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Rating: 
Summary: A good synthesis of battlefield action and command decisions
Review: This is the larger story that contains in part East of Chosin, also by the author. The book talks about the roles of Marine and Army ground units, as well as Naval air support in the entire reservoir area and the MSR to evacuation at Hungnam. Despite the disaster east of the reservoir, the final evacuation to Hungnam occurred in a most professional mannner and in no way resembled a Dunkirk, despite US news media hysteria cooed on by their communist sympathizers.
On the other hand Appleman makes clear that while the Chinese had a manpower advantage (and even that was not as overwhelming as many thought), they had no artillery, tanks, air support or motor transit. Their largest weapons were small mortars. Appleman is a powerful writer who elegantly weaves battlefield action, command decisions, and military analysis into a cogent text. Among his insights:
*** The 'gap' between 8th army and X corps (occupied by the savage peaks of the Taebek range) was of no military significance and had no bearing on the outcome of operations in North Korea/Chosin.
*** General Almond did have reservations about pushing deeply into the reservoir area. However, after the Chinese 'disappeared' into the hills, McArthur insisted they move forward and Almond complied.
*** The book has good summary coverage of the 37th RCT east of Chosin ['task force Faith']. Ironically, it was the Chinese 80th division encounter with TFF, rather than proceeding directly to Hagaru-ri, that may have cost the Chinese a crucial victory at the southern tip of Chosin, on their first night attack at Hagaru-ri.
*** Often overlooked in the successful breakout was the role of the Far East Cargo command, providing ammunition and medical supplies by the ton to the escaping convoy.
*** Task Force Dryesdale, a tank-led column from Koto-ri NORTH to reinforce Hagaru, suffered heavy losses; but those who did make it provided vitally needed, experienced reinforcements.
*** The 2nd Chinese attack at Hagaru-ri, although better organized, had lost the 'element of surprise', so the Chinese suffered massive losses. In fact, this defeat turned the tides in favor of the Army and Marines at Chosin.
*** Armchair analysts and military brats should compare Faith's verbal orders to his task force at the Pyongnuri-gang Inlet with the far more coordinated USMC air-ground withdrawal from Yudam-ni and beyond.
*** Still, Appleman gives a far better account of the performance of Army units in the march south of Hagaru-ri than Donald Knox and others have. This is especially true on hill 1081 near Funchilin pass, with frequent praise of Captains Rasula and Kitz and Lt. Colonel Page. Especially useful is the last chapter where Appleman evaluates Chinese and X corps command and field decisions. Appleman feels the Chinese were correct to attack UN forces directly at Chosin. An attack further north would have left Hungnam open for evacuation or reinforcement. An attack further south would not be a surprise since X-corps knew Chinese were in the area.
Appleman feels the Chinese attack at Chosin failed for several reasons. First, their manpower advantage was not as overwhelming as many writers suggest. 'Human Wave' tactics were largely a myth, though the Chinese often massed attacks on one spot. Perhaps most important, the US Marines did not panic: they remained and fought in their perimeters (no better example than Fox company at Toktong pass) as they moved south.
Appleman slips into military jargon--"element of surprise"; "mass of forces"; still, at Hagaru the Chinese lost the former and didn't capitalize on the latter. He also is stretching military journalism a bit in his references to "Xenophon's retreat from Asia Minor." But the fact remains that the Marines knew they had to control the higher ground in order to retreat. The Army did not: neither east of Chosin, nor in the west at Kunu-ri.
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