Rating: 
Summary: Deep but badly flawed
Review: In Downfall, Richard B. Frank has done a wonderful job in bringing together the facts about US bombing raids on Japan, the invasion and counter-invasion plans in 1945/46, the truth about the Japanese economy in the lead up to surrender and the victories won by US military intelligence. It's really hard to fault what he's put together here. That said, I have one major complaint about the book and its reviews. Frank claims to show that the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the primary events which brought about a Japanese capitulation. I believe that, if judged by this objective, the book is a total failure. As Downfall draws to a close, Frank makes the claim again and again, that the cataclysm unleashed by atomic explosion forced the Emporer to sue for peace. While his evidence that Japan wasn't serious about peace until early August 1945 is undeniable, his claims that the bomb did the trick simply don't wash. In fact, even he doesn't even seem to believe it himself since his list of factors leading to capitulation changes between the final chapters and the conclusion. In the final chapters he states that the bombs did it - and the Soviet declaration of war wasn't important. Then in the conclusion he lists both events, along with others, as the reason. Any source that doesn't back up his claim is dismissed - often on the spurious grounds that people who write their memoirs are less reliable than those who testify immediately after the event. This is shabby work which ends with some light weight waffle on Japanese atrocities, as if to cover over the failings of his atomic thesis. After reading Downfall, I am no less convinced that the USSR's declaration of war on Japan was, at least, partly responsible for the Emporer's decision to sue for peace. Once the Soviets declared war, any chance of winning was over and any chance of obtaining a favourable armistice was totally gone. This isn't a bad book though. It's depth of info on the final struggle is terrific - as long as you are only interested in US exploits. It's description of the US bombing raids is a great addition. The wealth of details that describe Japanese attempts to avoid unconditonal surrender, despite being totally defeated, is staggering. And, in particular, Frank's analysis of the work of code breakers and their relationship with policy makers is an invaluable insight into how the Pacific War was won. I'd give this book five stars were it not for the faulty plot line and the US-centric cast. Three stars will have to do.
Rating: 
Summary: The Decision to Drop the Bomb Proves Correct
Review: One of the great areas of debate among World War II historians is whether or not Japan would have surrendered without the Americans using the atomic bomb. Richard B. Frank has produced an excellent book on this very topic. The book begins by describing the terrifying fire bomb raid on Tokyo on the night of March 9-10 1945. Hundreds of B-29 Superfortresses dropped incindieries on the Japanese capital. Fueled by a wind that gusted upwards of 60mph, 15 square miles of Tokyo was reduced to cinders, as many as 100,000 Japanese were killed, and over a million were left homeless. Dispite this terrible raid, the Japanese still fought on. Many Americans, including General Marshall and Admiral Nimitz (who later changed his mind) believed that Japan must be invaded to secure surrender. Thus, operation Olympic was put into action. This operation called for a landing on the island of Kyushu on or about November 1, 1945. A follow-up invasion, operation Coronet, was scheduled for March 1, 1946, to take place in the Tokyo area of Honshu. Gaining their information from Magic and Ultra sources, the Americans were given an estimate of Japanese strenghts on Honshu, but the Japanese build up was just beginning. Soon, the Americans would be facing a ratio of almost 1 American soldier to 1 Japanese soldier; a disasterous ratio for the invader. Meanwhile, scientists working in the United States had successfully tested the first atomic bomb in the New Mexico desert. Two bombs were available for use against the Japanese. The first of these bombs, "Little Boy" was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Actual figures differ, but at least 60,000 Japanese were killed in this raid. Three days later, "Fat Man" was dropped on Nagasaki. The results were not as devastating with this bomb because it had to be dropped by radar and thus missed its projected point of detonation by over a mile. Still, over 30,000 Japanese died in this attack. Even with the dropping of the bombs, there was no guarantee that Japan would surrender. In the event of surrender, Japan wanted certain terms from the U.S. such as the right to disarm themselves, the preservation of the Imperial throne, no Allied occupation of Japan, and the right to oversee any war crimes trials. The United States insisted on unconditional surrender, however, they finally agreed to allow the Emperor to remain on the throne. Many believed that he sould have been tried as a war criminal. On the American side, there was no deviation from unconditional surrender. Japan must surrender to the Allies without any conditions. In final analysis, the dropping of the bomb saved numerous lives, both Japanese and American. Losses on both sides would have been horriffic. An analogy used often in the book cites "twenty Okinawas"; this being the number of casualties on the American side alone. Even with the dropping of the bomb, there were many in the Japanese government who still wanted to fight on. It was only after the Emperor intervened that the surrender occurred, and fighting still took place in isolated areas well into September, 1945. This is a well-researched book on the topic of the Japanese surrender. Specifically, chapter twenty deals with the revisionist viewpoint that the Japanese would have eventually surrendered without the use of the atomic bomb, and Mr. Frank does an excellent job of refuting these claims, specifically pointing to the massive Japanese build up on Kyushu, and, through Ultra and Magic intercepts, learning that Japan intended to fight to the last man. I highly recommend this book. The information presented within is excellent and gives the reader a true sense of what might have happened if the atomic bombs were not available or not used.
