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Rating: 
Summary: A new understanding of this forgotten involvement
Review: A wonderful account of Cuba's role in Africa. Few if any books exist describing the epic of the Cuban missions to Africa which cost thousands of lives and impacted a continent. Che's diary and `Guerrilla Prince' are the few books that detail this important facet of Cuban Policy. This book goes a step further from analyzing Che's first failed mission to the Congo to the final victory over South Africa in the Congo. The author describes the Battles as well as the diplomatic missions to such diverse places as Algeria. Everything is covered, from the breakup of the Portuguese empire to the revolutions in Guinea-Bissau. A wonderful singular account that will make you respect Cuba's exporting of revolution and introduce you to many interesting figures, especially opening up the void of African politics, which is all too often ignored.Seth J. Frantzman
Rating:
Summary: A new understanding of this forgotten involvement
Review: A wonderful account of Cuba's role in Africa. Few if any books exist describing the epic of the Cuban missions to Africa which cost thousands of lives and impacted a continent. Che's diary and 'Guerrilla Prince' are the few books that detail this important facet of Cuban Policy. This book goes a step further from analyzing Che's first failed mission to the Congo to the final victory over South Africa in the Congo. The author describes the Battles as well as the diplomatic missions to such diverse places as Algeria. Everything is covered, from the breakup of the Portuguese empire to the revolutions in Guinea-Bissau. A wonderful singular account that will make you respect Cuba's exporting of revolution and introduce you to many interesting figures, especially opening up the void of African politics, which is all too often ignored. Seth J. Frantzman
Rating:
Summary: Definitive history of Cuba in Africa
Review: An excellent look at Cuba's actions in Africa, from its partnership with Algeria in Ben Bella's time, aid to rebels in Congo/Zaire, the independence struggle in Guinea-Bissau, to Angola. Supremely well-documented. Definitively settles a number of disputed issues: Cuban troops did not go to Angola because the USSR told them to; in fact, the USSR was not even informed until they were on their way. "Benigno" was not, in fact, in the Congo as he claimed. Savimbi did, in fact, collaborate with the Portuguese before independence. Particularly good on Angola 1977: a lot of stuff I didn't know about independence, and about the joint U.S./South African/Mobutu covert ops culminating in the invasion by regular South African forces. And about how the Cuban response stopped that invasion and drove them out, doing irreparable damage to the image of invincibility, self-confidence, and internal stability of the apartheid regime. Includes, for background, a good short look at the early history of the Cuban revolution and U.S. response to it. The author went through the archives of Cuba, the U.S., the former west and east Germanies, and a number of other countries, and obtained a large number of declassified documents.
Rating: 
Summary: Excellently researched
Review: Before going into greater detail about this fascinating history of Cuban-African relations, let's start off by noting the dimensions of Gleijeses' research. His work uses the archives of six pages, including unprecedented access to the Cuban ones, and he studied more than forty sets of papers in the American ones. (This is espeically impressive since many papers from that time have yet to be fully declassified.) He looked at the newspapers from thirty countries and he conducted well over a hundred interviews. The result is an impressive work of research, and while not as thorough or as revelatory as Gleijeses's book on the Guatamelan Revolution, is still the most useful work on the subject and is now the book one will look at to understand the 1975 Angolan crisis. Gleijeses' thesis is rather simple. Castro's Cuba was sincerely motivated to encourage revolution in Africa, and from the early sixties onward sought to encourage it by sending advisors, soldiers, desparately needed doctors and other assistance. In doing so Cuba acted out of its own concerns and not as a puppet of the Soviet Union. The first major action was when Cuba helped Algeria ward off Moroccan aggression in 1963. A larger intervention was to assist rebels in Congo/Zaire against the corrupt Tshombe and Mobutu governments. Although not very skillful themselves the Simba rebels were able to repel the hopelessly demoralized army. As it happened the United States secretly arranged for white mercenaries to buck up the Congolese. By the time that Che Guevera went over personally to assist the rebels in 1965, the mercenaries' brutal actions had essentially won the war. Gleijeses is particularly good on the sources for this affair, about how the United States managed to keep their sponsorship of the mercenaries out of the press, and how the media gave these brutal thugs an astonshingly free ride. ... Gleijeses also shows that Jon Lee Anderson is probably wrong in suggesting that Guevera was pushed into going to Zaire, and he ably shows that Dariel Alarcon's own controversial account is vitiated by the fact that he was never in Zaire. Gleijeses also discusses Cuba's awkward arrangements with the pseudo-radical government of Congo (Brazzaville) and the crucial assistance it gave to the liberation movement of Guinea-Bissau. Gleijeses helpfully reminds us of the Nixon policy's support of white supremacy: in the November 1972 vote that declared the PAIGC the legitimate government of Guinea-Bissau there were only six opponents. One was Portugal, the occupying power. The rest were militarist Brazil, quasi-fascist Spain, apartheid South Africa, and oh