a lot by reading it. I would definitely recommend this to anyone who doesn't read a lot of history normally but who is curious nonetheless. Schlesinger is a great writer and is easy to get into--additionally, the text is quite short for a history book, so this also makes it ideal for a beginner.

Rating:
Summary: Cogent, but rambles at the end.
Review: Arthur Schlesinger's foray into Bush-bashing comes rather late, but is perhaps the most interesting example yet published. Schlesinger is probably best known for "A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House," and it is his reputation as a two-time Pulitzer Prize winner and august presidential historian that will attract readers otherwise repelled by the glut of partisan books, pro and con, about the George W. Bush administration. Rather than re-hash ground already well-trodden by other authors, in this collection of essays Schlesinger sticks with his forte and looks at the Bush Administration through the lens of the revived "Imperial Presidency" (a phrase Schlesinger himself coined). The result is a collection of Schlesinger's thoughts, part of which tell a very different story about the Bush Administration emerges from this shift of focus from character and policy to historical place and precedent. This different story is both a new and an old one.

It is an old story, in that "unilateralism" is as old as the Republic. The tradition of unilateralism in American foreign policy is often muddled through the use of the term "isolationism." Schlesinger reminds us that the point of America's original school of foreign policy was never to turn inward and isolate America from the world (as China did in the 15th Century), but to avoid foreign alliances and entanglements. The history of pre-Wilsonian America is not one of a country eschewing foreign affairs altogether, but one of a country avoiding foreign commitments. Even Bush's aggressive twist to unilateralism is not especially new, as the 1846 Mexican War should remind astute students of history. The shift towards internationalism is relatively new, beginning only with and sustained by the Cold War. Schlesinger sees this and places the modern Bush doctrine of unilateralism, and especially preventative war, into this perspective.

Schlesinger reminds us that Bush's enhanced political power is also nothing new. Schlesinger's phrase "the Imperial Presidency" was the title of his book about the Nixon Administration, and has since become a basic concept in American political science: when confronted by a foreign crisis, the Congress dumps enormous power into the hands of the Presidency. The modern twist on this came about through the sustained crisis of the Cold War; prior crises had been of a much shorter duration. This imperial accumulation of Presidential power during the Cold War continued until the abuses of the Nixon Administration caused a backlash and restored some sense of balance in the political system. The threat of global terrorism after 9/11 has brought about the resurgence of the Imperial Presidency.

Although it is a generally sober and often insightful work, the book does suffer from some editorial flaws. In the early chapters of the book, Schlesinger addresses just how important the character of the Attorney General can be during times of crisis in determining how civil liberties are handled. However, he later devotes a whole chapter later to "Patriotism and Dissent in Wartime." His discussion on Attorney Generals and their relative merits would have been much better if it had been consolidated there, in particular his frank disapproval of John Ashcroft.

It is in the last two chapters that the subject matter seriously diverges from the chosen topic. While they sometimes make for interesting reading, "How to Democratize American Democracy," "Has Democracy a Future?" and "The Inscrutability of History" do not really belong in a book entitled "War and the American Presidency." "How to Democratize American Democracy," a brief history of the flawed workings of the Electoral College and consideration of how to reform it, is the best. The other chapters are speculative in nature and are, in a sense, contradictory. One looks at the problems facing the future of democracy, the other points out the limits of using history to speculate on the future. One wonders why the author would place those two side-by-side, let alone in a historical examination of War the Presidency during wartime. These final chapters - especially the latter of the two - have the feel of being hastily tacked on.

While the book comes to a rambling conclusion, there is much merit to the particular approach taken by Schlesinger his criticism the Bush Administration. Unlike the books of Michael Moore, Al Franken or Paul Begala, Schlesinger's work is not a comedy. Nor is it mere angry partisan bile. It is a cogent historical analysis. While the book reads much like a man's musings on a small variety of topics, the musings and the man make them well worth reading.