Rating: 
Summary: It was Right to Drop the Bomb
Review: Perhaps no aspect of World War II is less known to the general public than the final months between Germany's May surrender and August when Japan finally capitulated. Consequently an entire revisionist myth has been allowed to crop up and gain general acceptance. This myth states that the dropping of the Atomic bombs were unnecessary, that Japan was on the verge of surrender, that the bomb's were dropped to intimidate the Sovets, that the bombs were dropped on Japan out of American rascism etc. In this fascinating book, Richard Frank, through meticulous research and analysis, fully footnoted puts the lie to each of these. Written from the perspective both of the United States and the Imperial government, Downfall demonstrates how the Japanese had no intention of surrendering and, to the contrary, were preparing the Homeland for a massive invasion. As Frank describes, any talk of surrender by the Japanese was more along the lines of the 1918 German surrender whereby the losing power got favorable terms and kept foreign troops off its soil. The treaty of Versailles was widely regarded as a disaster directly responsible for the second world war and no one in the United States government would have seriously entertained an armistace which did not permit the dismantling of the Japanese system, with or without the emperor. It was not until the dropping of both bombs, that a significant faction in the Japanese government thought to stop the war and even then it was touch and go as a coup by hardliners nearly derailed the settlement. As for the United States, as Frank shows, all intelligence reports indicated in July that the Japanese would not end the war and allow Allied troops on their soil without a massive invasion. Even after a succesful invasion with estimated Allied casualties of nearly one million and unthinkable amounts of Japanese casualties, allied planners feared a formal capitualtion could not be secured and guerilla warfare could continue. When the bomb became available, it was simply inconceivable that it would not be used in an effort to secure surrender without the need for invasion. As for the bomb's morality, Frank makes the perfect case that its use was the moral choice. Besides the fact that Tokyo had more dead from conventional fire bombings, the planned Allied blocade would have led to the starvation of 5 to 6 million Japanese when the railways were completely destroyed. This fact is often forgotten. Furthermore, the United States rightly assumed that each and every prisoner of war held in Japan would have been lost in the event of an invasion. As for the cannard that Truman wanted to intimidate the Soviets, Frank shows that to be nonsense. Indeed, in July 1945, still expecting an invasion, Truman at Potsdam, was urging Stalin into the war. And without question, if necessary, the bomb would have been dropped on Germany. In the end, however, the case is proven simply by the fact that untold millions would have died had the war continued as it clearly would have. Not just Allied forces but millions of innocent Japanese civilians. As Frank eloquently argues, the victims of the bombs had no greater right to life than the millions who were saved. War is a great tragedy and this war the greatest of them all. But to focus in on the deaths of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (tragic as they were) while ignoring the fifty million other deaths as well as the millions and millions that would have been killed is the worst kind of revisionism. This book should be read.
