Rating: 
Summary: Coercive Diplomacy and Kosovo
Review: "Waging Modern War" is former Supreme Allied Commander General Wesley Clark's reflection of Operation Allied Force. He opens the book with his appointment as the Director of Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff. In this capacity he was introduced to Balkan issues and participated in the Dayton Peace Accord negotiations. The remainder of the book is dedicated to his tenure as the dual-hatted position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the US European Command Commander where he was responsible for the planning and execution of Operation Allied Force.
The most compelling portion of the book was his discussion of the role of NATO in European issues and United States' diplomatic actions in resolving the genocide in Kosovo. Ultimately, he outlines how the United States and NATO's inability to produce a cohesive Serbian strategy, the misapplication of military force, and inconsistent assessments of the strategic situation were directly responsible for the problems encountered in Operation Allied Force. He describes how our coercive diplomacy policy towards Milosevic migrated across the diplomatic spectrum when General Clark writes, "events proceed from diplomacy backed by discussions of threats, to diplomacy backed by threats, to diplomacy backed by force, and finally to force backed by diplomacy" (p. 457). Eventually, a workable solution was reached but only via a less than desirable means and inefficiently applied.
He writes with an uncomplicated style and does not overuse complex military jargon. He includes a list of abbreviations to help readers through the military prose. His cast of characters is an outstanding reference which provides the person's official position and the time they held that office. The paperback version, released in 2002, includes a preface not included in the hardcover edition. His preface provides General Clark's thoughts on international military affairs in a post-Sept 11th world. The timely addition is a valuable enhancement and helps frame his argument for the role of military force in diplomacy.
This book is not for readers looking for technical analysis of the actual war. It deals with the commander's cogitation of the strategic planning and prosecution of Operation Allied Force. It uses this event to discuss the impact it will have on future limited wars, the issue of diplomacy and the use of military force as an instrument of national power, and warfighting in a coalition environment specifically examining NATO. There are a number of lessons to be drawn from our actions in Kosovo, and while not directly applicable in all future situations, General Clark does an excellent job summarizing them in his conclusion. These lessons are deep questions about how a nation balances the need to project its will for the maximum effect against the desire to accomplish this in the lowest cost terms possible. A discerning reader will find the basis of this book is General Clark's views generated from his firsthand experiences and should be balanced with an unbiased or dissenting opinion to be more meaningful. General Clark's persuasive argument is extremely relevant today.
I recommend this book.
Rating: 
Summary: The lessons of Kosovo
Review: "Waging Modern War," by Wesley K. Clark, is an account of the 1999 NATO military action in Kosovo from the perspective of the author, an American army general who oversaw the operation. Clark notes that this book is "a personal memoir" and is not intended to be "a complete record of the war." Included as supplemental features are a "Cast of Characters," with descriptions of over 60 individuals from the international group of people involved in the story; a list of the abbreviations used; a map; and an index.
This is a gripping text that, at times, I found very difficult to put down. It's a fascinating look at war from the perspective of a general near the very top of the chain of command. Among the many issues Clark touches on are the following: the complexity of dealing with an international military alliance; humanitarian concerns; relations between military and civilian officials; and the role of the media. He touches in particular on the complexity of his "double-hatted" role in both the NATO and U.S. military structures. He also discusses some of his life before the Kosovo crisis.
Particulary interesting are his memories of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, whom Clark describes early in the book as "a supremely manipulative liar and bully." Milosevic emerges as a wily, fascinating true-life villain. Equally noteworthy is Clark's account of his working relationship with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, a former Spanish government minister. Clark shows how personalities, as well as terrain, tactics, and weaponry, impact a war.
This is a lengthy (479 plus XLV pages) and dense text; Clark hits you with a blizzard of facts, names, and acronyms. The book may be daunting to general readers, but I believe that those who take the time to read it carefully will be rewarded. "Waging" is not just a memoir, but also a theoretical work on modern war using the Kosovo campaign as a textbook example. As the Iraq war continues and people speculate on what future wars could embroil us, I believe that civilian and military leaders could benefit from the knowledge and insights in this important book.
