BACK FIRE

Rating:
Summary: Outstanding
Review: Buy it, read it, live it. Evenhanded for a change account of a good war -- noble cause, ably fought -- by a very fine writer

Rating:
Summary: From Secret to Obscure ... A Book Before Its Time
Review: It is disappointing to learn that Roger Warner's excellent work is now out of print. He and the publisher Simon & Schuster did a national service in producing "Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam." One can only hope that a softcover edition will be forthcoming.

Good history doesn't spring readily into public consciousness, no matter how well researched or written. The Vietnam War and related events still carry too much baggage for the American public to embrace easily ... perhaps in another generation this will change.

When attitudes do change (and they surely will), Warner's efforts to unravel and explain the events that transpired across Vietnam's western border in the 1960s and 1970s will provide a springboard to understanding and future research.

I found that "Back Fire" answered many questions about my own involvement in the war during those troubled times. One instance in particular that Warner recounts was the secret operation of a radar facility on a mountain in northern Laos, from which fighter bombers were vectored to targets in North Vietnam. The installation was destroyed in a desperate fight after outnumbered and unsupported defenders were overwhelmed by North Vietnamese regular troops. Later, not many miles away, a similar radar system was reestablished on a peak in the northern part of South Vietnam near the A Shau Valley. It too came under attack by enemy regulars and its defenders withdrew after a 23-day siege. (See Keith Nolan's "Ripcord: Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Vietnam 1970.")

There are many key individuals that make up this intriguing tale. One of the most interesting is the charismatic Vang Pao, a Humong (or Meo) tribesman who rose from obscurity to lead the only effective Laotian army to fight the communists. Tragically for the Humong, when the U.S. sent combat troops to South Vietnam the CIA lost control of the air war in Laos. Subsequent mismanagement of air assets began the downward spiral of defeat for the tribesmen.

In the end, "Back Fire" is about more than just secrecy. It is about the cruel side of war and about war's illusions. It chronicles the sacrifices of small countries and naive, primitive groups to the hubris of more powerful neighbors and larger countries.

If you can get a copy of "Back Fire," do so. It will be an acquisition the military historian and history buff will not regret.

Rating:
Summary: From Secret to Obscure ... A Book Before Its Time
Review: It is disappointing to learn that Roger Warner's excellent work is now out of print. He and the publisher Simon & Schuster did a national service in producing "Back Fire: The CIA's Secret War in Laos and Its Link to the War in Vietnam." One can only hope that a softcover edition will be forthcoming.

Good history doesn't spring readily into public consciousness, no matter how well researched or written. The Vietnam War and related events still carry too much baggage for the American public to embrace easily ... perhaps in another generation this will change.

When attitudes do change (and they surely will), Warner's efforts to unravel and explain the events that transpired across Vietnam's western border in the 1960s and 1970s will provide a springboard to understanding and future research.

I found that "Back Fire" answered many questions about my own involvement in the war during those troubled times. One instance in particular that Warner recounts was the secret operation of a radar facility on a mountain in northern Laos, from which fighter bombers were vectored to targets in North Vietnam. The installation was destroyed in a desperate fight after outnumbered and unsupported defenders were overwhelmed by North Vietnamese regular troops. Later, not many miles away, a similar radar system was reestablished on a peak in the northern part of South Vietnam near the A Shau Valley. It too came under attack by enemy regulars and its defenders withdrew after a 23-day siege. (See Keith Nolan's "Ripcord: Screaming Eagles Under Siege, Vietnam 1970.")

There are many key individuals that make up this intriguing tale. One of the most interesting is the charismatic Vang Pao, a Humong (or Meo) tribesman who rose from obscurity to lead the only effective Laotian army to fight the communists. Tragically for the Humong, when the U.S. sent combat troops to South Vietnam the CIA lost control of the air war in Laos. Subsequent mismanagement of air assets began the downward spiral of defeat for the tribesmen.

In the end, "Back Fire" is about more than just secrecy. It is about the cruel side of war and about war's illusions. It chronicles the sacrifices of small countries and naive, primitive groups to the hubris of more powerful neighbors and larger countries.

If you can get a copy of "Back Fire," do so. It will be an acquisition the military historian and history buff will not regret.

Rating:
Summary: The easiest way to understand the War in Laos, 1960-1975
Review: Most books about Laos are boring. By contrast, Back Fire is interesting. As I left Laos in late 1974, I asked myself if anyone would ever be able to describe in plain English and lucidity the absurdity and complexity that became the War (between the United States and North Vietnam) in Laos from 1960 to 1975? Will anyone ever explain why the War in Laos should be chronicled in the Encyclopedia of Human Stupidity? Roger Warner comes closer than any other author. His book, Back Fire, traces the incidents and the players after 1960 in a way that is easy to follow and understand. Warner takes neither a pro- nor anti-war position; instead he lays out the chronology with facts and events and also does a very good job laying out the strengths and weaknesses of the chief CIA, State Department, and, Lao, and Hmoung (Meo) leaders. Vietnam Vets will shake their heads after reading this book -- the overall strategy and implementation of the strategy to sacrifice Laos and its people for Vietnam was more imbecilic than previously explained. While there were certainly heroes in the Laos war, Warner shows us the dolts in higher positions too. Forget assassination laws, our nation needs a law that prohibits any member of the State Department, including Ambassadors and chargé d'affaires, from ever commanding military resources. This book is ripe with example. On a personal note, I want to thank Roger Warner for documenting the true story about the 24 foot tape worms - it's free beer for me forever. If you think racial prejudice is unique to the United States, read Warner's true account about the prejudice among white, green, and blue Meo (the color of a woman's tribal dress trim, not skin color). Warner does a fair job explaining the CIA and Hmoung involvement with the opium and heroin trade. There are weaknesses in the book, Warner mentions but doesn't conclude about the road built by the Chinese Army from southern China through northern Laos to an unbridgeable termination at the waterfalls on the Mekong River - the secret of that road remains intact. He also neglects to mention Colonel John P. Cross, British Military Attaché, and his significant contribution between 1972 and 1976. While Americans were flying to and from in Laos, Colonel Cross walked from border to border, village to village, through government and communist controlled territory and gained more intelligence than all the CIA. Cross may have been eccentric, but he was usually right. (see First In, Last Out, An Unconventional British Officer in Indo-China; Cross, J.P.) The writer briefly notes the presence of Army and Air Force Detachment 404, but neglects to explain it's purpose and activities. The same for COMUSMACTHAI (whatever) and communication intelligence. Individuals involved with unconventional warfare (teaching or planning) and students of Laos should read this book, I doubt if many others will care. And by the way, Warner makes it clear that North Vietnam led and controlled the communist Pathet Lao party, not a Laotian.