Democracy by Force : US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World (LSE Monographs in International Studies)

Rating:
Summary: BEST GOVERNANCE?
Review: Democracy - rule by the people - is widely considered as the central legitimating ethic of modern governance. Although definitions of democracy have shown substantial variety from one country and time period to the next, there is a consensus in today's world that good governance means democracy. Moreover, democratic states tend not to fight other democratic states, and the spread of democracy would lead to greater international security according to Democratic Peace Theory. Putting humanitarian concerns high on the agenda and ignoring state sovereignty for the promotion of democracy, after the Cold War with the disappearance of Superpower competition, the international community, especially the USA, has been involved in certain civil conflicts which, between 1990 and 1996, outpaced other types of conflicts like the ones between states. When economic sanctions or diplomatic pressures have failed, military intervention, that is to say, democracy by force, has been undertaken in these civil conflicts. After a brief discussion of the evolution in military intervention and nation-building, by examining Germany, Japan and Vietnam cases, since World War II, and after defining nation-building and democratisation elaborately and clearly, this book analyses four US-sponsored post-Cold War military interventions successively taking place in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia in order to evaluate what in fact has changed since 1989. Also, reader can use the maps that are on the first page of each case to see where an event occurs during studying if necessary. In each of these cases, Karin Von Hippel explains military intervention and the use of force, which often lead to peace support operations, which in turn can lead to nation-building attempts. The 1989 US invasion of Panama provides an appropriate starting point for this study as it straddles the Cold War and post-Cold War interventions. Panama case introduced the democracy rationale; that is, to oppose the repeal of democratic elections as a justification to intervene, without an obvious threat of communism. US troops also used the post-World War II plans for the reconstruction of Germany and Japan as their model for Panama. Somalia then served as a test case for a purely humanitarian crisis that did not affect the developed world. Demilitarisation was a priority in this heavily armed society. However, its failure hindered any reaction in the next major humanitarian crisis in Rwanda. Events in Somalia did not stop the US government from intervening in Haiti in 1994, due to the latter's closeness to the USA and problems related to the increased flow of refugees into Florida. Haiti then became the first case when the aim of the military intervention and the nation-building attempt were the same: to establish a democratic state. It was also the first time the UN Security Council sanctioned intervention to restore a democratically elected government. The USA considered Somalia when trying to avoid involvement in Bosnia, but was eventually pushed into acting there militarily beginning in 1995, again on humanitarian grounds, in spite of maintaining the credibility of the NATO and US leadership in Europe. Dayton may have been the most complicated nation-building mission since World War II. In the final chapter, Karin Von Hippel, first, examines the common threads linking and leading to the Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia interventions, second, points to the lessons learned and applied within the military, in civil-military relations, and in peace support operations, and third, concludes by discussing the developments in nation-building, areas of continued concern, and how future operations might achieve greater success. Today it is believed that the democracy is the best governance. Even for the promotion of democracy, however, intervention in domestic affairs of a state may not be always necessary, and there may be other solutions to be applied as the concept of democracy is flexible, and its meaning may change from time and society to time and society. In certain cases, restoration of democracy may be only an immediate cause, and the underlying cause of intervention may be different from the promotion of democracy, such as national interest. Also, the US government does not stick to democracy in its own country although it intervenes in the internal affairs of other states for the promotion of democracy. So this study tries to legitimise certain faulty actions of the USA, and this makes this book seem far away from objectivity.

CANER SANNAV

Rating:
Summary: Jolly good read
Review: Karin von Hippel is an up-and-coming foreign policy thinker whose academic credentials (Yale, London School of Economics)are reinforced by stints in Kenya, Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo. As a result, her examination of US military interventions in the post-Vietnam era is refreshingly clear-headed and readable, as well as being extremely smart. Von Hippel looks at four instances of US intervention--Panama, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia--and discusses why the US got involved in those countries, whether US intervention worked, and what Americans can learn from those experiences. What I particularly liked about this book is that it's insightful and intelligent at a level academics would find satisfying. But I'm not an academic, and I found it really interesting. Definitely worth a read if you're interested in modern American history.

Rating:
Summary: Jolly good read
Review: Karin von Hippel presents an excellent analysis of the US military in the post-Cold War era. She gives a intriging looks at what the future holds for the US military and what kinds of projects it is most likely to behold. She observes most of the factors causing intervention, even those not included in administration publications. Hopefully we can look forward to further editions.

Rating:
Summary: Useful survey of US interventions
Review: This book analyses the developments in nation-building following US-sponsored military intervention by examining the four post-Cold War cases in which both took place: Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.

The UN did not authorise the US intervention in Panama. President Bush launched the invasion 'to restore democracy', after thirty years of supporting the drug-trafficking dictator General Noriega. As von Hippel writes, 'the democracy excuse rang hollow'. 37% of the people are still below the poverty line. Its debt is 70% of its GDP. US troops are still there.

The US government intervened in Somalia in 1992-95 under what von Hippel calls 'the humanitarian pretext'. The Security Council breached the UN Charter by authorising the intervention. Several thousand Somalis were killed. In the 'Blackhawk down' incident in Mogadishu, 300 Somalis were killed and 700 wounded; 30% of the casualties were women and children. Intervention cost $4 billion, used 50,000 troops and worsened an already dire situation. The World Bank has no figures for the economy, but knows that the country owes exactly $2.3 billion.

Over Haiti, the Security Council again broke the UN Charter by sanctioning military intervention, for another 'unique' situation 'requiring an exceptional response'. Haiti was no threat to 'international peace and security', so Cuba, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela opposed intervention. The CIA funded corrupt, drug-running fascist generals, which von Hippel calls 'somewhat unpredictable and bizarre', despite noting the similarity with US support for Noriega. Structural Adjustment Programs and sanctions, as usual, worsened the country's problems, causing 60% unemployment. 80% of the rural population still live below the poverty line.

The US intervention in Bosnia has produced a military protectorate, with the economy destroyed. In 1997, Serbia's unemployment rate was 50% and in the Republic of Srpska, part of Bosnia, 90%.

Von Hippel notes that foreign aid and international charity cause aid dependency. In Somalia, for instance, foreign aid funded 70% of the national budget, before the collapse. She writes that aid "tends to enrich only the elite at the expense of the masses."

Her accounts show that nations cannot be built from outside, especially not by US military intervention.