Does America Need a Foreign Policy? : Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century

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Summary: Does America need Henry Kissinger?
Review: (excerpted from the full review)

Across 288 pages of geopolitical analyses and reflections on national character, Henry Kissinger writes his state-of-the-political-world address for American readers and policymakers, with a special nod to the vanguard of American power. Does America Need a Foreign Policy? divides the world by continent, studies the political history of each region and proposes a direction for American foreign policy based on a synthesis of the two. It is a methodical study of minute and specific political realities set into broad frameworks of continental trend, national interest and historical parallel. It is sometimes insightful, always analytical, and easy to read.

But Does America Need a Foreign Policy? is also frequently misleading and historically incorrect. It is the rushed work of an egoist, planned less than subtly to place the author as mediator in a debate between two imaginary ideological camps in American public discourse. While Kissinger hopes to convince readers that he is a thinker of clarity and unusual import, there are in fact few if any ideas here that one cannot draw from embassy cables or academic publications. A cautious read soon finds the book's more interesting message not within but rather between its lines: an authorial bias poorly veiled by the adoption of "human rights" language, a clear disdain for the "self-righteous" pursuit of international ethics, and a poorly played off fear of prosecution in international courts. Readers who've not had the chance to analyze international political developments of the last ten years will learn much from Kissinger's analysis of the factors that create the political will for the United States to act or take a certain position in the former Yugoslovia, China or Somalia. Other readers will find themselves debating and even conceding points to the poster boy for realpolitik. But the book's best contribution is the opportunity it affords us all to evaluate how a politician rises to a position of prominence, holds it for decades, and now tips his hand as to how he intends to stay there. After seven chapters of questionable sincerity and carefully crafted terms of debate, Americans ought to question why we and our government pay homage to and consult retired opportunists who use our government and abuse our trust to build and protect their legacy of personal power. We ought to pose in return a query of our own, "Does America need Henry Kissinger?"
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Kissinger seems to see "America's national interest" (he never expressly defines the term) as open markets for American goods, military security and a political climate equal to the values of the American people, the last of which is minimally clarified in a single reference to "human rights" (p.163) In a telling parallel, other nations pursuing their comparative national interest acquire from Kissinger the derogatory term "nationalist" (p.124). Kissinger asserts that policymakers cannot interact effectively with other nations without an understanding of each nation's history and geopolitical position. He merges these two factors into a sort of personality for each state in question. Kissinger writes about nations as a playwright would his characters. Britain, he says, is America's natural partner, born of a common history and a special friendship that Britain has guarded as the cornerstone of its foreign policy since World War II. France is a stubborn nation that prides itself on bucking the authority of the United States to the extent that it proves convenient. The "creeping expansionism" of Russia is a recurring theme the international community would do well to bear in mind (p.71).

Though Kissinger evaluates the political landscape nation by nation with careful attention to history, he processes this information into the simplest of models. No complex problem is immune from allegory or short description. America and Europe make up "The World of Democracies." Asia is "The World of Equilibrium," the Middle East and Africa, "Worlds in Transition." As Kissinger points out, this sort of intellectual insight is preferable to the idea carried by some policymakers that the American context is applicable anywhere. But it is dangerous in its simplicity and ignores key factors not defined by the nation-state. Corporations are rarely mentioned in this book. Non-governmental organizations are non-existent. The transmission and control of information from governments to their people receives no treatment here, the mixing of populations across borders little. This barren analysis is painfully difficult to ignore in the book's final chapters, wherein Kissinger abandons geography to address 'The Politics of Globalization" and "Peace and Justice."
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Similarly, Kissinger wants to defend the American interest by stopping Mercosur, a trade agreement linking together a number of Latin American nations (p.95). "Like every new trading bloc, Mercosur affirms that its intentions are non-discriminatory; the reality is otherwise. It is the defining characteristic of a trading bloc that its internal barriers are lower than its external ones; its bargaining position depends on its ability to grant or withhold benefits that its own members enjoy as of right" (p.96). Of course by this definition the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and Kissinger's own proposed TAFTA are also trading blocs, albeit trading blocs that benefit the United States. Cuba was not invited to Quebec City for negotiations on the FTAA. Its exclusion was a diplomatic method of denouncing Cuba's political system and as another step in isolating its economy. But rather than admitting to some idea of relative truth, Kissinger strangles the debate once more. "As an alibi for their reluctance to cooperate, the Latin American governments tend to cite US hypocrisy" (p. 93).

