Strategy

Rating:
Summary: "Business", "Theatre", "Politics"
Review: "Business", "Theatre", or "Politics"; that B.H. Liddell Hart was a soldier and a military theorist/historian rather than businessman, a playwright or a politician is the only reason this work is not otherwise so named, and thus focused. His own limited martial experience, later enlightened and informed by exhaustive professional study, enabled his use of the history of warfare for a verdant field of analogy, metaphor and example. An alternate approach to the study of waging war is expressly not his chief intent, however. Advocacy for the "indirect approach" is his ultimate purpose.

Unlike many military writers, ancient and modern, who reduce their theories to slim maxims out of "superficial obfuscation" more often than "genuine profundity" Liddell Hart's readers are treated to illustrations from the Hoplites of classical Greece, to the hydrogen bomb and the early Cold War. That the "consequences of failure in war are greater than in any other human enterprise", Liddell Hart's use of military examples is especially useful in communicating his main; though not necessarily exclusively military, premise.

The author does not offer a cursory introduction and overview to military history and strategy, but he carefully selects and examines contests of will, some of them bloodless, which convincingly support his central theme: the superiority of "expending brains instead of blood", of "fighting with the legs instead of the fists". Moving always along the "line of least expectation" and striking with the greatest surprise. A commander's grasp of the "indirect approach"; while quantifiable in material and geographic victories, is best understood through its impact psychologically - the havoc and confusion it achieves in the mind of the opponent.

The aim of "grand strategy" then is the engineering of conditions, circumstances and perceptions which make ultimate defeat of an enemy on the battlefield an historic inevitability or a mere useful finality for a specific contest.

Though every vignette is culled from military history, minimum imagination and extrapolation will yield the obvious applicability of the "indirect approach" to business, romance, entertainment or politics - any field of human endeavor where one will contends for supremacy or influence over another

Rating:
Summary: An authority on War and Strategy
Review: Adjust your end to your means.
Clear sight and cool calculation should prevail. Do not bite off more than you can chew. Keep a clear sense of what is possible. Face facts while preserving faith. Confidence will be of no avail if the troops are run down.

Keep your object always in mind, while adapting your plan to circumstances
Recognize that alternatives exist but make sure they all bear on the object. Weigh the feasibility of attaining an objective against its contribution to the attainment of the end in mind.

Choose the line (or course) of least expectation.
Put yourself in your opposition's shoes and try to see what course of action he will see as least probable and thus not try to forestall.

Exploit the line of least resistance -- so long as it can lead you to any objective that would contribute to your underlying object.
Seize on opportunity -- but not any opportunity. Tactically, this refers to following up on success; strategically, it refers to the management and deployment of your reserves.

Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives.
Choose a single course of action that could have several objectives; do not let your actions reveal your objectives. This puts your opponent on the horns of a dilemma. It introduces uncertainty regarding that which is to be guarded against.

Ensure that both plans and dispositions are flexible -- adaptable to circumstances.
Include contingencies or next steps -- for success as well as failure. Organize and deploy your resources in ways that facilitate adaptation to either.

Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard -- whilst he is well placed to parry or evade it.
Unless your opponent is much inferior, do not attack until he has been disorganized and demoralized. Psychological warfare precedes physical warfare. Similarly, physical warfare can be psychological in nature.

Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed.
If at first you don't succeed, give up. Your reinforcements will likely be matched by the enemy. Moreover, successfully repulsing you the first time will morally strengthen him for the second.

Rating:
Summary: An Outstanding Book on Strategy
Review: Although I teach corporate strategy, I read this classic work on military strategy to broaden my understanding of the nature of strategy. In particular, this book emphasized the utility of the indirect versus direct attack, and drew examples from the Civil War, WWI, and WWII. Unlike Clauswitz approach of massing strength and marching up the middle as expected by the enemy, Hart's indirect attack epitomizes the expression, "Choose your battles". This means forcing the enemy to engage when and where you prefer, in a battle that works to your advantage and their disadvantage. The indirect attack is the unexpected route; it opens up a new front where the foe is unprepared to fight, much like the action taken by Norman Schwartzkopf in Desert Storm with his now famous "left hook" maneuver. The logic of the indirect attack is that it changes the point of engagement at an inopportune moment for the enemy, and in doing so, captures the initiative, creates a dilemma for the opposition, gains the psychological upper hand by catching the opponent off-guard and confusing their response.

