<< 1 >>
Rating: 
Summary: Galloping at publishing
Review: Ian Fletcher has established himself as a writer on various aspects of military history of the British Army in the Peninsular War. In "Galloping at Everything", he promises to reinterpret the value of the British Cavalry and explode the myth about their lack of military value. However, this books is marred by numerous inconsistencies and selective referencing.
For example, comparisons should be made with other contemporary mounted units, allies or enemies. However, the author states outright that he will not make comparisons with other contemporary mounted units Later, he contradicts himself by making some comparisons with the mounted units of the King's German Legion and the French cavalry.
The author reanalyses the findings of earlier historians, notably Oman, Fortescue and Napier to reinterpret the role of the British cavalry. These three historians have apparently been at odds in interpreting the role of the British cavalry in the Peninsular war. Generally, Oman is on one side of the debate, with Fortescue and Napier on the other side.
Mr Fletcher especially thinks that Oman has been the main villain in depicting the British Cavalry in a bad light by, misquoting Wellington (who also thinks likewise), highlighting their spectacular failures such as Campo Mayor and Maguilla, overlooking their spectacular successes such as Sahagun and ignoring other numerous tactical successes. Furthermore, by misinterpreting the true nature of some of these actions, Oman has painted the British cavalry as incompetent. The funny thing is that in some of these actions, it is Oman (not Fortescue) who thinks that the British cavalry performed well. Whatever their interpretations, throughout this book, Mr Fletcher picks on the more favourable interpretation of either historian to buttress his argument that the British cavalry was very successful in their tactical role.
A blow-by-blow dissection of his inconsistencies would take up far too much space and I have condensed some of the main points below.
The Introductory chapters take broad swipes at Oman's dominant interpretation of the British cavalry role and Wellington's dismissal of their military value. In Fletcher's opinion, there were only two overall brilliant commanders of British cavalry - Henry Paget and Gaspard Le Marchant, and Sir Stapleton Cotton was just an adequate commander who merely followed instructions from Wellington. To cite from the book directly "Cotton lacked the brilliance of Henry, Lord Paget". A few paragraphs down, the author repeats his assertion that the British cavalry was well led, this time however by three very good commanders - Paget, Le Marchant and Cotton. This contradicts the earlier analysis of Cotton's capability.
The author apparently equates brilliance with flair and dash. For example, Robert Crafurd, Paget and Le Marchant were all brilliant. However, Crafurd was "prone to error of judgement and over enthusiasm" and Paget's abilities "have been called into question". That's brilliance?
Further discussions on the relative merits of cavalry officers appear pointless. The British had a purchase system where they bought their way up the military hierarchy. But there is "no evidence to suggest that officers who bought their way up were inept". If there were any bad officers, "it probably says more about Wellington's inability to rid himself of inept officers". Now it's Wellington's fault if there are any bad officers.
"At Waterloo, the entire British cavalry corps could boast just one peer, thirteen sons of peers, seventeen sons of baronets, two knights, one son of a knight, one Italian prince, one Hanoverian baron and one son of a German countess. This is hardly what one might term an aristocratic assembly". Huh?
Regarding deserters, "the problem was never a serious one, unlike in other armies". The author then cites probably the worst case army - the Portuguese. Why didn't he cite desertion rates for the French?
Chapters on horse care, foraging and arms do not provide clear insights into issues that translate into tactical superiority for the British Cavalry. The author acknowledges that The King's German Legion was always considered better cavalry troops than the British regulars but he will not discuss the KGL further as he wants to focus on the British troops. And that is probably the weakest point of this section - the lack of direct comparison with contemporary units, allies or enemies. In addition, he cites almost exclusively from British primary and secondary sources which would allow a certain amount of nationalistic bias to creep into such selective referencing.
Furthermore, the author thinks that both Paget and Le Marchant were brilliant innovators because they introduced new carbine and sabre models respectively to the British Cavalry. However, as these models were not universally adopted by the cavalry prior to an assessment of their performance, their tactical significance is not measurable except in anecdotal accounts.
Regarding an assessment of the British cavalry in piquet and patrol work, the author states that "it is difficult to quantify the success of outpost and piquet operations" and later, "to assume that all other piquet operations were successful by the mere fact that nothing untoward ever occurred". This is a damning indictment of his bias and use of false logic to make his case.