Rating:
Summary: Invasion or the atomic bomb
Review: Reading DOWNFALL is a revelation. As one who boarded ship in Italy for Manila on the day the bomb was dropped this book holds a particular interest. It is a fascinating account of the final days of the war, the preparations for Olympic (the U.S. plan for the invasion of the Japanese homeland), and the counter measures the Japanese Army and Navy were taking for the defense of the homeland. The tally of figures for the expected casualties leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that the decision for the dropping of the atomic bomb was one that in the end saved tens of thousands of lives, many of them American. This is a thoroughly documented and readable book about a subject that has remained controversial since August of 1945. It should put to end any thought that an invasion of Japan would have been a simple or painless effort.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent. Should Settle Debate on How US Ended War
Review: Richard Frank has produced one heck of a piece of history and historical analysis with "Downfall." His book examines the end of World War II in the Pacific from a policy perspective. In this superb treatise, he seeks to answer the questions surrounding our strategy to end the war, including the change in air bombardment strategy culminating with incendiary attacks on Japanese urban areas as well as the decision to use atomic weapons. This is also the story of the end of the war, focusing on how the diplomatic, governmental and military players felt their way toward the cessation of hostilities. He pays particular attention to the situation in Japan, which is fascinating reading. Planning for our invasion (operations Olympic and Coronet) of the home islands, as well as Japanese defense strategies and preparations are covered. He gives background of Japan's suicide weapons programs, the Manhattan project and a host of other historical occurrences associated with the time. Not only is he thorough, but his writing is tight and interesting. This is a book any history fan will both thoroughly enjoy and praise as a piece of scholarship. Franks is meticulous in his research and presentation of evidence. Using American sources (including ULTRA and MAGIC cryptology reports) as well as Japanese, he conducts his analysis from the vantage point of what decision makers on both sides understood as facts and assumptions contemporaneously to their actions. This is significant because so many of these type of "did they get it right" books fail to separate hindsight when critiquing events of the past. I have read a fair amount of World War II history and was impressed with the new information developed by the author. This is true particularly surrounding the situation and assessments on the Japanese side. In "Downfall," the author is successful in taking the reader into the inner councils of Japanese leadership, including the Emperor. I arrived at this book already convinced that Truman made the right decision in dropping the bombs. Franks analysis supports this position. Throughout his book, he buttresses his case by demolishing arguments made over the last several decades that the Japanese would have surrendered without the atomic bombs or that casualty figures relating to the invasion of Japan were wildly overestimated. Much of this revisionist thinking has focused on discrete pieces of MAGIC or ULTRA communications or the actions of individual Japanese diplomats overseas. Franks takes more than a few of these counter-arguments head on and demonstrates that the data upon which they rest is either taken out of context, contradicted by much more contemporary evidence, or did not originate from a policy maker that mattered. Frank's basic conclusion, for which he leaves no doubt through his evidentiary presentation, is that the Japanese would not have surrendered absent the two atomic bombings. Even after Hiroshima, critical Japanese decision-makers thought our country only possessed one bomb and/or that we could not stomach another attack. American leadership also believed that we faced huge losses among US troops through a direct attack on the Home Islands. Even had the invasions been successful, the experience on Saipan and Okinawa foretold huge casualties among a fanatical Japanese civilian population, and a corresponding large loss of our soldiers. It was also very unclear that the million plus Japanese soldiers who were in Burma, China, Indo-China and many islands in the Pacific (and inflicting tens of thousands of casualties per month on civilians - primarily Chinese), would have surrendered even had the Home Islands been wrestled from the Imperial Army. There was a real possibility, as Sec. of Defense Stimson noted, that we faced "twenty Okinawas" even after the successful battle for Japan proper. Truman saved not only many American lives, but also Japanese and Asian lives.
Franks demonstrates that, even in hindsight, American leadership could not have made more appropriate decisions than those made at the time to meet our objectives of 1). bringing the war to a speedy conclusion, 2). minimizing American casualties 3). minimizing other casualties, and 4). ensuring that Japan would not rise, like Germany after WWI, to present the next generation with "their world war." A very good book.
Rating:
Summary: Excellent
Review: Richard Frank's Downfall is an excellent work that any student of the Second World War should be sure to read. Frank's research into the planned invasion of Japan is fantastic, and provides the greatest insight I've ever read into the subject. Beginning with the American fire bombings of Japan, the book goes on to study the American and Japanese military and dilpomatic policies that led to the Atomic bombings and the end of the war. A magnificent account covering both sides of the subject, Downfall does well to answer the question over the use of atomic weapons and bringing the end of the war.
Rating:
Summary: Good, despite these exaggerated reviews
Review: The merits of "Downfall" have been more than adequately praised here. I think Frank does a great job of contextualizing the decision to use the Bomb.
I'm disturbed, though, by the reader reviews that insist "Frank proves it was moral to drop the Bomb," etc. He does no such thing; this isn't a work of moral philosophy, nor does it try to be. Frank's point is that, given that mass bombing of civilians was an accepted part of WW2 with or without the Bomb, the decision to go nuclear made sense in view of (1)Japan's intractability and (2) the fear of Soviet intervention (even the Japanese, presumably, are grateful that the Russians didn't take Hokkaido for 50 years a la East Germany).
