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Rating: 
Summary: What were the Odds?
Review: Another volume in the quest to demonstrate that the GI had a good thing going against the German Army. The author makes his case that GI's demonstrated sound tactics, training, and leadership to be the first army to successfully attack into and defend the rugged Vosges Mountains in eastern France.The strong points of the book is that the author has compiled great details on the opposing forces to include theory, doctrine, training, equipment and performance. I especially enjoyed his references to the Master, and how he described the problems and issues of military operations in mountainous terrain. He then compares what actually happened to what should have been expected given Clausewitz's interpretation. The strongest argument for the book is that it covers a time and period that has been overshadowed and neglected by Market Garden, Patton, and the Bulge. There are some significant weaknesses. First of all, the title is very misleading. The odds were not even. True, the Americans didn't enjoy the ubiquitious fighter bomber that many Germans implicitly blame for their at times poor performance, and the theater was a backwater for both sides, HOWEVER, the Americans were attacking and held the initiative. That counts for a lot at the operational level. True, it is no fun for the grunt who has to expose himself to machine gun fire, mines, falling trees, the cold, and rain. By being able to pick the place of battle, bypass strongpoints, and mass combat power, the Americans routed their opponents. Who, by the way, were not the Africa Korps nor the SS. The German Army by the Fall of '44 was not the Wehrmacht of 1941. While the US Army had peaked, the Germans were on their last leg. The German Nordwind offensive aptly demonstrates that they were not a competent force any more. One final negative is the maps. They are not clear with respect to forces and terrain, and do not conform to the narrative text in a conducive manner. So, the odds weren't so even after all. That is not to say it couldn't have gone the other way, or that the GIs had a cake walk. On the contrary, they fought the Germans, the elements, and the terrain with skill, some cunning, and guts.
Rating: 
Summary: Logical, Accurate and Balanced
Review: Both during and after World War Two, historians and military thinkers sought to analyze the relative effectiveness of American and German combat units. As an active duty infantry officer and a veteran of the United States Military Academy, Keith E. Bonn decided to tackle the task of comparing German and American efficiencies in the combat of World War Two in his book titled When The Odds Were Even. In order to accomplish his goal of critical analization, Bonn searched for a place and time during the war where neither side enjoyed a tactical or operational advantage other than the pure combat readiness and efficiency of the respective units. Bonn found this place and time to be the Vosge Mountains from October 1944 to January 1945. According to Bonn, when the odds were even the Americans demonstrated that they were the better fighting force. Through his historical accuracy, well-developed logic, and excellent balance throughout the book, Bonn successfully proves his thesis. To accomplish his mission of determining whether the Germans or Americans were better battlefield units, Bonn breaks his book down into five main sections. He begins with a thorough introduction of the Vosge Mountains (both the High and Low Vosges). This section aims at giving the reader a perspective on how the terrain looked, and how it limited technological advantages for either side. Bonn uses this section to emphasize how this specific place and time would provide an accurate account of which force was superior. The second section, titled The Opposing Forces, provides the reader with background information about the doctrine, training and organization for each country's army. This portion of the book serves to arm the reader with knowledge about how exactly each nation fought battles, and why they fought that way. Furthermore, this allows the reader to make their own conjectures about the combat readiness of both forces before actually knowing what does happen in the battles for the Vosges Mountains. The third and fourth sections of the book outline the battles for the High Vosges and Low Vosges respectively. In each section Bonn goes into extreme detail about the campaigns and ends each section with a conclusion that offers his personal analysis and arguments for which side he felt was superior. In the final section of this book, The Vosage Mountains In Perspective, Bonn shows the impact of the training, doctrine and organization, which he had previously outlined in the section titled The Opposing Forces, on the outcome of the battles for the Vosge Mountains. In order to determine the accuracy of Bonn's argument it is essential to examine the resources used in the development of this book. Through this examination of sources, the accuracy of Bonn's argument shows its validity. While Bonn does rely on many secondary sources such as books and journal articles, he also uses German documents, unit histories, manuscripts, and interviews, as well as United States Army operations and intelligence reports, company morning reports, field manuals, and unit histories. The overwhelming majority of works come from the United States Army company morning reports. At first, this may give the impression of biased data in favor of the American military performance, but Bonn does an excellent job of providing an even distribution of sources throughout his book. He coordinates German accounts with American ones and balances