France, the United States, and the Algerian War

Rating:
Summary: Was de Gaulle as arrogant as he appeared?
Review: Irwin Wall's book on American relations with France during the Algerian war of independence is a sequel to his book on how America supported (and manipulated) France during the Fourth Republic. It is not as interesting as that book, but it provides a workmanlike overview of the problem. It shows the Eisenhower Administration in its best light (it has much less to say about Kennedy). Overall Eisenhower was an intelligent man, much more so than was thought at the time, and he was personally decent, in striking contrast to most of his successors. But his administration was deeply unimaginative and unsympathetic and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was extremely narro-minded and dogmatic, very bad qualities for a diplomat. Notwithstanding these problems, the Americans soon realized that the French could not suppress the FLN and that ultimately autonomy and independence were inevitable. Here Eisenhower and Dulles are in their best light, tactfully offering advice to a French government that will not lessen, not (for once) being hoodwinked by the claims of the French to be fighting communism, and making their own contacts with the FLN. They are properly angry over the British-French-Israeli aggression at Suez, and understandably disturbed over the French attack on Sakiet, Tunisia, where it is not clear whether the army or the government is in control. Given the unreliability of the government they decide that it would not be that bad an idea for De Gaulle to take power and inaugurate the fifth French Republic.

Much of this book narrowly reads the available diplomatic materials and often reads as a paraphrase of rather inconclusive discussions between the Americans, the French and the British on such questions as Algeria, trying to revamp NATO to increase French power (unsuccessfully), and the question of a French nuclear deterrent. Wall does have an important new thesis: in contrast to the hagiography around De Gaulle, he argues that the president did not in fact plan in 1958 to eventually give Algeria independence, but in fact wanted to keep it as French as possible. Unfortunately for the reader, the book is more than half over by the time he encounters this. The thesis is interesting and is certainly plausible; De Gaulle did appear to wish to cover Algeria in new euphemisms for dependence. And if true, it would mean that De Gaulle prolonged the war with worse results than if the government had stared down the military rebels in 1958. Still it is not definitive, since De Gaulle spoke different things to different people. Wall's verdict on De Gaulle's foreign policy is largely negative, since he achieved very little. Wall does make the interesting comment that by concentrating on the prestige item of nuclear weapons, De Gaulle failed to modernize conventional forces which would have made France more effective in a post cold-war Europe. One problem with this book is that Wall is somewhat repetitive. Another, and more serious problem, is that one learns relatively little about the partner in America's negotiations. The contrast with Walter Lafeber's The Clash on Japan, or Piero Gleijeses' Shattered Hope on Guatemala, or Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie on Vietnam is striking. There is some interesting information on France; there is much less, however on Algeria itself.

Rating:
Summary: Competent, kind of dull
Review: Irwin Wall's book on American relations with France during the Algerian war of independence is a sequel to his book on how America supported (and manipulated) France during the Fourth Republic. It is not as interesting as that book, but it provides a workmanlike overview of the problem. It shows the Eisenhower Administration in its best light (it has much less to say about Kennedy). Overall Eisenhower was an intelligent man, much more so than was thought at the time, and he was personally decent, in striking contrast to most of his successors. But his administration was deeply unimaginative and unsympathetic and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was extremely narro-minded and dogmatic, very bad qualities for a diplomat. Notwithstanding these problems, the Americans soon realized that the French could not suppress the FLN and that ultimately autonomy and independence were inevitable. Here Eisenhower and Dulles are in their best light, tactfully offering advice to a French government that will not lessen, not (for once) being hoodwinked by the claims of the French to be fighting communism, and making their own contacts with the FLN. They are properly angry over the British-French-Israeli aggression at Suez, and understandably disturbed over the French attack on Sakiet, Tunisia, where it is not clear whether the army or the government is in control. Given the unreliability of the government they decide that it would not be that bad an idea for De Gaulle to take power and inaugurate the fifth French Republic.

Much of this book narrowly reads the available diplomatic materials and often reads as a paraphrase of rather inconclusive discussions between the Americans, the French and the British on such questions as Algeria, trying to revamp NATO to increase French power (unsuccessfully), and the question of a French nuclear deterrent. Wall does have an important new thesis: in contrast to the hagiography around De Gaulle, he argues that the president did not in fact plan in 1958 to eventually give Algeria independence, but in fact wanted to keep it as French as possible. Unfortunately for the reader, the book is more than half over by the time he encounters this. The thesis is interesting and is certainly plausible; De Gaulle did appear to wish to cover Algeria in new euphemisms for dependence. And if true, it would mean that De Gaulle prolonged the war with worse results than if the government had stared down the military rebels in 1958. Still it is not definitive, since De Gaulle spoke different things to different people. Wall's verdict on De Gaulle's foreign policy is largely negative, since he achieved very little. Wall does make the interesting comment that by concentrating on the prestige item of nuclear weapons, De Gaulle failed to modernize conventional forces which would have made France more effective in a post cold-war Europe. One problem with this book is that Wall is somewhat repetitive. Another, and more serious problem, is that one learns relatively little about the partner in America's negotiations. The contrast with Walter Lafeber's The Clash on Japan, or Piero Gleijeses' Shattered Hope on Guatemala, or Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie on Vietnam is striking. There is some interesting information on France; there is much less, however on Algeria itself.

Rating:
Summary: Was de Gaulle as arrogant as he appeared?
Review: The material is well researched & the story is told with tightly reasoned clarity & in lucid prose. The specialized subject is covered in great depth, and Dr. Wall's backward look at the events of the late 50's & 60's is of great help in sorting them out. Their interest is further enhanced by contemporary tie-ins such as the Arab world & the Middle East today, & by their association with the American tragedy that was Viet Nam. I particularly enjoyed the analysis of motivation & intent of the western politicians & de Gaulle. The irony of all that careful planning & diplomacy, which came to nothing, yet, everything seemed to work out for the best anyway. So de Gaulle appears a seer & it's better to be lucky than smart.

Rating:
Summary: Not this time!
Review: Why can't American Marxists leave Marxist interpretations to Frenchmen? Tbey are much better at it.