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Rating: 
Summary: Not sure what to make of this
Review: Clearly Michael Ignatieff is a gifted writer, but the theme throughout this book did not string together that well. Ignatieff had some great insights into the diplomacy building up to the Kosovo air campaign (i.e. gaining valuable insight into Holbrooke's shuttle diplomacy), but some of the observations, particularly those in the last chapter beg questioning.The repercussions of a zero casualty conflict will reverberate throughout the US defense establishment for years to come and will certainly set benchmarks, warranted or not for future conflicts. But sacrifice in battle will be supported by the American public if the situation warrants. The war in Afghanistan bears this point out to an extent. The dialogue between Skidelsky and Ignatieff was interesting, as was the return of Ignatieff to Belgrade to meet his longtime friend Aleksa Djilas. This dialogue portrayed the extent to which people such as Skidelsky and Djilas would like to look past the atrocities committed by the like of Milosevic, at the expense of Western intervention. I rated the book three stars only because I didnt see the common thread throughout the book...merely a series of collected essays that may or may not have had anything to do with the subject "virtual war". THe book does add some interesting insight into Holbrooke's dealings with Milosevic, but could have delved more into discussions with Gen Clark and perhaps Lt Gen Mike Short, the Joint Forces AIr Component Commander, on the extent the "virtual war" was or was not fought both on the battlefield, in the media and in the political realm.
Rating:
Summary: Not sure what to make of this
Review: Clearly Michael Ignatieff is a gifted writer, but the theme throughout this book did not string together that well. Ignatieff had some great insights into the diplomacy building up to the Kosovo air campaign (i.e. gaining valuable insight into Holbrooke's shuttle diplomacy), but some of the observations, particularly those in the last chapter beg questioning. The repercussions of a zero casualty conflict will reverberate throughout the US defense establishment for years to come and will certainly set benchmarks, warranted or not for future conflicts. But sacrifice in battle will be supported by the American public if the situation warrants. The war in Afghanistan bears this point out to an extent. The dialogue between Skidelsky and Ignatieff was interesting, as was the return of Ignatieff to Belgrade to meet his longtime friend Aleksa Djilas. This dialogue portrayed the extent to which people such as Skidelsky and Djilas would like to look past the atrocities committed by the like of Milosevic, at the expense of Western intervention. I rated the book three stars only because I didnt see the common thread throughout the book...merely a series of collected essays that may or may not have had anything to do with the subject "virtual war". THe book does add some interesting insight into Holbrooke's dealings with Milosevic, but could have delved more into discussions with Gen Clark and perhaps Lt Gen Mike Short, the Joint Forces AIr Component Commander, on the extent the "virtual war" was or was not fought both on the battlefield, in the media and in the political realm.
Rating:
Summary: An interesting series of essays
Review: I bought this book a couple of years ago but did not get around to reading it until last week, shortly after the war in Iraq ended (more or less). I was curious to see what kind of perspective it would offer not only on the Kosovo campaign but on the war in Iraq. I found it both a useful refresher on a very different battle, the 79 day air campaign against Serbia, and an interesting meditation on modern war. The front end of this book consists of a series of snapshots of different aspects of the war, along with a couple of arguments Ignatieff has with fellow intellectuals. Several reviewers on this site wrote that they couldn't see the connection between these bits of reportage with the latter half of the book, which is an extended essay on aspects of modern, "virtual" war. I think they're perhaps not trying very hard, as the longer essay quite obviously tackles in a disciplined fashion the themes raised in the reportage--international law, the revolution in military affairs, values, societal support or the lack thereof for political decisions to move toward war. Ignatieff is often clear-thinking. It is a bit startling to read this book, written in 1999-2000, talking about the merits of regime change in places like Iraq and Serbia/FRY. He is likewise prophetic in noting how the revolution in military affairs created an incentive for the Saddams of the world to seek a countervailing military threat in the form of chemical and biological weapons. Where he is perhaps a bit less far-sighted is in failing to see that the precedent of a "virtual war" in Kosovo--by which he means a zero-casualty, low-cost war (for the attacking side only, of course), that is not legitimised by international law or blessed by the kind of domestic support that must be whipped up to permit a high-cost, full mobilization "real war", with real casualties on both sides--could be used to support not only human rights' causes but narrower interests. Overall this is a book well worth reading. I'd recommend it to anyone interested in understanding what goes into a modern war.
