Rating: 
Summary: Fascinating Discussion as viewed by Outsider
Review: Understanding the legal lingo is difficult to begin with for those outside the judicial profession. Some writers add to this with their scholarly padding while others communicate quite clearly what they hope to. Scalia certainly fits in the latter, Tribe the former.Scalia it would seem proposes what true Biblical exegeis seeks, to find the original intent, while Tribe hedges on this even being possible. As Scalia succinctly puts it in his reply, "if one can't interpret original meaning in the Constitution, can we have any fair statutes? Salient was this Scalia retort to Tribe: "Prof. Tribe takes refuge in candar and ... self-conscious humility. Rejecting base certitude he acknowledges that he does not know the answer to either of these questions. Indeed, he is not even sure and mean to disparage candor and humility, virtues that are not only admirable but also rare, particularly in intellectual circles. They would assuredly carry the day if the issue before us were quality of character, rather than soundness of interpretative theory. But they are of little use to the judge who must determine whether and whither the Constitution has wandered, and who is not permitted to render a candid and humble judgment of undecided." Amazed as questioning of inclusion of Constitutional interpretation while entertaining statutes. Does not the Constitution form the basis for all law? Scalia easily carries the day in this excellent discussion.
Rating: 
Summary: Ignores data on literacy processes and social identities.
Review: Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's views demonstrate a profound ignorance of any scientific understanding related to his topic.
His all too common scientific blindspot can be assessed by comparing his analysis to works like E. D. Hirsch, Jr.'s (1987), Cultural Literacy, and Tom Tyler et. al.'s (1997), Social Justice in a Diverse Society.
Quite correctly, Scalia identifies his approach as "an art or a game, rather than a science" (p. 8).
By contrast, Hirsch and Tyler et. al. show how reliable data can contribute to our knowledge of important literacy processes like reading, writing, and judging.
Hirsch's literature review related to "The Discovery of the Schema" (Ch. 2) leads him to conclude that most of the "meaning" from any printed page comes not from the text but from the reader's own literacy, i.e., prior knowledge, ignorance, and disinformation.
From research in social psychology Tyler et. al. show how relevant social identities shape our judgments of justice and injustice.
In this limited but increasing empirical light, we can understand our legal conflicts much better, e.g., the 1856 Dred Scott decision that denied federal citizenship to African Americans, the belated voting rights of women in 1920, and the Warren Court's recognition that suspects (like Richard Jewell) need and deserve meaningful constitutional protection.
Contrary to Justice Scalia, the key to understanding these historical and continuing conflicts is not "moral principles" that "are premanent" (p. 146) and tied to any text and its original context.
Rather, congruent with Professor Dworkin's "semantic intention" (pp. 118-119) and Professor Tribe's "abstract principles," the most valid literacy keys are the different ways that we perceive and value or devalue the identities of others.
(This should be quite obvious to anyone who takes the time and trouble to read the Dred Scott "reasoning" & "judgment," including the two dissenting opinions.)
The fundamental key to proper legal understanding begins with perceiving African Americans, women, children, suspects, and even prisoners as persons.
Then, as the introductory or Identity Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment says, "All persons born or naturalized in the United States" are citizens and, thus, are entitled to the due process of law and its equal protection.
Depersonalization of any of these persons undermines our literacy process, the Constitution, and the democratic morality that can unite as a one nation and People.
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