secondary and primary sources. In this work, no one source, or source type, dominates the evidence. Bonn employs his use of evidence well and, through his research, provides an accurate perspective on the events that took place in the Vosage Mountains from October 1944 to January 1945. Part of the success of Bonn's argument lies in his logical approach. Since Bonn's purpose for this research was to determine which side was better in battle, Bonn chose to avoid making assumptions about the weight of the advantages that either side had, and instead found a place where the odds were even. In essence, Bonn eliminated the worry of weighing one advantage over another by finding a place and time where neither side had an advantage to worry about. Bonn denotes this logic by stating, "For a truly fair and accurate comparison, then, it is necessary to find a campaign in which these differences were obviated, or at least diminished to the point of insignificance." To further enhance his argument, Bonn does not rely heavily on assumptions. There are only two clear-cut assumptions in his book. First, Bonn assumes that it is not possible to clearly analyze which side is better if there is an advantage held by either side during the battle. Bonn attacks this assumption by discrediting other works in which the authors attempt to analyze the combat effectiveness of forces where there was such an advantage. According to Bonn, these other works either focus too much on parameters, or do not go in-depth enough to properly analyze the discussed battles. In Bonn's view, the use of parameters is an inefficient method because, "they are artificial and ex post facto at best, irrelevant at worst." A second, and relatively closely related assumption that Bonn makes is that: in the Vosge Mountains, the odds were in fact even. To address this assumption, Bonn spends the first fifty pages of his book, following the introduction, addressing the doctrine, organization and training of each force present at the battle. Furthermore, Bonn addresses the impact of terrain and weather as huge factors that limit the technological advantages of each side, bringing the two sides down to a level playing field. Overall, Bonn follows a fairly simple cause and effect relationship. Bonn effectively shows that because the Americans were victorious at the Vosges Campaign, during which neither force held a significant advantage, the American troops can be labeled as the more efficient combat force. The logical preface of Bonn's argument, combined with the lack of unwarranted assumptions, and his well-developed cause and effect relationship, make his argument believable and effective. Bonn adds to the effectiveness of his logic by maintaining a good balance in this book. Throughout this book, Bonn seems to be aiming less to prove his argument, and more towards finding the truth about who was better. In the introduction when Bonn attacks other works on the same topic as being unsubstantiated, he seems to take personal offense to the lack of logical arguments in the works of his peers. One example of Bonn's attitude towards other works is evident when he says, "The Official United States Army Historical Series volume on the Seventh Army's campaigns in the ETO, titled From the Riviera to the Rhine, was not published until the spring of 1993, nearly a half century after the fact!" Through this bitter resentment towards the laxidasical inefficiencies in the work of his peers, Bonn demonstrates his desire to be an effective detached observer seeking the truth. To further add to Bonn's credibility through balance is his outstanding background. Bonn is a West Point graduate and, at the time he wrote the book, an active duty officer in the United States Army. Bonn's military background seemed to focus him to rely heavily on primary accounts from the battlefield as well as American and German field reports. Furthermore, Bonn's military experience seemed to influence his information gathering by allowing him to discard data that is clearly distorted and impossible based on common military knowledge. As an infantry officer, Bonn also has a valuable background in United States Army doctrine and training. This book is very interesting and informative. With that said, it does not seem to be targeted for all types of audiences, but rather is designed to intrigue military personnel, fans of history, and people who are fond of military history. More specifically, this book is an excellent work for historians in any field specific to the study of World War Two. Bonn's book would be difficult to read and most likely uninteresting to the average civilian reader because the two sections of the book that talk about the battles of the Vosge Mountains go into great military detail. For historians and military personnel fond of military history, this book is an excellent time investment. Bonn has found a place and time in World War Two where no serious tactical or operational advantage was enjoyed by either side. In doing so, Bonn has succeeded in justifying the superiority of the American ground forces where technology and other advantages do not play a part. This work is a very valuable resource because it forces its readers to look beyond who won or lost, but to who would have won or lost, had the odds been even. Beyond all else, this book can be of profound use to a future officer. Officers and future officers must realize that even with all of the technological advantages that they might enjoy, there will be a place and time somewhere in which they are forced to operate without that advantage. Then and only then, will the better-prepared, better-trained, and better-organized force
Rating:
Summary: Rousing & Well-Written Tome About Vosges Mountains Campaign!