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Summary: New Challenges in a Time of Preeminence
Review: At the dawning of the new millennium, the United States faces a paradox. It finds itself basking in a success unrivaled by history's greatest empires. In popular culture, finance, weaponry, science, technology and education, the country dominates the worldview. The country considers itself both the source and the guarantor of global democratic institutions.

Yet, Kissinger argues, the United States finds itself at a juncture with irrelevance to many of the issues affecting and changing the world order. Interest in foreign affairs, he notes judging from media coverage and congressional sentiment, is at an all time low. As a result the United States finds itself facing some of the most profound and widespread upheavals the world has ever witnessed, yet unwilling and uninterested in developing concepts relevant to the foreign policy reality.

Our relations with Europe, Asia, Africa and the Middle East require subtle responses rendering the traditional American quest for an all-purpose, magic foreign relations formula irrelevant. Unfortunately, the former Secretary of State argues, three forces in domestic politics drives American foreign policy in the opposite direction.

First, Congress legislates the tactics of foreign policy and seeks to impose a code of conduct on other nations by sanction. These legislative actions drive American foreign policy towards a unilateral and, what Kissinger describes as, occasionally bullying conduct.

Second, coverage of these events by a ratings-driven media does not help. Their obsession with the crisis of the moment rarely fosters discussion of the long-range historical challenges. They prefer to portray today's crisis as a morality play with a specific outcome and then move on to the next new sensation. Even though the underlying trends continue, growing in their unmanageability on a daily basis, they receive little attention.

Finally, the deepest reason for America's failure to develop a coherent strategy is the presence of three different generations, each with its own approach to foreign relations dominate the foreign policy debate - the Cold Warriors, Vietnam Protestors and Generation X, whose experience makes it hard for them to understand the perceptions of the previous two.

The inability of these three groups to articulate an unapologetic statement of enlightened self-interest results in what Kissinger refers to as "Progressive Paralysis." Certainly the country must fashion a foreign policy consistent with its democratic heritage and concerned with the democracy's world wide vitality, he writes, but it must also translate these values into answers to difficult questions: What, for our survival, must we seek to prevent no matter how painful the means? What wrongs is it essential to right? What goals are simply beyond our capacity?

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Summary: Nice primer - but nothing groundbreaking
Review: Does the US Need Foreign Policy? Good question. Unfortunately you won't find the answer in this book.
In this book, Kissinger takes the reader around the globe region by region reviewing Cold War history. I was quite disappointed. Not all is lost though. If you can make it through Kissinger's dense and entangling prose this book makes quite a good primer for world politics.
Kissinger's well thought out attack on the International Court is the one redeeming aspect of the book. I disagree with Kissinger's reasoning, but he does give an excellent, intellectual case against the ICJ. His argument is predictable though - finding its roots in the peace of Westphalia - and he has good reason to argue against such a court - with old foreign pals from the Nixon administration finding themselves in hot water (e.g. Pinochet).
Surprisingly, a new development has occurred in Kissinger's analysis. He has recently made a new acquaintance of "low politics" - namely economics. It's reassuring.
I could only recommend this book to someone new to IR studies or someone that wants a quick review around the world - this book would make an excellent primer. But that's all.

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Summary: A detailed answer to a simple question
Review: Henry Kissinger presents a detailed and thorough examination of the world "at this writing" (as he says many times through out the book) and very much so as the BusinessWeek review says he seems to "take the globe in his hands, turn it slowly, and explain everything he sees on each continent." Indeed, the world's situation - and the actions of foreign governments thereof - was made much more clear to me.