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Summary: Why We Should Disband NATO
Review: "Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat" is Gen. Wesley K. Clark's (ret.) first-hand account of the political and military operations conducted during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) attempts to end ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. Kosovo is a province of Yugoslavia that is predominantly Muslim Albanian while the rest of Yugoslavia is predominantly Christian Serb.Clark presents a picture of battling egos and national interests that almost scuttled NATO's operations before they even started. Clark; as the dual-hatted Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) of NATO and the Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR) of the United States; faced a myriad of challenges. Clark often had to reconcile the various opinions which separated the American and European visions of how to conduct the operations. While Clark gives a good account of what it's like to conduct a military operation without the full support of your country or its military, what "Waging Modern War" can most be recommended for is its shining a light on the true nature of NATO. Clark didn't intend for his book to do so but, it gives the best explanation for why NATO should be disbanded. In the Balkans, NATO only succeeded because it had overwhelming firepower. Had it met a more determined or well-armed foe, it would have been a resounding disaster. This is due to the inherent instability of the NATO system. Instead of giving overall authority to the obvious leader of the alliance, the United States, NATO is rule by consensus. When it comes to issues of power, there can only be one person or country in charge. NATO's structure violates this premise by giving an equal to all members without regard to their contribution. This system was not a problem so long as NATO would never have to act. When it was merely a defensive structure aimed at deterring the Soviet Union from invading western Europe, NATO could function as one unit. When the threat of a Russian invasion melted away, NATO no longer had a raison d'etre. The operation in Kosovo is a spectacle of what happens when an organization goes looking for a new mission when its old one ends. Unfortunately, that future for NATO seems to be intertwined with the rush to peacekeeping that is the latest fad amongst western democracies (as if the imposition of peace from the outside can ever be kept). "Waging Modern War" cannot be considered the whole story of what happened in the Balkans during Clark's tenure; but, it is certainly an interesting and instructive view from the inside. I am eager to read some outside perspectives on the conflict and I do recommend reading Clark's version.
Rating:
Summary: A worthwhile read for people interested in military affairs
Review: "Waging Modern War" gives us great insights into what exactly happened in the air campaign over Kosovo. For most of us, this war was kind of confusing. Everyone was arguing over whether or not we should be there, and the facts of the matter tended to be lost in all the rhetoric. Now General Clark helps clear it up for us, with personal accounts of what exactly took place in the negotiations with Milosevic, the NATO meetings, and communications with Washington. It's all very disturbing to anyone familiar with how a war should be fought. We went about fighting this war very incompetently, and we could have easily been defeated by a competent and determined enemy. This kind of political bickering is what could cause our next Vietnam, folks, so read this book to learn what to look out for.
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Summary: A Turning Point for Strategic Thinking (Hopefully)
Review: "We lost our way in the world when we lost our adversary." "The 1997 Quadrenial Defense Review set the Pentagon against the foreign policy establishment and the regional CINCs [commanders in chief]... the Pentagon tried to dictate foreign policy." - Gen. Wesley K. Clark, USA (ret.) August 8, 2001 These two quotes appropriately describe the two major themes found within "Waging Modern War." When I saw this book, felt a personal need to read it - I had been present at Pentagon briefings the day prior to the commencement of Allied Force and was party to personal meetings with General Clark in the waning days of the Operation. I knew it would be a damning review of NATOs actions regarding Kosovo, but I had no idea it would be so insightful and poignant. General Wesley K. Clark, USA (ret.) begins by (briefly) addressing his career history and the hand he had in creating the current U.S. Grand Strategy, focusing on two nearly-simultaneous major regional conflicts (2MRC), and the strategy of overwhelming force, popular support and technological superiority, known as 'The Powell Doctrine.' He then addresses his path to becoming SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO) and U.S. CINC Europe, a dual-role which would set him against the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the basic U.S. foreign policy. Clark relates the inherent conflicts of interests resulting from the U.S. approach to the 2MRC policy and the needs of regional CINCs, suggesting that the policy which he himself helped pen is outdated and restrictive in the post-Cold War Era. General Clark advocates and explains the failure of the U.S. to use diplomatic compellence through threat of force to achieve policy goals in the former-Yugoslavia, as well as the failure to understand the usefulness of diplomacy during the bombing campaign. Perhaps most telling are Clark's accounts of his discussions with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Hugh Shelton, USA and then-Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph Ralston, USAF - conversations that demonstrated a lack of understanding and concern for the European theater and its political and strategic circumstances. He also details the actions on the part of his subordinate and parallel U.S. commanders in Europe, some of whom were more concerned about their own careers than doing a marginally good job, as well as the circumstances that led to his dismissal and replacement by Ralston, euphemistically termed an 'early retirement.' Finally, Clark addresses his growing concern over the increasing U.S. focus on the Middle East and Eastern Asia at the expense of NATO and our European allies. While not popular within the Pentagon, due to the number of high-ranking officers he blasts and his airing of dirty laundry, Wes Clark's views are privately shared by many high-ranking military officials, particularly those serving in NATO commands. In June, a personal meeting over dinner in Paris reconfirmed this with one very high-ranking U.S. flag officer. Clark hopes this well-written, interesting and insightful book will serve not just to point out the mistakes of one campaign, but to cause the U.S. defense establishment to reconsider its strategy and the manner in which it deals with political goals and regional commanders. I hope so as well.