The indirect strategy applies equally well to the military as it does to business, not to mention football, chess, politics, debate, the list goes on. I see parallels in this, for example, with Hewlett-Packard's indirect attack on the computer industry, which avoided its rivals superior strength in PCs, and instead attacked at the periphery in the printer market where the rivals were weak and caught by surprise. Overall a very interesting book.

Rating:
Summary: An Outstanding Book on Strategy
Review: Although I teach corporate strategy, I read this classic work on military strategy to broaden my understanding of the nature of strategy. In particular, this book emphasized the utility of the indirect versus direct attack, and drew examples from the Civil War, WWI, and WWII. Unlike Clauswitz approach of massing strength and marching up the middle as expected by the enemy, Hart's indirect attack epitomizes the expression, "Choose your battles". This means forcing the enemy to engage when and where you prefer, in a battle that works to your advantage and their disadvantage. The indirect attack is the unexpected route; it opens up a new front where the foe is unprepared to fight, much like the action taken by Norman Schwartzkopf in Desert Storm with his now famous "left hook" maneuver. The logic of the indirect attack is that it changes the point of engagement at an inopportune moment for the enemy, and in doing so, captures the initiative, creates a dilemma for the opposition, gains the psychological upper hand by catching the opponent off-guard and confusing their response.

The indirect strategy applies equally well to the military as it does to business, not to mention football, chess, politics, debate, the list goes on. I see parallels in this, for example, with Hewlett-Packard's indirect attack on the computer industry, which avoided its rivals superior strength in PCs, and instead attacked at the periphery in the printer market where the rivals were weak and caught by surprise. Overall a very interesting book.

Rating:
Summary: A masterpiece of theory from from a master strategist
Review: An early tank warfare theorist, Liddell Hart championed the cause of mobility in the field and rapid deployment. Largely ignored by the British, his theories were put into practice by the German High Command, which was influenced by Liddell Hart in their plans for Blitzkrieg in WWII. It wasn't until the North African Campaign, when O'Connor rolled backed Graziani's "grey tide" of Italians by rapid movement, capturing thousands of previously victorious Axis troops, that the British took Liddell Hart seriously enough to put his theories to use on the offensive. When the Americans arrived, the Allies were ready to face Rommel, who had also steeped himself in Liddell Hart's theories. The drama of the campaign in central North Africa is, in part, the drama of two sides using different versions of the author's theories. In "Strategy," we have the thoughts of the mature man, one who has seen that the atomic bomb can stop a rapid deployment in its tracks, and who realizes that the West's military superiority over the rest of the world will end with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are now available to frequent military rivals India and Pakistan (whose "Islamic Bomb" secrets were recently transmitted to other Muslim nations by one of the bomb's designers), and to North Korea -- which had fought the West to a bloody standstill in Liddell Hart's lifetime. The old theories of rapid deployment which were the hallmark of Liddell Hart's earlier thought are STILL believed in by many military leaders, ready, as so often, to fight the LAST war over again. Liddell Hart's too brief comments about war in the age of nuclear weapons are all the more important to us today, lest we find ourselves caught up in an unwinnable war because of poor strategy. Liddell Hart's conclusions on "industrial bombing" were that it was NOT a useful means of warfare. We may suggest, based upon very recent military experience, that today's aerial campaign of "awe and terror" rapidly lead's to tommorrow's "guerrila war" on the ground, down and dirty, and very, very bloody.

Liddell Hart's chapter on "Guerilla War" helps to illustrate the bloody catastrophes of the Viet Nam era and the current insurgency in Iraq.

"Strategy" is a bit out-of-date, but a wise reader can discern where Liddell Hart's theories WOULD have led had he lived a few years longer. I rate "Stragey" 5 stars, up from my earlier rating of 4 stars, which I gave it before the Iraq "insurgency" showed that Basil Liddell Hart knew his stuff: the war is unfolding as "Strategy" suggests that it would. This book is A MUST READ for anyone interested in strategy, whether for playing war games or waging a real war.