For example, on pg. 40 he explains why Germany's government often seems topsy-turvy in whether or not she is a close ally to the United States: Germany, now united, is trying to continue to grow into an international power, and while she may be "far less prepared to put at risk her links to the United States," Germany also wants to "seek for itself the role within Europe that France insists Europe should play in the Atlantic Alliance." I also think he makes a good point when he explains that the reason for much European disagreement with American foreign policy recently is that with the fall of the Cold War there is no longer a common enemy. We are seeing a re-emergence of nationalist-driven foreign diplomacy we saw in the 19th century.

The books goes on from more than the west. Kissinger moves on to Asia and explains Japanese, Korean, and Chinese relations with the United States (and why Japan and China should be considered necessary attendants of any Korean talks). He also talks about the Middle East and Africa, and I think he is right when he says that they are modern nations still politically stuck in the Middle Ages, with conflicts whose "emotional impetus derives from forces comparable to those of Europe during the 17th century." (pg. 164) If anything, Afghanistan is a perfect example of a nation with an internal structure still trapped in centuries gone past.

While I'll admit Chapter Six ("The Politics of Globalization") bored me, it is only because I am horrible at understanding any thing economic. However, the next chapter ("Peace and Justice") opens with a great study on the evolution of American foreign policy, from the development of European balance-of-power in Jefferson to the "Roosevelt corollary" and to the split between "Wilsonians" (interventionalists) and "Jacksonians" (isolationists) - I would highly recommend this part of the chapter. It then gives a good thesis on whether or not "noble" causes such as Rwanda, East Timor, or Somalia are worth time, money, and effort. As Kissinger says, there's nothing wrong with humanitarian efforts so long as Americans have "a readiness to pay the necessary price, in casualties or in financial sacrifice." (pg. 258) If any thing, Somalia is a perfect example of this, where troops were sent in to assist humanitarian efforts but at the death of 18 men were pulled out, stopping all efforts to ease the plight of the Somalians.

The main theme of this book seems to be equilibrium - America's ability to balance power in all regions while maintaining her foreign influence. As a result, I find many of Kissinger's ideals to be quite fair; for example, in the Israeli conflict, he suggests that Israel may have to make sacrifices but should not return to the security-threatening 1967 borders, while Palestine may be independant but needs to cease terrorist attacks and get rid of anti-Semite propoganda. (pg. 184) Yes, he does tend to criticize Clinton, but only Clinton's foreign policy, and nor is there any great critique against Democratic presidents. Kissinger praises Clinton for enacting NAFTA and other treaty organizations, but just didn't think he did enough. He also speaks well of Kennedy's and Carter's administrations, and even uses Carter's Camp David Accords as a better example of Middle East peace-talks when compared to the rushed and overambitious Berak-Clinton Peace Plan. I seriously doubt Clinton would even mind the criticism: while promoting his book Clinton said it was perfectly fine if some one disagreed with him, just so long as instead of brandishing him "a monster" they gave their reasons in a logical manner. Kissinger has done just that. I have to also comment if you are offended there seems to be an American bias in this book...you should look back at the title.

In summary, I enjoyed this read, and I wouldn't mind reading it again. Here we have a concise, detailed review of our world situation and it's historical context. (a very important effect to Kissinger) If you are interested in American foreign policy or where it is headed, I would highly suggest this book, even if it is just to get another opinion.

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Summary: A walk across the globe with henry
Review: Henry Kissinger, one of the men most responsible for the shape of foregn policy in this country over the last several decades shares his thoughts on the world climate and the U.S. response to it in the present and future. In a thouroughly readable way Kissinger breaks down, region by region, all of the aims and goals, successes and failures of our foreign policy and offers his views on where we should be headed now. The new chapter on the 9-11 attacks provides a needed and helpful postscript. Highly recommended.

