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Rating: 
Summary: Triumph of the Will
Review: "Historians" who claim that the Werwolf was nothing more than a figment of the imagination will be forced to hang their arrogant heads in shame after reading this superb book. The research is top notch. So many things I never read about before. The Werwolf was a very active guerrilla organization that refused to bow down to the enemies of the Reich. After reading this book you will be forced to admit that the Werwolf was the most underated guerrilla oranization in history. But finally a true historian from the old school has come forward to tell the simple truth. The fantical followers of Hitler refused to give up. They retreated into the woods and mountains of Holy Reich and waged war on the enemy for YEARS after the fall of Berlin and the death of Der Fuehrer. A must read for anyone interested in untold tales of World War II. Inspiring. After you read it you will want to form your own Werewolf unit and continue the Struggle. 88!
Rating:
Summary: Kapitulieren? Nein!
Review: As WW2 came to a close, the Third Reich established the "Werwolf" guerilla movement for defense against the Allied invasion of Germany. This book discusses the establishment of the Werwolf, and covers a long series of their exploits: sabotage, sniping at allied troops, and leaving behind poisoned liquor for the Russians. A young HJ member's valiant retaliation against a Russian officer who accosted his sister is discussed, along with the further crimes the Red Army perpetrated in response. The famous last-ditch Alpine Redoubt is covered in detail.This book also discusses the significant differences in attitude toward the Allied invasion in different districts of Germany. The fate of ethnic Germans living in Alsace, Malmedy, Poland, and the Sudetenland receives a considerable amount of attention. The book can become rather depressing at times, because of the utter hopelessness of the war at this point, and the attrocities commited against German civilians and POWs by the Allies. However, it remains a very compelling tale none the less. I highly recommend the book.
Rating:
Summary: Nazi Werwolves and Iraq
Review: Perry Biddiscombe asserts that historians have overlooked the extent of Nazi partisan warfare during and after World War II. With meticulous research and drawing on U.S., German, French, British and some Soviet sources, the author admirably fills in this void by piecing together an account of Nazi resistance. He focuses on the Nazi Werwolf diversionary groups, part of the SS-Police establishment and closely linked to the Hitler Youth corps. These groups were established to engage in partisan resistance to the invading Allied forces. Biddiscombe describes their organizational, ideological and social character and follows their development inside a Nazi bureaucracy beset with turf wars and personality clashes. Noting that "the Nazi Reich was hardly a unified totalitarian state, but rather a feudal patchwork of rival fiefs," he adds a geographic element to his analysis, highlighting the regional differences among the werewolf groups within Germany and the differences found in groups outside German territory. The Nazi resistance or partisan movement began in 1944 as the Allies began to dislodge the German army from occupied territories. Biddiscombe draws on detailed archival materials to describe how support for a resistance movement came from a variety of competing interests within the Third Reich. First established as part of Himmler's SS, then coupled with the Hitler Youth, the Werwolf groups were subsequently dominated by the military who saw their usefulness in slowing the Allied advance. In analyzing the active role of the Werwolf in partisan resistance, the author presents many detailed descriptions of attacks on Allied soldiers and collaborating Germans (sniping, decapitation wires, assassinations, poisonings, etc.) and sabotage actions. He documents a few cases involving children as young as 9 or 10 years old (p.62 and p.64) and many conducted by teenagers (pp.59 ff.). At times the author's analysis distinguishes between Werwolf attacks and partisan resistance that occurred before and after the German surrender, but generally this distinction remains in the background. This distinction deserves greater prominence. While some fighting has continued after the formal end to many wars, most stops soon thereafter. (Fighting continued only briefly in Texas after Lee's surrender and President Johnson?s declaration that the civil war was over.) Continued and vigorous post-surrender partisan activity in Germany would have revealed a significant residual pro-Nazi German sentiment and resulted in a much more difficult occupation. Biddiscombe at one point characterizes post-surrender resistance as "minor" (p.275). He labels post-war Werwolfs as "desperadoes" (p.151) and describes them as fanatics living in forest huts (p.80). He also cites U.S. Army intelligence that characterized partisans as "nomad bands" (p.197), judged them as less serious threats than the attacks by foreign slave laborers (p.152) and considered their sabotage and subversive activities to be insignificant (p. 115). Finally, he notes that: "the Americans and British concluded, even in the summer of 1945, that, as a nationwide network, the original Werwolf was irrevocably destroyed, and that it no longer posed a threat to the occupation." (p.51) It would appear that the defense of home and family from outside invaders united large, disparate groups of Germans, while post-war partisan actions only attracted relatively few fanatics and/or thugs. A plan to mount post-war resistance, the Axmann Plan, never worked. In tallying up the Allied soldiers killed by partisan activities after the surrender, this reader found fewer than several dozen. It appears that when the war was over, so was the most of the resistance. Bidiscombe's book on German resistance and the Allied occupation has received some notice by people searching for historical parallels to the current US military occupation of Iraq. Hitler and Saddam Husein as personifications of evil make such comparisons seductive. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Rice evoked this theme in their 25 August 2003 speeches before the 104th National Convention of the VFW. While one hopes that our national leaders bring an historical perspective to their actions, it appears that they have chosen to read Biddiscombe's book, not to learn from history, but to manipulate it for their own ends. Biddiscombe's book should, however, cause one to reflect on the current US situation in Iraq. First, General Eisenhower and his staff devoted considerable effort during the war to developing a post-war occupation strategy, not all of it consistent with international law. (pp. 252-254) Second, the occupation of Germany was a direct result of German military aggression and followed a formal surrender by German authorities. Germans knew that Germany had started the war. Third, the successful occupation of Germany occurred after it was entirely surrounded by hostile forces. There were no open borders with countries opposing the Allied occupation, unlike Iraq, which borders Iran and Syria. Fourth, the Nazi Party?s extermination of the Jews left only Protestants and Catholics, two Christian sects that hadn?t been at war in Germany for over 200 years. The ethnic (Kurds and Iraqis) and religious (Sunni and Shiite) tensions in Iraq continued to erupt throughout the twentieth century. Finally, the partisan resistance to Allied occupation quickly faded at the end of the war. Continued Iraqi resistance quite likely points, in part, to simmering ethnic and religious tensions. These historical differences show the magnitude of the problems facing the current U.S. military occupation of Iraq. If nation building by military force is now an accepted tenet of U.S. foreign policy, this book should provide valuable historical background for the U.S. officer corps and the enlisted personnel called upon to implement that policy. It would also be useful for citizens who wish to understand better some of on-the-ground issues that would be faced by their military occupation forces.