Rating:
Summary: A masterpiece of theory from from a master strategist
Review: An early tank warfare theorist, Liddell Hart championed the cause of mobility in the field and rapid deployment. Largely ignored by the British, his theories were put into practice by the German High Command, which was influenced by Liddell Hart in their plans for Blitzkrieg in WWII. It wasn't until the North African Campaign, when O'Connor rolled backed Graziani's "grey tide" of Italians by rapid movement, capturing thousands of previously victorious Axis troops, that the British took Liddell Hart seriously enough to put his theories to use on the offensive. When the Americans arrived, the Allies were ready to face Rommel, who had also steeped himself in Liddell Hart's theories. The drama of the campaign in central North Africa is, in part, the drama of two sides using different versions of the author's theories. In "Strategy," we have the thoughts of the mature man, one who has seen that the atomic bomb can stop a rapid deployment in its tracks, and who realizes that the West's military superiority over the rest of the world will end with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons are now available to frequent military rivals India and Pakistan (whose "Islamic Bomb" secrets were recently transmitted to other Muslim nations by one of the bomb's designers), and to North Korea -- which had fought the West to a bloody standstill in Liddell Hart's lifetime. The old theories of rapid deployment which were the hallmark of Liddell Hart's earlier thought are STILL believed in by many military leaders, ready, as so often, to fight the LAST war over again. Liddell Hart's too brief comments about war in the age of nuclear weapons are all the more important to us today, lest we find ourselves caught up in an unwinnable war because of poor strategy. Liddell Hart's conclusions on "industrial bombing" were that it was NOT a useful means of warfare. We may suggest, based upon very recent military experience, that today's aerial campaign of "awe and terror" rapidly lead's to tommorrow's "guerrila war" on the ground, down and dirty, and very, very bloody.

Liddell Hart's chapter on "Guerilla War" helps to illustrate the bloody catastrophes of the Viet Nam era and the current insurgency in Iraq.

"Strategy" is a bit out-of-date, but a wise reader can discern where Liddell Hart's theories WOULD have led had he lived a few years longer. I rate "Stragey" 5 stars, up from my earlier rating of 4 stars, which I gave it before the Iraq "insurgency" showed that Basil Liddell Hart knew his stuff: the war is unfolding as "Strategy" suggests that it would. This book is A MUST READ for anyone interested in strategy, whether for playing war games or waging a real war.

Rating:
Summary: a masterpiece -- still
Review: Here Liddell Hart sums up his principles of strategy, illustrating his ideas with examples throughout history. Critics have claimed, with some justice, that he got too wrapped up in his major idea, the "indirect approach," and oversimplified the campaigns he reviewed here to bolster his point. What a reader must realize, however, is that by the time this book was written, much of Liddell Hart's approach had been battle-tested, with spectacular results: among those who credited him were Guderian, Rommel, and Montgomery. If his "indirect approach" is not universally effective, especially against opponents who have also read the book, it is still brilliant and valuable.
Liddell Hart seems to have fallen into disfavor in U.S. military circles, to a degree that cannot be explained simply by his disagreement with Clausewitz about the necessity of destroying the main force of the enemy. While not crediting him, the U.S. applied an indirect approach, emphasizing rapid maneuver, with great success in the Gulf War. Perhaps the explanation lies in a careful reading of the last chapter, added in the 1967 edition, in which he suggests that counter-guerilla warfare must aim to disrupt the guerillas' sources of supply and liaison with allied regular forces nearby -- in short, to win, the U.S. needed to isolate the battlefield. Maybe the U.S. thinkers didn't want to hear this -- and it hasn't helped that, once again, he was absolutely right.
So, by all means, read this book carefully. But then also read
his critics. Nobody, even Liddell Hart (or Clausewitz, or Sun Tzu) had all the answers, and the art of applying past principles to future conflicts keeps changing.

