Anarchy, State and Utopia

Rating:
Summary: If you have any interest in pol. philosophy, this is a MUST
Review: If you have any interest in political philosophy at all, if you are worried about the erosion of individual liberty (and its companion, individual responsibility) in modern society, or (even) if you are a collectivist and actually promote government involvement in our individual lives for the "greater good" at the expense of some or all, you MUST read this book. It is a somewhat difficult book to digest, so others (political moderates or those apathetic with regard to political philosophy) need not even crack the cover.

If you find that you agree with the arguments and conclusions of Robert Nozick, you will be enriched with ammunition for debating political philosophy. If you DON'T agree and you believe that your disagreement is based upon sound philosophy, you will still be greatly rewarded - if for no other reason than you were required to expend some great effort to refute the presented material as you read it.

The major principles presented and defended by Mr. Nozick are as follows:

1) Anarchy is not tenable. 2) A "minimal state" or "nightwatchman state" that only protects the rights of its constituents is justified/legitimate. 3) any state beyond that "minimal state" is unjustified/illegitimate because it will inherently violate the rights of (at least) some of its constituents.

Beyond these major principles, Mr. Nozick also revisits the concept of Utopia in the last section of the text. I found this last section very enjoyable. Mr. Nozick's presentation of the concept of "Meta-Utopia" opened up whole new avenues of political thought for me.

I agree with the major principles of this work as I have stated them above; however, I found that I did not agree with everything presented. I enjoyed the mental exercise required to think through many of the presented topics. I was very pleased to realize the existence of this book and to read it.

Not that it has any bearing on the significance of the presented material, I did find the book to be quite difficult to read. Similar to what many critics and reviewers of this book have stated before, I found the organization of the presented material lacking and the absence of concise summaries of major topics disappointing. I found myself wishing that this were not the case - so that I might glean more benefit from the reading of the book. Also, Mr. Nozick seems too quick to prolifically digress into tangent discussions. Although the topics of these tangent discussions are quite interesting, it is my opinion that, coupled with the organization problem already mentioned, the frequency and magnitude of these discussions detracts from the persuasiveness of the book.

Even with the shortcomings, I feel some great deal of enlightenment and joy after reading this book. Mr. Nozick obviously respects and attempts to understand opposing views to the degree that he is willing to examine them with great scrutiny and then, aptly, present his arguments against them. Since I read books like this one to help me seek answers to philosophical political and otherwise) questions, I found it refreshing that an author would approach (or at least, attempt to approach) such arguments so objectively.

As I said at the beginning of this review, anyone with an interest in political philosophy will find the reading of this book to be time and thought well spent.

Rating:
Summary: Gaping Holes and Shoddy Logic
Review: Most students of philosophy know that _Anarchy, State and Utopia_ has been a continual source of embarrassment for Robert Nozick since its publication. In multiple subsequent works, Nozick recants, repudiates, or otherwise distances himself from this strenuously argued turkey that Randian libertarians nevertheless cling to with appalling vigor. (Just look at the rest of the reviews.)

In particular, Nozick's flaws include the following:

1) A poor examination of protective agencies -- a concept borrowed from anarcho-capitalists of the 60s anyhow, Nozick never provides the critical connection between these agencies and a sorting criterion of fairness.

2) The basics of the right to private property are asserted, rather than explained. Nozick actually *deconstructs* the Lockean theory of acquisition with devastating effectiveness, but then waves away the problems he's created with little more than, "Some may think this important, but I think it won't be in any miminal state." Ooh, convincing.

3) Nozick doesn't seem to understand the concept of lexical priority. Nozick's concept of basic individual rights never outlines any hierarchy for when these rights come into conflict, despite the confusing chapter on the authorization of boundary-crossings. Ultimately, we are led to assume that the right to property (and specifically, the right to contract) is the foundation for all other rights -- but two enormous holes present themselves: (a) why? and (b) how is it that we can contract away our lesser rights, but not contract away the right to contract itself?

Ultimately, _Anarchy, State, and Utopia_ is revealed as a slipshod, poorly constructed, weakly argued propagandist piece. It is painful to read, excruciating to follow, and would be amusing, were it not so frightening. Pass.

Rating:
Summary: Brilliant, Powerful, Enlightened
Review: Nozick has recapitulated for the modern era the theory of classical liberalism that was originated by J. Locke. However, he goes one better by providing a secular, rationalized basis for the theory of Natural Rights. Thus, all that follows in a minimalist state is justified in a rigorous manner. Further, he ably refutes the contemporary champion of revisionary liberalism, Rawls and his original position thesis. Absolutely the most revolutionary work on the subject in over a century.

Rating:
Summary: Very academic, very poorly presented
Review: Nozick may or may not be a genius. I'll never know. Why will I never know? Because the man has no ability to actually convey a thought in a method of communication that I find easy to digest. As a thinker, he might be great. As a writer, he clearly needs some work. I felt like I was reading a contract.