Rating:
Summary: The "imperial presidency," revisited and in perspective
Review: Avoiding polemic, this simple (but hardly simplistic) and slim book examines the 2000 Bush election and administration through the lens of history.

The first three chapters discuss how Bush's foreign policy adventures are not wholly unprecedented: a unilateral fervor has always formed the core of American diplomacy. Schlesinger first provides a concise overview of how American policy has changed from nineteenth-century isolationism to Wilson's abortive multilateralism through Roosevelt and Truman's success in preparing Americans for a larger world role. He confirms that the United States has always insisted on its right to "preemptive" war but insists that the new Bush Doctrine is more accurately called "preventive" war, which "refers to potential, future, therefore speculative threats." Schlesinger then revisits the thesis he introduced in "The Imperial Presidency," and finds that the most recent executive actions have taken on a new look; "the American Presidency has come to see itself in messianic terms as the appointed savior of a world whose unpredictable dangers call for rapid and incessant deployment of men, arms, and decisions behind a wall of secrecy."

In spite of the book's title, its second half is concerned with matters other than war and broader than the American presidency: the instability caused by the electoral college (he proposes a solution), the future of democracy itself (his verdict is optimistic), and the "use" of history in determining future events. On this last issue, he marshals an array of arguments against the self-defeating prophecies of Marxism and concludes, persuasively, that history is a "negative" model: "It instructs us not, like Marxism, in the things we must do, but in the things we must not do--unless we wish to repeat the mistakes of our ancestors."

Schlesinger's reinforces his political observations with historical anecdotes, trenchant quotes, and a solid grounding in American jurisprudence. A certain old-fashioned quality pervades his opinions, and usually this traditionalism is admirable. I take issue only with his predisposition against the "electronic town hall"; he claims in an aside that the "Internet has done little thus far to foster the reasoned exchanges that in Madison's words 'refine and enlarge the public views.'" One senses that Schlesinger is judging the Internet secondhand by its excesses (on both right and left) rather than by intimate knowledge of the online political community. If anything--regardless of the outcome of any single election and in spite of the blogs that promote rumor over reality--the Internet has, in a remarkably short time, increased citizen participation in and knowledge of politics. Indeed, it is the traditional news media, with its penchant for entertainment and oversimplification, that has failed us.

Yet this quibble is negligible, and this short little book does much to put our current crises in perspective, reminding us that history "supplies an antidote to every generation's illusion that its own problems are uniquely oppressive."

Rating:
Summary: Okay But Not Great -Neutral Rating
Review: My first impression of this book was that it was not much for $24. and that was surprisingly still my conclusion after reading the book. It is very slim and printed in large font, always a bad sign.

Some will notice that this Schlesinger book is sold by amazon.com in a two book deal with Hersh's book Chain of Command. The latter is a wonderful 5 star expose of the management of the war on terror, and the present book is not in the same league as the Hersh book. This latter book is a long and detailed book, well researched, well written, it contains many insights, and it is a book that everyone should read. If you have not yet read this Hersh book, just buy that book and skip this Schlesinger book.

In the first half of the book the author draws on his knowledge of US history in an attempt to show the development of foreign policy since the birth of the nation starting with Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson, then to proceeding to Wilson, on to FDR, then Eisenhower, on to Vietnam and Johnson and of course to the current President Bush. That is an interesting section of the book, and perhaps the best part. Unless I misunderstood his arguments, he thinks that the executive branch has too much power especially in its ability to send troops overseas without Congressional approval, i.e.: declaration of war.

He reveals much of his thoughts when in a passage late in the book he poses the question - and I paraphrase him here: are historians of any use, do they serve a purpose? It is clear to him that we have not learned from our history and he claims (his words not mine) that "loonies" are now running US foreign policy, people that one would not have found in charge in the past administrations - but rather would be out on the fringes of power advocating radical militaristic solutions, not moderation and diplomacy as is closer to his norm for past governments. He thinks that this has happened largely in the past few years with Bush II. On some of this I disagree and think it is wishful thinking. The problem is far more pervasive going back many decades including actions legal or illegal in Cuba, Chile, Granada, Panama, El Salvatore, Columbia, Guatemala, Vietnam, the funding of surrogates such as Iraq, and on and on, etc just to name a few other military interventions. There seems to be one flaw in his arguments. Vietnam started under Kennedy when he was in government or at least to accelerate in scope gets little discussion in the book.