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Summary: Has many valid points, overly critical of Bill Clinton, etc.
Review: I am reading Dr. Kissinger's book (which I'm almost finished with). I found that he has some valid points, regarding some of the decisions made, in foreign policy, by American Presidents and their administrations. He does appear to be focused on the mistakes made, he says, by the Clinton administration; which, no doubt some are true and some are due to his political perspective. His comments, regarding Iraq, Iran, and others, seem to be fairly appropriate right now (especially with the current war). Like the other book of his, Diplomacy, he presents eloquent, intelligent arguments; some of which, like his criticisms of Bill Clinton, I don't happen to agree with, as I probably wouldn't with this newest right-wing diatribe, "Dereliction of Duty:..."; which is written by a former military man, someone who probably has an ax to grind (since Clinton never served in the armed forces). Anyway, it's overall, not bad, but I wouldn't give it five stars, for the forgoing reasons, and I would recommend reading Diplomacy, and another book, if one can find it, by former Secretary Of State, James Baker. I am wondering why Dr. Henry Kissinger hasn't been asked on any of the news broadcasts for his opinion. He has a very unique perspective. I know many don't like him, but I respect (even when I disagree with) him.

Rating:
Summary: Interesting ...
Review: Interesting reading. I don't suppose this book has much value for an American, but for outsider it helps explain many things, and also offers an insight into American foreign policy goals. The style is very accessible. The mid-east chapter is especially interesting for obvious reasons. Being an Indian, I found his analysis of relationship with India pretty positive and interesting. I could give it 3 1/2 stars if I could.

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Summary: An Important Question
Review: Kissinger employs the use of colloquial language here in a manner not seen since he wrote articles in the 1950s (The Conservative Dilemma: Political Thought of Metternich published in The American Political Science Review; The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal, published in World Politics Vol. 8 No. 2 January 1956, pp. 264-280) The first time reader need not research Kissinger nor is any reading of his prior work required or even partly necessary to understand any topic discussed in this work. A student so inclined may wish to supplement this with any decent world political survey such as Calvocoressi's World Politics.
Kissinger expertly weaves historical detail with insights relative to the globalized horizon. The author's strongest literary quality has always been the length at which he dissects and reconstructs his arguments. Kissinger is not willing to discuss an important political or philosophical topic in one hundred words when it can be dissected and explained without ambiguity and fuzziness in one thousand words. Most strikingly, Kissinger's lengthy discussions do not center on any personal claim or boast. The material discussed at length merely hints at a man whose expert knowledge undoubtedly qualifies him as the proper authority to answer the question posed as the title of this book.
The shame here is much of the book would have undoubtedly been rewritten by the author since the events of September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, it is refreshing to read an account of what the future was intended to be and what it could have been given the historical currents and their future products and dividends as mentioned extensively in this work.

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Summary: Great overview of Foreign Policy
Review: Kissinger provides a great analysis of US F. Policy, as well as in what direction it should be taken. I wish my International Relations teacher used this in class! He goes over the important events of 20th century analyzing (from a realist perspective) them. He gives an image of where American policy should be taken, as well as a historical overview of the major theoretical approaches in IR. Even if you don't agree with his positions, the book is packed with substantive accounts. I def. recommend this book no any1 interested in foreign police or 20th century history. .

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Summary: Outlining the role of America in a single superpower world
Review: Kissinger systematically analyzes each global region and the challenges that the United States faces in developing a coherent foreign policy towards each. He covers Europe, Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, and (though somewhat grudgingly) Africa.

The coverage of the benefits and risks of Globalization is a must read for anyone interested in joining or opposing the current anti-Globalization movement that has caused havoc at many of the global leaders summits.

Though he does not say as much, Kissinger clearly disdained the manner in which Clinton's foreign policy was executed. Always the champion of Realpolitik, he finds many of the American excursions into foreign policy of the 90's reeking of bland Wilsonianism and to be ill-conceived and neither well thought-out nor well executed. Each reader will have to come to terms with his viewpoint in her own way.

There are many issues that America will have to deal with in the coming years and decades. South America is on the brink of either becoming an economic powerhouse or political morass. Asia is growing in economic strength and considers American hegemony distasteful. The Middle East continues to confound as it is both a gooey tarbaby and the supplier of fuel for the American economic engine. Africa remains a victim of the recent colonial period with no steady government save Nigeria. America, as the sole remaining superpower, must conduct itself so as to maximize peace and prosperity around the world. Whether we are able to do so well is the main question Kissinger poses.