Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980

Rating:
Summary: Pragmatic Dogmatics
Review: Roty, the grand disciple of Dewey and the most articulate pragmatist, elucidates some of the most bothering aspects of pragmatism in this book. In some of these essays, however, one could not help but feel that Roty is over enthusiastic in pushing the pragamtism agenda: he sounds almost evangelistic. If pragmatism wishes to achieve the kind of ideal that Dewey and others like James and Pierce has set out to achieve, the ideal of a democratic capitalist society, such dogmatism may sound a little unwarranted.

Rating:
Summary: Rorty and modern comedy
Review: This book might be a good place to start trying to gain a complete knowledge of the historicity of secret thoughts. "Hegel's historicism" (p. 3) might be compared with Americans who thought that World War Two was a great event, but this book is more concerned with "The notion of alternative conceptual frameworks." (p. 3). There is no entry in the index for historicity, but the idea of historicity, which is so important in understanding arguments about right and wrong, could teach us more than the index, which has the names of lots of philosophers in unusual conceptual combinations: Hegel and truth, Hegel and Kuhn, Hegel and Bloom, Nietzsche and James, Kant and James, and names that only appear in the notes at the end of the essays in this book. Published in 1982, the final note for Essay 3, "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey" contains an acknowledgement, thanking "my late colleague Walter Kaufmann for helpful comment on a draft of this paper." (p. 59, n. 73). Essay 3 was originally read at a conference in 1974 and published in `The Review of Metaphysics' in 1976, a few years before Walter Kaufmann's death in September, 1980. Overcoming tradition might be a small accomplishment, compared to living in a time so comic that laughter might be considered an important cause of the death of an arguer. Having many philosophers and no Philosophy, as much of this book implies, might be as funny as the fatal truth that hardly anyone could believe any of this stuff before, during, or after its historicity.

I would prefer to review this book as if the particular philosophical questions which it collected in the essays (set in the subtitle in the timeframe 1972-1980) serve as a better example of the comedy which was popular in the field of topical humor about politics in a time of turbulent opinions during those years after the death of Lenny Bruce from an overdose of narcotics and before we could watch "South Park" and, unfortunately, of more interest to us today than what Truth or Philosophy might mean. The Introduction, in particular, which attempted to tie the essays together in a manner which suggests that Rorty would prefer some intellectual position that defines the nature of his self, but admitting that a thorough reading might convince us that he had not yet achieved an understandable consistency, fades into insignificance when we readers confront such statements as "Even if I were thinking, which I am not, that would not show that I exist." (p. 7). Ha? Ha? Ha?

Is a title like "The World Well Lost" (pp. 3-18) even decent? Does humor form a barrier to understanding the title "Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein" (pp. 19-36) when a key theme of the essay is "Yet Wittgenstein came in the end to mock his own creation," (p. 19) "vapid imitation" (p. 22), and that philosophers' attempts to understand Wittgenstein involve "the same paradoxes elaborated by Wittgenstein himself (who cheerfully tosses out half-a-dozen incompatible metaphysical views in the course of the INVESTIGATIONS)." (p. 23) ? Moving right along, Essay 4, "Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture" (pp. 60-71) begins with the suggestion that "Santayana saw us as one more great empire in the long parade. His genial hope was that we might enjoy the imperium while we held it. In a famous essay on American philosophy, he suggested that we were still spoiling our own fun." (p. 60). Our society produces a fine mix of "joy in business itself" (p. 60), "We can afford to smile at this," (p. 61), "the contempt the successful feel for the shabby genteel." (p. 61), "pointing with scorn to the low level of argumentative rigor among the competition" (p. 62), and ultimately:

"American sociology, whose early stages had been satirized as the expenditure of a five-thousand-dollar grant to discover the address of a whorehouse, came to be satirized as the expenditure of a five-million-dollar grant to plot the addresses of a thousand whorehouses against a multidimensional array of socio-economic variables." (pp. 63-64).

