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Rating: ![5 stars](http://www.reviewfocus.com/images/stars-5-0.gif) Summary: Disagreement without Intention Review: It is the most devastating critique of such notions as "identity" (unitary or hybrid), "subject position" (however contingent), and "experience" (recourse to materiality of an artifact-object paradoxically legitimates the immediacy of subjective perception), thus undermining theories ranging from deconstructionism, psychoanalysis to new historicism, or from postcolonial criticism, queer politics to media studies. Eloquently, Michaels contends that once we dismiss the question of the author's intended meaning, all we talk about is our different perception dependent on our different subject positions, that is why the radical play of signifiers that signify or "effect" differently in various contexts would take a conservative turn to maintain the primacy of identity. One result is that we now differ in terms of identity but no longer have any genuine disagreement (we only see different things from different perspectives). Correspondent to this academic atmosphere is the post-Cold War mentality, in which the ideological question of what we believe is displaced by the ontological question of what we are. Hence the peculiar conception of the war on terrorism, wherein Michaels points out neither side is truly conceived to fight for any belief (the enemies are not even seen as Muslim; they are only criminals). More precisely, terrorism as a limit case of our identitarian politics, Michaels argues, is projected as an ultimate crime of having no identity.Despite his Anti-Theory reputation, Michaels proves to be theoretically engaging and indispensable to think through the dilemmas of theory rather than simply being dismissive. His reference to global political crises at this very moment testifies that theory, whether we are for or against it, is highly relevant. The adept illumination of theoretical issues by way of reading recent scientific fiction is another source of charm in this book. I especially admire the way he relates, under the encompassing problematic of theory, the sci-fi fantasy of the name Mars calls itself to the deep ecologistic claim that a tree or a river by itself can seek a legal redress, or to the nativist claim that a language should be protected like an endangered species. Michaels is not writing from an ivory tower of theory; rather, he is taking theory and his opposition to it as a light to reflect upon the much wider social and political practices. Nothing is more urgent and provocative than his conclusion that we should put aside not only talks of cultural/gender identities but also, more strikingly, the hypocritical imperative of historicization, so that the crucial issue of class conflict and poverty can resurface. While I agree with Michaels's convincing descriptions about the "consequences" of theory's dismissal of authorial intention, it is difficult to follow his agenda that we should fall back on authorial intention, as if the problematization of the categories of "author," "intention," "meaning" has never occurred in the last three or four decades. Actually, the Michaels-style critique, (in)famous for its scandalizing power, itself already proves there is no U-turn to those categories. For one thing, Michaels's critique can never be applied to the level of authorial intention: no authors of the theoretical or literary writings that Michaels dismantles so ruthlessly are expected to say he reads their intended meanings correctly. For another thing, more important, even Michaels himself confesses (in note 8, p. 200) that his reading does not disagree with the authors he is attacking on the level of intended meaning but on the level of "consequence." That is, when someone intends to say s/he doesn't believe in authorial meaning, the "unintended consequence" according to Michaels must be that s/he will fall into the trap of identity. It is this "unintended consequence" definitely beyond authorial intention that is the real subject of this book. However, this would directly contradict Michaels' central claim that disagreement is possible only when we talk about authorial meaning, because, Michaels maintains, once we emphasize the ever-changing effects of a signifier drifting about in different contexts and received from different subject positions, we can only differ in identity without actual disagreement. If it is really the case that we can only disagree about the intended meaning but not about the effects, then how can Michaels possibly launch his attack based on his disagreement about consequence with the authors he is criticizing? How can he conceptualize the distinction between the effect that he accuses deconstruction for being obsessed with and the notion of consequence his own critical enterprise is entirely reliant upon? Michaels seems to presume (he never articulates) the distinction lies between the contingency of the deconstructionist notion of effect and the internal (or pure theoretic) logic of what he names consequence. Such a distinction, however, breaks down from the very beginning, because Michaels realizes what he critiques (the consequence of theory) cannot afford to be purely logical or theoretical but is a distinctive "historical phenomenon" (introduction, p. 14). Worse still, as long as Michaels goes beyond authorial intention in his critical reading, his reading is no longer a reading, in his strict sense of this word, but only an experience based on his own subject position, the very thing Michaels spent a whole book trying to discredit. Michaels's dilemma suggests that while the dismissal of authorial intention historically led to the rise of identitarian politics, this need not mean that authorial intention is the only thing that can bring back disagreement that transcends the difference in identity. In place of the irredeemable notion of intention, Michaels unintentionally attests, is "consequence." In fact many people do not find themselves in disagreement about the real "intention" of the war in Iraq (Who cares if the administration really want freedom in Iraq? -- I guess they do, but so?) Rather, what the disagreement is about is the consequences of the war: Has it made the world a "safer" place? What kind of democracy will it bring about? What has it done to the welfare of Iraqi people Americans are supposed to liberate? It is this alternative possibility of disagreement, alternative to authorial intention, that Michaels has shown us despite his intention.
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