Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917-1919 (Cass Series--Military History and Policy, No. 1)

Rating:
Summary: New insights on British Middle Eastern policy
Review: Matthew Hughes offers valuable new insights on British Middle East policy-making during World War I in this study of General Allenby's campaigns in Gaza and Palestine during 1917-1918. The title, though, is slightly misleading as this book will not be of interest to military history buffs. It is, rather, a study of policy on the grand scale, an analysis of British objectives in the Middle East considered in the context of the overall war effort. Hughes argues convincingly that the Middle Eastern campaign detracted from the primary war effort being conducted on the western front. The Palestine campaign was designed first, he contends, to provide emotional uplift and counterpoint to the dreary failures being suffered in France. Second, Allenby's efforts were conceived with a view towards solidifying Britain's post-war imperial objectives-- controlling the Middle East and, by extension, vital British sea, land and air routes, to India. The book is slightly unbalanced in that, after the capture of Damascus on October 1, 1918, the focus shifts from Allenby and the men "on-the-spot", to London and Paris, where Lloyd George and Clemenceau struggled with the issue of imperial paramountcy in the Levant. Lloyd George was determined to either keep the French out of Syria altogether, or, at least, to truncate the boundaries of historic Syria in order to secure British rail, air and oil pipeline routes from northern Iraq to Palestine. Clemenceau, on the other hand, while little interested in France's overseas empire, was nevertheless determined to secure French historic economic and religious interests in Syria. Allenby had little influence on these major policy decisions. Still, Hughes is successful in showing how the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement (wherey Britain and France essentially carved the Middle East into spheres of influence) was re-worked in the post-war settlement. His study reflects wide reading in both the secondary sources and in the private paper collections of most of the important figures in the decision-making process. This book is recommended for those interested in British Middle Eastern policy, the post-war settlement and the career of General Allenby.

Rating:
Summary: New insights on British Middle Eastern policy
Review: Matthew Hughes offers valuable new insights on British Middle East policy-making during World War I in this study of General Allenby's campaigns in Gaza and Palestine during 1917-1918. The title, though, is slightly misleading as this book will not be of interest to military history buffs. It is, rather, a study of policy on the grand scale, an analysis of British objectives in the Middle East considered in the context of the overall war effort. Hughes argues convincingly that the Middle Eastern campaign detracted from the primary war effort being conducted on the western front. The Palestine campaign was designed first, he contends, to provide emotional uplift and counterpoint to the dreary failures being suffered in France. Second, Allenby's efforts were conceived with a view towards solidifying Britain's post-war imperial objectives-- controlling the Middle East and, by extension, vital British sea, land and air routes, to India. The book is slightly unbalanced in that, after the capture of Damascus on October 1, 1918, the focus shifts from Allenby and the men "on-the-spot", to London and Paris, where Lloyd George and Clemenceau struggled with the issue of imperial paramountcy in the Levant. Lloyd George was determined to either keep the French out of Syria altogether, or, at least, to truncate the boundaries of historic Syria in order to secure British rail, air and oil pipeline routes from northern Iraq to Palestine. Clemenceau, on the other hand, while little interested in France's overseas empire, was nevertheless determined to secure French historic economic and religious interests in Syria. Allenby had little influence on these major policy decisions. Still, Hughes is successful in showing how the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement (wherey Britain and France essentially carved the Middle East into spheres of influence) was re-worked in the post-war settlement. His study reflects wide reading in both the secondary sources and in the private paper collections of most of the important figures in the decision-making process. This book is recommended for those interested in British Middle Eastern policy, the post-war settlement and the career of General Allenby.