He thinks that the UN since it was largely created by the US should receive more serious attention from everyone including by those that created the institution, and be used as a serious vehicle for foreign policy.

As noted by some of the other reviewers, the last half of the book is a bit rambling and covers a variety of subjects seemingly without much direction.

The book is well written entertaining and merits 3 to 4 stars, and how can one put a price tag on well presented information especially such a famous historian as Arthur Schlesinger? But for myself I have a book budget and a finite library space and with so much book competition I cannot recommend this book as a buy in hardcover at $24. to another reader and fellow book buyer. There are too many other great books. Sorry but that is my opinion.


Rating:
Summary: Great Book by a Great Man
Review: Schlesinger's book is elegant, fluid, controlled, and yet impassioned. A must read by one of the few writers on politics whose extraordinary public service and writings all but obligates intelligent citizens to weigh his opinions carefully, regardless of whether we end up fully agreeing with him (and many times, I haven't).

The previous review - which cynically stretches and scrunches history to fit the procrustean bed of the reviewer's neoconservative ideology - has a rather odd perception of what Schlesinger is talking about. For example, what Chablis might have to do with the topic of Schlesinger's book truly escapes me, although it must be important because the right mentions the wine with tiresome regularity. Y'know, it's time to break open that bottle of Ripple '77 you've been hoarding for special occasions and think up some new cliches, folks!

Rating:
Summary: VERY MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT THIS ONE
Review: The title of this work is a bit misleading. The first three or so chapters stick pretty well to the subject, but then the author starts to indulge in a bit of rambling. I do feel you that when you read this work, you must remember at which end of the political spectrum Mr. Schlesinger is shooting from. While he brings forth many valid points, ones we should give more than passing thought to, we have to realize that many of his statements are colored by his liberal mind set. This is certainly okay, but we do have to keep it in mind. Many of the more current events the author addresses, we simply will not be able to evaluate for a number of years. Speculative history is just fine and dandy as long as you realize what it is your reading. All in all though, I admire Schlesinger's work and certainly recommend you read this one. As I said, it does give you some thoughts to ponder, agree or disagree.

Rating:
Summary: To much focus on the modern
Review: This book tries to understand the nature of War and the office of the president. But it is hideously guilty of tunnel vision. It seems to ignore a few essential points. First of all America has always been involved in war somewhere almost from the day of creation. Countless presidents sent American forces abroad, from Jeffersons war on the barbary pirates to Wilson's punitive expeditions against Pancho Villa Mexico. How does one square this with the assessment found here that Bush's use of force is new and dangerous and somehow unprecedented. Bush's war in Iraq is not unprecedented in terms of casualties. It is unprecedented in terms of manpower perhaps and cost. But America has invaded so many places so many times. Who remembers the 30 year occupation of Haiti? The thousands lost putting down Phillipino rebellion in 1900? The hundreds lost fighting Sandino in Nicaragua. And who remembers such interventions as LBJ's 1964 invasion of Dominican Republic. This book suffers from tunnel vision. It doesn't ever present he reader with a general list of the wars from 1789 to present that America embarked on. Rather it focuses on Mr. Bush. And while Mr. Bush is important, it seems to ignore the unilateral bombing campaigns enacted by Clinton against such disparate targets as Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Bosnia, not including the interventions in Haiti and Somalia.

If this were a better study it would conclude that if a year doesn't go by without an American invasion somewhere then that wasn't a typical year and that the War on terror has more in common with the War against Japan then it does wit the interventions in the first Gulf War.

Nevertheless this is a good book, by an eminent author and is a good contribution to the question of Bush, the War powers act and the American president as commander in chief.

Seth J. Frantzman