Drawing the Line : The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949

Rating:
Summary: A book all Americans should read
Review: This is a book all Americans should read, but probably won't. Although stylistically undistinguished, it tells a vitally important story about the origins of the cold war. Few criticisms of the Soviet Union's diplomacy are more damning than the way it imposed dictatorship in Eastern Europe. What Eisenberg's book suggests however, is that the partition of Germany was not the result of Stalinist bullying, but American preference for it over a neutral social democratic state. Relying on more than 70 sets of private papers and files, Eisenberg shows how the United States subtly weakened denazification, decarterlization and the American committment to ensure the war-ravaged Soviet Union its share of German reparations. Gradually they decided that economic recovery and political security required an American allied Germany even if the Soviet quarter remained a Communist dictatorship. As Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith bluntly put it "The difficulty under which we labor is that in spite of our announced position, we really do not want nor intend to accept German unification in any terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seemed to meet most of our requirements." With Truman having only a vague idea of the real issues, the United States ignored Soviet plans for reunification, forced plans for currency reform, and refused international proposals for mediation of the Berlin Blockade crisis. The consequences of this decision were incalcuably tragic for Central Europe and the world.

Rating:
Summary: A book all Americans should read
Review: This is a book all Americans should read, but probably won't. Although stylistically undistinguished, it tells a vitally important story about the origins of the cold war. Few criticisms of the Soviet Union's diplomacy are more damning than the way it imposed dictatorship in Eastern Europe. What Eisenberg's book suggests however, is that the partition of Germany was not the result of Stalinist bullying, but American preference for it over a neutral social democratic state. Relying on more than 70 sets of private papers and files, Eisenberg shows how the United States subtly weakened denazification, decarterlization and the American committment to ensure the war-ravaged Soviet Union its share of German reparations. Gradually they decided that economic recovery and political security required an American allied Germany even if the Soviet quarter remained a Communist dictatorship. As Ambassador Walter Bedell Smith bluntly put it "The difficulty under which we labor is that in spite of our announced position, we really do not want nor intend to accept German unification in any terms that the Russians might agree to, even though they seemed to meet most of our requirements." With Truman having only a vague idea of the real issues, the United States ignored Soviet plans for reunification, forced plans for currency reform, and refused international proposals for mediation of the Berlin Blockade crisis. The consequences of this decision were incalcuably tragic for Central Europe and the world.