Review: Most military historians are likely to offer the Battle of the Bulge as constituting proof positive of the Allies' military prowess and ability to fight toe to toe with the Wehrmacht and win. Yet, in this fine book by Keith E. Bonn, the author argues persuasively that in the battle for the Vosges Mountain region in the late fall and winter of 1944-45, the Allies in general, and the American army in particular, showed just how well they could meet the challenge of defeating a numerically superior foe that was well dug-in and much more familiar with the terrain. The stunning defeat of the German forces at the hands of the Americans should put quite a wrinkle in the discussion about the war being decided by either the sheer weight of Allied logistics support or of overwhelming numerical advantage. Here the odds truly were even. This campaign conducted toward the end of the war is a stirring account of how the American Seventh Army gradually but steadily breached the well-established fortifications in the Vosges Mountain region, where the remnants of the Wehrmacht had reconstituted itself in a last ditch effort to punish the Allies and slow their progress across the region's passes. Indeed, Bonn illustrates how many of the German army's finest combat forces were clustered into the area in an effort to safeguard it. In summary, he shows how all of the prevailing conditions initially favored the defenders, and shows how the American Seventh army systematically worked its way painfully but effectively through the stagnant defense and gradually overcame all these initial advantages. In so doing the American army made history, for it was the first time a defender had been successfully defeated in the Vosges Mountains region. As another reviewer commented, Bonn shows how the better organized and better trained American troops acted in systematically attacking and overcoming each of the many obstacles the Germans had erected to repel them. Of course, it is also true that the American forces were better able to focus the kinds of men and equipment they needed to overcome the circumstances. Yet, even when considering the fact of superior logistical support and air superiority, one must recognize that even when these advantages were removed due to poor weather, extremely rugged terrain, the ongoing competition for scarce resources due to the rush toward Berlin, the Americans simply outthought, outmaneuvered, and outfought their German opponents. Thus, this book offers a stunning example of how well the American fighting man could compete on the battlefield when adequately trained and equipped. "When the Odds Were Even" offers powerful testimony to that fact, and by carefully analyzing the campaign, succeeds marvelously in conveying an accurate and quite detailed portrait of the relative merits of the two opposing sides. I agree with another reviewer's comment that this book is destined to become a classic, and should be on any serious WWII scholar's reading list. I highly recommend this book. Enjoy!
Rating:
Summary: Of the Best Printed on the US in World War II
Review: The time? Autumn and winter 1944-45. The place? The Vosges
Mountains of northeastern France. Allied forces from the 7th US Army
pitted against the vaunted, often overly hailed, but numerically
superior Wehrmacht pierced the perimeter of Hitler's Army Group G.
Defending the Vaterland from the formidable defensive bastions in the
Alsace were some of Germany's finest combat formations. However, for
the first time in military history an attacker vanquished a defender
entrenched in the Vosges Mountains. While the odds were even for both
sides in terms of personnel strengths and combat multipliers, US
doctrine was more clearly reflected in the organization of its troops
for combat and US soldiers were far better trained and led than most
of their German counterparts. The result of these differences was the
success of American arms in the Vosges Campaign. Infantry officer and
author Keith E. Bonn conducts a complete analysis of the winter battle
in When the Odds Were Even.. While explaining the ground rules for
comparing historical entities, Bonn offers a precise and thoroughly
researched chronicle of the campaign from its initial successes in
early October to the harsh fight for the Low Vosges in the closing
days of 1944. At this point in the Second World War the Americans
possessed air, logistical, and manpower superiority in the European
Theater of Operations. However, due to the poor weather and
impregnable terrain in the Vosges those advantages were obviated and
the opposing forces were pitted against each other clearly on even
terms. Referring to Clausewitzian principles and doctrinal concepts,
Bonn offers the reader an absolute complete case study of this often
overlooked battle. This great mountain barrier of the Vosges
Mountains constituted the last great geographical barrier before the
Rhine itself. Crossing the Rhine would place the Allies on the
doorstep of the Third Reich. By late 1944 the German Army in the west
was suited neither by organization or personal training for the
execution of its mission to hold back the Allies from the gates of
Germany. While the American's tactical and operational doctrine was
very similar to the that of the Germans, the US 6th and 15th Corps
clearly out fought the Germans. In the end, the victor would be
decided not by the numbers, air power, or armor superiority, but by
training and tactical proficiency. And that victor was the US Army.
