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Summary: Essential reading for understanding US relations with Iran
Review: This is a short and very readable account of the American sponsored coup that overthrew the Iranian government of Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. I recommend this book for a variety of reasons. First, it briefly summarizes Iranian history in a way that readers without a lot of background can absorb. Secondly, Kinzer tells the story of the coup without loading the reader down with so much detail that the essentials of the story are obscured. Thirdly, while Kinzer clearly blames the British, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Eisenhower Administration for making a short-sighted decision, he acknowledges that there is no way to disprove the justification for the coup, i.e., that it was necessary to prevent a Soviet takeover of Iran. As an aside, Harry Truman comes off looking very wise in resisting pressure from Britain to support the coup; a decision the Eisenhower Administration reversed.
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Summary: As Thrilling to Read as it is Illuminating
Review: "All the Shah's Men" is a wonderfully constructed account of America's fateful decision to back Britain and it's principle Iranian oil interests by overthrowing Iran's popular, democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in 1953. Based on his extensive research into a variety of Iranian and American sources including now declassified CIA documents, veteran New York Times journalist, Stephen Kinzer, has produced a historical analysis that reads like a spy thriller. In addition to focusing on the fascinating details of the American-sponsored coup itself, Kinzer provides a vivid and objective portrait of the principle players including the coup's colorful mastermind, CIA operative, Kermit Roosevelt, Iran's enormously popular and passionately nationalistic Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, and a host of other individuals ranging from world leaders to the shadowy organizers of street mobs in Iran. Much to his credit, Kinzer examines an understandably controversial subject without employing a predictably judgmental perspective. For example, while Kinzer displays tremendous sympathy toward Mossadegh, he avoids characterizing him as completely virtuous, and competent leader who was overthrown by a rapacious world power. In many ways Mossadegh was a virtuous leader, and his decision to nationalize the deeply oppressive and intractable Anglo/Iranian Oil Company not only earned him tremendous popularity in Iran, but also generated tremendous sympathy in the anti-colonial Truman Administration (which invited him to the United States) and even within the conservative Eisenhower Administration, albeit to a lesser extent. But as just as Mossadegh's grievances against Britain may have been, Kinzer demonstrates that he lacked the shrewdness and the practicality to negotiate with Britain when he had the upper hand. While it was probably impossible for Mossadegh to fully understand the increasingly binary nature of America's global rivalry with the Soviet Union, and how the American government would come to view him in this context, one can't help but wonder how a more skilled and ruthlessly practical politician such as Ghandi or Ho Chi Minh would have handled the situation. Kinzer concludes that while Mossadegh was undoubtedly the victim of an American-sponsored coup, his own understandable, but deeply impractical political passions were partly to blame. Equally fascinating is the lens that Kinzer turns on the American leadership and on its gradual shift from sympathizing with Mossadegh to ultimately backing the British in their quest to regain control of their Iranian oil concessions. In part this resulted from changing political fortunes on both sides of the Atlantic. In roughly the same time frame Attlee's Labor Government in Britain, and the Democratic Truman Administration in America-both of which were largely sympathetic to Mossadegh-were replaced by the more deeply reactionary administrations of Churchill and Eisenhower. Churchill saw himself as the last bastion of the remaining British Empire, and Eisenhower had campaigned on a strong anti-Communist platform. In this context neither leader was willing to tolerate a nationalistic leader of Mossadegh's calibur in Iran. Despite its role in overthrowing the elected leader of a sovereign nation, the American government emerges from these pages in a surprisingly sympathetic manner by at first attempting to work with Mossadegh and then reluctantly helping the British to overthrow him. It is perhaps the British with their hidebound arrogance and total dismissal of Iranian interests who come across as the book's only villains. Finally there is the planning and execution of the coup itself, by CIA operative, Kermit Roosevelt. This part of the story contains so many fascinating and unbelievable twists that it even prompted President Eisenhower to compare it to a dime store novel after Roosevelt provided him with a subsequent intelligence briefing on the subject. One could argue that the Iranian coup formed the blueprint for so many subsequent right-wing coups in places like Nicaragua (1955), Vietnam (1963), Brazil (1964), Chile, (1973), Florida (2000), Venezuela (2002--which actually failed) and Haiti (2004). In most cases, the process of overthrowing a democratically elected government involved a strong man to replace the deposed leader, organizing and dispatching violent mobs to create chaos and to provide the veneer of popular rage toward the existing government, control and skillful application of the mass-media, at least minimal military and police cooperation, and some sort of legal or judicial process to vilify the outgoing leadership and legitimize the new one. Roosevelt skillfully assembled and deployed these elements in deposing Mossadegh and replacing his government with that of the deeply repressive Mohammad Reza Shah. Kinzer concludes his book with some practical questions and hypothetical examinations of other possible outcomes. Could Mossadegh have avoided the coup if he had been more flexible? Would America's long-term foreign policy aims have been better served by backing Mossadegh and by standing for democracy in practice as well as in rhetoric? Was the coup really necessary to counter the perceived Soviet threat? How might subsequent American foreign policy have differed if the coup actually failed, which it very nearly did? In examining these issues, Kinzer come to two sobering conclusions. First, he observes that having easily overturned an undesirable government in one country, American foreign policy makers, most notably the Dulles brothers, believed that "regime change", as we now call it, was a simple and practical approach to implementing America's global security requirements in potentially troubled regions. Kinzer also concludes that seemingly inexplicable events such as the humiliating American Hostage Crisis in 1979 and many subsequent terrorist attacks have origins in the coup that overthrew Mossadegh. Kinzer does not frame his conclusions in a manner that blames America or justifies terrorism. Instead, he provides a rational explanation of cause and effect and suggests that the blowback from the Iranian experience should be considered when making similar policy decisions.
