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Rating: 
Summary: Excellent History Of A Pioneering Effort
Review: Hugh Morgan and John Weal in this volume primarily write of the people and aircraft in Germany's use of the Me 262 jet fighter during World War 2. There are many great black and white photographs from that era contained here, as well as lots of text about the history of the Me 262. Also, there are some color line drawings included of actual aircraft with their flight colors and a bit about the history of each. There is also a short appendice listing Luftwaffe jet aces and jet fighter units. In addition, the authors discuss the rocket powered Me 163 with photographs and it's history as well, and a few other jet powered German aircraft are briefly covered. I found this to be a fascinating read about very advanced aircraft for their time, sometimes misused by the Luftwaffe.
Rating: 
Summary: How not to deploy a New Weapon System
Review: Osprey's Aircraft of the Aces volume 17, German Jet Aces of World War 2, is an interesting account of the difficulties of introducing a revolutionary weapon system in the midst of a major conflict. This volume provides considerable detail on the German jet units and pilots, as well as the aircraft themselves. Overall, this volume is an excellent succinct history of the Luftwaffe's jet fighter units in the waning days of the Second World War. German Jet Aces of World War 2 begins with a short introduction on the early German jet aircraft prototypes in 1939-1942. The most important issue addressed in this section is the torpid pace of the German jet development effort. Despite the facts that the Luftwaffe had flown a jet prototype in August 1939 and the first practical jet fighter (the Me-262) by July 1942, the Germans squandered their technological advantage by not beginning to form operational units until 1944. At that point, Hitler famously interfered with the jet program by demanding that the Me-262 be fielded as a bomber instead of a fighter. Few sources note that Hitler reversed his mistake six months later and ordered the Me-262 deployed as a fighter. Normally, Hitler gets the blame for fatally delaying the Me-262 program, but it seems questionable to assert that Hitler's 6 month delay was more egregious than the nearly 2 year delay imposed by the Luftwaffe hierarchy. Indeed, it is possible that without Hitler's backing none of the jets would have entered service before the end of the war. The second chapter covers the earliest Me-262 units, such as "Kommando Nowotny" and Ekdo 262. These units were small in size and primarily established as operational test and training units, rather than as combat units. The third chapter deals with JG-7, the largest and most important user of the Me-262 in 1944-1945. The formation of JG7 was plagued by problems and although the unit conducted a few combat sorties in late 1944, it was not capable of large-scale operations until the spring of 1945. In March and April 1945 JG7 was able to employ 20-30 jets at a time instead of the previous scrambles of only 2-4 jets. The authors note that the combination of the fast Me-262 fighter and the new R4M air-to-air rockets posed a serious threat to Allied air formations over Germany. In all, JG7 claimed 500 Allied aircraft in the last two months of the war. However, the German jet units were rapidly whittled down by the relentless attrition of combat and non-combat losses. The American P-51 fighter pilots quickly realized that the jets were vulnerable in their long, slow landing runs and began to ambush them their airfields (15 Me-262s were lost in one such attack). Non-combat losses due to the finicky jet engines were high and the aircraft proved to have a steep learning curve even for experienced pilots. The fourth chapter deals with several "oddball" jet units like Lieutenant General Galland's pick-up team JV44 and a small night jet fighter unit. Galland had been demoted from chief of the Luftwaffe fighter arm after criticizing Reichsmarchall Goering, and his punishment was to form a small squadron size jet unit. In JV44, Galland scored six "kills" in his jet before being wounded. The final chapter covers the other jet types (Me-163, He-162 and Arado 234), none of which were very successful or produced any aces. The authors include appendices listing all Luftwaffe jet aces, a table of victories claimed by each unit and the order of battle for jet units in May 1945. There are also 33 color plates of jets, all but 6 of which are various Me-262s. Unfortunately, the authors failed to provide either a bibliography or a list of the German sources used. In sum, the Me-262 jet fighter accounted for about 735 Allied aircraft in the final months of the war. Yet was the Me-262 a potentially war-winning weapon if it had only been deployed sooner? "If only Hitler hadn't interfered," is the argument advanced by modern-day revisionists who assert that the Me-262 might have changed the tide of the air war. Actually, this account makes such claims appear doubtful. While the Me-262 was indeed a revolutionary aircraft with amazing potential, the Luftwaffe made serious mistakes in the training of new jet pilots (only a handful of two-seat trainer versions were built) and the jet engines suffered from severe teething problems. One of the Luftwaffe's top aces, Major Walter Nowotny with 258 kills, was killed by engine malfunction on his first combat sortie. While the Germans might have managed the program better and put more jet fighters into service sooner than occurred, the numerous hurdles would have made any effort problematic.