Later, "At the risk of appearing to be selective, the following incidents demonstrate how good Wellington's cavalry were on patrol". The rest of the book continues on in similar fashion.
He also has this irritating habit of repeating facts and statements ad nauseum throughout the book. There are a lot of non-sequitar arguments in this book.
Ultimately, what Fletcher is arguing for is that the British cavalry was well mounted, but lacked control. They could dominate their French counterparts on many occasions and could lose just as badly. Their commanders were good, and not so good. Thus, there is nothing new here, merely a poor attempt at reassessment of the immutable facts.
The British cavalry was really too small in numbers and many of their tactical successes were not readily converted into strategic successes. Thus they were insignificant by comparison to the strategic value of the French cavalry (Ulm being the greatest example).
Rating:
Summary: Galloping at Publishing
Review: Ian Fletcher has established himself chiefly as a writer on various aspects of military history of the British Army in the Peninsular War. In "Galloping at Everything", he promises to reinterpret the value of the British Cavalry and explode the myth about their lack of military value.
However, I was somewhat disappointed and perplexed by the author's very inconsistent treatment of the topic. I would understand that in order to achieve this, comparisons have to be made with other contemporary mounted units, allies or enemies. The author does not do this. He states outright that he will not make comparisons with other contemporary mounted units (he then contradicts himself later by making some comparisons with the mounted units of the King's German Legion and the French cavalry).
In fact, the author will reinterpret the role of the British cavalry by reinterpreting the findings of earlier historians, notably Oman, Fortescue and Napier. These three historians have apparently been at odds in interpreting the role of the British cavalry in the Peninsular war. Generally, Oman is on one side of the debate, with Fortescue and Napier on the other side.
Mr Fletcher especially thinks that Oman has been the main villain in depicting the British Cavalry in a bad light by, misquoting Wellington (who also thinks likewise), highlighting their spectacular failures such as Campo Mayor and Maguilla, overlooking their spectacular successes such as Sahagun and, ignoring other numerous tactical successes. Furthermore, by misinterpreting the true nature of some of these actions, Oman has given the impression that the British cavalry was incompetent. The funny thing is that in some of these actions, it is Oman (not Fortescue) who thinks that the British cavalry performed well. Whatever their interpretations, throughout this book, Mr Fletcher picks on the more favourable interpretation of either historian to buttress his argument that the British cavalry was very successful in their tactical role.
A blow-by-blow dissection of his inconsistencies would take up far too much space and I have condensed some of the main points below.
The Introductory chapters take broad swipes at Oman's dominant interpretation of the British cavalry role and Wellington's dismissal of their military value. In Fletcher's opinion, there were only two overall brilliant commanders of British cavalry - Henry Paget and Gaspard Le Marchant. The former, after eloping with Wellington's sister-in-law, was removed from the scene until his reappearance at Waterloo, and the latter was killed at Salamanca just as he was about to make his mark. Meanwhile, Sir Stapleton Cotton was just an adequate commander who merely followed instructions from Wellington. To cite from the book directly "...Cotton lacked the brilliance of Henry, Lord Paget...". A few paragraphs down, the author repeats his assertion that the British cavalry was well led, this time however by three very good commanders - Paget, Le Marchant and Cotton. This contradicts the earlier analysis of Cotton's capability. My understanding is that the author equates brilliance with flair and dash. For example, Robert Crafurd, Paget and Le Marchant were all brilliant. However, Crafurd was "...prone to error of judgement and over enthusiasm..." and Paget's abilities "...have been called into question...". This is brilliance?
Further discussions on the relative merits of cavalry officers appear pointless. The British had a purchase system where they bought their way up the military hierarchy. But there is "...no evidence to suggest that officers who bought their way up were inept". If there were any bad officers, "...it probably says more about Wellington's inability to rid himself of inept officers". Now it's Wellington's fault if there are any bad officers.
"...At Waterloo, the entire British cavalry corps could boast just one peer, thirteen sons of peers, seventeen sons of baronets, two knights, one son of a knight, one Italian prince, one Hanoverian baron and one son of a German countess. This is hardly what one might term an aristocratic assembly...". Huh?
Regarding deserters, "...the problem was never a serious one, unlike in other armies...". The author then cites probably the worst case army - the Portuguese. Why didn't he cite desertion rates for the French?
