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Anarchy, State and Utopia

Anarchy, State and Utopia

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Rating: 5 stars
Summary: Libertarian, or Property-tarian?
Review: Robert Nozick argues from the (Kantian) principle that nothing and nobody can use an individual as a means rather than an end. We are inviolable in ourselves as individuals and as owners of our property (legitimately acquired in the form of land etc.; or understood as our bodies/minds). Any boundary crossing not expressly consented to, is a violation of these fundamental negative rights. Understood as such, any state that seeks to redistribute through taxation is performing an unconsented-to boundary crossing, and is therefore guilty of violation of these fundamental rights.

It's altogether a very impressive feat of logical, consistent argumentation from first principles. I find the book impeccable. I am not a libertarian after reading Nozick's book, but it has forced me to devote a lot of time and energy to working out why I'm not a libertarian. After all, who can disagree with the principle of 'don't do to others what you wouldn't want others to do to you'? The morality underlying Nozick's edifice is entirely acceptable, and yet as the argument progresses I found myself getting more and more uncomfortable. The problem has to do with which rights you might agree are fundamental and inviolable. Is the right to property, however acquired, fundamental to liberty? Nozick argues that it is. Without justice in property, there is no justice. Or Freedom. Or Liberty. Without the concept of private property, we are all potentially slaves to the State.

Concomitant with that proposition is an attitude which can be labelled 'individual atomism'. Nozick, in keeping with other libertarians like Von Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe believes that individuals are paramount, unique and indivisible. Nothing may impinge on them. They enter the world fully formed (philosophically speaking) and exist before, above and outside of society. Indeed, I suspect that for most libertarians, society is a rootless (pointless?) concept. This isn't necessarily a provable falsity. It is a view-point which however, is myopic. For by focussing so exclusively on one aspect of individuality, it ignores a host of other elements that contribute to individuality. Humans do not grow up alone. Our very being - in whatever category you choose to view it (philosophically, developmentally, ethically, biologically) - is formed in relation to, in opposition to, in agreement with others of our species (and, indeed, with other species). There is a totality which, through a 'perspective shift' suddenly leaps into sight. It is this - society? - which Nozick et. al. are uncomfortable with. To be fair to Nozick, he is perhaps an abstainer on the concept of society. In the 'Utopia' part of his book, he argues that as individuals we have the freedom to choose whichever society we might, assuming we can find enough other individuals who share our value preferences. And indeed, by going back to the first ethical principle of 'don't do to others what you don't want them to do to you' Nozick can claim that he's arguing from a principle which recognises other individuals as equal to - if completely separate - from ourselves.

If there is a flaw in the libertarian and/or Nightwatchman State position, we must seek it in the so-called inviolability of private property rights. Nozick is very fuzzy here, and such fuzziness is telling. He disagrees with the Lockian formula for justice in acquisition and replaces it with a notion that there is justice in acquisition if by such acquisition we don't leave others any worse off. If we do, then compensation (however determined) is due. That's a very 'nice' principle, but it seems to me to be a fairytale. A libertarian political philosophy has to, at some stage, come to grips with the notion of origins, and it is here that Nozick fails. Can there ever be justice in acquisition of private property? How much property is needed? Can somebody allowably grab more than others? If so, then they will have more 'freedom' than the rest, and more liberty. A secondary consideration has to do with demographics. Libertarianism seems to me to be a view-point ideally suited to frontier communities. Where are we to find such communities these days? And how could you possible recreate them?

A final word on the usual association of libertarianism and free-market economics. Clearly Nozick thinks that only the unfettered operations of a free-market can sort out the competing claims of individuals in a State Of Nature; and that through such operations a minimal or Nightwatchman State can arise. He is, to be fair, agnostic on the rights of individuals to choose other forms of economic arrangements in his Utopia. But I suspect that he'll have his bets firmly behind the capitalists who will out-compete all other social systems...

Rating: 2 stars
Summary: A poor case for libertarianism
Review: Rozick's is a weak case for libertarianism.He does not even consider issues of public goods, monopoly economic power, positive and negative externalities of political and economic decisions which can not be properly governed by a minimal state.
His attack on other systems of justice is inadequate. For example, he criticises Rawls on trivial grounds quoting examples which Rawls doe not even claim good fo proper application of his theory.
Seen against the comprehensive works of Rawls, this book is rather sketchy and does not develop anything which could be called a theory. His main arguments of justice in acquisition and justice in transfer are simply assumed and not defended.

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: Locke's Apostle
Review: The essence of Nozick's theory is that the justification for property historical, namely, whether it is acquired or transfered in accordance with moral princples, not an end-state theory of how it ought to be distributed. He makes a number of compelling arguments. However, he never describes the moral princples or principles of justice that apply in any detail. And, as is often the case, the devil is in the details. Morality does not give one any absolute rights over property, for to do so would be to say we can harm others with our property. A much better approach, one that is sympathetic to Nozick but more realistic and well thought out, is to be found in M. Berumen's Do No Evil, Ethics, Economic Theory and Business. Berumen shows why private property is the default postion of morality, but he also shows why that does not mean ownership rights are unlimited or inviolate. He also shows the folly of socialism from a moral perspective. He finds the proper balance between libertarian conceptions and those who view the state as an instrument of justice.

