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Rating: 
Summary: A useful reference for future reading.
Review: Having walked the battlefield twice this book is something that I will carry with me on my future, third sojourn. The maps in the book, while less numerous than others, are certainly more than you get while reading a general overview of the battle. This book should be read, or consulted when reading some of the old classics of this battle such as Madjalay's, "Cassino."
I had been to the village of Cairo (where the American's successfully crossed the Rapido) and saw the bullet-pocked houses but had no real idea of scale until I read this book.
The fighting was confused to say the least, but with the high ground commanded by the Germans and the allies need to capture it, the strategy is quite straightforward.
The outlines of the four major battles fought here (two on the ridge, the one in the town, and the final crushing overwhelming offensive are outlined and should serve as a jumping off point for later reading.
The one thing that this book does well is to set the battle in its general strategic setting. It well describes Cassino and its relation to Anzio. It also describes the composition of forces for the last offensive.
I think it is balanced with an appreciation of the fighting capabilities of the French and Morrocans, and also details the forces following up the offensive such as the Canadian Armoured Corps, and the Gurhkas -- all of whom are hardly mentioned in the main histories concentrating only on the three forlorn battles to crack the line.
A useful reference for future reading.
Rating:
Summary: Lacks Detail Needed for a Proper Study
Review: Ken Ford's Cassino 1944: Breaking the Gustav Line, which is Number 137 in the Osprey campaign series, probably attempts to bite off more than can be reasonably summarized in a 96-page format. The author's decision to include a substantial amount of coverage on the Anzio landing - certainly worthy of its own Osprey title - detracts from space available to cover the Cassino battles. Furthermore, the author fails to provide the kind of critical analysis or detail that would enable serious military readers to evaluate a lengthy and controversial campaign; for example, important details on troop strengths involved and casualties are often omitted. Overall, this Osprey volume on Cassino falls short of the type of summary that a reader might reasonably expect from such a well-known battle. Ford begins the volume in the standard fashion, with an introduction that sets the strategic background to the Cassino campaign and the operational background, sketching the Allied advance to the German Gustav Line. The chronology that follows is inadequate, since it only mentions "start dates" for Allied offensives at Cassino, with little mention of actions on specific days. The section on opposing leaders is threadbare, listing only operational level commanders (theater, army and corps), showing only photos of two German division-level commanders. Ford also slights French General Juin who played a critical role in the first and fourth battles of Cassino, but gets only a nod here. This section is unfortunate, because Cassino was a very tactical battle and the division-level leadership counted far more than remote operational commanders. The section on opposing armies is inadequate. First, Ford should have mentioned that there were over 700,000 Allied troops in Italy facing about 412,000 German troops, giving the Allies an almost 2-1 edge in manpower. Second, Ford spends little effort mentioning important differences, such as the fact that the 2nd New Zealand Division was an over-size unit with almost 25,000 troops but most of the German divisions had only about 6-7,000 men. The order of battle appears to be a complete muddle, and Ford lists most Allied and German brigade and higher units that were involved in the Cassino battles at various times, but it also includes Darby's Rangers who did not fight at Cassino but omits the entire Polish II Corps which actually seized Cassino Monastery (whoops!). No artillery units are mentioned - like the German 71st Nebelwerfer Brigade that so ably supported the 1st Parachute Division or the US 240mm batteries. Ford's section on opposing plans fails to note that the first Allied offensive against the Gustav Line in January 1944 failed to actually designate any specific units to seize the critical Monastery position, nor was any special air or artillery support arranged to breach a known fortified line. Nor does Ford note the operational-level incoherence introduced by the Anzio landing: which was the Allied main effort in Italy - 6th Corps at Anzio or US 5th Army on the Gustav Line? The maps are also a bit skimpy in this volume, with only five 2-D Maps: advance to the Gustav Line; US 5th Army's attack on the Gustav Line; US VI Corps landing at Anzio; New Zealand II Corps attack; Operation Diadem. Unfortunately, there is no map depicting the link-up between the Allied forces that broke through the Gustav Line and the Anzio beachhead - a crucial omission. The three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps depict: the US II Corps attack north of Cassino; the third battle of Cassino and the Polish II Corps captures the monastery. The three battlescenes by Howard Gerrard depict: the American attack across the Rapido river; German paratroopers defending Cassino town and Polish infantry advancing on Snakeshead Ridge. The bibliography provided is modest and the notes on the battlefield today are rather terse. Ford's description of the US 36th Infantry Division attack across the Rapido river on 20-21 January 1944 is decent and this was one of the most botched US military actions of the entire war, on a par with the action at Sidi bou Zid in February 1943. The attack was an incredibly bad plan that was made in the style of Passchendaele in 1917 - without regard to terrain, weather or the enemy - and it failed miserably. The awful plan was also made worse by faulty execution due to very poor coordination between infantry, artillery and engineers. However, there is a tendency to exaggerate the significance of the 36th Division's defeat, which incurred 1,681 casualties in a 48-hour period. While this attack failed, the adjacent 34th Infantry Division successfully carved out a bridgehead on the western side of the Rapido and captured terrain that provided the vital jumping off positions needed to encircle Cassino. Furthermore, while these two US divisions suffered about 4,500 casualties in this first battle, the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) also seized vital terrain north of Cassino but at the cost of 7,800 casualties (facts omitted by Ford). Put in proper perspective, the 36th Division failure to cross the Rapido was a tactical setback, but the success of the 34th Division and FEC attacks more than outweighed that defeat.
