Field of Glory: The Battle of Crysler's Farm, 1813

Rating:
Summary: On To Montreal!
Review: Donald Graves continues his expert telling of the tale of the fighting on the Niagara frontier in the War of 1812 with this chronicle of the abortive invasion of Canada by the inexpert American forces under the incompetent command of the treasonous General James Wilkinson. Factual, colorful, and authoritative, this book is a must for any student of the War of 1812 in particular and the Napoleonic period in general. Frequently overlooked as a very small sideshow compared to the huge conflagration in Europe, the War of 1812 is really America's, and Canada's, forgotten war. Fought over immense distances under incredible hardship with very small armies, the stakes fought for were unbelievably high, and the difficulty of waging war in this primitive wilderness, and the hardships endured by the troops, is simply unbelievable. High deeds and much incompetence takes place in this volume, where an outnumbered, but much more skilled and better led, British/Canadian force badly defeats an American army whose only advantage is numbers. However, some of the American regimental commanders take note and learn their lessons, and came roaring back the next year at Chippawa, Lundy's Lane, and Fort Erie to win back pride, prestige, and to fight the British and Canadians to a Mexican standoff, not quite winning, but not losing either. Expertly written by THE authority on the period on the Niagara frontier, with the additional treat of a forward by Col John Elting, noted authority on the Napoleonic period and perhaps the greatest American military historian of the last half of the twentieth century, this book is a treat and definitely a must have.

Rating:
Summary: Montreal or Bust in 1813!
Review: The 1813 campaign against Montreal must rank as one of the most dismal episodes in US Military History. No wonder it takes a Canadian like Donald Graves to write about it, as no American historian has wanted to touch it! Yet there is much food for thought here, and we as Americans have a lot to learn from our poor showing at the battles of Crysler's Farm and Chatanquay. In America we are often found of pointing out how the British professionals lacked imagination and iniative. This seemed to be so during the Revolution. How did it change for the War of 1812? The fundimental difference appears to be that the 13 Colonies took a defensive posture against the Britishin the Revolution, while in the War of 1812 the United States was deffinitely the aggressor. Yet the laws of the United States did not provide well for offensive operations. State Militias could deny crossing international boundries, and did so freqeuently during this conflict. Also, the leadership in the United States army was exceedingly poor in this period. With the likes of James Wilkinson, John Boyd and Wade Hampton leading the US invasion against Montreal, what else but failure could be expected! Here we have the classic example of political patronage and connections providing an officer corps that was totally incompetent. In contrast, the British, often accused of having such in their army, were made up totally of competent, professional individuals.

The American Army that went to war in 1812 was as bad or worse than the Spanish army of the period. The American troops were half trained at best, brave yes, but that could not compensate against discipline and professionalism. At the battle of Chantanguay a small force of Canadien Voltigeurs and Indians under de Salaberry managed to rebuff Wade Hampton. Canadians have made much of this action, but in reality with the uninspired generalship of Hampton, defeat was almost assured. This poor showing was compounded a few weeks later at Crysler's Farm where a much bigger American army was roughly handled by a smaller professional British force less than half its size. Wilkinson who lead this part of the army demonstrated leadhership as bad or worse than Hampton. In fact he was ill throughout the battle, leaving command in the field to John Boyd, a mercinary soldier of low fortune. The British, under the inspired Colonel Morrison had only the 49th & 89th regiments of foot and a few light companies and militia to hold off Boyd's horde. Yet, the sheer professionalism of the British and their allies enabled them to do so. Morrison deployed his well-drilled regulars in an enclosed field, forcing the Americans to take him head-on. The bumbling American columns were shot to pieces as they emerged from the woods, yet the prolonged firefight which ensued would prove costly to the Britsih as well. Still, there could be no denying that the Americans were woefully under trained to take on such professionals. Boyd withdrew after two hours of desultry fighting, losing close to 500 men killed, wounded and captured. British losses were less than half. With this second repulse, the American drive on Montreal was ended.

Canada owes a great debt to the professionalism of the British regulars who defended her borders. Popular Canadian history has tried to down-play the contributions of the British troops, while boasting the role of the Indians and Militia. This is nonesense, and Mr.Graves more than sets the record straight here.