yes, Edward Heath's Britian, and Richard Nixon's America. But it is Gleijeses' account of the Angolan crisis that makes this book so valuable. It contains a point by point refutation of Kissinger's account in the latter's Year of Renewal. Very simply, when Portugeuse dictatorship collapsed in 1974, there were three rebel groups in Angola struggling for power. There was the quasi-Marxist MPLA, and the anti-Marxist FNLA and UNITA. American intelligence noted that the FNLA was "totally corrupt", "subservient" to the vile Mobutu regime, and it paid him a generous subsidy. Although Jonas Savimbi, the head of the UNITA became something of a conservative hero in the eighties, Gleijeses points out that he collaborated with the Portuguese before 1974. We also get to see him double-talking, approaching the South Africans to assist him. He fully agreed to sell out SWAPO, the liberation movement of Namibia, which links Angola to South Africa and at the time was illegally occupied by the latter. Once South African intervention could not be concealed Savimbi pretended to be defending Angola along with the MPLA and SWAPO. As for the MPLA although it was at time militarily weak and time and the stresses of war would enhance its corrupt and authoritarian features, the Portuguese army stated "it remained the most important movement in Angloa." Those Americans who were actually in Angola (and whose advice was ignored by Kissinger) agreed that it was "the only Angolan organization that had any national representativeness, that could be considered an Angolan-wide organization." The same Americans agreed that it had the support of the most intelligent and politically conscious people in the country. And so Gleijeses refutes arguments that Russian and Cuban aid for MPLA before October 1975 massively swamped aid for the FNLA and UNITA. Contrary to the arguments of UNITA supporters, American intelligence agreed that the Portuguese officials in the transition to independence were not supporting the MPLA. Gleijeses also reminds us that the MPLA was winning before either South Africa or Cuba intervened. He also points out that the problems Kissinger was having with detente in 1975 over SALT, the Middle East, Italy and Portugal had nothing to do with Russian aggressiveness, but that intervening in Angola would strengthen his hand in Republican Party infighting. All in all, this is a superb autopsy of a callous and ill-thought out policy, and should be read by anyone who admires Kissinger.
Rating: 
Summary: Conflicting viewpoints
Review: INVOLVEMENT AFTER 11 NOVEMBER 1975
After independence, Cuban forces and an unlimited number of Russian armamaents streamed into Angola and completely took over the military function from MPLA. FOXBAT, strengthened by ZULU, had to contend with heavy 122mm fire on 13 November 1975, after which this battle group also requested artillery from the RSA. While the build-up of Cuban forces took place mainly in the Quibala area, the South African supported Unita and FNLA concentrated on the retention of their traditional areas of influence. Action in which these forces were concerned took place mainly in no-man's land between Quibala and Santa Comba. The need to hold the territory resulted in an escalation of South African involvement and the creation of additional battle groups to such an extent that the South African involvement just before withdrawal stood at just under 2000 men (logistics element included). As a counter- move to the Cuban build-up and especially to the 122mm rocket launchers, 140mm guns were brought into the struggle. This caused chaos among the Cuban ranks. The following events are exceptional:
Bridge 14
To deny the Cuban forces access to the anti-communist line of defence, the Battle of Bridge 14 took place on 9 December 1975 in the Catofe area. During this battle, the battle group FOXBAT dealt the Cubans a shattering blow. FOXBAT comprised 3 FNLA/Unita companies, a company of South African infantry and an armoured car squadron, supported by eight 140mm and four 38mm guns, a platoon of mortars and an engineer element, all South Africans. The Cuban/MPLA force consisted of a battalion of Cubans, an MPLA battalion and a mixed supporting battalion with 122mm rocket launchers, artillery and mortar support. The battle raged from 9 December 1975 to 12 December 1975 and yielded the following results:
i. 200 Cubans dead
ii. 200 MPLA dead
iii.10 x 76mm guns seized
iv. 22 x 122mm mortars seized
v. 4 x 122mm rocket launchers destroyed
vi. 1 x 122mm rocket launcher seized
vii. 4 South Africans dead
Occupation of the Salazar Bridge
A newly appointed battle group, known as ORANGE, comprising a Unita battalion, an armoured car squadron, a company of South African infantry and artillery occupied the Salazar Bridge over the Cuanza River, north of Mussende, the northern border of the Unita area, on 12 December 1975.
Apparently the South Africans lost air superiority. Below are records of South African/Cuban air engagements.
On 6 November 1981 then-Major Johan Rankin of the South African Air Force (SAAF) shot down a MiG-21MF (the SAAF identified it as a "MiG-21Bis"), flown by Teniente Danacio Valdes, over Angola with 30mm gunfire while flying a Mirage F-1CZ. It was the SAAF's first victory in air-to-air combat since Korea. Almost a year later on 5 October 1982, the second aerial combat of the war took place. The duo formed by Tenientes Raciel Marrero Rodriguez and Gilberto Ortiz Perez, clashed with a couple of Mirage F1s, again under the leadership of Johan Rankin; Marrero's MiG-21 was lightly damaged by the 30mm gunfire. The MiGs broke contact and returned to their base in Lubango, without encountering any further problems. The South Africans however, declared that Rankin had shot down one of the MiG-21s and that the other had crashed after being damaged, two supposed MiG loses that never took place.
