Caesar's Gallic Wars

Rating:
Summary: The Legions march into Gaul.
Review: As I say in my Amazon's AYA page I'm a history buff. Caesar is one of my favorite characters. I've read his "Commentaries" and "The Civil War", Suetonius' "The Twelve Caesars", Plutarch's "Lives" and a score of contemporary books about his life.
In my periodic searches I've found Kate Gilliver's "Caesar's Gallic Wars" and the excellent review of it from Dr. Forczyc and decided to give it a try.

I wasn't disappointed. This is a great resume of the Roman conquest of Gaul. In only 96 pages the author gives a very concise, clear and accurate picture. Maps of the campaign and specific battles are wonderful. For the first time I was able to visualize the enormous distances covered by Roman Legions in such a brief time period and the strategic difficulties they had to overcome.
Ms. Gilliver starts with a synopsis of the events preceding the campaign, continue with a comparison of Roman and Gallic mentality and attitudes on regard of war. Then describes the campaign itself and finally gives an evaluation of the impact on Gaul and Rome.

Osprey's edition is very well done, first quality paper and reproductions and a dynamic presentation of the text.
This book may suites as an introduction for neophytes or as a graphic resume for students and researchers.
Reviewed by Max Yofre.

Rating:
Summary: A good place to start
Review: I must confess that I don't know much about Ancient History. That is why I am really enjoying Osprey's Essential History series. This book is a better one in the series. It is well written and laid out (unlike The Punic Wars, which looked like it was assembled in a tornado). The colour maps and diagrams are placed close to the corresponding text.
Of course it only skims the surface of Caesar's conquest of Gaul (modern day France), but that is all I want for now. It nicely sets up the next book in the series: Caesar's Civil War.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent Concise Account
Review: Osprey's Essential History Volume 43, Caesar's Gallic Wars 58-50 BC, covers the series of wars in wars in Western Europe that made Julius Caesar a household name in ancient Rome. Kate Gilliver, a British academic who took in PhD in Roman military theory, uses Caesar's own commentaries as the basis for her synopsis, but tempers that biased account with input from other sources to provide greater balance. Indeed, military readers will be pleased with the sound use of military analysis in order to add value to this account; unlike many other historians who attempt to detail ancient campaigns, Gilliver remains focused on the primary elements of the conflict and does not become distracted with archaeological minutiae. The campaign maps provided in this volume also add greatly to the narrative, since most translations of Caesar's commentaries lack effective maps to demonstrate Roman operations. Overall, Gilliver's account should be pleasing to academics and military professionals, for shedding greater insight into how, why and what Caesar accomplished in Gaul.

Caesar's Gallic Wars begins with a short introduction, a chronology, and a section on the background to the war. The section on the warring sides is 12 pages long and notes that, "the Gallic warriors fought as individuals, " but "the might of the Roman army lay in the strength of its formations, and that was based on unit morale, discipline and training." The heart of Gilliver's narrative - the sections on the outbreak of the war and the main campaigns of 58-50 BC, spans some 35 pages. The narrative is greatly aided by seven maps: the campaigns of 58 and 57 BC, the battle against the Helvetii in 58 BC, the battle against the Nervii in 57 BC, the campaigns of 56 and 55 BC, the campaigns of 54 and 53 BC, the campaigns of 52 and 51 BC, and the siege of Alesia. The final sections include portrait of a soldier (Caesar's centurions), the impact of the conflict (loss of life, slavery, destruction, food supplies, religious and social changes), portrait of a civilian (Roman merchants), how the war ended (Roman triumphs), and conclusions. The section of further reading is overly-brief, and considering the author's academic background, should have included pertinent journal articles from relevant historical and archaeological texts.

Gilliver makes a number of interesting and often understated points about the military aspects of the Gallic Wars. First, the Romans had a technological edge in field artillery and siege warfare techniques that hurt the morale of Gallic opponents. In particular, the scorpion was a very effective anti-personnel weapon for which the Gauls had no equivalent. The Gaullic oppidum, or hill forts, had seemed resilient to attack in tribal warfare but they were easily reduced by efficient Roman siege methods. Second, the Gauls were accustomed to tribal warfare where rival armies disbanded during the winter months, but the professional Roman armies were capable of staying together year after year. Rome's ability to conduct a sustained military presence in conquered Gaullic territory undermined the Gaul's hopes that they could ride out an invasion. Third, the Roman army was virtually unbeatable in conventional battles and the only effective means of resistance was guerrilla warfare. Gilliver notes that other than the heavy losses inflicted on Sabinus' legions during the revolt of 53 BC and the repulse at Gergovia in 52 BC, the Roman army generally dominated combat operations throughout the wars. Although Caesar's campaigns may not seem like Blitzkrieg-style operations to the modern mind, Gilliver notes, "for the Gauls, the intensity of Roman campaigning and particularly the speed with which their lands were reduced to provincial status must have been a terrible shock." A fourth military point that Gilliver makes concerns the inability of the Gauls to form a common defense against the Romans; indeed, Caesar was particularly adept at playing upon tribal rivalries to divide and conquer his foes.