When the Odds Were Even carefully analyzes this campaign and conveys
an accurate picture of the comparative combat proficiency of the two
adversaries involved. Bonn's thesis is confirmed by one of Germany's
own Gerhard Graser,, official historian (and combat veteran) of the
198th Infantry Division, which had three years of combat on the
Eastern Front before engaging the Americans in the Vosges when he
wrote in his Zwischen Kattegat und Kaukasus: Weg and Kämpfe der
198. Infanterie-Division (From the Kattegat to the Caucasus: The Route
and Battles of the 198th Inf Div -- Tübingen, 1961) "The fighting
[in the Vosges] always consisted of small battles in the underbrush,
man on man. The American infantrymen, accustomed to the protection of
superior air power and artillery, and used to advancing behind tanks,
suddenly found themselves robbed of their most important helpers. The
persistent bad weather hindered their air force, and the terrain
limited the mobility of their armor to a significant degree. Here the
individual soldier mattered the most. For the German soldier, there
was the courage of despair that gave rise to the utmost resistance:
after many years of combat all over Europe, his back was to the wall
of the homeland. On their side, the Americans believed that the banner
of victory was already half-fastened to their colors and that it would
take only one last energetic exertion for them to victoriously end the
war. So both sides fought with unbelievable bitterness and
severity." Keith Bonn has provided this long overdue account in a
masterful manner refuting the much claimed idea that the US should
discard its own uniquely evolved institutions and doctrines and simply
imitate the Wehrmacht. Historians and military leaders must read this
book for it proves that the superior training, organization, and
execution of doctrine by the American Military units is what accounted
for the unprecedented success of the 7th Army in 1945 and will
continue to do so in the future. I write this review with deep
consideration of a derogatory review recently posted: Let me refute
some thoughts that may linger especially in a recent review posted on
AOL. The reviewer in question apparently missed all of Chapter 5 of
this fine book when he says that the odds were not even because the
Americans were on the offensive and had the "advantage" of
choosing the time and place of their attacks. That the Germans had
had two months and thousands of slave laborers to build successive
belts of positions in the previously impregnable Vosges when they were
defending doesn't appear to matter to this near sighted reviewer. In
fact, as noted also in Chapter 5, the Germans launch NORDWIND against
Americans who had about a week to prepare their defenses . . . this is
something much more worthy of mentioning. In the end, when
considering an analysis of why the odds were not even one must move
beyond the ridiculous and historically pointless reasons ( such as,
"this wasn't the German Army of 1941" or "the Afrika
Korps or the SS"). Actually, it WAS the SS, two full strength
divisions of them, including the one full-strength, previously
undefeated SS division left in the world at that point, i.e. the 6th
SS Mountain . . . Kit Bonn's When the Odds Were Even is in short a
classic and should be treated as such. I write reviews for many many
professional and commercial publications - Bonn's work continues to
lead the pack both in authorship and now as the Publisher for one of
this nations finest Publishing Groups, The Aberjona Press, an
imprint of Aegis Consulting Group.
Rating:
Summary: Odds even - in 1945?