Rating: 
Summary: What is the point?
Review: If you decide to read this book, do yourself a favor and skip everything but the last chapter. The book up to the end is a high level overview and includes chapters on the committee approach to target selection, administrative details on persecuting war criminals, and my favorite - the emails of 2 British writers debating their respective positions. The book brings up occasionally interesting notions such as the international community's right to get involved in a sovereign state's affairs and the double standards that arise when we do choose to get involved (ie why Kosovo but not Rwanda). But overall the author doesn't seem to have a coherent message other than to say that "the Kosovo conflict was different than past military operations and future operations will likely be different from Kosovo." Even though the author defines Kosovo as a "virtual war", he forgets that it only achieved success when "real war" elements were introduced (such as turning off the lights, dropping the bridges, and introducing ground troops). If there were lessons to be learned from the Kosovo conflict, you won't find them in this book.
Rating: 
Summary: Changed his tone
Review: Really a series of sketches of the Kosovo War, followed by a longer essay giving Ignatieff's thoughts on the development of warfare towards the end of the 20th century. The sketches are good, if lacking the depth of an historical work. The best is his meeting with Aleksha Djilas in Belgrade, a visit which must have caused him some trepidation. More recent events, let it be said, have borne out Ignatieff's analysis - I mean the popular revolt in Serbia, the discovery of mass graves, and the extradition of Milosevic to face trial on war crimes charges(something the author explicitly doubted would ever happen). However, the ongoing events reduce the overall value of the work, and the book must be judged by the value of the final essay. Again, this thesis on 'virtual' war - with managed presentation of events to the public, zero casualties, and high tech weaponry, seems to me to be only true so far in Western, particularly US, war-making, and even there the soldiers are reacting with horror to the prospect of replacing a large army with smaller forces armed with high-tech weaponry. The biggest killer weapon in the world is still the AK47!. The other point is the attrition in high-tech weapons - by the end of the war, NATO was running out of smart bombs. Still, thought provoking, and just about worth the price of the book, if war and politics is your sphere of interest. Otherwise, read Misha Glenny or Tim Judah for events in former Yugoslavia.
Rating:
Summary: Changed his tone
Review: The important question one has to ask before picking up this book is why anyone would feel confortable relying on the opinion of a commentator whose name was so closely associated with the word "appeasement" when war and genocide were raging in Bosnia. The fact that Ignatieff was one of the equivocators who had little to chose between Karadzic and Mladic and their victims will taint him the rest of his life.
Ironicaly, he is now advertised as a human rights scholar, albeit a human rights scholar who opposed intervation to stop the Serb sponsored genocide in Bosnia, which took 250,000 lives and culminated in the masacre of Srebrenica. Ignatieff now has the good sense to change his tone, even though Kosovo presents no stronger a case for intervention than Bosnia did. This is the overiding question that Ignatieff does not answer. Why does he now support intervention within the sovereignty of a state, and yet opposed it when Bosnia was attacked in a trans-state conflict? The answer is clear, he has realized the error of his ways, a matter that Ignatieff should have the courage the face up to. It would make for an interesting book or article: the well meaning, often Serb biased Yugoslav experts who, when confronted with the worst human rights abuses seen in Europe since the Second World War, fumbled the ball miserably.
Overall, not a very engaging book, from a discredited personality, who failed the Bosnians miserably.