The book begins, appropriately, with the horrors of the firebombing of Tokyo, maybe the single most destructive raid of the entire war. Such mass murder of civilians was not enough to defeat the Japanese; and I agree with the reviewer here who points out that it was the one-two of the Bomb AND the Soviet declaration of war that probably led Hirohito to throw in the towel.
It's possible, perhaps, to justify the wholescale slaughter of civilians through bombing: the Japanese, like the Germans, supported their leaders in waging aggressive war, and paid the price personally. But Frank doesn't tackle that case here. His point, and it's a good one, is that using the Bomb made sense at the time, and "at the time" is the only reasonable way to judge the men who made that decision.
Rating:
Summary: An interesting contribution...
Review: This book by no means settles the debate over whether or not it was wrong ethically or strategically for the United States to use atomic weapons (they had not yet graduated to being called nuclear weapons at this period) near the end of the war with Japan in 1945. Frank's contribution draws heavily on facts and details known at the time -- to help render a judgement without benefit of hindsight. His research into military strengths and weaknesses, production capabilities, longer-range plans is thorough and far more engaging that one would normally think a presentation of large amounts of statistical data would be. His use of sources from both the Japanese and American sides, as well as his analysis of diplomatic versus military concerns and strategies is well done. His analysis of cabinet-level thinking on both sides deserves to be carefully studied, as it draws upon contemporary documents and, where those conflict with hindsight recollections, he lays the controversy bare and lets the readers decide for themselves. His analysis of the role of the emperor in particular deserves special consideration, for it neither paints Hirohito as a puppet or a warmonger, but as a human leader with internal and external considerations to weigh in decision making. Frank begins with a description of the firebombing of Tokyo, a tactic in itself probably as horrific as an atomic blast, with similar resulting damage and casualty counts (remember, the early atomic weapons were quite a bit less powerful than todays models). I would have welcomed more maps, in particular showing Japanese and American forces at the end of the war. Frank does have maps showing planned invasion routes of the southern islands, both from American contemporary intelligence and from a Japanese actual-strength perspective -- this difference alone is best seen in a side-by-side comparison; anyone who thinks American and Allied forces wouldn't have undertaken the worst battle in the history of the world to that point is deceiving themselves, and the casualty rates on both sides would have far exceeded the Hiroshima and Nagasaki totals. A clear, detailed yet concise history of the final days of World War II.
Rating:
Summary: A Must Read for Those Interested in WWII
Review: This book is a must read for those interested in WWII, and in particular how the Pacific War ended. The book examines how and why U.S. commanders anguished over an invasion of the Japanese homeland, as well as the political undercurrents within the Imperial headquarters relating to ending the war with honor. Between the lines are the harsh moral issues, such as whether it was OK to firebomb cities with industrial production killing hundreds of thousands, but not to bomb Japan's overworked railroad system which would have doomed tens-of-millions (including Allied POWs) to starvation.
Rating:
Summary: the definitive book on the endgame in the Pacific
Review: This is the definitive and exhaustive book on the final days in the war against Japan. Not merely a book on the debate over the dropping of the atomic bombs, though at its core it is that, but a thorough retelling of the final months, days, even hours of the war against the empire of Japan. Frank provides extensive information on all aspects of the final push against Japan, including intelligence briefings, intercepted military and diplomatic radio communications, thoughts of leading policymakers both civilian and military in both Japan and the the Allied nations, final Japanese activities in the Pacific and in China, American naval actitity in and around Japanese waters including blockading actions, and the extensive convential air campaign against Japan. Frank draws upon all this information to show that not only was Japan not close to surrender prior to the dropping of the two atomic bombs, but that very likely the dropping of the bombs - and the subsequent surrender - likely saved many millions of American, Allied, and Japanese lives. Frank does not glamorize war and does not flinch from portraying the suffering from conventional and nuclear bombing raids, but he makes a compelling and highly logical case that the suffering would have orders of magnitude worse if invasion had occurred. Frank has very detailed discussions of the proposed Allied invasions of Japan, including troop, aircraft, and naval strengths and deployments on boths sides and detailed battle plan maps, as well as discussions over the terrain of the proposed landing areas and the likely involvement of Japanese civilians. For those interested in what "might have been" the sections detailing the hypothetical invasion that thankfully never came are pure gold. I don't think anyone can find a better case anywhere for why the US dropped the bomb, nor a better chronicle of the decision to drop it and the events and atmosphere in Japan and the US leading up to it. Highly, highly recommended.
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