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Rating: Summary: Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age Review: I cannot recommend this book. Berkowitz and Goodman are to be commended for advocating a major reshaping of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Unfortunately their proposals for how to effect that reshaping are superficial and ill-conceived. This is a shame because they actually have some good ideas such as making the IC more flexible by using virtual teaming, bringing analysts closer to policy makers, and making better use of non-IC resources. In the end however the book fails to convince. Apparently neither Berkowitz nor Goodman has a clue as to how the intelligence process actually works.
To take one example, the collection, processing and exploitation of information in the intellgence cycle are much more complex than authors would have the readers beleive. A customer requirement is not satisfied by opening a tap called 'collection' and pouring the resulting information into bucket to be passed to the analytic phase of the cycle.As they ought to know, but apparently do not, the collection of both technical and human intelligence(information) in response to customer requriements can often take weeks, months or even years of focused activity. Further as information is collected, it often will lead to changes in collection methods, the perceptions of the analysts who are trying to transform that information into intelligence, and even change the requirement that initiated the effort. This phase of the cycle is a dynamic process that involves constant interaction between collectors, technicians,analysts, and ,yes, customers.
Berkowitz and Goodman have a smilarly simple minded understanding of the intellegence production phase of the cycle. It is difficult to take seriously proposals for reform of the intelligence process from authors who appear not to understand that process. As in everything else, in buying books you have to seperate the nuts from the bolts.
Rating: Summary: Godd overview, poor suggestions Review: I enjoyed the broad overview of the generation and use of intelligence information. I found the suggestions of how to change the intelligence system too vague, driven by the management technique of the hour and unworkable. The authors suggestion that agencies drop specialized groups and pulls special teams together when needed. This may be workable in the short run, but in the long run there will be no deep experts as there are today. It takes time and money to develop these experts and only the government can plan to develop these experts, that may or may not ever be fully utilized. The authors site NASA's faster, better, cheaper management, a style that in my opinion is none of these, as something the intelligence community should adopt. It would be alright for someone to site this, but you must also site the numerous failures of the method. I got the feeling that if the book had been written ten years ago, Japanese management methods would have been sited as useful, they have of course fallen from favor. Cold fusion and the work that was done by innumerable physics to at the time of the first announcement as the way the intelligence community should attach important new questions that are time sensitive. Have hundreds of experts across the intelligence community bear upon a question as a way to get a quick, high quality answer. What the authors don't understand is all those physicists were working for free or on someone else's dime. All those hundreds of people will need to charge against this new effort, enough to break any budget, not to mention the poor chance of getting a high quality answer. So, the book is a good airing of the issues, but not much at solving the problems.
Rating: Summary: Godd overview, poor suggestions Review: This book dedicates itself entirely to fixing the underlying process of intelligence. The authors place intelligence in the larger context of information, and draw a plethora of useful comparisons with emerging private sector capabilities and standards. They place strong emphasis on the emerging issues (not necessarily threats) related to ethnic, religious, and geopolitical confrontation, and are acutely sensitive to the new power of non-governmental organizations and non-state actors. The heart of their book is captured in three guidelines for the new process: focus on understanding the consumer's priorities; minimize the investment in fixed hardware and personnel; and create a system that can draw freely on commercial capabilities where applicable (as they often will be). Their chapter on the failure of the bureaucratic model for intelligence, and the need to adopt the virtual model-one that permits analysts to draw at will on diverse open sources-is well presented and compelling. Their concluding three chapters on analysis, covert action, and secrecy are solid professional-level discussions of where we must go in the future.
Rating: Summary: The Next President, and Next DCI, Need to Read This Book Review: This book dedicates itself entirely to fixing the underlying process of intelligence. The authors place intelligence in the larger context of information, and draw a plethora of useful comparisons with emerging private sector capabilities and standards. They place strong emphasis on the emerging issues (not necessarily threats) related to ethnic, religious, and geopolitical confrontation, and are acutely sensitive to the new power of non-governmental organizations and non-state actors. The heart of their book is captured in three guidelines for the new process: focus on understanding the consumer's priorities; minimize the investment in fixed hardware and personnel; and create a system that can draw freely on commercial capabilities where applicable (as they often will be). Their chapter on the failure of the bureaucratic model for intelligence, and the need to adopt the virtual model-one that permits analysts to draw at will on diverse open sources-is well presented and compelling. Their concluding three chapters on analysis, covert action, and secrecy are solid professional-level discussions of where we must go in the future.
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