Grand Strategies in War and Peace

Rating:
Summary: Muddled, misleading, disappointing
Review: Grand strategy is all about one nations' conception and definition of war, security, soverrignty and peace, and how to achieve them at minimal/acceptable costs (through war, submission, neutrality, non-belligerence,containment, alliance, subversion, proxies, clients, protectorates, negotiations, compensations, disarmament, annexations, surrenders, occupations etc). And war/military strategy is but only part of it. So I am pretty disappointed that Kennedy, with his stellar reputation, has got it all wrong about the basics of Grand Strategy. His muddled thinkling, so evident here, is certainly doing to his, or the other contributors', reputation, no good.

To get a feel of Grand Strategy, start off with Paul Schroeder's book The Transformation of European Politics which covers the Napoleonic era, but is illuminating on the subject, which is sadly lacking in this pedantic, sub standard work.

Rating:
Summary: A Bit Too Narrowly Focused
Review: This book has a lot going for it, not least of which is an editor with an excellent reputation. The authors of the individual essays are also well-known and respected within the field, and the essays are well-written and cogent. However, despite Paul Kennedy's explanation in the preface, the essays concentrate primarily on either military strategy during wartime or preparation, primarily military, for the next war. What consideration is given to economics, alliances, and diplomacy is geared toward military preparedness. This makes the essays much narrower than Kennedy's definition of grand strategy implies, and I cannot help but wonder about the choice of essays.

Within this narrow field, however, this book is excellent. The essays are clear, easy to follow, and persuasive. Most do an excellent job of providing not just a history lesson, but an analysis of the positive and negative aspects of the strategy. Of particular use were the three essays concerning British strategy in the War of Spanish Succession, World War I, and World War II. The essays on German and French policy also covered more than one war, making them useful for an analysis of how policy changes over time. Both successful and unsuccessful examples are given, and much thought is given on why this is so.

Beyond this, all I have are minor quibbles, the most serious being the fact that this is, essentially, a series of case studies. It is dangerous to use case studies to provide an objective analysis, in that there is a temptation to choose a thesis first, then choose which cases to observe to support that theory. Case studies are more useful in defending or defining a theory than in determining one. Here we can only hope that Paul Kennedy's reputation is earned (and I believe it is), because it would be very easy for him to mislead us.

The focus of the book is on Western Europe, and this is somewhat disappointing, given that other countries are becoming more and more prominent on the world scene. An analysis of Chinese, or even better, Japanese policy would have been useful, especially given its unique position. The end notes are placed at the very back of the book, making it difficult to check references, etc. The first essay could have used tighter editing as well.

Enough complaints, however. This is an excellent book, more useful for history than for strategy formulation, but a useful companion book nonetheless.

Rating:
Summary: A Bit Too Narrowly Focused
Review: This book has a lot going for it, not least of which is an editor with an excellent reputation. The authors of the individual essays are also well-known and respected within the field, and the essays are well-written and cogent. However, despite Paul Kennedy's explanation in the preface, the essays concentrate primarily on either military strategy during wartime or preparation, primarily military, for the next war. What consideration is given to economics, alliances, and diplomacy is geared toward military preparedness. This makes the essays much narrower than Kennedy's definition of grand strategy implies, and I cannot help but wonder about the choice of essays.

Within this narrow field, however, this book is excellent. The essays are clear, easy to follow, and persuasive. Most do an excellent job of providing not just a history lesson, but an analysis of the positive and negative aspects of the strategy. Of particular use were the three essays concerning British strategy in the War of Spanish Succession, World War I, and World War II. The essays on German and French policy also covered more than one war, making them useful for an analysis of how policy changes over time. Both successful and unsuccessful examples are given, and much thought is given on why this is so.

Beyond this, all I have are minor quibbles, the most serious being the fact that this is, essentially, a series of case studies. It is dangerous to use case studies to provide an objective analysis, in that there is a temptation to choose a thesis first, then choose which cases to observe to support that theory. Case studies are more useful in defending or defining a theory than in determining one. Here we can only hope that Paul Kennedy's reputation is earned (and I believe it is), because it would be very easy for him to mislead us.

The focus of the book is on Western Europe, and this is somewhat disappointing, given that other countries are becoming more and more prominent on the world scene. An analysis of Chinese, or even better, Japanese policy would have been useful, especially given its unique position. The end notes are placed at the very back of the book, making it difficult to check references, etc. The first essay could have used tighter editing as well.

Enough complaints, however. This is an excellent book, more useful for history than for strategy formulation, but a useful companion book nonetheless.