Defeat in the West (Cassell Military Paperbacks)

Rating:
Summary: Interesting, if imperfect, analysis
Review: Defeat in the West is a curious classic history of World War II. Shulman, immediately after the war ended, set out to interview German generals to find out why the Allies won. One might conclude that this source of information would be hopelessly biased. Shulman, however, seems to be fairly immune from the German generals' excuses and scapegoating. Instead, Shulman argues that the Germans were defeated because of three problems with their military.

First, Shulman identifies Hitler's disastrous in military affairs. As the war continued, Hitler became progressively involved in military minutia, to the point of issuing tactical orders. I always feel that care must be taken with this argument. Too many authors slip into the mode of "it was all Hitler's fault", which is most certainly incorrect. Hitler by himself did not lose the war for Germany. Shulman occasionally loses sight of this fact, although corrects himself at the end of the book by placing much of the blame on the German field generals and general staff. Further, it can be argued that it was not Hitler per se that was the problem, but rather that tactical orders emanated from a politician, who was hundreds of miles from the front, and who constantly had information that was badly out of date. Anyone occupying such a position would have performed as badly as Hitler. So, I think it is more appropriate to blame a highly inefficient and ineffectual chain of command. Shulman essentially makes this argument, although he frequently writes as if Hitler the man was the source of the problem.

Second, Shulman identifies "discipline" as a factor for Germany's defeat. This is interesting, as militaries typically stress discipline as a factor for victory. However, Shulman uses the term to describe the German army's willingness to follow Hitler all the way to the destruction of their country. This perhaps was a curious hold-over from the traditions of the German general staff, that held that the army should be strictly apolitical; the head of state would make the strategic decisions and it was up to the military to carry out its orders without question. As an institution it was not to interfere or offer opinions in the realm of politics, nor to question military orders. Shulman demonstrates how this played out in the war. German generals were too "disciplined" (too reflexive in their need to obey orders) to ignore stupid commands emanating from Hitler's headquarters. Additionally, resistance to Hitler's plans almost never was offered on political or moral grounds. Any debate about strategy was purely military (e.g. delaying the attack on France not because it would be wrong, but because the army was not ready). Political resistance, most visibly in the July 20, 1944 assassination attempt on Hitler, only occurred when the generals realized the war was lost and that some political settlement was needed. Shulman notes that even this logic was basically military and not moral. He does a good job showing that the German generals completely failed in moral terms, at a time when only they could have offered effective political resistance. Shulman holds contempt for the German generals for being morally and professionally spineless. For Shulman, the professional spinelessness ("discipline") was a cause for German defeat: despite disagreeing with Hitler's orders, they obeyed them anyway with disastrous consequences. For example, had Rommel not obeyed Hitler's order to stand fast at El Alamein in the face of Monty's attack, he probably would have been able to extract more of his infantry forces from battle.

Finally, Shulman identifies "ignorance" as the third factor for Germany's defeat. Nazi Germany was built on disinformation. The less people knew about the true world, the more the government was able to dominate. Further, the German military, probably due to Hitler's style of leadership, utilized a very top-down approach to communications. Shulman shows that this meant that commanders on the various fronts had little or no idea about events and situations elsewhere, nor of what sort of reserves or supplies were available. Rommel is a textbook example of this: he knew next to nothing of Barbarossa before it was launched, causing him to wonder why his frequent appeals for reinforcement fell on deaf ears. Further, Rommel waged his war in North Africa with a callous disregard for supply; it was just "someone else's job" and he assumed supplies would arrive. Had he known the true picture, he might have acted differently. Another example of this ignorance is when the German 15th army was cut off during the pursuit across France because it, unknowingly, had its left flank dangling in thin air because the neighboring army had vanished. Hitler's efforts to maintain control over the army by denying it information worked for him. German generals were deprived of the "big picture" and therefore had difficulties when arguing against Hitler on military matters. What benefited Hitler in the short term caused long-term problems for the military, however, and ultimately Shulman points to this as one of the causes of defeat.

What Shulman fails to analyze is why the German army, if it was so badly commanded, was able to fight for so well for so long. The slog up Italy was costly. Allied forces were practically bled white in Normandy. Two badly battered SS armored divisions were able to crush the thrust to capture Arnhem. The Battle of the Bulge showed the Germans were far from spent, even just 5 months before their surrender. Given that Shulman's factors of Hitler, discipline and ignorance were basically present throughout the entire war, Shulman's assessment fails to explain why the German military went from a winner to a loser. Shulman's argument is deterministic: the Germans were destined to fail. I do not think this was the case, and his book can not address this. Defeat in the West is a classic that all should read, not because it is perfectly correct but because it will prompt discussion about why the Germans lost.


