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Summary: I don't sell many of my books...
Review: but this one I had no trouble parting with. I purchased this book shortly after it was released, long before General Clark made his bid for the Democratic nomination. I've tried to complete it twice, but cannot bear to finish it. It's just too much celebration of General Clark and not enough discussion of events in his life or the the context of those events. It's a dissapointment , because General Clark is obviously intelligent, and has the resume to provide an interesting read.
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Summary: Decent book, but thet title is somewhat misleading.
Review: Clark has written an excellent book on the politics of coalition warfare. However, there is precious little in the book on the actual mechanics of one of the most important air campaigns ever waged. Kosovo was the first conflict, in which air power alone determined the out come of the war. The introduction of weapons such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and other GPS guided weapons totally revolutionized the effectivness of airpower, effectively delivering what air power enthusiasts have been promising since the days of Billy Mitchell and Curtis Lemay. I for one hoped to find out more about the air campaign but was sorely disappointed on this count. Nothing in the book about how the Serb's managed to obtain the Nato Air Tasking Order (ATO) in advance thereby greatly enhancing the danger to Nato pilots. Also only a few lines devoted to the bombing of the Chinese Embassy, an event of huge political significance. That the Chinese Embassy was the only target in the whole campaign nominated by a certain intelligence agency in Langley Virginia, underscores how woefully unprepared that organization is to support U.S. military operations.
Nonetheless, despite the books shortcomings it does give an insiders view into the politcs behind the Kosovo Campaign. Most disturbingly it illustrates how the Service Chiefs and Chairman of the JCS seemingly undermined the spirit if not the letter of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which was supposed to enhance the powers of the regionals CINCs. This was perhaps the most disturbing element of the book. Of particular concern was how the Army Chief of Staff used his influence to deny Clark the use of Apache Helicopters deployed to Albania. Truly a pathetic tale. At any rate if your interested in the politics of coalition warfare you will love this book. If you want details on one of the most important Air Campaigns ever waged, one that in many ways was a precursor for the Afghanistan Campaign, you will be disappointed. Come to think of it, though, could we really expect an Army 4 Star, to write in glowing terms about Air Power?
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Summary: words of a war criminal
Review: Clark ordered the use of cluster bombs over civilian areas, used depleted uranium bombs and presided over the terror bombing of cities (bridges, electrical grids, power stations, TV stations, hospitals, etc.). Most people would call him a war criminal. For him to write a book about it is disgusting.
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Summary: Required, timely reading
Review: Clark's account should be required reading for everyone involved in planning and explaining the upcoming war against terrorism.
This is a remarkably timely book. General Clark commanded NATO during its first war, the war to push Serbia out of Kosovo. Clark candidly outlines the political complexities of an alliance, the gap between the view from Washington and the NATO headquarters in Washington, and the impact of the news media on both the military and diplomatic campaigns.
As we enter what will almost certainly be a long campaign against terrorism, a campaign that will involve allies, the news media and probably some significant military actions, there is a lot to be learned from Clark's description of the constantly evolving balance between the politicians, the military, the diplomats, and the news media. The anti-terrorist campaign will be longer and more complicated than the NATO intervention in Kosovo and that was so difficult it almost failed.
Clark describes a pattern of destructive dishonesty that permeated the Clinton Administration. Clark could never count on candor from Shelton (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), Secretary of Defense Cohen, or President Clinton. Contrast that with the fact that we have every reason to believe President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretaries Powell, and Rumsfeld. This administration will prove far more reliable and far more honorable.
However Clark cautions that far beyond the weaknesses of the Clinton Administration there is a new complexity to coalition warfare in a 24-hour news media environment that will require new thinking and new systems to sustain effectiveness and ensure victory.
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Summary: Not a kiss and tell...
Review: Gen Clark has given an excellent first-hand account of the internecine politics between the regional warfighting CinC (in this case CINCEUR/SACEUR) and the National Command Authority. In a day and age of rapidly expanding communications, which allows Washington DC to have insight as it never has before, the regional commanders are increasingly finding the management of public opinion and of the political leadership as difficult as managing the campaign itself.
The insight provided on differences between the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and himself reinforce this dilemma.
Gen Clark has been a key player in the Balkan military/diplomatic scene since the Bosnian conflict, and its somewhat tenuous resolution at Dayton; culminating with the war in Kosovo. His personal relationships with many of the leading political figures in the region only add weight to his narrative.