Rating: 5 stars
Summary: A theoretical justification of libertarianism
Review: This and Rawls' _A Theory of Justice_ are arguably the two most important works of political philosophy of the last half century. Nozick harkens to a hypothetical pre-civilization 'state of nature' (as have several other imporant philosophers over the centuries) to provide a foundation from which to argue that a libertarian 'minimal state' is the limit of the rightful powers of a government.

You needn't agree with Nozick's conclusions to find this an utterly worthwhile read. In fact, puncturing holes in the arguments of political philosophers is an interesting hobby in itself, and Nozick presents some tempting targets for someone so inclined.

Rating: 5 stars
Summary: It has done its job...brilliantly
Review: This book is one of the most unusual in the history of political philosophy, and perhaps one of most brilliant. The author's ideas are thought-provoking and highly original, and he asks the reader to consider arguments, rather than engaging in a "diatribe to convince" (my words here). The author creates a reading atmosphere of intellectual honesty, and this helps to soften the possible uneasiness that some readers might feel in encountering these kinds of arguments for the first time. Some may seem radical and unpalatable for readers of other political persuasions, but any reader who is open to new ideas should find the reading highly interesting. The political philosophy of libertarianism finds its best apology here, but the contents of the book, and the method of presentation will and has found application to other political philosophies, and to legal philosophy.

In the first chapter, the author asks the reader to consider what he calls the "state-of-nature theory". This (Lockean) notion, although archaic in the author's view, allows one to answer whether a state would have to be invented if it did not exist, this being a classical question in liberal political philosophy. The chapter is a detailed justification for pursuing the state-of-nature theory. He holds to the premise that one can only understand the political realm by explaining it in terms of the nonpolitical. He thus begins with the Lockean state of nature concept and uses it to build a justification for the state in the rest of the book.

Most of the discussion in part 1 of the book revolves around the "dominant protective association" in a given geographical area. The author then builds on this in an attempt to justify from a moral perspective "the minimal state". Along the way, one reads about the "ultraminimal state", which has a monopoly over the use of force except that necessary for immediate self-defense, but will not provide protection to those who do not purchase it. The author discusses the tension that arises between the ultraminimal state and those who decide not to participate in it. The game-theoretic, optimization-theoretic approach that the author takes, although not advanced and rigorous from a mathematical standpoint, is very straightforward to follow for those not familiar with the more analytical and formal aspects of many modern treatments of political science.

In part 2 the author attempts to deal with alternatives to the minimal state, such as those proposed by the political philosopher John Rawls, and incorporating the doctrine of "distributive justice". The entitlement-welfare state dialog has not abated in modern political debate, and those who desire an in-depth analysis of these debates will find it in this book. And again, game-theoretic analysis comes into play, although not from a rigorous mathematical standpoint. One of the more interesting discussions in this part concerns the right of individuals to leave a state that they find too compulsory. If a compulsory distribution scheme is the most important, why would a state permit this emigration? Would such an overidding principle of compulsory distribution also permit forced immigration? These are the kinds of questions that the author addresses in the book, and some are left solely for consideration by the reader.

Reader who desire a list of platitudes and endless arguments supporting libertarianism will not find them in this book. Readers though who are not concerned with their political and cognitive equilibrium disturbed will enjoy immensely this book. If it can assist in more careful individual consideration of accepted political doctrine and moral cliches, it has done its job.

...and indeed it has.

Rating: 3 stars
Summary: Interesting But Limited
Review: This book is regarded often as the definitive defense of libertarianism. If so, then libertarianism is in trouble as this work is quite interesting but hardly provides knockout arguments in favor of libertarianism. Nozick's point of departure is a Lockean state of nature and he assumes a Lockean view of rights with accords a good deal of weight to property rights. The book is divided into 3 sections; Anarchy, State, and Utopia. In Anarchy, Nozick attacks anarchist thought and demonstrates that some form of state is necessary to safeguard rights. In the State section, he extends his argument to argue that only a minimal state is justified; a more expansive state encroaches on essential liberties. The utopia section is quite interesting and makes the fundamental point that utopia would have to be a plurality of utopias to accomodate the plurality of human conceptions of ultimate good. As is often the case, the critical aspects of this book are better than its constructive elements. Nozick provides an excellent critique of anarchism and provides some useful though not fatal criticism of individuals like John Rawls who espouse a more expansive view of the state. Many sections contain ingenious arguments though there are a fair number of diversions from the main issues.
Nozick's arguments, however, suffer from at least 2 fundamental flaws. His attempt to demonstrate that only a minimal state is justified is incomplete and ignores basic features of human nature.
1) Incompleteness - Nozick's vindication of the minimal state rests squarely on his assumption of a Lockean scheme of rights. He is clear that this is an assumption and makes no effort to defend his choice of this set of assumptions. By assuming a different conception of rights, we would arrive at a different view of the state. With more emphasis on social and/or economic equality, we would arrive at a more expansive state. In order to present a definitive argument for the libertarian state, Nozick would have to present a convincing jusification of his choice of fundamental rights. Since he does not, his argument is not convincing.
2) Ignorance of Human Nature - Nozick's scheme tolerates inequalities, indeed, the minimal state is likely to generate huge inequalities. This is not hypothetical but a matter of historic fact. The closest we have ever come to such a state was Gilded Age America with its enormous class and economic differences. The temptation for the powerful to exploit their advantages is irresistable. The inevitable result is both economic and political domination by the powerful with consequent erosion of the basic rights of the less powerful. The resulting abuses of power result in political and social institutions that attack the basic rights, including property rights, of the less privileged. Further, as Tacitus wrote, "it is human nature to despise those you have injured." One of the consequences of domination is the development of ideologies justifying domination. Looking again at American history for an example, we can see the development of a variety of proslavery doctrines arising in the antebellum South as illustrating this tendency. In a so-called minimal state dominated by the powerful, ideologies would arise that would attack and very likely ultimately vanquish the official doctrine of libertarianism. Nozick's scheme carries with it the seed of its own destruction. I worked out this critique for myself, only to discover subsequently that Nozick himself arrived at similar conclusions and no longer espouses libertarianism.