So, I profess that I did not finish the book. I read roughly half of it before I decided that my time was not worth it. It was painful.

As to the text of the book, Nozick wavers between having some interesting thoughts and some purely academic/unrealistic thoughts. One problem with the book is the philosophy that puts individual rights as the main assumption. In fact, that's the first sentence. As a fellow member of Earth, I have to ask where this is based. Sure, his philosophy rests on it, but many later thoughts do not build upon earlier thoughts. Often there is not a procession of ideas, but new ones that spring from this initial one. In other words, there is little building and more jumping to new conclusions based on the same assumption. A very flat thought pattern, of you will.

But the clearer problem with this outlook is that he completely overlooks human nature in trying to set up a minimal state. All one needs to do is look at our current system of government to see that corruption is a human element. Where power exists, people gravitate to. Power corrupts. I believe this sentiment to be true and Nozick never, in my mind, covers this piece of human nature.

As evidence of his thoughts on people's tendency to violate one another, all one needs to do is look at his first section, where Nozick painstakingly defines how frequently one may have his rights violated. If such a comprehensive effort is made to investigate the numerous ways of rights violations, one can only assume that there is a fear that people will innately abuse any right of power that they may get in the minimal state.

There are some good thoughts in the book. In particular, I get a kick out of the question, why is blackmail illegal? It's a good question. Isn't silence just a service rendered? Another good thought is his questioning of rules of war. While a passing thought, it is a good one. The rules of war remove the rules of everyday life. Of course, for every good thought in the book there is a poor one.

For every yin, there is a yang, so to speak. But I say that with a grain of salt because we're not dealing with a yin-yang text, more of a Newton Law-ish text where every good thought has an equal and opposite bad thought.

All in all, I might give the book 3 stars. But since the words are entrenched in obfuscation, I have to say it's 2 stars. One main reason we put words together is to convey an idea to another. When you refuse to play by the rules of communication, you fail in that communication. A book is the ultimate interface of communicating via written words. Nozick fails miserably in that communication.

Rating:
Summary: Property Rights Absolutist
Review: Nozick's book is lucid, readable, and non-polemical. Even better, he's not out to start a personality cult around himself. He's very exceptional among the "ivory tower" types, most of whom are his diametric opposite when it comes to politics (hint: they're Marxists -- and what's worse, they're post-Soviet collapse Marxists, which tells you something right there). But if you like to argue with statists (i.e., people who think government's power is more important than individual rights -- how else can one justify taking wealth from those who produce it and giving it to those who refuse to work?), you'll find plenty of ammunition here.

Rating:
Summary: A better introduction to the "minimal state" than Ayn Rand
Review: Nozick's book is lucid, readable, and non-polemical. Even better, he's not out to start a personality cult around himself. He's very exceptional among the "ivory tower" types, most of whom are his diametric opposite when it comes to politics (hint: they're Marxists -- and what's worse, they're post-Soviet collapse Marxists, which tells you something right there). But if you like to argue with statists (i.e., people who think government's power is more important than individual rights -- how else can one justify taking wealth from those who produce it and giving it to those who refuse to work?), you'll find plenty of ammunition here.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent Defense of Libertarianism
Review: Nozick's classic is an outstanding book. One of its great virtues is its accessibility to the intelligent layman. This books is alot easier to read than, say, Ronald Dworkin's "Sovereign Virtue" and easier to read than Rawls's "A Theory of Justice". In addition, it is much more focused and tighter than those two books (about 200 pages less than each of them). Nozick stays pretty focused on his main arguments and doesn't stray too far into tangenital side issues, whereas Dworkin and Rawls do much more.

The heart of the book are Chapters 3 and 7. In chapter 3, Nozick lays out his foundations for libertarianism: the idea that individuals are ends in themselves. He claims that libertarian rights follow from treating people as ends and never only as means. The core of Libertarian rights is the idea that in order to deal with people you must have their consent. This treats them as ends because you will only be able to gain their consent if they think that transacting with you or cooperating with you (or whatever) is in their own best interests. Hence, they'll only do so when doing so serves their own ends; requiring consent treats people as ends and not only as means.

In chapter 7, Nozick uses his famous Wilt Chamberlain example to show that egalitarian theories of distributive justice require continual interference with liberty. That is because voluntary transactions lead to inequalities that violate the preferred pattern of distributive justice.

The second part of chapter 7 is a pretty thorough critique of Rawls. Rawls ignores the claims of the most talented and well off and he treats people's abilities as common assets. And more.

