After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War

Rating:
Summary: Am I reading the same book as reviewer dfallas?
Review: AS this book DOES NOT dwell on the German Army per se, it covers mostly the thoughts of some military thinkers/polemists of the time in question regarding the right tactics for the next war.

Being a lecturer in the US Army Staff Collge, I am surprised and dismayed that the author exhibited such profound ignorance and befuddled thinking on things military.

First off, he has absolutely no idea what, in German military parlance, the differences are between strategy (how to physically/morally dominate over your own opponent), operations (the offensive, defensive or a mixture of both, actions to be undertaken on land, in the air and at the sea) and tactics ( the use of morale, material and manoveure)). Apparently, he believes the difference between strategy and tactics lies in the distance involved!

Secondly, if we are to know how pre war German military thinking shaped their war plans (operations) and their battles (tactics), one would have thought that the focus should be on the ones whose theories, dogmas and doctrines carried weight with the Großer Generalstab, as the latter was tasked with drafting, and updating/revising the war plans and issuing the relevant service regulations. Thus one would have expected that the thoughts of elder Moltke, Graf Schlieffen and Tirpitz would be carefully scrutinised to see how they affected Germany's strategic stance, armament plans, mobilization schedules, opeations plannning, strengths and dispositions and so on. Instead, one is treated with a superficial analysis of some insignificant, and in times, demagogic thinkers like Scherf, Schlictung and Golz, whose rants never had any impact on the
Großer Generalstab!

Thirdly, the aforementioned thinkers were all writing on, and arguing about battlefield tactics on land, and had nothing to say about the role of the Kriegsmarine in a British blockade in the North Sea, or how the Kaiserheer should fight against the French and Russians at the same time. It is hard to see how the tactical deployment of artillery, calvary and infantry would
solve Germany's strategic dilemma, ie, in an actual war the Allies need not fight, they can just adopt a defensive stance on land and a blockade at sea to wear out Germany, whereas the latter, without natural resources and depending on imports to feed her population, MUST fight!

Thirdly, pages are devoted to superficial socio-cultural observations on Social Democracy and pacifism, and each chapter ends with an simplistic overview of the topic in contemprorary France, Britain, US and Russia, which do not add anything to the subject at hand.

One thing though, the author did consult a lot of archival German sources in writing this poorly conceived book, one wishes though that had he focussed on Tirpitz, Moltke and Schlieffen, then he would have done an immense service in a much neglected subject.


Rating:
Summary: Monumental work!
Review: Being a text of the Modern War Studies by the University Press of Kansas already indicates this is a great book. Actually, I bought it for that reason and because the subject attracts my attention. After reading it, I can only say this book is fantastic. After Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806 on the hands of Napoleon, it took several years for the German peoples to again have a respectfull army. This books deals with this process. This book reveals why the Germans succeded on creating a new and powerfull army, while its neighbors (France and Russia, although Great Britain is also treated) decreased in power. The creation of a High Command and a General Staff are decisive factors on such evolution. Wargaming, modernization (this means, using all technological advantages on railroads, rifle making, artillery and machine guns, while demobilizing or transforming cavalry units) and professionalization (with always increasing quality levels of the reserve units) are the keys of German capability shown against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870). One thing I really liked of this book is the extraordinary quantity and quality of the research sources (actually, thanks to this book I've been able to get some other texts on the subject), many of which are not in English. An extraordinary work.

Rating:
Summary: Monumental work!
Review: Being a text of the Modern War Studies by the University Press of Kansas already indicates this is a great book. Actually, I bought it for that reason and because the subject attracts my attention. After reading it, I can only say this book is fantastic. After Prussian defeat at Jena in 1806 on the hands of Napoleon, it took several years for the German peoples to again have a respectfull army. This books deals with this process. This book reveals why the Germans succeded on creating a new and powerfull army, while its neighbors (France and Russia, although Great Britain is also treated) decreased in power. The creation of a High Command and a General Staff are decisive factors on such evolution. Wargaming, modernization (this means, using all technological advantages on railroads, rifle making, artillery and machine guns, while demobilizing or transforming cavalry units) and professionalization (with always increasing quality levels of the reserve units) are the keys of German capability shown against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866) and France (1870). One thing I really liked of this book is the extraordinary quantity and quality of the research sources (actually, thanks to this book I've been able to get some other texts on the subject), many of which are not in English. An extraordinary work.