Rating:
Summary: Excellent,analyses reasons behind Germany's defeat in WWII
Review: There were serious flaws in Germany's military leadership especially the command exercised by Hitler.German dictator more and more relied on intuition while taking decisions which impinged upon the security of the Reich.Most of his decisions were devoid of sound military logic.Success of his initial moves -annexation of Rhineland, Austria,Sudentenland; conquest of Poland ,France and Low countries- made Hitler think himself infallible. His initial triumphs laid the seeds for Third Reich's defeat.Other reasons given for Germany's defeat :Hitler's interference which had a stultifying effect on military operations at every level.Ethics of Prussian military caste represented by the officer corps which blindly followed orders was exploited by the wily German dictator.They meekly executed Hitler's orders even at a time when it brought only military ruin to the country.All this does not mean German General Staff was free from blame.They consistently sought scapegoats for some of the major reverses suffered by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.Infact I do not find any difference between the General Staff and Hitler. Both represent two faces of the same coin. General Staff ,like the leader of the Reich, wanted to reverse the outcome of the First world war and sought military glory. However unlike the leader it showed more restraint in aiming to attain those objectives.The situation was further compounded by the poor quality of the German intelligence.As postwar revelations show miserable failure of German intelligence.The author has correctly put it "German victories were won disregarding intelligence rather than heeding it".

Further author elaborates on the blunders committed by Hitler and his Generals while prosecuting war.The escape of BEF from Dunkirk ,for this senior officers of the German GroupA should share the blame with Hitler.Hitler was wrong in assuming that British were finished,for the German leader thought the French holding out below river Somme posed more serious menace.A serious student of military history of the western world knows that key to the domination of Europe lay in conquest and subjugation of Britain.Because London formed the 'centre of gravity of the war as the German military philospher Von Clausewitz would have put it.Hitler ought to have realised this ,had he done so there would not have been 'miracle at Dunkirk'Fuehrer and his Generals thought Soviet Union could be conquered in one rapier-like thrust.On the contrary the immense reserves at the disposal of the Soviets wore down the German onslaught.This along with poor quality of roads with huge distances to be covered in Russia impeded German invasion.Hitler's obsession with Russia prevented Germany from coming to grips with the British Empire.Possibly a fraction of the forces earmarked for Barbarossa would have sufficed to smash British Empire .As a result a golden opportunity which comes rarely in the history of the country ,according to author, was botched.Perhaps the biggest blunder committed by Third Reich was when it declared war on UnitedStates.Hitler's assurances that he will come to the aid of his Japanese ally emboldened Tokyo to attack PearlHarbor.Under the mutually defensive Tripartite Pact [signed by Axis powers on Sep 27,1940] Germany could have stopped shot of declaring war on US.But the German dictator succumbed to the demands of Kriegsmarine,which fed up by constant American provocations ,wanted to initiate attacks on US shipping in the Atlantic. Second part of the book the author expatiates on the reasons for German failure to repel Allied landings in Normandy and finally defeat of Wehrmacht in the west.Here I feel Schulman is partial in the interpretation of events.The author makes reader believe Germans were on the run the day the Allies landed in Normandy.Author has ignored Montgomery's botched attempt to seize Caen as the Anglo-Americans were prevented every where from attaining D-day objectives.For more than a month outgunned outnumbered German units were able to pin down Allied armies.Confined to Normandy lodgements the Allies resorted to tremendous firepower to bludgeon through German defences.Notwithstanding the fact they were doped by Goebbel 's propaganda,German soldiers put up a fanatical resistance.Even Hitler's Mortain counter-attack could have been fatal if the Anglo-Americans not had the benefit of Ultra. There are a few factual errors in the book.In the chapter narrating German invasion of the Wes tauthor says Von Manstein personally approached Hitler to discuss the plan of campaign.We now know that it was Hitler's personal adjutant Rudolf Schmundt who brought about their meeting after Manstein was unceremoniously removed from the post of chief- of -staff of Army Group A due jealousy and backbiting of senior officers of Army General staff.Another mistake is author's argument that Hitler was responsible for halting German armour before Dunkirk.Research done by reputed historians -Shirer ,Liddell Hart,Bullock-blame Von Runstedt for the halt order.Fact goes that rapidity of German advance through northern France stunned even some of their commanders who felt tanks had moved far ahead of supporting infantry consquently flanks were exposed.Von Kluge ,the commander of 4th army phoned Von Runstedt at Army Group A HQ who issued halt order.Equally erroneous is author's argument that Moscow instigated resistance against Axis domination in the Balkans Actually it was British secret services along with American OSS which fomented trouble.Churchill wanted to create Balkan Front against Germany involving Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia.Also preposterous is the notion had there not been Balkan mess Germany would have launched its attack on Soviet Union on May 1941,Wehrmact would have escaped Russian winter seized Moscow.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent,analyses reasons behind Germany's defeat in WWII
Review: There were serious flaws in Germany's military leadership especially the command exercised by Hitler.German dictator more and more relied on intuition while taking decisions which impinged upon the security of the Reich.Most of his decisions were devoid of sound military logic.Success of his initial moves -annexation of Rhineland, Austria,Sudentenland; conquest of Poland ,France and Low countries- made Hitler think himself infallible. His initial triumphs laid the seeds for Third Reich's defeat.Other reasons given for Germany's defeat :Hitler's interference which had a stultifying effect on military operations at every level.Ethics of Prussian military caste represented by the officer corps which blindly followed orders was exploited by the wily German dictator.They meekly executed Hitler's orders even at a time when it brought only military ruin to the country.All this does not mean German General Staff was free from blame.They consistently sought scapegoats for some of the major reverses suffered by the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.Infact I do not find any difference between the General Staff and Hitler. Both represent two faces of the same coin. General Staff ,like the leader of the Reich, wanted to reverse the outcome of the First world war and sought military glory. However unlike the leader it showed more restraint in aiming to attain those objectives.The situation was further compounded by the poor quality of the German intelligence.As postwar revelations show miserable failure of German intelligence.The author has correctly put it "German victories were won disregarding intelligence rather than heeding it".