So, this is a very good book on Libertarianism. Many have pointed out that Nozick doesn't firmly establish foundations for Libertarian rights. That is true and he admits as much in the Preface. At the same time, the idea of treating individuals as ends in themselves, allied with the idea of self ownership, even if it is just assumed, is still intuitively appealing and seemingly right.

I haven't read the first part on the dispute between anarchists and proponents of the minimal state but I've heard it is quite good as well.

Greg Feirman ([e-mail])

Rating:
Summary: Excellent Defense of Libertarianism
Review: Nozick's classic is an outstanding book. One of its great virtues is its accessibility to the intelligent layman. This books is alot easier to read than, say, Ronald Dworkin's "Sovereign Virtue" and easier to read than Rawls's "A Theory of Justice". In addition, it is much more focused and tighter than those two books (about 200 pages less than each of them). Nozick stays pretty focused on his main arguments and doesn't stray too far into tangenital side issues, whereas Dworkin and Rawls do much more.

The heart of the book are Chapters 3 and 7. In chapter 3, Nozick lays out his foundations for libertarianism: the idea that individuals are ends in themselves. He claims that libertarian rights follow from treating people as ends and never only as means. The core of Libertarian rights is the idea that in order to deal with people you must have their consent. This treats them as ends because you will only be able to gain their consent if they think that transacting with you or cooperating with you (or whatever) is in their own best interests. Hence, they'll only do so when doing so serves their own ends; requiring consent treats people as ends and not only as means.

In chapter 7, Nozick uses his famous Wilt Chamberlain example to show that egalitarian theories of distributive justice require continual interference with liberty. That is because voluntary transactions lead to inequalities that violate the preferred pattern of distributive justice.

The second part of chapter 7 is a pretty thorough critique of Rawls. Rawls ignores the claims of the most talented and well off and he treats people's abilities as common assets. And more.

So, this is a very good book on Libertarianism. Many have pointed out that Nozick doesn't firmly establish foundations for Libertarian rights. That is true and he admits as much in the Preface. At the same time, the idea of treating individuals as ends in themselves, allied with the idea of self ownership, even if it is just assumed, is still intuitively appealing and seemingly right.

I haven't read the first part on the dispute between anarchists and proponents of the minimal state but I've heard it is quite good as well.

Greg Feirman ([e-mail])

Rating:
Summary: Excellent Defense of Libertarianism
Review: Nozick's classic is an outstanding book. One of its great virtues is its accessibility to the intelligent layman. This books is alot easier to read than, say, Ronald Dworkin's "Sovereign Virtue" and easier to read than Rawls's "A Theory of Justice". In addition, it is much more focused and tighter than those two books (about 200 pages less than each of them). Nozick stays pretty focused on his main arguments and doesn't stray too far into tangenital side issues, whereas Dworkin and Rawls do much more.

The heart of the book are Chapters 3 and 7. In chapter 3, Nozick lays out his foundations for libertarianism: the idea that individuals are ends in themselves. He claims that libertarian rights follow from treating people as ends and never only as means. The core of Libertarian rights is the idea that in order to deal with people you must have their consent. This treats them as ends because you will only be able to gain their consent if they think that transacting with you or cooperating with you (or whatever) is in their own best interests. Hence, they'll only do so when doing so serves their own ends; requiring consent treats people as ends and not only as means.

In chapter 7, Nozick uses his famous Wilt Chamberlain example to show that egalitarian theories of distributive justice require continual interference with liberty. That is because voluntary transactions lead to inequalities that violate the preferred pattern of distributive justice.

The second part of chapter 7 is a pretty thorough critique of Rawls. Rawls ignores the claims of the most talented and well off and he treats people's abilities as common assets. And more.

So, this is a very good book on Libertarianism. Many have pointed out that Nozick doesn't firmly establish foundations for Libertarian rights. That is true and he admits as much in the Preface. At the same time, the idea of treating individuals as ends in themselves, allied with the idea of self ownership, even if it is just assumed, is still intuitively appealing and seemingly right.

I haven't read the first part on the dispute between anarchists and proponents of the minimal state but I've heard it is quite good as well.

Greg Feirman ([e-mail])

Rating:
Summary: Setting the debate for 20th century political philosophy
Review: Rawls and Nozick were responsible for reinvigorating rights-based liberalism in the 20th century, saving political philosophy from mere in-fighting among utilitarians, and the superstitions of Marxism. Political philosophy since is largely a response to Rawls and Nozick.

This is a work of genius, though it is frequently misunderstood, perhaps on purpose. Most readers, including important philosophers like Thomas Nagel, simply misunderstand the argumentative structure, with the result that many famous criticisms of the book are irrelevant.

Nozick's thesis is that a minimal state can be justified, but a more than minimal state cannot, except under unusual situations.

