Rating: 
Summary: "Breakdown" Wears Blinders
Review: "Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11" by Bill Gertz provides an operational history of America's spy community.
While his credentials and writing ability are beyond reproach, Gertz fails miserably by simplistically concluding that politics ruined our intelligence gathering system. Without mentioning the bloody, destabilizing covert actions that compelled legislative intervention, Gertz blames congressional panels "packed with liberal Democrats who assumed that U. S. intelligence agencies posed a threat to American democracy and engaged in wide criminal activity."
To agree with Gertz, one must ignore scores of corporate-friendly coups supported by the CIA in the last half century. For a more complete examination of intelligence misdeeds, read "Endless Enemies: The Making of an Unfriendly World" by Jonathan Kwitny.
By taking a partisan stance to draw a political conclusion, Gertz fails to put the blame where it belongs; on the hubris ridden, bureaucratic Boys Club that the intelligence service has become. Sycophancy and conformity cross party lines, and smother the creative thinkers in our nation's intelligence community.
Rating: 
Summary: Helpful
Review:
The author has done a wonderful job, without reference to any of the fifteen books on intelligence reform published between 1999 and 2000, in quickly reviewing the key elements of intelligence failure and in recommending some specific reforms that thus far have been denied by successive Administrations.
If this book forces policymakers to think, and makes it possible for the public to get very angry about the various failures of intelligence that contributed to 9-11, then it will be in the running for most patriotic and useful book of the year. The author leaves one aspect of the 9-11 failure untouched--although he makes references to Democratic and to Republican policymakers, what he does not tell the American people is that intelligence failures do not occur without very substantive policy failures of two kinds: first, policy failures where the intelligence professionals are gutted, abused, intimidated, and generally prevented from being effective. The Director of Central Intelligence usually serves as the policy representative to intelligence in carrying out these abuses, rather than as the intelligence representative to policy. The second failure is one of "inconvenient warning," where solid professional intelligence estimates are set aside and ignored because the politicians don't want to be bothered, don't think it will cost them with their domestic constituencies, and are not truly committed to long-term national security. This is a bi-partisan problem--until the American people appreciate the connection between voting, policymaker character, and intelligence success, we will continue to get the government--and the intelligence community--that our citizens deserve.
Rating: 
Summary: The sum is less than the parts
Review: A few days before writing this, Congress approved the 'Intelligence Reform Act of 2004'. I thought this book might be useful for understanding the exceptionally difficult issues involved. Unfortunately, it only covers the preliminary ground work.
Unless you have been living in a cave for the last 5 years, you are well aware that Congress, the FBI, the CIA and the NSA (and thus the President of the United States) had a variety of warnings which could have prevented the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC. This book reviews the warnings, using a chapter for each agency, the Congress and the Presidency.
While interesting, these reviews are poor narratives. The story line becomes very familiar, 1) agent 'X' was suspicious of 'Y' and wrote a 'warning memo'. 2) Unfortunately, a Democratic party functionary was running the agent's office and hid the warning. 3) If one looks into the office politics, it becomes obvious that the Democratic party functionaries were uninterested in Muslim terrorists. Instead, they favored activites that protected bureaucratic positions, maintained elected office, expanded a social service or played to the 'we hate the US military' crowd.
While interesting, the stories fail to argue for any general understanding of bureaucratic dynamics, the mind of Muslim terrorists or US politics. It is useful to know the specifics of various available warnings, but the simple moral tales were unconvincing. As a whole, the details are just details. The sum is less than the parts. In particular, there is no balance-of-powers governmental principle elucidated. Balance-of-power is the bedrock of US politics.
After these reviews, a set of recommendations were offered.
1. New clandestine service replacing CIA directorate of Operations and DIA Defense HUMINT. The goal is to create a service that relies on American diversity to place Americans in the front lines of intelligence collection.