The only recorded aerial victory for the Cuban MiG-21s occurred on 3 April 1986 when a pair of MiG-21MFs intercepted two C-130s reportedly carrying cargo to UNITA. They shot down one and the other escaped seriously damaged. According to South Africa (and the International Air Transport Association) they actually shot down a civilian C-130 registered to the Angolan government airline.
The best-documented loss of a Cuban-flown MiG-21 over Angola was on 28 October 1987 when an armed two-seater MiG-21UM was downed by ground fire near Luvuei. The two crewmembers successfully ejected and were captured by UNITA
Rating: 
Summary: Cuban propoganda
Review: The account of Cuba's supposed driving back of South Africa's "apartheid" or "racist" or "facist" forces (colourful terms described in this book), seems to contradict with the vast array of other books written on the war in Angola. Why would we then believe the account given by Mr Piero Gleijeses? I could not help thinking that there was a suspicious dolloping of bias on the part of the Cuban "archived material" which will be picked up in this book by the reader. Not enough attention (strangely enough) was given to the reports of pressure exerted on Pretoria by the international community to leave Angola, which then conflicts with the Cuban military "driving South African troops from Angola". Read this book with an open mind.
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Summary: Boring one eyed Cuban propaganda
Review: The Angolan conflict was my only area of interest in this book, and having read quite a few other books on the South African war in this region I sped quickly to this chapter.
If I didn't know any better I would suspect that the author had vested interests in keeping the Cuban military in a good light through this section of the book. Any serious historians would baulk at the drivel written about the South African 'defeats' and I for one felt enraged at this blatant pro-Cuban military propaganda...very disappointing.
Rating:
Summary: Best book about Cuba and Angola
Review: This book thoroughly investigates the Cuban involvement in the African continent. It carefully constructs the forming of a revolutionary Cuban foreign diplomacy with real selflessness.
The historical period after 1974 Portugal Velvet Revolution is covered intensively. The UK, US and China sponsored forces plus South African mercenaries a.k.a White Giants suffered terrible losses under the highly trained and vailant Cuban revolutionaries with their African comrades-in-arms. Credit due to native fighters--especially of Guinea-Bissau--of course. The relations of Cuba with Soviet Union demands attention as the writer succesfully explains that Cuban decision to involve massively in Angola was not Moscow's decision on the contrary it was a decision taken without Moscow's knowledge. When I visited Cuba I saw memorial stones in villages for the ordinary Cuban fighters who gave
their lives for Angolan independence.The Cuban revolution, fighting shoulder to shoulder with their African brothers shows how real internationalism between peoples should be.
Rating:
Summary: first-rate brilliant study
Review: This magisterial, first-rate study sheds important light on a fascinating and much-neglected chapter of the cold war and authoritatively reveals the decisive contributions of Cuba to liberation movements in Africa. Extremely well-written and documented. Brilliant!!!
Rating:
Summary: Superb book on Cuba's "selfless aid" (Mandela) to Africa
Review: This superb book is based on research in Cuban, American, Belgian, German and British archives. Piero Gleijeses is an expert on the USA's role in Latin America. He has written The Dominican crisis, the best account of the US invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Shattered hope, the classic account of the US overthrow of the elected Guatemalan government in 1954.
Gleijeses stresses Cuba's internationalist role in Africa, from sending teams of doctors to Algeria in 1963, to the 2000 doctors in 21 African countries today. It is a unique example of a country's selfless aid.
By contrast, US and British foreign policy in Africa has been squalid and self-interested. In 1964, in a secret CIA operation, assisted by MI6, the US state armed, organised and transported 1000 mercenaries (mostly South African and Rhodesian) into the Congo. The mercenaries raped, pillaged, tortured and killed the Congolese people. Cuba provided valuable aid to the national resistance.
Belgium, Britain, France and the USA all backed Mobutu's coup there. Henri Spaak, the Belgian Prime Minister, one of the key figures in the founding of the EEC, at US orders allowed Zaire's government to recruit mercenaries in Belgium, breaking Belgian law.
The USA and South Africa cooperated in arming and training terrorist UNITA forces in Angola in 1975. In October 1975, South African armed forces invaded Angola. The US, British and French governments all pressed the South African government to keep going, to capture Luanda, Angola's capital.
Cuban forces entered Angola in November, and played the decisive role in turning back the invaders - a historic defeat for apartheid, which should never be forgotten. In 1976, Britain's Labour government aided the recruitment of mercenaries to support UNITA's efforts to destroy Angola and its newly elected government, allowing 200 of them to leave Britain, many without passports.
In 1991, Nelson Mandela visited Cuba and rightly said, "We come here with a sense of the great debt that is owed the people of Cuba. What other country can point to a record of greater selflessness than Cuba has displayed in its relations with Africa?"
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