Gilliver also makes the interesting conclusion that Caesar used the wars in Gaul to build himself a fortune (from the sale of slaves) and a military reputation, both of which were necessary to further his political ambitions. Caesar's campaigns succeeded in neutralizing all effective resistance to Roman occupation, but it took several more generations to pacify the entire countryside. Operationally, Caesar was also quite brutal - even by Roman standards - and he strove to inflict (or claim) maximum losses upon the enemy. Gilliver notes that a Roman general had to kill at least 5,000 enemies in order to gain a triumph in the capital. Furthermore, Caesar used cruelty to weaken the will to resistance in his foes. In 52 BC, Caesar's troops stormed the oppidum of Avaricum and massacred all 40,000 inhabitants. In 51 BC, Caesar eliminated one of the final Gaullic holdouts at Uxellodunum but, "instead of massacring the defenders, Caesar cut off their hands and set them free, to serve as an example of the punishment meted out to those who resisted Rome." Caesar was also capable of military "stunts" like bridging the Rhine River and brief expeditions to Britain, both of which captured the Roman imagination but provided no tangible strategic benefits. Gilliver's account of the Gallic Wars is excellent in every regard and is a model synthesis, particularly given the restraints of limited ancient sources.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent Concise Account
Review: Osprey's Essential History Volume 43, Caesar's Gallic Wars 58-50 BC, covers the series of wars in wars in Western Europe that made Julius Caesar a household name in ancient Rome. Kate Gilliver, a British academic who took in PhD in Roman military theory, uses Caesar's own commentaries as the basis for her synopsis, but tempers that biased account with input from other sources to provide greater balance. Indeed, military readers will be pleased with the sound use of military analysis in order to add value to this account; unlike many other historians who attempt to detail ancient campaigns, Gilliver remains focused on the primary elements of the conflict and does not become distracted with archaeological minutiae. The campaign maps provided in this volume also add greatly to the narrative, since most translations of Caesar's commentaries lack effective maps to demonstrate Roman operations. Overall, Gilliver's account should be pleasing to academics and military professionals, for shedding greater insight into how, why and what Caesar accomplished in Gaul.

Caesar's Gallic Wars begins with a short introduction, a chronology, and a section on the background to the war. The section on the warring sides is 12 pages long and notes that, "the Gallic warriors fought as individuals, " but "the might of the Roman army lay in the strength of its formations, and that was based on unit morale, discipline and training." The heart of Gilliver's narrative - the sections on the outbreak of the war and the main campaigns of 58-50 BC, spans some 35 pages. The narrative is greatly aided by seven maps: the campaigns of 58 and 57 BC, the battle against the Helvetii in 58 BC, the battle against the Nervii in 57 BC, the campaigns of 56 and 55 BC, the campaigns of 54 and 53 BC, the campaigns of 52 and 51 BC, and the siege of Alesia. The final sections include portrait of a soldier (Caesar's centurions), the impact of the conflict (loss of life, slavery, destruction, food supplies, religious and social changes), portrait of a civilian (Roman merchants), how the war ended (Roman triumphs), and conclusions. The section of further reading is overly-brief, and considering the author's academic background, should have included pertinent journal articles from relevant historical and archaeological texts.

Gilliver makes a number of interesting and often understated points about the military aspects of the Gallic Wars. First, the Romans had a technological edge in field artillery and siege warfare techniques that hurt the morale of Gallic opponents. In particular, the scorpion was a very effective anti-personnel weapon for which the Gauls had no equivalent. The Gaullic oppidum, or hill forts, had seemed resilient to attack in tribal warfare but they were easily reduced by efficient Roman siege methods. Second, the Gauls were accustomed to tribal warfare where rival armies disbanded during the winter months, but the professional Roman armies were capable of staying together year after year. Rome's ability to conduct a sustained military presence in conquered Gaullic territory undermined the Gaul's hopes that they could ride out an invasion. Third, the Roman army was virtually unbeatable in conventional battles and the only effective means of resistance was guerrilla warfare. Gilliver notes that other than the heavy losses inflicted on Sabinus' legions during the revolt of 53 BC and the repulse at Gergovia in 52 BC, the Roman army generally dominated combat operations throughout the wars. Although Caesar's campaigns may not seem like Blitzkrieg-style operations to the modern mind, Gilliver notes, "for the Gauls, the intensity of Roman campaigning and particularly the speed with which their lands were reduced to provincial status must have been a terrible shock." A fourth military point that Gilliver makes concerns the inability of the Gauls to form a common defense against the Romans; indeed, Caesar was particularly adept at playing upon tribal rivalries to divide and conquer his foes.

Gilliver also makes the interesting conclusion that Caesar used the wars in Gaul to build himself a fortune (from the sale of slaves) and a military reputation, both of which were necessary to further his political ambitions. Caesar's campaigns succeeded in neutralizing all effective resistance to Roman occupation, but it took several more generations to pacify the entire countryside. Operationally, Caesar was also quite brutal - even by Roman standards - and he strove to inflict (or claim) maximum losses upon the enemy. Gilliver notes that a Roman general had to kill at least 5,000 enemies in order to gain a triumph in the capital. Furthermore, Caesar used cruelty to weaken the will to resistance in his foes. In 52 BC, Caesar's troops stormed the oppidum of Avaricum and massacred all 40,000 inhabitants. In 51 BC, Caesar eliminated one of the final Gaullic holdouts at Uxellodunum but, "instead of massacring the defenders, Caesar cut off their hands and set them free, to serve as an example of the punishment meted out to those who resisted Rome." Caesar was also capable of military "stunts" like bridging the Rhine River and brief expeditions to Britain, both of which captured the Roman imagination but provided no tangible strategic benefits. Gilliver's account of the Gallic Wars is excellent in every regard and is a model synthesis, particularly given the restraints of limited ancient sources.