Rating:
Summary: Nazi Werwolves and Iraq
Review: Perry Biddiscombe asserts that historians have overlooked the extent of Nazi partisan warfare during and after World War II. With meticulous research and drawing on U.S., German, French, British and some Soviet sources, the author admirably fills in this void by piecing together an account of Nazi resistance. He focuses on the Nazi Werwolf diversionary groups, part of the SS-Police establishment and closely linked to the Hitler Youth corps. These groups were established to engage in partisan resistance to the invading Allied forces. Biddiscombe describes their organizational, ideological and social character and follows their development inside a Nazi bureaucracy beset with turf wars and personality clashes. Noting that "the Nazi Reich was hardly a unified totalitarian state, but rather a feudal patchwork of rival fiefs," he adds a geographic element to his analysis, highlighting the regional differences among the werewolf groups within Germany and the differences found in groups outside German territory. The Nazi resistance or partisan movement began in 1944 as the Allies began to dislodge the German army from occupied territories. Biddiscombe draws on detailed archival materials to describe how support for a resistance movement came from a variety of competing interests within the Third Reich. First established as part of Himmler's SS, then coupled with the Hitler Youth, the Werwolf groups were subsequently dominated by the military who saw their usefulness in slowing the Allied advance. In analyzing the active role of the Werwolf in partisan resistance, the author presents many detailed descriptions of attacks on Allied soldiers and collaborating Germans (sniping, decapitation wires, assassinations, poisonings, etc.) and sabotage actions. He documents a few cases involving children as young as 9 or 10 years old (p.62 and p.64) and many conducted by teenagers (pp.59 ff.). At times the author's analysis distinguishes between Werwolf attacks and partisan resistance that occurred before and after the German surrender, but generally this distinction remains in the background. This distinction deserves greater prominence. While some fighting has continued after the formal end to many wars, most stops soon thereafter. (Fighting continued only briefly in Texas after Lee's surrender and President Johnson?s declaration that the civil war was over.) Continued and vigorous post-surrender partisan activity in Germany would have revealed a significant residual pro-Nazi German sentiment and resulted in a much more difficult occupation. Biddiscombe at one point characterizes post-surrender resistance as "minor" (p.275). He labels post-war Werwolfs as "desperadoes" (p.151) and describes them as fanatics living in forest huts (p.80). He also cites U.S. Army intelligence that characterized partisans as "nomad bands" (p.197), judged them as less serious threats than the attacks by foreign slave laborers (p.152) and considered their sabotage and subversive activities to be insignificant (p. 115). Finally, he notes that: "the Americans and British concluded, even in the summer of 1945, that, as a nationwide network, the original Werwolf was irrevocably destroyed, and that it no longer posed a threat to the occupation." (p.51) It would appear that the defense of home and family from outside invaders united large, disparate groups of Germans, while post-war partisan actions only attracted relatively few fanatics and/or thugs. A plan to mount post-war resistance, the Axmann Plan, never worked. In tallying up the Allied soldiers killed by partisan activities after the surrender, this reader found fewer than several dozen. It appears that when the war was over, so was the most of the resistance. Bidiscombe's book on German resistance and the Allied occupation has received some notice by people searching for historical parallels to the current US military occupation of Iraq. Hitler and Saddam Husein as personifications of evil make such comparisons seductive. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and National Security Advisor Rice evoked this theme in their 25 August 2003 speeches before the 104th National Convention of the VFW. While one hopes that our national leaders bring an historical perspective to their actions, it appears that they have chosen to read Biddiscombe's book, not to learn from history, but to manipulate it for their own ends. Biddiscombe's book should, however, cause one to reflect on the current US situation in Iraq. First, General Eisenhower and his staff devoted considerable effort during the war to developing a post-war occupation strategy, not all of it consistent with international law. (pp. 252-254) Second, the occupation of Germany was a direct result of German military aggression and followed a formal surrender by German authorities. Germans knew that Germany had started the war. Third, the successful occupation of Germany occurred after it was entirely surrounded by hostile forces. There were no open borders with countries opposing the Allied occupation, unlike Iraq, which borders Iran and Syria. Fourth, the Nazi Party?s extermination of the Jews left only Protestants and Catholics, two Christian sects that hadn?t been at war in Germany for over 200 years. The ethnic (Kurds and Iraqis) and religious (Sunni and Shiite) tensions in Iraq continued to erupt throughout the twentieth century. Finally, the partisan resistance to Allied occupation quickly faded at the end of the war. Continued Iraqi resistance quite likely points, in part, to simmering ethnic and religious tensions. These historical differences show the magnitude of the problems facing the current U.S. military occupation of Iraq. If nation building by military force is now an accepted tenet of U.S. foreign policy, this book should provide valuable historical background for the U.S. officer corps and the enlisted personnel called upon to implement that policy. It would also be useful for citizens who wish to understand better some of on-the-ground issues that would be faced by their military occupation forces.
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