Ford's description of the second and third battles for Cassino has odd omissions, like he fails to note that the third battle was known as Operation Dickens. Readers might also miss the fact from Ford's description that the New Zealanders committed only a handful of their battalions to this set-piece battle and thereby eschewed any kind of numerical advantage over a dug-in defender. Oftentimes, Cassino is presented as an "Italian Stalingrad" but this is just not apt. If Ford had provided casualty figures for the actions around Cassino, they would have been surprised to see that the Allies suffered only 287 killed in action in the third battle, versus 315 German KIA. All told, the Cassino fighting cost the Allies about 25,000 casualties in five months of fighting; significant, but certainly not crippling.
Rating:
Summary: Lacks Detail Needed for a Proper Study
Review: Ken Ford's Cassino 1944: Breaking the Gustav Line, which is Number 137 in the Osprey campaign series, probably attempts to bite off more than can be reasonably summarized in a 96-page format. The author's decision to include a substantial amount of coverage on the Anzio landing - certainly worthy of its own Osprey title - detracts from space available to cover the Cassino battles. Furthermore, the author fails to provide the kind of critical analysis or detail that would enable serious military readers to evaluate a lengthy and controversial campaign; for example, important details on troop strengths involved and casualties are often omitted. Overall, this Osprey volume on Cassino falls short of the type of summary that a reader might reasonably expect from such a well-known battle. Ford begins the volume in the standard fashion, with an introduction that sets the strategic background to the Cassino campaign and the operational background, sketching the Allied advance to the German Gustav Line. The chronology that follows is inadequate, since it only mentions "start dates" for Allied offensives at Cassino, with little mention of actions on specific days. The section on opposing leaders is threadbare, listing only operational level commanders (theater, army and corps), showing only photos of two German division-level commanders. Ford also slights French General Juin who played a critical role in the first and fourth battles of Cassino, but gets only a nod here. This section is unfortunate, because Cassino was a very tactical battle and the division-level leadership counted far more than remote operational commanders. The section on opposing armies is inadequate. First, Ford should have mentioned that there were over 700,000 Allied troops in Italy facing about 412,000 German troops, giving the Allies an almost 2-1 edge in manpower. Second, Ford spends little effort mentioning important differences, such as the fact that the 2nd New Zealand Division was an over-size unit with almost 25,000 troops but most of the German divisions had only about 6-7,000 men. The order of battle appears to be a complete muddle, and Ford lists most Allied and German brigade and higher units that were involved in the Cassino battles at various times, but it also includes Darby's Rangers who did not fight at Cassino but omits the entire Polish II Corps which actually seized Cassino Monastery (whoops!). No artillery units are mentioned - like the German 71st Nebelwerfer Brigade that so ably supported the 1st Parachute Division or the US 240mm batteries. Ford's section on opposing plans fails to note that the first Allied offensive against the Gustav Line in January 1944 failed to actually designate any specific units to seize the critical Monastery position, nor was any special air or artillery support arranged to breach a known fortified line. Nor does Ford note the operational-level incoherence introduced by the Anzio landing: which was the Allied main effort in Italy - 6th Corps at Anzio or US 5th Army on the Gustav Line? The maps are also a bit skimpy in this volume, with only five 2-D Maps: advance to the Gustav Line; US 5th Army's attack on the Gustav Line; US VI Corps landing at Anzio; New Zealand II Corps attack; Operation Diadem. Unfortunately, there is no map depicting the link-up between the Allied forces that broke through the Gustav Line and the Anzio beachhead - a crucial omission. The three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps depict: the US II Corps attack north of Cassino; the third battle of Cassino and the Polish II Corps captures the monastery. The three battlescenes by Howard Gerrard depict: the American attack across the Rapido river; German paratroopers defending Cassino town and Polish infantry advancing on Snakeshead Ridge. The bibliography provided is modest and the notes on the battlefield today are rather terse. Ford's description of the US 36th Infantry Division attack across the Rapido river on 20-21 January 1944 is decent and this was one of the most botched US military actions of the entire war, on a par with the action at Sidi bou Zid in February 1943. The attack was an incredibly bad plan that was made in the style of Passchendaele in 1917 - without regard to terrain, weather or the enemy - and it failed miserably. The awful plan was also made worse by faulty execution due to very poor coordination between infantry, artillery and engineers. However, there is a tendency to exaggerate the significance of the 36th Division's defeat, which incurred 1,681 casualties in a 48-hour period. While this attack failed, the adjacent 34th Infantry Division successfully carved out a bridgehead on the western side of the Rapido and captured terrain that provided the vital jumping off positions needed to encircle Cassino. Furthermore, while these two US divisions suffered about 4,500 casualties in this first battle, the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) also seized vital terrain north of Cassino but at the cost of 7,800 casualties (facts omitted by Ford). Put in proper perspective, the 36th Division failure to cross the Rapido was a tactical setback, but the success of the 34th Division and FEC attacks more than outweighed that defeat.
Ford's description of the second and third battles for Cassino has odd omissions, like he fails to note that the third battle was known as Operation Dickens. Readers might also miss the fact from Ford's description that the New Zealanders committed only a handful of their battalions to this set-piece battle and thereby eschewed any kind of numerical advantage over a dug-in defender. Oftentimes, Cassino is presented as an "Italian Stalingrad" but this is just not apt. If Ford had provided casualty figures for the actions around Cassino, they would have been surprised to see that the Allies suffered only 287 killed in action in the third battle, versus 315 German KIA. All told, the Cassino fighting cost the Allies about 25,000 casualties in five months of fighting; significant, but certainly not crippling.
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