Part I of the book is addressed to other libertarians, specifically market anarchists (also called anarcho-capitalists). As such, Nozick assumes libertarian rights of self-ownership (or self-governance). Basically, Nozick wants to show market anarchists that a minimal state can arise without violating anybody's rights, where the rights in question are things that all parties to the debate agree that we have. To do so, he describes a scenario in which security companies come inevitably to have natural monopolies over geographic areas. After providing a highly original analysis of the nature of risk and its moral implications, plus a hugely important discussion of side constraints and moral prohibitions, Nozick establishes that such a monopoly would legitimately prohibit other security firms and independent enforcers from operating in its area, provided it compensates everyone involved. The most natural form of compensation is free security. Nozick then argues that an equilibrium will occur in which the security of all can be provided for with an analogue of coercive taxation.

At the end of this section, Nozick, provided the argument is successful (and there are good reasons to think it is not) has established that an agency provided court, military, and police services in a geographic area will arise without violating rights and without the explicit intention of creating a state.

A very common misreading of Nozick occurs here. Many philosophers think Nozick believes that only a state that does arise in this manner and has this form (of a security company with private shareholders) can be legitimate. Nozick didn't think this and isn't committed to it. Instead, what he believes he has shown is both that a minimal state is desirable (it would arise unintentionally as a result of spontaneous order because it is superior to market anarchy) and legitimate. Nozick can then say that this leaves open whether the state will be democratic and in what way.

The second part of the book is meant to challenge arguments for the more than minimal state. It is also misunderstood, even by very smart people. Nozick does not assume libertarian rights in part II, though he refers to them at times. Instead, his argument consists of three factors. First, he primarily addresses egalitarian liberals (hereafter e-liberals). E-liberals believe that rights to personal freedoms (sexual activity, etc.) are justified, but hold that economic activity can be controlled by government decree. Nozick examines e-liberals reasons for wanting a more-than-minimal state (such as a welfare state or social democracy), and debunks them by drawing analogies between the economic activity the e-liberal would regulate and personal freedoms the e-liberal desires to leave free. If the e-liberal cannot identify a morally salient difference, she is forced to either deny the personal freedom, thus becoming an authoritarian, or admit that the economic activity should remain free, thus conceding Nozick's point.

Another style of argument used in part II is what I will call "the liberal presumption" argument. The liberal presumption is that any human activity ought to remain unregulated by laws unless some strong reason can be shown to regulate the activity. (This can be contrasted against the authoritarian presumption, which Mussolini and Stalin held, namely that any activity ought to be governed unless strong reason can be shown to let it be free.) Nozick addresses e-liberals, who hold the liberal presumption, and then attacks the reasons they offer in support of regulating various activities. He shows that the reasons are based on misunderstandings and bad arguments, thus restoring the liberal presumption.

The last type of argument does not rely on this presumption. Nozick addresses Marxists, for instance, who are not liberals. His arguments against them consists mostly of just showing what's wrong with their position. For instance, Marxist exploitation theory crucially depends upon bad economic theory, such as the labor theory of value, something which was shown false back in the early 1870s. (Almost all contemporary economists would agree with Nozick on this. Marxism is to smart people what creationism is to dumb people, a pseudo-science.)

The result of these arguments is to show that the more than minimal state cannot be justified.

Along the way, in part II, Nozick provides us with some gems. He gives the first major critique of Rawls. The critique is devastating, as Nozick points out mistakes in Rawls reasoning (simple logical errors, etc.) that leave Rawls' project ungrounded. Rawls, for some reason, never responded to this critique. Nozick also analyzes envy, and provides hypothetical histories to arrive at the more than minimal state that uncover its nature (it is logically equivalent to system in which we all own parts of each other). He also sketches a theory of justice in holdings to contrast with Rawls, Dworkin, and others. This theory, the entitlement theory, is very rough, but it provides a welcome alternative to simplistic theories maintaining that all there is to justice is establishing patterns of ownership.

Part III is the least often read and least understood part of the book. Partly, it provides a contractarian argument for libertarianism (see Loren Lomasky's article in David Schmidtz' book, Robert Nozick, contemporary philosophy in focus). It thus contains some of the foundations that Nagel claims Nozick lacks (though this criticism is based on Nagel's mistaken reading.) In part III, Nozick asks us to try to construct a system that allows for experimentation and in which everyone, despite their differences, can find a society that allows them to live out their conceptions of the good. The system that best approaches this is a libertarian framework, inside of which non-libertarian communities may be established provided they respect other, different communities. Part III is sketchy, but contains seeds of brilliant things, and it is too bad it hasn't been explored more.

Overall, I would say that the argument of part I is the weakest, part II is the strongest, and part III the most interesting and ripe with philosophical potential.

If you care about political philosophy, you owe it to yourself to read this book. You also owe it to yourself to understand it. If you find yourself thinking Nozick is making a dumb mistake or begging the question, you've misunderstood. But you'll be in good company.