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Summary: Something you will not see on the 5 O'Clock News
Review: I read this book along with the idiots guide to the Koran. I have been on a journey of personal enlightenment and would like to understand the truth of Islam and the Middle East. This book helps shed some light on the pillar of "the axis of evil, " Iran and how it was shaped, formed, and started by none other than the Eisenhower administration of the United States of America. Our lack of fore sight on Middle Eastern policy has laid the ground work for the Taliban in Afghanistan the funding of Hamass and other extremist organizations. I fear we are only doomed to repeat these actions with our unwavering backing of Sharon of Israel. We must take each country and situation as its own and offer humility and respect. We must support the adoption of a modern middle class that will reach out to the west in friendly relations. Take Turkey's Example: they have had moderate leadership supported by the west that has allowed them to form a state that is majority Muslim and still economically viable with many democratic freedoms and steered safely clear of the meddling hands of the Soviets.With the short team band-aid foreign policy of the Bush Administration I fear we are doomed to repeat our mistakes and celebrate a victory such as Operation Ajax- which in the end is truly a sobering defeat. I highly recommend this book. It will allow you to argue Middle East politics from the inside rather than finger pointing and going off of what the 5 oclock news feeds us at the trough every night. There is a reason that Iran refers us to as the Great Satan. There is a reason for the extreme Islamic regime. Iran is a pendulum and I hope in the near future we can adopt a policy that helps it stop somewhere in the middle rather than swinging wildly from side to side.
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Summary: Please share this eye-opening book by gifting it to someone
Review: This book is my favorite over the last 2 years, and I read more than 50 books every year (about one book per week). My only complaint is that the title of the book should have mentioned Mossadegh....something like, "The Story of Mossadegh: How the British and the CIA Destroyed a Great Soul and a Great Nation." All the Shah's Men are not important - history will forget them, at most in a few decades. Mossadegh's legend will grow with time, just like those of Socrates or Mother Teresa. Mossadegh was to the Iranians, what Gandhi was to Indians, or what Martin Luther King was to the African Americans. Its just a matter of time - the current Islamic govt. in Iran is too afraid of the democratic ideals that Mossadegh represented. Sooner or later Mossadegh will occupy the place in history that he rightfully deserves - there will be many more books, movies, and who knows even future revolutions inspired by him. Many thanks to Stephen Kinzer for publishing an accurate account of how Churchill's and Eisenhower's short term oil interests and communophobia ruined a budding democracy in a great historical land. Note that the book was just published in 2003 and a lot of material was inaccessible until very recently. Iran or Persia was home to Rumi, the great sufi mystic, and Zoroaster, the great spiritual teacher. Iranians are moderate people, representing the best values of Islam. Yet, a typical American's assessment of Iranians is that they are fanatic zealots and hate the whole western culture. And may be there is some truth to that. But have you ever wondered why Iranians became so disgusted and suspicious of the Americans and the British. Read this book. Whatever you may think of America or Britain, it will forever change you assessment of the evil roles played by the governments of these two countries (only the governments, not the people of these countries, of course). Also, if your heart has ever cried thinking about the 9/11 tragedies, then your answers will be forever incomplete if you do not begin to understand the powerful forces of hate unleashed by CIA and Churchill in the 1953 coup when they removed a democratically elected, liberal minded leader named Mossadegh in favor of British oil interests. Mossadegh inspired millions of Iranians, just like Thomas Jefferson inspired millions of Americans. By implanting Shah as the cruel dictator and removing Mossadegh (the democratically elected Prime Minister), the CIA operative Kermit Roosevelt forever changed Middle eastern politics. Consider for a moment what would have happnened if the British had implanted a cruel dictator like Fidel Castro in the U.S. in 1776 and imprisoned the founding fathers of U.S. If you have taken the trouble to read some of these reviews - buy this book, its the most important book on why we are where we are today. A sobering realization of who is really behind the world that we have inherited today. You decide that after reading the book!