Rating:
Summary: uninspiring as a history, provoking as a book on theory
Review: I apologize in advance for my lack of brevity, but to be fair to the author I feel that I must analyze this book at length.
While somewhat unimpressed by Hart's biography of Scipio Africanus, Hart's enviable reputation and the praise he garnered from some of our century's greatest generals encouraged me to give Strategy a chance. At first it looked like another disappointment, but I have come to appreciate this as a truly worthwhile book.
The bad first: The opening section of this book is an attempt by Hart to trace the entire history of Western warfare and demonstrate that in each era of history the indirect approach has worked better than direct assaults. For 143 pages he makes this point over and over again without adding any more detail. I quickly began to feel that he was oversimplifying events, and several times he seems to make very tenuous stretches between events and his theories. At other times it feels like he is attempting to stretch events to fit his theories when there is an insufficiently strong connection. He also seems to have an inadequate grasp of some of the historical periods. His knowledge of the American Civil War seemed a bit piecemeal to me, and his assertion that McClellan's indirect approach during the Peninsular campaign failed due to Lincoln's refusal to increase McClellan's forces does not match well with what I have heard from other sources, which blame McClellan's failure on his own hesitations.
After this section Hart enters into the period of the World Wars. Here he truly starts to shine. The campaigns are described in much greater detail and readers are treated to much better examples and explanations than previously. At last his theories can be envisioned and we hear something more detailed than the monotonous (if correct) repitition of the phrase "indirect approach."
After this excellent analysis of the World Wars, Hart moves on to discuss his theories. Here at last is the brilliance that had been promised. As irritated as I was with his history, his abstract writings were beautiful, concise, and thought-provoking. He is even-handed, imaginative, and rather than the over-simplification that I criticize him for in his earlier chapters he gives excellent and informative explanation. Of particular merit is his discussion of the limitations of Clausewitz (as commonly interpreted).
His final chapter discusses guerilla warfare and raises some fascinating questions about the downside of encouraging guerilla warfare against your enemies. While I think Hart might have erred on the side of caution here, the points he raises all have great merit and the fact that US-funded guerillas in Afghanistan later became a threat to the US bears out his warnings. My one criticism of this chapter is that it feels unfinished; he does not develop both sides of the argument and he does not suggest measures to help with the problems that he foresees.
On the whole, I find Hart to be an uninspiring historian but a brillian strategist and highly recommend this book for anyone who has an interest in grasping the true art of military matters.

Rating:
Summary: Belisarius said it Best!
Review: I have an original edition of this book and found it useful to read at odd moments. As a naval oficer and one-time World History teacher, I found the early parts of the book fascinating and useful. And by the time Hart reaches his discussion of the age of Justinian and the re-conquest of the Roman Empire by Belisarius, one really has learned quite a bit about Western Civilization and its war history.

The chapter on Belisarius should be committed to memory by all of the current administration's strategic advisors should, because it was Belisarius who developed the Byzintine Empires strategy of winning wars by not "fighting" them.

Belisarius realized that a defeated Roman Empire could re-emerge as a great threat to Constantinople, as could the re-energized Persian Empire and the numerous babarian states surrounding Byzantium. And even with its great position as a world culture and trading capital, neither Justinian nor his empire could afford to engage every threat directly. Therefore, surrogates, feints and his age's version of "gunboat diplomacy" was much more cost effective. In fact Belisarius was one of the most effective generals of all time, even though his actual field leadership experience in battle was relatively limited.

(As an aside -- I would not be surprised if Belisarius was studied vigorously by every Soviet general who ever served. It seems that even though their government carried out a flawed political ideal, their strategies definitely articulated many of Belisarius's military ideas.)


Rating:
Summary: Guderian's bible....
Review: The best book on strategy that I've ever read. I know that doesn't mean anything to you, but it was also the best book on strategy that Heinz Guderian ever read (the German Panzer commander that conquered most of Europe at the start of WW2.)

The whole book is summed up by THE INDIRECT APPROACH (i.e. never, ever, do what the enemy would logically assume that you will do.) Always make it look like there are several targets that you are planning to attack- and throw your whole weight against the least likely at the last moment.

It was this book that gave me a full appreciation of the Byzantine General Belisarius. This is the general that briefly reconquered the the western empire, but was stupidly recalled by a jealous emperor that feared his genius and success. Briefly, Belisaurius, would break through and operate far behind enemy lines. His entire army was mounted. He was forced to live off the land because he was far from his bases, and faced with an unreliable and jealous emperor. He would strike out between two possible targets, putting the enemy on the horns of a dilemma, and vear off to strike one of them only at the last possible moment. He would take what supplies he needed and burn the rest. He would repeat this over and over again. If he found a suitalble location to fortify he would do so. He would let his pursuers catch up and bleed their strength off in direct frontal attack on his fortified position (held by dismounted armored cataphracts and horse archers.) Then, he would simply mount up, break out, and start the whole thing over until his enemy was exhausted and ready for decisive defeat.
Needless to say, this is a pattern readily modified to fit armored and mechanised warfare.