Rating:
Summary: Most Miss Point: Book Excells At Highlighting Our Weaknesses
Review:
Every citizen should read this book so they can instruct their elected representatives and vote for military reform. As things now stand, we will lose the war on terrorism over time because of the perennial flaws in our system that this book identifies. Don't Bother Us Now. The U.S. political system is not structured to pay attention to "early warning". Kosovo (as well as Croatia and Serbia beforehand and later Macedonia) were well known looming problems, but in the aftermath of the Gulf War, both Congress and the Administration in power at the time said to the U.S. Intelligence Community, essentially: "don't bother us anymore with this, this is inconvenient warning, we'll get to it when it explodes." We allowed over a hundred thousand to be murdered in genocide, because our political system was "tired." "Modern war" is an overwhelming combination of micro-management from across the varied nations belonging to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; a reliance on very high-tech weapons with precision effect that are useless in the absence of precision intelligence (and the lawyers insist the intelligence be near-real-time, a virtual impossibility for years to come); and an obsession with avoiding casualties that hand-cuffs our friendly commanders and gives great encouragement to our enemies. Services versus Commanders. The military services that under Title 10 are responsible for training, equipping, and organizing the forces--but not for fighting them, something the regional commanders-in-chief must do--have become--and I say this advisedly--the biggest impediment to the successful prosecution of operations. The detailed story of the Army staff resistance to the use of the Apache helicopters is the best case study I have ever seen of how senior staff generals with political access can prevent operational generals with field responsibilities from being fully effective. In combination with the insistence of the services that forces be held back for Korean and Persian Gulf threats that might not be realized, instead of supporting a real war that existed in Europe, simply stated, makes it clear that there is a "seam" between our force-creating generals and our force-fighting generals that has gotten *out of control.* The fog of war is thickest in Washington, and the greatest friction--the obstacles to success in war--are largely of our own making. Lawyers, Fear, and Micro-Management. Just as we recently witnessed a lawyer overruling the general to avoid killing the commander of the Taliban, General Clark's war was dominated by lawyers, a fear of casualties, and micro-management, from Washington, of his use of every weapons system normally left to the discretion of the field commander. This has gotten completely out of hand. Within NATO it is compounded by multi-national forces whose commanders can refuse orders inconsistent with their own national view of things, but reading this book, one is left with the clear understanding that General Clark was fighting a three-front war at all times: with the real enemy, with the media, and with Washington--his NATO commanders were the least of his problems. Technology Loses to Weather and Lacks Intelligence. Throughout the book there are statements that make it clear that the U.S. military is not yet an all-weather military, and has a very long way to go before it ever will be. Aligned with this incapacity is a high-technology culture that suffers from very weak maintenance and an almost complete lack of intelligence at the level of precision and with the timeliness that is needed for our very expensive weapons to be effective. Nothing has changed since MajGen Bob Scales wrote his excellent Firepower in Limited War, pointing out that artillery still cannot be adequately supported by the intelligence capabilities we have now. Strategic Mobility Shortfalls, Tactical Aviation Constraints. Although General Clark judges the air war to have been a success, and an essential factor in facilitating "coercive diplomacy", he also communicates two realities about U.S. military aviation: 1) we do not have the strategic aviation lift to get anywhere in less than 90-180 days, and his request for a 75 day mobilization was not possible as a result; and 2) our tactical aviation assets are so specialized, and require so much advance preparation in terms of munitions, route planning, and so on, that they cannot be readily redirected in less than a full day. A full day. This is simply outlandish. We Don't Do Mountains. No statement in the book hurt me more than one by an Army general telling General Clark that his plans for the ground campaign could not be supported by the U.S. Army because "we don't do mountains" This, in combination with the loser's attitude (no casualties) and the general reluctance of the services to put their high-tech capabilities like the Apache at risk in a real war, sum up the decrepitude of the U.S. military leadership and the Revolution in Military Affairs-Andrew Gordon in Rules of the Game has it exactly right-the post Viet-Nam and post Cold War era has left us with a bunch of high-tech chickens in control of military resources, and we need to find ourselves some rat-catchers able to redirect our military toward a lust for man to man combat in every clime and place-and the low-tech sustainable tools to do the job. General Clark's concluding words, on page 459: "In Kosovo my commanders and I found that we lacked the detailed prompt information to campaign effectively against the Serb ground forces. Most of the technologies we had been promoting since the Gulf War were still immature, unable to deal with the vagaries of weather, vegetation, and urban areas, or the limitations of bandwidth and airspace. The discrete service programs didn't always fit together technically. And (sic) the officers who operated the programs were not qualified to work across service lines and did not understand the full range of national capabilities. I worried about the nature of Joint skills even among senior officers." Are we ready? No.
Rating: 
Summary: Diary of an Insane War Criminal.
Review: A friend of mine remarked that Gen Clark was a certifiable monster, I disagree. He's a certified monster and this book serves as the certificate. In this book, Clark extols the virtues of unrestricted warfare, strategic carpet bombing and the absolute, undivided power of military brassdom. In a very biased manner, he blasts NATO for not giving him full license to commit wanton slaughter. This book largely serves as an apology for his murderous strategy. A strategy so morally repugnant that the Russians had to intervene to stop it. Even then Clark tried to start an armed conflict with Russia when he ordered an airborne assault on the the airport in Pristina. Thank God his orders were refused by General Sir Jackson. Clark is a raving lunatic.
Rating:
Summary: A magnificent book by a great general
Review: A magnificent book that shows how one of the best generals the USA has produced since World War 2 fought the last conflict in Europe of the 20th century -and an essential guide on how 21st century war should be fought. Christopher Catherwood, author of CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS AND ISLAMIC RAGE (Zondervan, 2003)
Rating:
Summary: Clear, well-written account of NATO's operation in Kosovo
Review: A stellar account of the challenges the Supreme Allied Commander faces during times of conflict. General Clark explains clearly and with wonderful detail the organization of the operation, the diplomatic and military steps taken to increase pressure on Milosevic, and the final decision that Operation Allied Force must begin. He allows the reader to understand the difficulties he faced with his "two-hat" command, leading both the NATO military and the American military in Europe. This book allows you to see the human side of command during the operation and gives you a true picture of what we were fighting for. I highly recommend this to anyone interested in looking at the new face of war, and what that means for the future of the military. Readers should keep in mind this is his personal memoirs, apparently not everyone who read and reviewed this book did.
Rating:
Summary: A Very Insightful Look at Waging Modern War
Review: Although it is primarily a memoir chronicling General Clark's experiences during Operation Allied Force (the air campaign against Serbia during the Kosovo crisis), it is also a sobering look at waging war during the 21st Century. General Clark offers a revealing look at political intrigue in the Pentagon and the State Department during the second Clinton administration. More importantly, he demonstrates how such intrigue had an adverse impact on his duties as NATO's supreme military commander in Europe. Clark makes a strong case that NATO's involvement in future European conflicts will require mutual consensus among NATO members; a difficult political minefield he successfully navigated. Furthermore, he also stresses the need for more flexible, more mobile, American military forces in future wars. Needless to say, his splendid prose is probably unsettling news to some Pentagon and State Department planners. Without a doubt, this is an important book for military historians and one which should be read by those involved with - or interested in - American military strategy and tactics for the 21st Century.
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