Rating: 
Summary: Phenomenal book on the changing nature of warfare
Review: This book, written by a unique and highly knowledgeable military historian and journalist/broadcaster (okay, and a fellow Canadian!), is quite simply one of the most memorable books that I have read. Looking for further information on the Kosovo war, I came across Michael Ignatieff's current masterpiece and found something unlike other books. What is a `Virtual War'? What distinguishes it from traditional `Real Wars'? Simply put, it is the traditional method of warfare, where two (or perhaps more) opponents engage in fighting on battlefields for the sake of securing territory. There are one-on-one confrontations, there is direct killing (justified by self-defense; kill or be killed) and the war is very much a reality to those who fight it, as well as those that work behind the lines to provide the means by which battles can be waged (e.g. armaments and uniform production). Hence, war is a reality in `real wars.' Virtual wars, on the other hand, do not involve such traditional means by which to wage war. In such instances, it is technology that is the backbone of military strength, not personnel. The very word `virtual' is defining of this war: "existing in effect, though not in fact." Those behind the front lines are glued to television screens and press reports; the only sources of information about the wars. Because we see targets within the scopes of missile ranges, we see the effects of aggression. But the location is so far away and beyond the knowledge of the commonplace populace that many of us do not see this as a conflict, or war. We do not know why this war is happening, only that something is happening. All the crushing (and devastating) weaponry spawns from technological innovation that began toward the end of the Cold War, when the US and the USSR could not outdo each other in the production of nuclear arsenal that, logically, could not be used anytime. There was a stalemate in the arms race, and the only way that it could be broken would be through the production and development of conventional weapons that the opponent did not have. As Ignatieff writes: "The beauty of such weapons was that, unlike the nuclear arsenal, they could be used." On impunity: "From the beginning...technology was in search of impunity. War that could actually be fought had to be as bloodless, risk-free and precise as possible." In Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and most recently Kosovo, there was now a technological capability that made a nation like the US strong, as this technology could actually be used. Because of this development and revolutionary change, the battlefield has become obsolete. The nature and enactment of warfare (and the targets) have changed for good. In Kosovo, nerve centers became primary targets of strikes. In the past, it was industrial complexes that were primary targets because they were the bloods behind the war machine, producing military hardware. Now, the nerve centers mentioned are command posts, computer and Internet networks because they drive the war machine. "A blinded enemy - without computers, telephones or power - may still have forces capable of attack, but he no longer has the capacity to order them into battle." In the process of hitting such nerve centers in Yugoslavia, NATO knocked out not just television and Internet service providers, but also electricity that powered hospitals, infant incubators and water pumps. In the words of Ignatieff: "...warfare directed at a society's nervous system, rather than against its fielded forces, necessarily blurs the distinction between civilian and military objectives...There is no guarantee that war directed at the nervous system of a society will be any less savage than war directed only at its troops." The blurring of such integral distinction; yet another characteristic of virtual war. The very nature of warfare has changed: "one of the lessons of modern war is that war can no longer be called war." Virtual war is a dangerous and frightening phenomenon: they do not appear to be real to citizens of nations. Therefore, if impunity is guaranteed and military action is cost-free, what democratic restraints will be there to govern the use of force? "If war becomes virtual - and without risk - democratic electorates may be more willing to fight especially if the cause is justified in the language of human rights and even democracy itself." Sounds familiar? Look at Kosovo, where NATO claimed that it intervened for the sake of human rights abuses (at least this was the message to the listening and watching public), yet this moral claim is amoral when compounded with NATO's unwillingness to risk its own soldiers' lives. With its unwillingness to take casualties, how can NATO call themselves defenders of human rights? Hence, the real risks of virtual war are apparent for those that can decipher and plow through the virtual reality into the real. Michael Ignatieff's work tops off with these words: "Only the most devoted attention to what is real can help us to make judgments and take actions which are both responsible and efficacious." It all waters down to reality checks and thoughts for the future; while progression is something to be lauded, it is also something that requires checks and balances in order to hinder it from spinning out of control. Do we have those kinds of checks to really inform more than just a few? Ignatieff's book left a tremendous impression on my conscience and my mind. Awareness is most certainly defense, just like the adage "knowledge is power." But there can be no hope without some real risk. To quote Ignatieff one more time: "Virtual reality is seductive." Although I had not read that far into Virtual War when this happened, I mentioned the prospect of virtual war to my Dad, who was fixing a window. "I wouldn't worry about it," he told me. "There are too many checks and balances to hinder a maniac from blowing the world up." Only that night, when I closed the book in completion, did it hit me.
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