Review: There are basically two views on the performance of Allied and German troops in WWII -- the "Hollywood" version and the "academic" version. If you've seen "Kelly's Heroes" or "Where Eagles Dare" or any similar movie, you know what the Hollywood version is -- one Allied soldier is worth 20 - 50 Germans. If you've read postwar literature, even if it was written by Americans or Brits, you get a strikingly different picture, which boils down to "when the odds were even (in other words, when the Allied advantages in supply and air power were neutalized) the German soldier was, man for man, the best in the war." While any half-intelligent person should be able to take the Hollywood version for what it is worth (nothing), hundreds of films spread over fifty-odd years have most definetly had their impact on the mass consciousness of the former Allied countries. Patriotism and nationalism also have their effect. It's hard to shed the Hogan's Heroes version of Nazi Germany, even if you know it's bumf. On the other hand, three generations of academics cannot help but have had their own impact on the "informed person's" view of Germany's army 1939 - 1945. Therefore, Keith Bonn's book is important, even crucial, because it addresses not a particular army or campaign but the question itself: when the odds were even, which army really was better? Author Keith Bonn picks a campaign in the fall of 1944/winter of 1945 where American and German forces faced each other in (at least his assertion) equal numbers, on heavily forested, mountainous terrain that neutralized most of the advantages the Americans usually enjoyed. In other words, when the odds were even. Bonn is a well-credentialed academic and former West Point grad, so his bona fides are solid, even if his pride in our army makes him slightly suspect. Like many American historians, he has a tendency to underutilize German sources, which is one of the few mistakes I think he made on the purely technical front. Otherwise I would say his organization is first class, especially in the even-handed way he analyzes every component of each army, including its fighting philosophy, before making his case.
My problem with the book is simply this: Bonn has the usual Western myopia about World War II, to wit, he seems to think it started when America got involved. It subtly neglects the fact that the German army had been fighting all-out since 1939, and was passing out of its fighting peak as early as November 1942, when the first American soldier landed in North Africa. By June of 1944, when we landed in Normandy, it had deteriorated significantly further -- and the campaign Bonn uses to make his point, the battle for the Vosges mountains, started in October of 1944 and went into early 1945. By that time, Germany had suffered around 3.5 million combat casualties and its pool of young, strong military-age recruits was exhausted. Divisions were being formed out of the dregs: middle-aged and old men, people with specific types of medical problems (so-called "stomach and eye" battalions), Hitler Youth troops, ex-Luftwaffe personell, military police, foreign 'volunteers' from Russia and other areas, etc. Military training had been curtailed to 8 weeks of drill and little, if any, combat training (anyone who has ever drilled knows it has absolutely no practical value in battle). Germany's fuel reserves were gone, and the army relied heavily on horse-drawn transport and forced marches. The country's rail network had been ravaged by bombing and supplies, including food, often had trouble reaching the fighting areas even when it was available. Every unit, regardless of its elite status, was affected by these factors, and the fact that Germany had elite, fully-staffed units in the Vosges does not mean they were the equals of their American enemies in terms of full bellies, morale, age, physical strength, etc. -- the stuff that can really make the difference in war. Finally, the German army had lost an enormous number of top quality officers, NCO's and veteran soldiers, and could not make good on the losses; at the same time it was coming more and more under the direct control of Hitler and his field police. "Stand or die" had replace the flexible, common-sense tactics of the early years. Not very inspiring stuff to feed hungry, cold, demoralized, footsore troops who only had to look towards the American lines to see the advantages in comfort their enemies enjoyed.
In contrast, the American army started out totally inexperienced and clogged with officers at every level who were not up to the task, but rapidly cleaned out the dead wood and learned from experience. By 1944 the US fielded a completely motorized, veteran army that could replace all material losses immediately and troop losses with only slight delay, and no loss of quality (only experience). Each division rec'd at least 750 tons of supplies every day and regardless of whether these supplies got distributed properly (often they were not) the American 'dogface' was far better equipped materially and psychologically than his enemy. He had experienced no Stalingrads, no terror bombings, and no winters in Russia. Defeat was not staring him in the face. Bonn addresses these factors, but they seem to have made no serious impression on him. He is content that the numbers add up, and he passes over the fact that American fighting doctrine is not based on fighting 'fair', but on overwhelming superority. Who would have ultimately prevailed between the German and American armies had they met at their respective peaks is a terrific what-if, but I do not think Bonn's work provides the answer. In fact no answer is possible. Like Marciano and Joe Louis, these two titans met when their careers were travelling headlong in opposite directions. In 1945, the odds were not even, and no other outcome but American victory was possible.
Rating:
Summary: Odds even - in 1945?