2. Create a new Counter intelligence service outside the FBI.
3. Abolish the DIA and return its responsibilities to the Military.
4. Have CIA redesigned to support military.
5. Set up small Military 'special ops' force.
6. Upgrade technical abilities for collecting intel.
Two of these are non-controversial: #1 and #6, largely because they are so vague. Who would be against gritty 'real world' spies with technology James Bond would be proud to use? #3, #4, and #5 argue for giving more of the intelligence role to military officers, but the book has not made a case for trusting the military over 'spy bureaucrats', only against Democratic functionaries running spy agencies. #2 is the traditional 'new bureaucracy' temptation solution, which is as empty as #1 and #6. Thus, we are left with a simple analysis: turn counter terrorism over to the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Gertz and I probably agree that the Carter and Clinton administrations represent 20th century low points in US foreign policy, but the arguments and recommendations need to stand on their own merits. On their own, the case makes no sense. This probably explains the irrelevance of the book when used to inform opinion regarding the 2004 Intell Reform Act. The public debate over this measure revolved around two issues:
1. National driver's license standards
2. Congressional vs. Executive authority over 'real time' field level surveillance satellites.
The book makes no issue of driver license standards, nor the immigration issues that confuse the debate. The second issue is a 'balance of congressional and executive power' question, which the book never addresses.
In conclusion, while useful for summarizing the pre-9/11 warnings, the book is useless for making sense of 'how intel failed' and allowed 9/11 to take place. Since no theory of bureaucratic politics is offered, we end up with little more than 'my politics are better than yours' and 'another layer of bureaucracy will solve everything'.
Rating:
Summary: If People only Knew
Review: A pretty good synopsis of what's hampered our intelligence services, but a bit too harsh when passing blame. There's no doubt that our intelligence capabilities were proven to be in need of repair after the failures of 9/11 and the Iraq War. Gertz examines those failures, plus others, and lays the blame where he sees fit. He has excellent chapters on the organizational cultures of such intelligence agencies as DIA, CIA, NSA, and the FBI. I believe he has correctly captured the internal dynamics of those agencies, the arrogance, rigidity, disagreements, and even agenda-based analysis that defeats production of good assessments for the policy-makers. However, I felt he was unfairly critical when attacking people like ex-CIA Chief George Tenet. He's ultimately responsible for the failures, but it doesn't mean they were of his making.
Gertz should know that intelligence analysis is an art, not a science, no matter what politicians or societal pundits want to believe. (To better understand this argument, I'd recommend readers look at the book by John Hughes-Wilson, "Military Intelligence Blunders") I sense Gertz' severe critique of Tenet is colored by the latter's service for, and under, Democratic politicians. Nevertheless, the author is right-on when he disassembles the various agencies, and more importantly, when he details how Congressional Democrats, especially in the 1970s, have systematically destroyed our ability to collect intelligence. He also does a fine job of laying out the Presidential Administrations responsible for undermining our intelligence community.
In the end, Gertz offers some well though-out recommendations for improving intelligence capabilities. This is a revealing book, which should be read by those interested in better understanding the political and military challenges in the War on Terror.
Rating:
Summary: US Intelligence Isn't
Review: A quick informative read. Gertz makes a strong case against the Clinton administration for its "politicization" of the US intelligence apparatus (CIA, NSA, etc). He also describes the ridiculously naive and stupid PC-based regulations which we have implemented which hamstring our field intelligence-gathering abilities. We should have been able to at least have a fighting chance at preventing 9-11, but not with the dysfunctional intel community described here. Gertz also provides a brief plan to correct these major problems. This book is worth the two-three hours you will invest in it.
