Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs)

Rating:
Summary: Technology change requires more than just technology
Review: This book examines the hypothesis that innovation is easier during wartime than peacetime. It does so by considering a number of historical shifts of interest, and the technological inputs. It concludes with discussion about how a military can keep itself in touch with where technology may be going, and the difficulties of doing so.

Rosen adopts a tight definition for the term "innovation", requiring a major shift in doctrine or practice. The introduction of radar to the RAF is, for instance, not an innovation, because the RAF had already undertaken the doctrinal shift towards integrated air defence, through the policy shift away from bombers to fighters and the establishment of ground stations. True innovation may require the raising and acceptance of new strategic measures of effectiveness. This is a key reason why innovation can be as readily implemented in peacetime as in wartime; in wartime, the tendency is to discard risky ideas and focus on what is known to work.

The analysis is backed by a historical base of case studies, and turns up some surprises. He argues, for instance, that the British introduced the tank about as rapidly as was feasible - it was coupled to a new strategic measure based on minimising casualties, the zero-sum gain of infantry units versus tank units, and the need to gain tactical experience. The raising of naval aviation in the US Navy versus the Royal Navy is a useful example of how a new technology may require a reversal in primacy of extant technologies (ships and aircraft), with success or otherwise thus riding on doctrinal change. The US Army experience of raising the airborne cavalry concept points to a minimum time of about a decade for full acceptance of innovation. Truly successful innovation can and will withstand substantial setbacks if there is confidence in the strategic measures and concepts, as seen in the US Marine Corps invasion of Tarawa versus (implicitly) the Australian & New Zealand experience at Gallipoli.

Given that innovation may require a change in strategic measures, Rosen observes that new technologies are most rapidly introduced top-down - that is, a technology can and will be rapidly introduced if it presents a compelling strategic advantage and can be fielded through a small force. A notable example is the French mitrailleuse, a precursor to the machine gun, which was regarded as being a strategic weapon and hence not deployed into wider service. Subsequent to the book's publication, one might make similar observations about the uptake of stealth and space technology.

Rosen concludes that a Type II investment strategy is both effective and feasible for handling (technological) innovation; that is, one cannot predict which of a range of technologies will pan out, but can have in place a strategy for exploiting those technologies that do. Notably, the acquisition of equipment can come quite late in the innovation process, building on early work in doctrinal and strategic change. Within this, a key indicator is if the process is being lead by someone with an impeccable conventional background, who can shepherd the careers of the new staff officers who will go on to implement and support the new systems.

Overall, I found the evidence presented in a well-organised and well-written manner, and the conclusions compelling.