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Rating: 
Summary: A Valuable Addition to Market-Garden History
Review: Hell's Highway, which covers the dramatic events on the Eindhoven-Veghel stretch of highway in Holland on 10-26 September 1944, is one of the better Battleground Europe titles. It was the battle for the highway that ultimately decided the outcome of the Allies daring but risky Operation Market-Garden. Not only does this volume cover a neglected aspect of Operation Market-Garden in great detail, but the author's research, writing style and analysis provides a superb addition to the study of this campaign. The supporting photographs, maps and diagrams are also excellent. Once the additional planned volumes on Nijmegen and the Island are completed, this volume on Hell's Highway will be part of an important new historical trilogy that breaks the campaign down into distinct phases. This volume consists of 11 chapters, starting with the coup de main seizure of "Joe's Bridge" by the Irish Guards on 10 September 1944. The relatively easy seizure of this vital bridge on the Dutch-Belgian border served to entice Field Marshal Montgomery to attempt even more dramatic operations in order to bring the war to a rapid conclusion. The manner in which Joe's Bridge was seized and its impact upon the planning of Market-Garden is often ignored in standard histories of the campaign, but is covered in this book's second chapter. Beginning with the third chapter, the author shifts to a detailed dissection of Operation Market-Garden in the US 101st Airborne Division and British Guards Armored Division sectors. Individual chapters cover the initial XXX Corps attack, the 101st landings near Son, the often-ignored battle near Best, actions around St. Oedenrode, Veghel and Schijndel, and the German raids that temporarily cut the highway. A detailed order of battle for the British Guards armored division and the US 101st Infantry Division is also provided. Overall, the volume is well put-together and flows smoothly without distraction. Although intended also as a battlefield guide, the author does not allow this requirement to subvert the historical value of his narrative by endless digressions on tourist highlights. One of the great values of this volume is the attention devoted to the initial XXX Corps attack, which is often glossed over in most accounts in favor of actions at Arnhem. Particularly useful is the overlay depicting the XXX Corps artillery prepatory fire plan; although the 35-minute prep was fired by 350 guns most were lighter 25-pounders since the heavy corps artillery had not caught up to the front yet. Consequently, the initial British prep fire was not as heavy as it should have been. The supporting attacks launched by British 8th and 12th Corps on either side of Hell's Highway are also discussed in this account, although not in great detail. However the most controversial aspect of this volume is the timing of the XXX Corp's starting H-Hour and the corps' premature stop on the first night. The author tends to let Horrocks, the corps commander, off easily by stating that in retrospect, an H-Hour set at 1435 hours was too late in the day and that XXX Corps had little choice but to stop at sunset at 1847 hours. Actually, these explanations appear as little more than a face-saving effort. XXX Corps had been in contact with the German forces around "Joe's Bridge" for seven days prior to the launching of Market-Garden and the British had made little effort to exploit their bridgehead. Even at the time, the Americans felt that the ground phase could have commenced before paratroopers actually started hitting the ground. Horrocks wasted valuable daylight hours because he half expected the operation to be delayed by bad weather over England. After ripping through the outer layer of the thin German defenses along the highway, the British used the loss of 10 out of 200 tanks and the approach of darkness as an excuse to call it a day. Stopping one hour prior to sunset was certainly not the kind of decision one would expect from bold armor leaders. Instead, the Germans used the time to hastily throw together a new blocking force that further delayed XXX Corps on D+1. While most writers tend to blame the operation's ultimate failure on events at Son or Nijmegen, it is apparent that the ground-phase of Garden got off to a bad start. This volume also has good examples of British armor-US paratrooper joint actions, which are often ignored in other accounts. Typically, most American-written accounts of the campaign tend to depict British armor as timidly led, ineffective and prone to walking into German anti-tank ambushes. While incidents of this sort did occur, American accounts tend to underrate the number of times that British tanks saved US paratroopers from being overrun. One interesting incident detailed here covers an action near Schijndel on 19 September 1944, when a single British Sherman tank operated by only two crewmen saved the US 1/502nd Airborne from a vicious German counterattack. The limping British tank, commanded by a corporal, destroyed several German antiaircraft guns and allowed the US paratroopers to break contact. The attachment of a British tank battalion to the 101st Airborne once the ground link-up occurred is also often ignored. On the other side, German objectives and dispositions are also well covered. The only negative aspect of this book is the lack of a bibliography or any notes on sources for the numerous first-person accounts. It is obvious that the author has used other secondary sources, such as Kershaw's It Never Snows in September and Ambrose's Band of Brothers. Otherwise, this volume is a valuable addition to any reader interested in a detailed account of the initial ground phase of Market-Garden.