Rating:
Summary: How not to deploy a New Weapon System
Review: Osprey's Aircraft of the Aces volume 17, German Jet Aces of World War 2, is an interesting account of the difficulties of introducing a revolutionary weapon system in the midst of a major conflict. This volume provides considerable detail on the German jet units and pilots, as well as the aircraft themselves. Overall, this volume is an excellent succinct history of the Luftwaffe's jet fighter units in the waning days of the Second World War. German Jet Aces of World War 2 begins with a short introduction on the early German jet aircraft prototypes in 1939-1942. The most important issue addressed in this section is the torpid pace of the German jet development effort. Despite the facts that the Luftwaffe had flown a jet prototype in August 1939 and the first practical jet fighter (the Me-262) by July 1942, the Germans squandered their technological advantage by not beginning to form operational units until 1944. At that point, Hitler famously interfered with the jet program by demanding that the Me-262 be fielded as a bomber instead of a fighter. Few sources note that Hitler reversed his mistake six months later and ordered the Me-262 deployed as a fighter. Normally, Hitler gets the blame for fatally delaying the Me-262 program, but it seems questionable to assert that Hitler's 6 month delay was more egregious than the nearly 2 year delay imposed by the Luftwaffe hierarchy. Indeed, it is possible that without Hitler's backing none of the jets would have entered service before the end of the war. The second chapter covers the earliest Me-262 units, such as "Kommando Nowotny" and Ekdo 262. These units were small in size and primarily established as operational test and training units, rather than as combat units. The third chapter deals with JG-7, the largest and most important user of the Me-262 in 1944-1945. The formation of JG7 was plagued by problems and although the unit conducted a few combat sorties in late 1944, it was not capable of large-scale operations until the spring of 1945. In March and April 1945 JG7 was able to employ 20-30 jets at a time instead of the previous scrambles of only 2-4 jets. The authors note that the combination of the fast Me-262 fighter and the new R4M air-to-air rockets posed a serious threat to Allied air formations over Germany. In all, JG7 claimed 500 Allied aircraft in the last two months of the war. However, the German jet units were rapidly whittled down by the relentless attrition of combat and non-combat losses. The American P-51 fighter pilots quickly realized that the jets were vulnerable in their long, slow landing runs and began to ambush them their airfields (15 Me-262s were lost in one such attack). Non-combat losses due to the finicky jet engines were high and the aircraft proved to have a steep learning curve even for experienced pilots. The fourth chapter deals with several "oddball" jet units like Lieutenant General Galland's pick-up team JV44 and a small night jet fighter unit. Galland had been demoted from chief of the Luftwaffe fighter arm after criticizing Reichsmarchall Goering, and his punishment was to form a small squadron size jet unit. In JV44, Galland scored six "kills" in his jet before being wounded. The final chapter covers the other jet types (Me-163, He-162 and Arado 234), none of which were very successful or produced any aces. The authors include appendices listing all Luftwaffe jet aces, a table of victories claimed by each unit and the order of battle for jet units in May 1945. There are also 33 color plates of jets, all but 6 of which are various Me-262s. Unfortunately, the authors failed to provide either a bibliography or a list of the German sources used. In sum, the Me-262 jet fighter accounted for about 735 Allied aircraft in the final months of the war. Yet was the Me-262 a potentially war-winning weapon if it had only been deployed sooner? "If only Hitler hadn't interfered," is the argument advanced by modern-day revisionists who assert that the Me-262 might have changed the tide of the air war. Actually, this account makes such claims appear doubtful. While the Me-262 was indeed a revolutionary aircraft with amazing potential, the Luftwaffe made serious mistakes in the training of new jet pilots (only a handful of two-seat trainer versions were built) and the jet engines suffered from severe teething problems. One of the Luftwaffe's top aces, Major Walter Nowotny with 258 kills, was killed by engine malfunction on his first combat sortie. While the Germans might have managed the program better and put more jet fighters into service sooner than occurred, the numerous hurdles would have made any effort problematic.
Rating:
Summary: Great Look at Luftwaffe Jet Aces
Review: Usual excellent effort by Weal, who uses a time-based narrative to tell the "story" of the jet aces. In addition to the Me 262, the stories of some of the brave souls who flew the Me 163 are also told. Lots of great photos and color profiles are included. If you are interested in the Luftwaffe this is not to be missed!
Rating:
Summary: Great Look at Luftwaffe Jet Aces
Review: Usual excellent effort by Weal, who uses a time-based narrative to tell the "story" of the jet aces. In addition to the Me 262, the stories of some of the brave souls who flew the Me 163 are also told. Lots of great photos and color profiles are included. If you are interested in the Luftwaffe this is not to be missed!
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