Further author elaborates on the blunders committed by Hitler and his Generals while prosecuting war.The escape of BEF from Dunkirk ,for this senior officers of the German GroupA should share the blame with Hitler.Hitler was wrong in assuming that British were finished,for the German leader thought the French holding out below river Somme posed more serious menace.A serious student of military history of the western world knows that key to the domination of Europe lay in conquest and subjugation of Britain.Because London formed the 'centre of gravity of the war as the German military philospher Von Clausewitz would have put it.Hitler ought to have realised this ,had he done so there would not have been 'miracle at Dunkirk'Fuehrer and his Generals thought Soviet Union could be conquered in one rapier-like thrust.On the contrary the immense reserves at the disposal of the Soviets wore down the German onslaught.This along with poor quality of roads with huge distances to be covered in Russia impeded German invasion.Hitler's obsession with Russia prevented Germany from coming to grips with the British Empire.Possibly a fraction of the forces earmarked for Barbarossa would have sufficed to smash British Empire .As a result a golden opportunity which comes rarely in the history of the country ,according to author, was botched.Perhaps the biggest blunder committed by Third Reich was when it declared war on UnitedStates.Hitler's assurances that he will come to the aid of his Japanese ally emboldened Tokyo to attack PearlHarbor.Under the mutually defensive Tripartite Pact [signed by Axis powers on Sep 27,1940] Germany could have stopped shot of declaring war on US.But the German dictator succumbed to the demands of Kriegsmarine,which fed up by constant American provocations ,wanted to initiate attacks on US shipping in the Atlantic. Second part of the book the author expatiates on the reasons for German failure to repel Allied landings in Normandy and finally defeat of Wehrmacht in the west.Here I feel Schulman is partial in the interpretation of events.The author makes reader believe Germans were on the run the day the Allies landed in Normandy.Author has ignored Montgomery's botched attempt to seize Caen as the Anglo-Americans were prevented every where from attaining D-day objectives.For more than a month outgunned outnumbered German units were able to pin down Allied armies.Confined to Normandy lodgements the Allies resorted to tremendous firepower to bludgeon through German defences.Notwithstanding the fact they were doped by Goebbel 's propaganda,German soldiers put up a fanatical resistance.Even Hitler's Mortain counter-attack could have been fatal if the Anglo-Americans not had the benefit of Ultra. There are a few factual errors in the book.In the chapter narrating German invasion of the Wes tauthor says Von Manstein personally approached Hitler to discuss the plan of campaign.We now know that it was Hitler's personal adjutant Rudolf Schmundt who brought about their meeting after Manstein was unceremoniously removed from the post of chief- of -staff of Army Group A due jealousy and backbiting of senior officers of Army General staff.Another mistake is author's argument that Hitler was responsible for halting German armour before Dunkirk.Research done by reputed historians -Shirer ,Liddell Hart,Bullock-blame Von Runstedt for the halt order.Fact goes that rapidity of German advance through northern France stunned even some of their commanders who felt tanks had moved far ahead of supporting infantry consquently flanks were exposed.Von Kluge ,the commander of 4th army phoned Von Runstedt at Army Group A HQ who issued halt order.Equally erroneous is author's argument that Moscow instigated resistance against Axis domination in the Balkans Actually it was British secret services along with American OSS which fomented trouble.Churchill wanted to create Balkan Front against Germany involving Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia.Also preposterous is the notion had there not been Balkan mess Germany would have launched its attack on Soviet Union on May 1941,Wehrmact would have escaped Russian winter seized Moscow.