We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History

Rating:
Summary: Outstanding
Review: In this book, John Lewis Gaddis sets out to describe the major structural features of the Cold War, identify their causes, provide a narrative overview of the Cold War from its inception to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and embed the Cold War in the larger context of 20th century history. Gaddis succeeds in accomplishing all these ends in a well written book of less than 300 hundred pages. This is a considerable achievement. A good part of this book is driven by the fact that the end of the Cold War has resulted in access to Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern European sources that provide information about key events and decision makers. Much prior work concentrated one sidely on Western policies and policy makers. The new archival information allows reconstruction of important decisions and a more complete picture of the Cold War. It is important to note that not all the new information relates to Communist sources. For example, based on the availability of new documentation, Gaddis presents an account of John Kennedy's behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis that varies considerably from the standard accounts.
Gaddis addresses a number of key issues. Why did the Cold War begin? He sees the Cold War as a result of Stalin's insecurity and brutal Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe. Given the conduct of Soviet Armies and Stalin's aggressive foreign policy, the USA and its Western European Allies had no choice but to respond to Stalin in some form of confrontation. Was the Cold War a conflict just between the USA and the Soviet Union? Gaddis is careful to emphasize the autonomy of many decision makers during the Cold War. Some of these are surprising. An early and important event was the declaration of independence issued by Yugoslav communists in 1948. This event infuriated Stalin and played a large role in precipitating the Stalinist repression that occurred in many Eastern European Soviet satellites, further scaring Western European governments and pushing them closer to the USA. The emergence of NATO is presented very much as driven by Western European governments with the British playing a particularly important role. Gaddis contrasts the wisdom of American policy towards Europe and Japan with the ultimate failure of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. The Americans nourished European recovery with the Marshall plan, planted democracies in Germany and Japan, and tolerated a good deal of independence by important European partners. The Eastern European Soviet satellites, in contrast, were a chronic source of dissent and required diversion of considerable Soviet economic resources to maintain Soviet hegemony. This latter phenomena was actually predicted by the American diplomat George Kennan in the late 40s.
Gaddis deals very well with the problem of divided Germany and the expansion of the Cold War into Asia. He treats the Chinese and North Koreans as important independent forces and describes nicely the complexity of relations between the Soviets, the Chinese, and the North Koreans. Similarly, Gaddis provides a nice analysis of the expansion of the Cold War into the Third World, revealing very well how American policies, so successful in Europe and Japan, were mistaken in the Middle East and Latin America. Another topic dealt with very well is the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War. In Gaddis' view, nuclear weapons had a dual role. They reduced the chance of direct conflict between the US and the Soviet Union but provided the only arena in which it was possible for the Soviets to maintain some sort of parity with the West. The last effect considerably prolonged the Cold War.
Gaddis finishes after the Cuban missile crisis. This is a good choice for several reasons. It is likely that important documents relevant to the post-Missile Crisis period are only now emerging, so reassessment would be premature. It may be true also that in many important respects, the Cold War was over. The USA had triumphed in Western Europe and Japan, the Eastern European satellite states were a chronic headache for the Soviets, nuclear weapons had stablized the conflict, and conflicts in the 3rd world would never be crucial.
Finally, I have to address some comments made by other reviewers. Gaddis is not a right wing bigot. This is an evenhanded and fair book. It is written concisely and without literary flair but I would not describe it as dry. It is very difficult to combine narrative and analysis in a concise manner, especially when dealing with controversial topics like these. Gaddis has done an admirable job and deserves our thanks for bringing his analysis of the Cold War before the broad reading public.

Rating:
Summary: Groundhog day
Review: Mr Gaddis seems to have made a career of writing the same book eight times - new titles, references, but the same conclusion: everyone got it wrong but me

Rating:
Summary: Please, Mr. Gaddis, would you gi ve it a rest?
Review: Mr. Gaddis will never stop hammering away at his one sided position on the origins of the cold war. Really, you are wrong and you are tiresome.

Rating:
Summary: Incisive, compelling arguments.
Review: No, this book doesn't come too soon after the end of the Cold War. As Gaddis says at appropriate points, "we now know," suggesting we know much more and can evaluate much better than we could even at the end of the Cold War, but the "now" is just a temproary point. Obviously, we will eventually know more, perhaps much more. But, for now, Gaddis sheds new light on numerous events, and he does so in a serious but almost self-deprecating manner. For someone just plunging into the Cold War, this would be an excellent place to start. For those who lived through most of the Cold War as I did, and have studied it now and again, this work provides a wonderful reality check.

Rating:
Summary: outstanding
Review: Professor Gaddis's course on the Cold War at Yale is, without a doubt, the most popular class offered, attracting probably 800-1000 (one-fifth of undergraduates) people before it must be capped at a still staggering 400, and rightfully so: an un-assuming fellow, he is a well-known and brilliant historian with a knack for writing and teaching. His book, We Now Know, is an outstanding piece of historical scholarship on the origins of the Cold War and how it played out in the years before the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is carefully argued and well-documented. He approaches all sides of the Cold War, including the sometimes overlooked role China played in the early Cold War, not to mention the attention he gives to nuclear weapons and the third world, for example. Gaddis's writing is very accessible, and he draws many insightful parallels and analogies which aid in understanding even the most complicated of events and theories. While I think those with at least a basic background in Cold War history would appreciate the book and its interpretations more, it could certainly serve as an introductory text. Gaddis is the don of modern Cold War historians, and this is nothing short of a masterpiece. I heartily recommend it.