From a strictly military perspective, it would have been interesting to have seen more on his relationships with his senior commanders, but overall, a well written book, which will add yet another dimension to the history of this complex area of Europe
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Summary: Some defects in the book by NATO's Supreme Commander
Review: Gen. Wesley Clark's book primarily describes events associated with the US-led NATO bombing of Yugoslavia for 78 days in 1999. It is an easy read, no challenge because of vocabulary, footnotes, references, ideas, concepts or military strategy. He discusses in detail his conversations with many individuals and includes their quotes verbatim, as if there were transcriptions from a tape recorder. Did he have the approval of all to do so? Or is it just an author's liberty and style in presenting personal views of an historical event? The fact is that NATO, a defensive alliance of 19 Nations, with not a single one under attack, waged what Gen. Clark now calls a war, perhaps so that he can claim a victory. In earlier circumstances he referred to the events as "coercive diplomacy" (Brookings Institution, 2000). Others refer to them as humanitarian intervention which saved the credibility of NATO. But as history, this book should be considered as an attempt to exculpate its author from charges of poor performance or worse. He talks about disputes with his leaders at the Pentagon on the selection of targets, use of ground troops, APACHE helicopters etc. As Supreme Commander of NATO he did order his forces to commit what are war crimes. This included the deliberate bombing of primarily civilian targets, such as bridges far from Kosovo, petro-chemical plants releasing huge amounts of dangerous chemicals into the environment, the use of CLUSTER bombs against a civilian population and dropping of unexploded ordnance into pristine National Forests and the Adriatic Sea. Flying at 15,000 feet led to incorrectly identified targets so civilians became not just collateral damage but main targets. Gen. Clark lightly and incompletely discusses these events and fails to discuss the International Conventions which his NATO led forces violated. Lastly and most surprisingly, he omits any reference to what can be considered a primary reason why the diplomatic efforts by the International Community failed at Rambouillet in early 1999. That Agreement's Appendix B, if it had been accepted, would have authorized NATO to occupy ALL of Yugoslavia not just Kosovo (See item 8). He states on page 162: "My staff and I were involved in drafting the military agreements for the Rambouillet negotiations, for which we used the Military Annex of the Dayton Agreements as a model...". If he was so intimately involved, does he think a sovereign nation should have agreed when the only geographic region of conflict and contention was that of Kosovo, internal to Yugoslavia? In spite of these criticisms, I enjoyed reading this book because it documents how US foreign policies are failing diplomatically so that we must call upon the military to resolve them. Said more bluntly, the military is called upon to clean up the messes into which our politicans have led us. Such abuse of the military does not serve well our national interests, especially on the international scene. The bungling of Bosnia is now coming to light and the after-effects of the Kosovo intervention will be felt for many years.
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Summary: The Kosovo Campaign
Review: General (retired) Clark writes an excellent piece on both the events leading up to our entry into Kosovo and the continued decline of the American warrior spirit. I served seven months in Kosovo with KFOR 1B on Camp Monteith. General Clark's book answers many of the questions we all had while patrolling the trash strewn streets of Kosovo, "Why the hell are we here?". General Clark gives a great lead up to the Serbian aggression in Kosovo and the Albanian provocations which we once again see in Macedonia. His thoughts are well written and easy to read. Starting with the Dayton peace accords, which he was a key player in, Clark takes us through the twisted negotiations and difficulties of the Balkans. His story shows the inherent difficulties in coalition warfare and how I (and thousands of other soldiers) eventually arrived to put "boots on the ground." The other interesting aspect of this book is to watch how the military was severely restricted, almost to the point of endangering American lives, to protect a weak and unclear political agenda. Not only did General Clark have to fight Serbs, NATO, the air power pundits and the media, he also had to fight against his leadership in SecDef Cohen. A great read and interesting story about NATOs first war. Lets hope we never have to go through an experience like the Kosovo Campaign again. Buy this book. You'll throughly enjoy it! -CPT S
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Summary: Must Read For Political & Military Leaders
Review: General (Retired) Clark writes the best account of the tensions and competing demands of senior military leaders trying to bridge the divide between politics and military operations. He also clearly explains the linkages between our national security strategy (NSS) and national military strategy (NMS). As an insider during the Dayton Peace Accords, he had the benefit of understanding the development of a NSS with regard to the Balkans. He was able to transmit his unique insights during Dayton into an effective military campaign to bolster the credibility of NATO and keep soldiers from needlessly getting injured. Anyone on the staff or getting ready to assume a political office which relates to our NSS should read this book to understand the frustrations of competing demands placed on military commanders in a highly complex environment. Likewise, all future field grade officers should read and understand General Clark's insights. Given the complex nature of military engagement and the blurring of strategic, operational, and tactical realms due to new technology and the media, military leaders would do well to study this book. Warfare has changed in many substantive, as well as subtle ways. Thoughts on the subjects that General Clark exposes could save allied soldiers lives in the future. This book is a great addition to any military library and those interested in strategic thinking.
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Summary: Ultimate Insider
Review: General Clark does a good job of explaining the Kosovo Campaign. He pulls no punches as he details the difficulties in leading NATO's first war. The ultimate insider look at the strategic level of waging war as well as the tactical levels. Ample pages are devoted to the politics of the war. You need not be a military professional to understand the dynamics of the book, but if you are a military professional you need to read this book. Excellent insight on how to 'Wage Modern War'. HIGHLY RECOMMENDED.
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Summary: Making Modern Mistakes
Review: General Clark doesn't have much use for General Clausewitz, the Prussian strategist whose book, "On War," is a touchstone for students of conflict. Clark's one mention of Clausewitz comes during his discussion of the political conditions that led to NATO's war against Yugoslavia, and then he appears to quote directly from "On War": "No one in his right mind would, or ought to, begin a war if he didn't know how to finish it." But, in practice, this proved to be an unreasonable standard. (p. 167) Clark is right: To require an explicit "exit strategy" before intervening militarily is a prescription for inaction. However, he is wrong to attribute this standard to Clausewitz. As far as I can tell, the above quote is a garbled version of a key Clausewitzian axiom: No one starts a war -- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so -- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. ("On War," Howard/Paret translation. Princeton, 1976, 1984. Book 8, Chapter 2; p. 579) That is to say, first establish the war's political goal and then decide on the appropriate military means to reach that goal. This is worlds away from the unreasonable standard Clark so rightly deplores. If this is so then his implied critique of Clausewitz is misinformed because the quote on which it is based misrepresents what Clausewitz actually said and meant. For a general, even a retired one, to misquote and misconstrue the ideas of a celebrated thinker on war seems rather careless. I wonder whether this was just an isolated mistake.
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