Now that home computers make this much information readily available to millions of curious web surfers for study at a level that could be used to see how the number of credit card transactions at the whorehouses compared with the rate of personal bankruptcy in the area around each whorehouse, we are closer than ever to "the highbrow and the academic philosopher viewing each other with equal suspicion, each harping on the vices of each other's virtues." (p. 65). This could be the basis for a humorous aside on cross-disciplinary studies, in which the cross aspect is something like a euphemism for the word aghast, but that is far beyond the scope of this book.

Rating:
Summary: Rorty and modern comedy
Review: This book might be a good place to start trying to gain a complete knowledge of the historicity of secret thoughts. "Hegel's historicism" (p. 3) might be compared with Americans who thought that World War Two was a great event, but this book is more concerned with "The notion of alternative conceptual frameworks." (p. 3). There is no entry in the index for historicity, but the idea of historicity, which is so important in understanding arguments about right and wrong, could teach us more than the index, which has the names of lots of philosophers in unusual conceptual combinations: Hegel and truth, Hegel and Kuhn, Hegel and Bloom, Nietzsche and James, Kant and James, and names that only appear in the notes at the end of the essays in this book. Published in 1982, the final note for Essay 3, "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey" contains an acknowledgement, thanking "my late colleague Walter Kaufmann for helpful comment on a draft of this paper." (p. 59, n. 73). Essay 3 was originally read at a conference in 1974 and published in `The Review of Metaphysics' in 1976, a few years before Walter Kaufmann's death in September, 1980. Overcoming tradition might be a small accomplishment, compared to living in a time so comic that laughter might be considered an important cause of the death of an arguer. Having many philosophers and no Philosophy, as much of this book implies, might be as funny as the fatal truth that hardly anyone could believe any of this stuff before, during, or after its historicity.

I would prefer to review this book as if the particular philosophical questions which it collected in the essays (set in the subtitle in the timeframe 1972-1980) serve as a better example of the comedy which was popular in the field of topical humor about politics in a time of turbulent opinions during those years after the death of Lenny Bruce from an overdose of narcotics and before we could watch "South Park" and, unfortunately, of more interest to us today than what Truth or Philosophy might mean. The Introduction, in particular, which attempted to tie the essays together in a manner which suggests that Rorty would prefer some intellectual position that defines the nature of his self, but admitting that a thorough reading might convince us that he had not yet achieved an understandable consistency, fades into insignificance when we readers confront such statements as "Even if I were thinking, which I am not, that would not show that I exist." (p. 7). Ha? Ha? Ha?

Is a title like "The World Well Lost" (pp. 3-18) even decent? Does humor form a barrier to understanding the title "Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein" (pp. 19-36) when a key theme of the essay is "Yet Wittgenstein came in the end to mock his own creation," (p. 19) "vapid imitation" (p. 22), and that philosophers' attempts to understand Wittgenstein involve "the same paradoxes elaborated by Wittgenstein himself (who cheerfully tosses out half-a-dozen incompatible metaphysical views in the course of the INVESTIGATIONS)." (p. 23) ? Moving right along, Essay 4, "Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture" (pp. 60-71) begins with the suggestion that "Santayana saw us as one more great empire in the long parade. His genial hope was that we might enjoy the imperium while we held it. In a famous essay on American philosophy, he suggested that we were still spoiling our own fun." (p. 60). Our society produces a fine mix of "joy in business itself" (p. 60), "We can afford to smile at this," (p. 61), "the contempt the successful feel for the shabby genteel." (p. 61), "pointing with scorn to the low level of argumentative rigor among the competition" (p. 62), and ultimately:

"American sociology, whose early stages had been satirized as the expenditure of a five-thousand-dollar grant to discover the address of a whorehouse, came to be satirized as the expenditure of a five-million-dollar grant to plot the addresses of a thousand whorehouses against a multidimensional array of socio-economic variables." (pp. 63-64).

Now that home computers make this much information readily available to millions of curious web surfers for study at a level that could be used to see how the number of credit card transactions at the whorehouses compared with the rate of personal bankruptcy in the area around each whorehouse, we are closer than ever to "the highbrow and the academic philosopher viewing each other with equal suspicion, each harping on the vices of each other's virtues." (p. 65). This could be the basis for a humorous aside on cross-disciplinary studies, in which the cross aspect is something like a euphemism for the word aghast, but that is far beyond the scope of this book.