Finally his interesting assertion that in 1914, men did not enlist to fight in the Great war out of patrotism, but out of necessity to find work is not referenced.
Later chapters on horse care, foraging and arms do not provide clear insights into issues that translate into tactical superiority for the British Cavalry. For example, the horses were generally not as well-fed or cared for (by comparison with those in the King's German Legion). The author acknowledges that The King's German Legion was always considered better cavalry troops than the British regulars but he will not discuss the KGL further as he wants to focus on the British troops. And that is probably the weakest point of this section - the lack of direct comparison with contemporary units, allies or enemies. In addition, he cites almost exclusively from British primary and secondary sources. Surely, isn't it likely that a certain amount of nationalistic bias would creep into such selective referencing?
Furthermore, I believe that the author thinks that both Paget and Le Marchant were brilliant innovators because they introduced new carbine and sabre models respectively to the British Cavalry. However, as these models were not universally adopted by the cavalry prior to an assessment of their performance, their tactical significance is not measurable except in anecdotal accounts.
Regarding an assessment of the british cavalry in piquet and patrol work, the author states that "...it is difficult to quantify the success of outpost and piquet operations...". "...to assume that all other piquet operations were successful by the mere fact that nothing untoward ever occurred...". This is a damning indictment of his bias and using false logic to make his case.
A few pages on, "...At the risk of appearing to be selective, the following incidents...demonstrate how good Wellington's cavalry were on patrol...". Really? It's not obvious to me. The rest of the book continues on in similar fashion.
He also has this irritating habit of repeating facts and statements ad nauseum throughout the book. There is a lot of non-sequitar arguments in this book.Ultimately, what Fletcher is arguing for is that the British cavalry was well mounted, but lacked control. They could dominate their French counterparts on many occasions and could lose just as badly. Their commanders were good, and not so good.
Although the author doesn't make direct comparisons with the cavalry of other nations, the British cavalry was really too small in numbers and many of their tactical successes were not readily converted into strategic successes. Thus they were insignificant by comparison to the strategic value of the French cavalry (Ulm being the greatest example).
Exactly what I understand from reading Oman and others (ho-hum).
Rating:
Summary: Putting Foot to Stirrup
Review: The author, a recognized authority on the British army in the Peninsula from 1808-1814, set out to do a reappraisal of the commonly held belief that the British cavalry of the Napoleonic Wars was well-mounted and poorly led. While this volume is good and useful, I submit that the thesis was not proven. The book is well-laid out and organized, with the cavalry itself with its weapons, tactics, personnel and horses being discussed as well as such diverse, but essential topics, as picket duty, being scrutinized. The second half of the book is the meat of the study, that being the battlefield and campaign performance of the British cavalry. A myriad of reliable, first hand accounts are used, but so are some second hand ones that aren't, such as Hamilton-Williams' poorly done book, Waterloo-New Perspectives. Why would such a reputable author use a reference that is widely known as being unreliable? That is somewhat puzzling and doesn't lend credence to his thesis or study, in my opinion. However, such reliable and neglected reliable sources as Fortescue's History of the British Army, are used thoroughly here which help. The resulting product, in my opinion, is useful, but glaringly weak in some areas. The British cavalry is seldom if ever compared tactically or strategically to the cavalry of other contemporary armies. There is enough work in English, at least from the French (notably Antoine de Brack's excellent Light Cavalry Outposts) which do comparisons between the two which the author could have drawn on. Similarly, while touting some of the British cavalry commanders as excellent (in my opinion only Le Marchant was in that category), no comparison of note is done with their opponents even though some of the best French commanders, such as Montbrun, Kellermann, and Latour-Maubourg, served in the Peninsula. In the end, the same conclusion is drawn about the British cavalry, which both Wellington and de Brack agree on. They were spledidly mounted, a charge of their heavy cavalry could really 'sweep the field' their horses being larger than their French counterparts, and they were only adequately led at best, and at worst, they were 'horribly' led. Additionally, it should be noted that they were only adequate at light cavalry duties, and they were not good horsemasters. The cavalry of the King's German Legion was undoubtedly the best Wellington had, their main problem being the difficulty in getting replacements for losses suffered. This book, however, is recommended as an excellent history of the British cavalry, and the author is to be commended for bringing this unusual and neglected topic into print.
<< 1 >>
|