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Summary: Informative, fair, and eye-opening
Review: This short book describes the history and events that led to and include the overthrow of the Iranian democratic government of Mossadegh in fifties. Kezner describes not only the overthrow concocted by CIA, but the previous events of early Iranian history, British colonialism, corrupt oil deals, and the future ramifications of the overthrow. This book is a very concise history book. Out of the 200 pages, only about fifty concern the actual overthrow. It's much less a description of the overthrow than a sociological and psychological description and analysis of how the revolution occurred and whether it was a viable option to combat communism, or just an excuse to exploit a small country. All in all, it's a very concise, informative, insightful read which strangely mirrors many of today's current events. I highly recommend this.
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Summary: Makes you Wonder................................HoomanNYC
Review: My personal interest in the subject is due to my background. Being a Persian(Iranian)-American living in New York, I sometimes feel ambivalent towards the Unites States. On one hand I love this country for all of the opportunities it has offered me, but then I wonder if I would have been happier in my own country,with my family and countrymen if the U.S.did not interfere in Iran's political & economic advances and not caused the '53 revolution that would set IRAN so far back in the technology and everyday life that me & my family would have to leave our homeland in search of something better. The country and its history go far back and with the arrival of the new government, it is unfortunate that the country is set back to the prophet Mohammads time.
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Summary: All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle
Review: This comprehensive--and most current--account of the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company under the leadership of Mohammad Mossadegh in 1951 details the reaction of the company, the British government, and US political leadership to that historic event. Mossadegh had become "a defining figure whose ideas, for better or worse, were reshaping history," a fact that the British were simply not willing, or able, to accept. The ensuing crisis pushed Iran into economic bankruptcy and political chaos, vulnerable to Soviet designs. In 1952, Churchill and Eisenhower agreed to get rid of the Iranian prime minister using covert activities of the CIA. The consequences proved monumental for both Iran and the whole region. Seasoned New York Times reporter Kinzer offers a well-researched and attractive book that is more journalism than scholarship. Sources for the numerous quotations appear in endnotes rather than footnotes, and some quotations are from secondary sources whose reliability many scholars have questioned. However, on the whole, this is a valuable and informative work for students of international affairs, with a moving account in the epilogue of the author's visit to Mossadegh's estate, where the leader was forced to spend the last years of his life and where he is buried.
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Summary: Thrilling Record of Important History
Review: Mr. Kinzer wrote a book that is a factual thriller describing the events surrounding the coup that put the late shah in power. The primary motivations seemed to be greed and fear. Eisenhower's fear of a Soviet takeover, Churchill's greed for Iran's oil, and the greed of the family of the shah for money and the power that would lead to money. We destroyed a fledgling democracy and set up a history of ill-will to the U.S. That doesn't excuse terrorism or the actions of vicious men like Saddam Hussein, but it puts an important perspective on the difficulty of our MidEast relations. The mentality of the reviewer below is also a case in point. Notice how bellicose and uniformed the reviewer is. The name of the not very good book was "Palace of Solitude." It was written by the shah's second wife, not his first wife. He divorced both, but his first wife was Princess Fawzia. He divorced her when she only produced a girl, and married Soraya when she was 17. He divorced her after 7 years when he discovered she couldn't have children. The he married #3, who gave him a male heir and three other children. The son of a commoner thought God spoke to him and he dreamt of a dynasty. Fortunately, the world woke him up.
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Summary: blah..blah..blah...
Review: Yet another attempt to bash the Shah and the golden days of Iran under the Shah. Yes, the shah was not mother Teresa, but neither he was Changiz Khan! Ask any Iranian of 40+ years old living in Iran what is their greatest wish coming from heart, and they tell you to go back to 1979 and destory in the most brutal manner anyone who said "Death to the Shah". If you truly want to know what happened in 1953, read PALACE OF SOLITUDES by the Shah's first wife Soraya.
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Summary: Best Book on Iran
Review: This is a fascinating account of how we enabled the timid and tyrannical shah to regain power in Iran. The shah's father was a commoner and a military man who overthrew the centuries-old Qajar dynasty, and crowned himself king. There was no "Pahlavi dynasty." Today, the shah's son and third wife, his widow, have delusions of grandeur. His son says he'll be king if that is what "the people" want. His web site claims an imperial seal, even though he wrote a book about democracy in Iran in an attempt to pander to the West. Farah, the shah's widow, copied Queen Noor's autobiography in an attempt to sanitize her family's past. Her web site calls her an empress even though neither she nor her husband had a drop of "royal" blood. Amazing what you can force on people when you are holding the shooting end of a gun, but today, no one is buying their story. We put the shah in power because we thought he'd be more U.S. friendly, and we were right about that, but ultimately, the shah was a weak and spiteful man who contributed to his own downfall. We put him in power, but his intractability got him ousted. The shah was our failed experiment, and the best we can do is to learn from this experience.
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