Rating:
Summary: A Valuable Addition to Market-Garden History
Review: Hell's Highway, which covers the dramatic events on the Eindhoven-Veghel stretch of highway in Holland on 10-26 September 1944, is one of the better Battleground Europe titles. It was the battle for the highway that ultimately decided the outcome of the Allies daring but risky Operation Market-Garden. Not only does this volume cover a neglected aspect of Operation Market-Garden in great detail, but the author's research, writing style and analysis provides a superb addition to the study of this campaign. The supporting photographs, maps and diagrams are also excellent. Once the additional planned volumes on Nijmegen and the Island are completed, this volume on Hell's Highway will be part of an important new historical trilogy that breaks the campaign down into distinct phases. This volume consists of 11 chapters, starting with the coup de main seizure of "Joe's Bridge" by the Irish Guards on 10 September 1944. The relatively easy seizure of this vital bridge on the Dutch-Belgian border served to entice Field Marshal Montgomery to attempt even more dramatic operations in order to bring the war to a rapid conclusion. The manner in which Joe's Bridge was seized and its impact upon the planning of Market-Garden is often ignored in standard histories of the campaign, but is covered in this book's second chapter. Beginning with the third chapter, the author shifts to a detailed dissection of Operation Market-Garden in the US 101st Airborne Division and British Guards Armored Division sectors. Individual chapters cover the initial XXX Corps attack, the 101st landings near Son, the often-ignored battle near Best, actions around St. Oedenrode, Veghel and Schijndel, and the German raids that temporarily cut the highway. A detailed order of battle for the British Guards armored division and the US 101st Infantry Division is also provided. Overall, the volume is well put-together and flows smoothly without distraction. Although intended also as a battlefield guide, the author does not allow this requirement to subvert the historical value of his narrative by endless digressions on tourist highlights. One of the great values of this volume is the attention devoted to the initial XXX Corps attack, which is often glossed over in most accounts in favor of actions at Arnhem. Particularly useful is the overlay depicting the XXX Corps artillery prepatory fire plan; although the 35-minute prep was fired by 350 guns most were lighter 25-pounders since the heavy corps artillery had not caught up to the front yet. Consequently, the initial British prep fire was not as heavy as it should have been. The supporting attacks launched by British 8th and 12th Corps on either side of Hell's Highway are also discussed in this account, although not in great detail. However the most controversial aspect of this volume is the timing of the XXX Corp's starting H-Hour and the corps' premature stop on the first night. The author tends to let Horrocks, the corps commander, off easily by stating that in retrospect, an H-Hour set at 1435 hours was too late in the day and that XXX Corps had little choice but to stop at sunset at 1847 hours. Actually, these explanations appear as little more than a face-saving effort. XXX Corps had been in contact with the German forces around "Joe's Bridge" for seven days prior to the launching of Market-Garden and the British had made little effort to exploit their bridgehead. Even at the time, the Americans felt that the ground phase could have commenced before paratroopers actually started hitting the ground. Horrocks wasted valuable daylight hours because he half expected the operation to be delayed by bad weather over England. After ripping through the outer layer of the thin German defenses along the highway, the British used the loss of 10 out of 200 tanks and the approach of darkness as an excuse to call it a day. Stopping one hour prior to sunset was certainly not the kind of decision one would expect from bold armor leaders. Instead, the Germans used the time to hastily throw together a new blocking force that further delayed XXX Corps on D+1. While most writers tend to blame the operation's ultimate failure on events at Son or Nijmegen, it is apparent that the ground-phase of Garden got off to a bad start. This volume also has good examples of British armor-US paratrooper joint actions, which are often ignored in other accounts. Typically, most American-written accounts of the campaign tend to depict British armor as timidly led, ineffective and prone to walking into German anti-tank ambushes. While incidents of this sort did occur, American accounts tend to underrate the number of times that British tanks saved US paratroopers from being overrun. One interesting incident detailed here covers an action near Schijndel on 19 September 1944, when a single British Sherman tank operated by only two crewmen saved the US 1/502nd Airborne from a vicious German counterattack. The limping British tank, commanded by a corporal, destroyed several German antiaircraft guns and allowed the US paratroopers to break contact. The attachment of a British tank battalion to the 101st Airborne once the ground link-up occurred is also often ignored. On the other side, German objectives and dispositions are also well covered. The only negative aspect of this book is the lack of a bibliography or any notes on sources for the numerous first-person accounts. It is obvious that the author has used other secondary sources, such as Kershaw's It Never Snows in September and Ambrose's Band of Brothers. Otherwise, this volume is a valuable addition to any reader interested in a detailed account of the initial ground phase of Market-Garden.
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