Review: There are basically two views on the performance of Allied and German troops in WWII -- the "Hollywood" version and the "academic" version. If you've seen "Kelly's Heroes" or "Where Eagles Dare" or any similar movie, you know what the Hollywood version is -- one Allied soldier is worth 20 - 50 Germans. If you've read postwar literature, even if it was written by Americans or Brits, you get a strikingly different picture, which boils down to "when the odds were even (in other words, when the Allied advantages in supply and air power were neutalized) the German soldier was, man for man, the best in the war." While any half-intelligent person should be able to take the Hollywood version for what it is worth (nothing), hundreds of films spread over fifty-odd years have most definetly had their impact on the mass consciousness of the former Allied countries. Patriotism and nationalism also have their effect. It's hard to shed the Hogan's Heroes version of Nazi Germany, even if you know it's bumf. On the other hand, three generations of academics cannot help but have had their own impact on the "informed person's" view of Germany's army 1939 - 1945. Therefore, Keith Bonn's book is important, even crucial, because it addresses not a particular army or campaign but the question itself: when the odds were even, which army really was better? Author Keith Bonn picks a campaign in the fall of 1944/winter of 1945 where American and German forces faced each other in (at least his assertion) equal numbers, on heavily forested, mountainous terrain that neutralized most of the advantages the Americans usually enjoyed. In other words, when the odds were even. Bonn is a well-credentialed academic and former West Point grad, so his bona fides are solid, even if his pride in our army makes him slightly suspect. Like many American historians, he has a tendency to underutilize German sources, which is one of the few mistakes I think he made on the purely technical front. Otherwise I would say his organization is first class, especially in the even-handed way he analyzes every component of each army, including its fighting philosophy, before making his case.
My problem with the book is simply this: Bonn has the usual Western myopia about World War II, to wit, he seems to think it started when America got involved. It subtly neglects the fact that the German army had been fighting all-out since 1939, and was passing out of its fighting peak as early as November 1942, when the first American soldier landed in North Africa. By June of 1944, when we landed in Normandy, it had deteriorated significantly further -- and the campaign Bonn uses to make his point, the battle for the Vosges mountains, started in October of 1944 and went into early 1945. By that time, Germany had suffered around 3.5 million combat casualties and its pool of young, strong military-age recruits was exhausted. Divisions were being formed out of the dregs: middle-aged and old men, people with specific types of medical problems (so-called "stomach and eye" battalions), Hitler Youth troops, ex-Luftwaffe personell, military police, foreign 'volunteers' from Russia and other areas, etc. Military training had been curtailed to 8 weeks of drill and little, if any, combat training (anyone who has ever drilled knows it has absolutely no practical value in battle). Germany's fuel reserves were gone, and the army relied heavily on horse-drawn transport and forced marches. The country's rail network had been ravaged by bombing and supplies, including food, often had trouble reaching the fighting areas even when it was available. Every unit, regardless of its elite status, was affected by these factors, and the fact that Germany had elite, fully-staffed units in the Vosges does not mean they were the equals of their American enemies in terms of full bellies, morale, age, physical strength, etc. -- the stuff that can really make the difference in war. Finally, the German army had lost an enormous number of top quality officers, NCO's and veteran soldiers, and could not make good on the losses; at the same time it was coming more and more under the direct control of Hitler and his field police. "Stand or die" had replace the flexible, common-sense tactics of the early years. Not very inspiring stuff to feed hungry, cold, demoralized, footsore troops who only had to look towards the American lines to see the advantages in comfort their enemies enjoyed.
In contrast, the American army started out totally inexperienced and clogged with officers at every level who were not up to the task, but rapidly cleaned out the dead wood and learned from experience. By 1944 the US fielded a completely motorized, veteran army that could replace all material losses immediately and troop losses with only slight delay, and no loss of quality (only experience). Each division rec'd at least 750 tons of supplies every day and regardless of whether these supplies got distributed properly (often they were not) the American 'dogface' was far better equipped materially and psychologically than his enemy. He had experienced no Stalingrads, no terror bombings, and no winters in Russia. Defeat was not staring him in the face. Bonn addresses these factors, but they seem to have made no serious impression on him. He is content that the numbers add up, and he passes over the fact that American fighting doctrine is not based on fighting 'fair', but on overwhelming superority. Who would have ultimately prevailed between the German and American armies had they met at their respective peaks is a terrific what-if, but I do not think Bonn's work provides the answer. In fact no answer is possible. Like Marciano and Joe Louis, these two titans met when their careers were travelling headlong in opposite directions. In 1945, the odds were not even, and no other outcome but American victory was possible.
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