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Rating: 
Summary: Hitler's Biggest Mistake?
Review: Neil Short's Germany's West Wall, Osprey's Fortress series # 15, is actually a better study of Germany's western defenses than his full-length volume on the same subject. Unlike his earlier work, Short's volume for Osprey provides better graphic detail on the layout of German bunkers and more data on resources used in construction. Overall, the graphic quality of this volume makes this the best low-cost study available on the subject. Germany's West Wall consists of sections on design and development (11 pages, good); principles of defense (13 pages, adequate); the living site (discussion of construction and habitation); an operational history summary (11 pages); and an aftermath section that includes notes on useful websites and visiting the remaining West Wall structures. There are two maps - the layout of the West Wall defenses and the French 1939 Saar offensive - which are merely color versions of maps in his earlier book. There are seven color plates which depict: a typical bunker under construction; typical bunkers of the Limes and Aachen-Saar programs; a birds-eye view of the defensive system; the Gerstfeldhohe Tunnel System; American techniques for assaulting the West Wall; and the Katzenkopf B Werke. There is also a chart depicting manpower involved in building the wall during 1938-1940. As in his larger work, Short sees the West Wall as a qualified success, but the lack of a French offensive strategy in 1939 or Allied logistic sustainability in 1944 seem to undermine that conclusion. The color plates provided in this volume provide a better picture of the strength (or lack of) in the West Wall defenses and it is apparent that the system lacked sufficient firepower or numbers to provide an effective linear defense in depth of the German border. Indeed, the West wall was amazingly poorly armed, with few bunkers mounting any weapon heavier than a 50mm anti-tank gun (the bunkers before the war could not mount the larger, more effective 75mm or 88mm guns). The typical bunker built in the 1938 Limes Program - the "Regelbau 10" - provided shelter for a rifle squad and its light machinegun but cost at least 42,000 RM to build - about one-third the cost of a tank. While the Germans were able to supplement the lightly armed West Wall in 1944 with heavier weapons dug in adjacent hasty fighting positions, it appears that the West Wall was based around light infantry weapons, not heavy or long-range weapons. Lacking mobile reserves or heavy weapons, in most cases defenders in the West Wall had to wait for the Allies to approach to virtually point-blank range of less than 1,000 meters. With the information provided by Neil Short in this volume and his earlier work, it is possible to deduce from the data provided that construction of the West Wall was a huge drain on Germany's resources. Between 1936-1940, about 17,000 bunkers and other structures were built for a cost of somewhere between 900 million and 1.5 billion RM ($360-600 million) - which compares rather poorly with the French Maginot Line built in 1928-1936, which cost about $100 million. The project required over 150,000 workers and huge quantities of steel, gravel, sand and timber; the German transportation network was severely strained to move over 9 million tons of material to construct the West Wall. At a time when Germany was desperately short of steel for tanks and battleships, Hitler was investing thousands of tons of steel reinforcing rods into the West Wall's static "Dragons Teeth". Approximately 9% of the German military budget in 1938-1939 was spent on West Wall construction, versus the 1.3% of the French defense budget spent on the Maginot Line. Upon close analysis, the West Wall appears to have been a huge "White Elephant" of dubious value. If Hitler had invested the resources lavished on static fortifications on mobile forces instead, he could have started the Second World War in a much more powerful position; funds and materials from the West Wall project would have been sufficient to build about nine more panzer divisions and upgrade the existing ones with more Pz IIIs and Pz IVs; the Luftwaffe could have created an additional air fleet; the Kriegsmarine could have built several additional pocket battleships and two dozen more large U-Boats. Indeed, the case could be made that the resources squandered on the West Wall was one of Hitler's bigger strategic mistakes and helped to lose the war from the start.
Rating:
Summary: Hitler's Biggest Mistake?
Review: Neil Short's Germany's West Wall, Osprey's Fortress series # 15, is actually a better study of Germany's western defenses than his full-length volume on the same subject. Unlike his earlier work, Short's volume for Osprey provides better graphic detail on the layout of German bunkers and more data on resources used in construction. Overall, the graphic quality of this volume makes this the best low-cost study available on the subject. Germany's West Wall consists of sections on design and development (11 pages, good); principles of defense (13 pages, adequate); the living site (discussion of construction and habitation); an operational history summary (11 pages); and an aftermath section that includes notes on useful websites and visiting the remaining West Wall structures. There are two maps - the layout of the West Wall defenses and the French 1939 Saar offensive - which are merely color versions of maps in his earlier book. There are seven color plates which depict: a typical bunker under construction; typical bunkers of the Limes and Aachen-Saar programs; a birds-eye view of the defensive system; the Gerstfeldhohe Tunnel System; American techniques for assaulting the West Wall; and the Katzenkopf B Werke. There is also a chart depicting manpower involved in building the wall during 1938-1940. As in his larger work, Short sees the West Wall as a qualified success, but the lack of a French offensive strategy in 1939 or Allied logistic sustainability in 1944 seem to undermine that conclusion. The color plates provided in this volume provide a better picture of the strength (or lack of) in the West Wall defenses and it is apparent that the system lacked sufficient firepower or numbers to provide an effective linear defense in depth of the German border. Indeed, the West wall was amazingly poorly armed, with few bunkers mounting any weapon heavier than a 50mm anti-tank gun (the bunkers before the war could not mount the larger, more effective 75mm or 88mm guns). The typical bunker built in the 1938 Limes Program - the "Regelbau 10" - provided shelter for a rifle squad and its light machinegun but cost at least 42,000 RM to build - about one-third the cost of a tank. While the Germans were able to supplement the lightly armed West Wall in 1944 with heavier weapons dug in adjacent hasty fighting positions, it appears that the West Wall was based around light infantry weapons, not heavy or long-range weapons. Lacking mobile reserves or heavy weapons, in most cases defenders in the West Wall had to wait for the Allies to approach to virtually point-blank range of less than 1,000 meters. With the information provided by Neil Short in this volume and his earlier work, it is possible to deduce from the data provided that construction of the West Wall was a huge drain on Germany's resources. Between 1936-1940, about 17,000 bunkers and other structures were built for a cost of somewhere between 900 million and 1.5 billion RM ($360-600 million) - which compares rather poorly with the French Maginot Line built in 1928-1936, which cost about $100 million. The project required over 150,000 workers and huge quantities of steel, gravel, sand and timber; the German transportation network was severely strained to move over 9 million tons of material to construct the West Wall. At a time when Germany was desperately short of steel for tanks and battleships, Hitler was investing thousands of tons of steel reinforcing rods into the West Wall's static "Dragons Teeth". Approximately 9% of the German military budget in 1938-1939 was spent on West Wall construction, versus the 1.3% of the French defense budget spent on the Maginot Line. Upon close analysis, the West Wall appears to have been a huge "White Elephant" of dubious value. If Hitler had invested the resources lavished on static fortifications on mobile forces instead, he could have started the Second World War in a much more powerful position; funds and materials from the West Wall project would have been sufficient to build about nine more panzer divisions and upgrade the existing ones with more Pz IIIs and Pz IVs; the Luftwaffe could have created an additional air fleet; the Kriegsmarine could have built several additional pocket battleships and two dozen more large U-Boats. Indeed, the case could be made that the resources squandered on the West Wall was one of Hitler's bigger strategic mistakes and helped to lose the war from the start.
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