Rating:
Summary: Failure is not an option
Review: Allow me to repeat that: failure is not an option - unless, presumably, you work in the CIA and your name is George Tenet. Bill Gertz effectively dissects and examines the failure of our government to prevent the horrific events of 9/11 in a well-written effort that exposes the many deficiencies that ultimately led to that ignominious failure. Paramount among them, Gertz says, are "a system hamstrung by bad politics, poor leadership, and bureaucratic ineptitude." Gertz also points out the most glaring problem at hand: a flagrant lack of accountability - especially within the CIA. Gertz tells how Langley was notified of an impending Al Qaeda attack, and, of course, made no precautions whatsoever. Clinton holdover Tenet dropped the ball(as he has many times since), and he must pay the price. Consequences and repercussions must be meted out. Accountability must be respected. Tenet still arrogantly proclaims that his intelligence gathering ability, the same intelligence that has since proved faulty in Iraq, is sound and beyond reproach. Mr. Tenet, there's the door. Don't let it hit you on the way out.
Rating:
Summary: Failure is not an option
Review: Allow me to repeat that: failure is not an option - unless, presumably, you work in the CIA and your name is George Tenet. Bill Gertz effectively dissects and examines the failure of our government to prevent the horrific events of 9/11 in a well-written effort that exposes the many deficiencies that ultimately led to that ignominious failure. Paramount among them, Gertz says, are "a system hamstrung by bad politics, poor leadership, and bureaucratic ineptitude." Gertz also points out the most glaring problem at hand: a flagrant lack of accountability - especially within the CIA. Gertz tells how Langley was notified of an impending Al Qaeda attack, and, of course, made no precautions whatsoever. Clinton holdover Tenet dropped the ball(as he has many times since), and he must pay the price. Consequences and repercussions must be meted out. Accountability must be respected. Tenet still arrogantly proclaims that his intelligence gathering ability, the same intelligence that has since proved faulty in Iraq, is sound and beyond reproach. Mr. Tenet, there's the door. Don't let it hit you on the way out.
Rating: 
Summary: Spend your money elsewhere
Review: Bill Gertz doesn't deserve your cash. There are a number of books on intelligence reform written before 9-11 that are just as valid today. Gertz effort at "recent history" is as flawed as many similar works. It's too close to the event, with not enough objective data, Congress wasn't close to releasing a report when this was penned.
Gertz resorts to the same Clinton-bashing (and I'm no Clinton fan) he used before, and continues to highlight vulnerabilities, sources, and methods which I'm sure our foes will find useful. I've personally had sources eliminated after someone leaked a classified report to Gertz and he printed it verbatim.
I recommend books by Greg Treverton, Loch Johnson, or Berkowitz and Goodman instead of this tripe.
Rating:
Summary: White Wash
Review: Bill Gertz has done some excellent investigative reporting in the past; however, this book just absolutely looks over the facts surrounding the September 11th attacks. The overall conclusion to this book is that our Inteligence just "dropped the ball". An honest look at the facts will show that this is absurd. First, we have many FBI agents who have gone public about the criticism they received from within their departments for even investigating such an attack and David Schippers(Chief Counsel for Clinton Impeachment), who is representing some of these agents in their suits, went himself to the Attorney General's office with details surrounding the attacks two months before hand. He was not even given the time of day Finally, there is too much information that is just skipped over in this book - I have only included a small amount here. Are we to believe that there were all these warnings and coincidences and still conclude that our Intelligence just "dropped the ball"?
Rating: 
Summary: Head Are Going to Roll!
Review: Bill Gertz shows again why even his adversaries rate him as America's premier intelligence reporter today. Gertz's expose of the intelligence failures that led up to 9-11 is going to shock the nation and cause some much needed soul searching in our intelligence community. The book is written in terse, fact-based prose that often reads like a suspense thriller. Yet it's based on Gertz's solid news reporting experience on the spy and defense beat with the Washington Times, earning him a reputation as the man with the best top-secret leaker's rolodex in Washington. Gertz is also a patriot. He takes names, kicks ..., and points the finger squarely at our intelligence agencies' politically correct, risk-averse bureaucatic culture for failing to provide the "human intelligence" necessary to prevent terror attacks. This is a book that delivers. If Gertz's advice is taken, some heads are going to roll, notably that of Clinton holdover George Tenet at CIA. America and the world will probably be a safer place as a result, and our spy networks will get a long overdue new set of teeth.
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