Rating:
Summary: Good research, well written.
Review: The best thing about this book is that it uses Soviet and Chinese sources that up until early this decade (meaning the 90's) were unavailable to U.S. historians. The book covers the major events of the Cold War in a clear and engaging manner. A must read for any student of the Cold War.

Rating:
Summary: We now know what?
Review: The worst type of Cold Warrior propaganda. Gaddis dares be outraged by the Soviet Union's spies in the US, as if the United States didn't have their own spies in the Soviet Union. More of the same tired, "The Cold War was all the fault of the USSR. The noble United States would never be anything less than completely fair and objective." HAH!!! Forced to read this for a graduate seminar, it was a waste of time. A little more objectivity would be nice, and perhaps a touch of reality outside of the Reagan sphere of influence. Although, if the phrase "We're from the government, we're here to help you," does not strike terror into your heart, you'd probably truly enjoy this one-sided treatise on the causes and effects of the Cold War. I give it two stars because even though I couldn't sell it back, the size was perfect to block a hole in a baseboard so one of my cats wouldn't get stuck in the wall anymore.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting analysis.
Review: This is an analysis of the Cold War, not a history. Gaddis' writing style is a bit dry, but this is more than offset by the wealth of insight and information contained in his book. He has four principal themes:
· If you can pin the blame for starting the Cold War on anyone, it would be Josef Stalin. His personality and leadership style caused it. His imprint was so strong on the Soviet Union that Moscow's leadership style in the three decades following his death was still steeped in his. This served to perpetuate the Cold War, which began on his watch. (I presume, another reason it continued was that it had become institutionalized in the West as well by the mid-50s). It wasn't until the next generation of leaders-Gorbachev-came along that they finally broke from the Stalinist tradition. He sees no coincidence between this and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
· The Cold War was less bi-polar than is generally thought. Not only did Yugoslavia set its own course from Moscow, but Red China often expressed a will of its own even in the early days. (I was surprised to learn that Mao Zedong was a fan of Stalin's and remained so after Stalin's death.) Also, Eastern Europe remained in the Soviet Union's sphere only by force and coercion. North Vietnam, North Korea, and even East Germany, didn't always tow the line.
· The turning point of the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Up to that point, politics, ideology, and economics all played into the conflict, and the issue, even viewed from today, was considered to be in doubt. After the Cuban Missile Crisis the focus was solely on military power, which obscured to both sides the reality that the Soviet Union was losing-that it couldn't keep up either morally or economically.
· Digging into old Soviet and East European files and sources will bring surprises. He thinks (and, it would appear, reasonably so) that there's much more to be learned as we penetrate the old files.
Gaddis has a lot of detail on the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially on the number and types of Soviet missiles and associated equipment that deployed to Cuba, the number of Soviet troops involved, and the communications flow up and down the Soviet chain of command between Cuba and Moscow. I was struck by the apparent willingness of Castro to let the situation go nuclear.
This is a readable book that just begins to scratch the surface of the heretofore hidden history of the Cold War. Hopefully it is just a hint at what is to come.
For that matter, Mao seems to have never shrunk from the prospect of a full nuclear exchange either. This frightened Moscow, but in each case seems to have resulted from Castro's and Mao's believing Nikita Khrushchev's bombastic propaganda about the Soviet Union having nuclear parity with, and even superiority over, the West.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting analysis.
Review: This is an analysis of the Cold War, not a history. Gaddis' writing style is a bit dry, but this is more than offset by the wealth of insight and information contained in his book. He has four principal themes:
· If you can pin the blame for starting the Cold War on anyone, it would be Josef Stalin. His personality and leadership style caused it. His imprint was so strong on the Soviet Union that Moscow's leadership style in the three decades following his death was still steeped in his. This served to perpetuate the Cold War, which began on his watch. (I presume, another reason it continued was that it had become institutionalized in the West as well by the mid-50s). It wasn't until the next generation of leaders-Gorbachev-came along that they finally broke from the Stalinist tradition. He sees no coincidence between this and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
· The Cold War was less bi-polar than is generally thought. Not only did Yugoslavia set its own course from Moscow, but Red China often expressed a will of its own even in the early days. (I was surprised to learn that Mao Zedong was a fan of Stalin's and remained so after Stalin's death.) Also, Eastern Europe remained in the Soviet Union's sphere only by force and coercion. North Vietnam, North Korea, and even East Germany, didn't always tow the line.
· The turning point of the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Up to that point, politics, ideology, and economics all played into the conflict, and the issue, even viewed from today, was considered to be in doubt. After the Cuban Missile Crisis the focus was solely on military power, which obscured to both sides the reality that the Soviet Union was losing-that it couldn't keep up either morally or economically.
· Digging into old Soviet and East European files and sources will bring surprises. He thinks (and, it would appear, reasonably so) that there's much more to be learned as we penetrate the old files.
Gaddis has a lot of detail on the Cuban Missile Crisis, especially on the number and types of Soviet missiles and associated equipment that deployed to Cuba, the number of Soviet troops involved, and the communications flow up and down the Soviet chain of command between Cuba and Moscow. I was struck by the apparent willingness of Castro to let the situation go nuclear.
This is a readable book that just begins to scratch the surface of the heretofore hidden history of the Cold War. Hopefully it is just a hint at what is to come.
For that matter, Mao seems to have never shrunk from the prospect of a full nuclear exchange either. This frightened Moscow, but in each case seems to have resulted from Castro's and Mao's believing Nikita Khrushchev's bombastic propaganda about the Soviet Union having nuclear parity with, and even superiority over, the West.

Rating:
Summary: An outstanding work!
Review: To understand the beginnings of the Cold War and some of its major themes, this is the book to read. Its insights, analysis and documentation make it the single best book to date on the subject.