Rating: 5 stars
Summary: A Classic
Review: This is a dense, though engaging, philosophical defense of libertarianism. Nozick asks and seeks to answer some of the most fundamental questions posed by political science. The book is essentially divided into three main sections. Nozick first attempts to examine how a state comes to be formed in a state of nature and in the course of doing this, takes seriously the anarchist argument. Throughout this work, Nozick's skill of offering insightful thought exercises and brilliant counterexamples and analogies is unmatched. Having ruled out anarchy in the first section, Nozick next turns to the task of justifying the minimal state limited to the task of protecting against force, fraud, protecting property, and enforcing contracts. His analysis of the justification of property illustrates one of fundamental weaknesses to his approach. Against the philosophical argument made by the anarchist or socialist that the initial acquisition of property is coercive and thus unjustifiable, Nozick stumbles and then relies on Locke's theory of acquistion. Locke essentially maintained that someone rightly acquires property when they mix their labor with it. The attempt to base political philosophy on fundamentally unprovable moral principles (in any relevant epistemologic sense),is doomed for failure. Without making historical and economic arguments (which Nozick admittedly does to a limited degree) the argument is ultimately incomplete. Thus attempts by political philosophers to "prove objectively" that the minimal state is justifiable without making a utilitarian argument (which Nozick explicitly rejects) is bound not to convince all. Yet Nozick is quite persuasive is his critiques of John Rawls' theory of justice. His points out that Rawls' theory, like other theories of "social justice", is ahistorical. That is, it seeks to view the world and the justice in that world by looking at a slice of time (the present) without looking at or pretending that the past did not exist. This view, unlike the Marxian view or the entitlement view offered by Nozick himself, ignores the process of the resultant distribution of goods and services. One argument offered in the area of process by Rawls is the notion that economic liberty is unjustified in that the resultant distribution of goods and services is arbitrary from a moral point of view. To this, Nozick replies that though the distribution may be "arbitrary" it does not follow that government may coercively seize the fruits of anothers labor, which was honestly earned, and give it to another. A more compelling (and much simpler argument) is offered by Richard Epstein in Takings where he questions the entire premise of Rawls' thought experiment which seeks to discover what individuals in the "original position", ignorant as to their self-interest, would do in dividing up goods and services. Epstein makes the simple observation that rational individuals agree or contract only to those things that will clearly benefit themselves. Further, individuals only contract (by definition) when they know their own self interest (I don't contract to buy milk if I don't know if like milk or not). Thus Rawls' analysis of this contract that is made by people ignorant of their self-interest destroys the entire meaning of an agreement or contractual arrangement. Finally Nozick discusses the "framework for utopia" where individuals of disimliar interests could pursue different ends. I do suggest that anyone interested in political philosophy read this book but I don't think this is the best libertarian book one could read. Hayek's the Road to Serfdom or Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom come to mind. Be warned that this book is quite difficult at times and must be read carefully.

Rating: 5 stars
Summary: Important and must be read book on political philosophy
Review: This is one of the most important books on political philosophy in the latter half of this century. Robert Nozick has re-defined the debate over individual rights and the state. No matter what your political and philosophical position, you must read this book. You will either find ideas that you can use to define your own world-view or you will find the weapons that others will use against your own position.

Rating: 5 stars
Summary: Take it from someone who knows
Review: this is, of course, a great work. I have to agree with the writer who suggested that it should be read in tandem with Rawls’ work.

Although Nozick has in some ways amended his views since this publication (and moreover, stayed away from the subject) this work, imho, can stand alone. I think it’s important, especially in light of the atmosphere on college campuses today, for young minds to be subjected to the viewpoint that “rights matter” and that they should be taken seriously.

Rating: 4 stars
Summary: thought-provoking
Review: those of you who have not read the book: do. those of you who have, and have written reviews on it: think again. moral philosophy is not wothless, nor is it a waste of time! if it is not your genre,you should not read it in the first place. it is there to be appreciated and thought about; not casually criticised nor misunderstood.


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