Overall this is Mr. Grave's longest and most impressive work. His two previous books on the battles of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane brought these less well known actions to light, dispelling many popular myths in the process. Here Graves has shed light on a very dark aspect of the war for the United States, and one that is not well known in this country. American readers may find it painful to read, yet instructional. Also, in the ashes of defeat would come redemption in the following year when Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott conduct the 1814 Niagara campaign which salvages to some exstent the shattered reputation of the United States army. In reading this book one can see that we Americans are a people that enjoy war, yet are not professional in our conduct of it. These are lessons we need to take to heart for the present day.

In conclusion, Grave's book is well written, full of many interesting bios on the personalities involved, and provides numerous addenda. This reader cannot recommend it highly enough. It is his best work on the War of 1812 so far. Military buffs of the period will enjoy its up-close description of the fighting, providing as it does an interesting example of Napoleanic tactics applied in a secondary theater of war. All War of 1812 nuts should have it in their collection.

Rating:
Summary: Montreal or Bust in 1813!
Review: The 1813 campaign against Montreal must rank as one of the most dismal episodes in US Military History. No wonder it takes a Canadian like Donald Graves to write about it, as no American historian has wanted to touch it! Yet there is much food for thought here, and we as Americans have a lot to learn from our poor showing at the battles of Crysler's Farm and Chatanquay. In America we are often found of pointing out how the British professionals lacked imagination and iniative. This seemed to be so during the Revolution. How did it change for the War of 1812? The fundimental difference appears to be that the 13 Colonies took a defensive posture against the Britishin the Revolution, while in the War of 1812 the United States was deffinitely the aggressor. Yet the laws of the United States did not provide well for offensive operations. State Militias could deny crossing international boundries, and did so freqeuently during this conflict. Also, the leadership in the United States army was exceedingly poor in this period. With the likes of James Wilkinson, John Boyd and Wade Hampton leading the US invasion against Montreal, what else but failure could be expected! Here we have the classic example of political patronage and connections providing an officer corps that was totally incompetent. In contrast, the British, often accused of having such in their army, were made up totally of competent, professional individuals.

The American Army that went to war in 1812 was as bad or worse than the Spanish army of the period. The American troops were half trained at best, brave yes, but that could not compensate against discipline and professionalism. At the battle of Chantanguay a small force of Canadien Voltigeurs and Indians under de Salaberry managed to rebuff Wade Hampton. Canadians have made much of this action, but in reality with the uninspired generalship of Hampton, defeat was almost assured. This poor showing was compounded a few weeks later at Crysler's Farm where a much bigger American army was roughly handled by a smaller professional British force less than half its size. Wilkinson who lead this part of the army demonstrated leadhership as bad or worse than Hampton. In fact he was ill throughout the battle, leaving command in the field to John Boyd, a mercinary soldier of low fortune. The British, under the inspired Colonel Morrison had only the 49th & 89th regiments of foot and a few light companies and militia to hold off Boyd's horde. Yet, the sheer professionalism of the British and their allies enabled them to do so. Morrison deployed his well-drilled regulars in an enclosed field, forcing the Americans to take him head-on. The bumbling American columns were shot to pieces as they emerged from the woods, yet the prolonged firefight which ensued would prove costly to the Britsih as well. Still, there could be no denying that the Americans were woefully under trained to take on such professionals. Boyd withdrew after two hours of desultry fighting, losing close to 500 men killed, wounded and captured. British losses were less than half. With this second repulse, the American drive on Montreal was ended.

Canada owes a great debt to the professionalism of the British regulars who defended her borders. Popular Canadian history has tried to down-play the contributions of the British troops, while boasting the role of the Indians and Militia. This is nonesense, and Mr.Graves more than sets the record straight here.

Overall this is Mr. Grave's longest and most impressive work. His two previous books on the battles of Chippewa and Lundy's Lane brought these less well known actions to light, dispelling many popular myths in the process. Here Graves has shed light on a very dark aspect of the war for the United States, and one that is not well known in this country. American readers may find it painful to read, yet instructional. Also, in the ashes of defeat would come redemption in the following year when Jacob Brown and Winfield Scott conduct the 1814 Niagara campaign which salvages to some exstent the shattered reputation of the United States army. In reading this book one can see that we Americans are a people that enjoy war, yet are not professional in our conduct of it. These are lessons we need to take to heart for the present day.

In conclusion, Grave's book is well written, full of many interesting bios on the personalities involved, and provides numerous addenda. This reader cannot recommend it highly enough. It is his best work on the War of 1812 so far. Military buffs of the period will enjoy its up-close description of the fighting, providing as it does an interesting example of Napoleanic tactics applied in a secondary theater of war. All War of 1812 nuts should have it in their collection.