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Rating: 
Summary: Solid Craftsmanship
Review: As usual, noted armor export Stephen J Zaloga delivers the goods in Osprey Campaign #115, Battle of the Ardennes (I): St Vith and the Northern Shoulder. The northern sector of the "Battle of the Bulge" generally receives far less coverage than the fighting further south around Bastogne, but Zaloga clearly states that this was in fact, where the battle was decided. Zaloga's thesis - while not particularly original - is solidly crafted in a thorough narrative. Zaloga demonstrates that the German offensive was a poorly planned gamble, executed by marginally trained troops, over adverse terrain in poor weather against an adaptable foe. All these factors added up to rapid German culmination in a matter of days, which is why this volume only covers the period 16-25 December 1944. Battle of the Ardennes (I) begins in standard Osprey format with a short section on the origins of the campaign and a chronology (up to 24 December 1944). There are three sections discussing opposing plans, opposing commanders and opposing armies. The section on opposing plans is quite good and includes a section on weather and terrain, both of which had a decisive impact on the German offensive. Zaloga notes that Patton's G-2 accurately predicted a German counteroffensive in the Ardennes and this gave Third Army a big edge in responding to the attack. The section on opposing commanders, as usual with Zaloga, is the weakest section due to its over-emphasis on high-level commanders at the expense of the junior officers who actually fought the actions discussed in this volume (why is Jochen Peiper not in this section?). The eight-page section on opposing armies is useful and notes the low quality of German replacements in even their supposedly elite Waffen SS and Fallschirmjäger units. Indeed, Zaloga demonstrates that despite better equipment, many of the German units had to employ much less sophisticated tactics than in previous years. On the other hand, the US Army's neglect of cold weather gear and the placement of the corps boundary in the Losheim Gap ("a traditional invasion route") were serious mistakes. The order of battle provided is too bare-bones, listing only division-level units, and in light of Osprey's Order of Battle series on this campaign Zaloga could have listed more of the vital engineer, artillery and tank destroyer units. Battle of the Ardennes (I) has three 3-D maps (Battle for Krinkelt & Rocherath, Kampfgruppe Peiper's route and the Battle at Dom Butgenbach); these maps are only so-so and the one on Peiper is practically useless since it covers too large an area. The five 2-D maps are fine (strategic situation, German planned routes, initial attacks of 6th Panzer Army, destruction of the US 106th Division, and defense of St Vith) but the maps do not fully portray the US defense of the Elsenborn Ridge and even Peiper's route is difficult to follow with these maps. The three battle scenes are: Panzer graveyard at Krinkelt, Kampfgruppe Pieper and the rearguard at St Vith. The photographs throughout the volume, culled primarily from the National Archives, are excellent - particularly if one enjoys photos of burning Panther tanks. The photographs of the American 99th Infantry Division's reinforced log bunkers with overhead cover are impressive examples of fieldworks. Zaloga is particularly adept at demonstrating the relative combat efficiency of the American and German forces at this time. In one notable action on the first day of the German offensive, an American scout platoon from the 1/394th Infantry held off the German 5th Fallschirmjäger Regiment at the village of Lanzerath for the bulk of a day. Zaloga notes that both regiments of this worn-out airborne division mounted repeated frontal attacks across open ground in broad daylight and were mown down by US machine guns, which speaks volumes for the decline of German tactical competence. Although the US scout platoon was eventually overwhelmed and captured, this rearguard action unhinged the German timetable for the 1st SS Panzer Division's intended exploitation to the Meuse River, and this platoon became the most decorated American unit of the war. Zaloga also notes the huge difference in artillery capabilities. While the German preliminary artillery bombardment was relatively ineffective, time and again the Americans were able to mass huge amounts of artillery fire to smash or disrupt German forces preparing to attack (many accounts tend to portray US ground forces as helpless with air support - this was the German perception of US forces - which ignores the vital, all-weather contributions of US artillery). On the other hand, the loss of most of the US 106th Division - the biggest American surrender in the ETO - was due to a combination of inexperience and bad luck. Zaloga does not delve deeply enough into the personal factors involved at St Vith, including the relationship between MGN Alan Jones of the 106th Division and BGN Bruce Clarke of the 7th Armored Division, which go a long way toward explaining the situation there. Zaloga does cover the German special operations Grief and Stosser, but his coverage of the defense of St Vith is rather brief. In conclusion, Zaloga points to many factors for the failure of the German operation: (1) Dietrich, commander of the 6th Panzer Army, under-estimated the US defenses, (2) the preliminary German artillery barrage was ineffective but alerted the US troops of imminent attack, (3) the German infantry units in the first wave assaulting units lacked sufficient armor support and (4) the Germans tried to push too many units down a few main roads, without using the numerous forest trails. These points are all valid, but they only explain how the Germans lost the battle, not how the Americans won it. In short, the US Army won in the Ardennes due to increased tactical competence, which enabled US forces to adapt and improvise ad hoc defenses with whatever was at hand, until overwhelming reinforcements arrived from the northern and southern flanks.
Rating:
Summary: Solid Craftsmanship
Review: As usual, noted armor export Stephen J Zaloga delivers the goods in Osprey Campaign #115, Battle of the Ardennes (I): St Vith and the Northern Shoulder. The northern sector of the "Battle of the Bulge" generally receives far less coverage than the fighting further south around Bastogne, but Zaloga clearly states that this was in fact, where the battle was decided. Zaloga's thesis - while not particularly original - is solidly crafted in a thorough narrative. Zaloga demonstrates that the German offensive was a poorly planned gamble, executed by marginally trained troops, over adverse terrain in poor weather against an adaptable foe. All these factors added up to rapid German culmination in a matter of days, which is why this volume only covers the period 16-25 December 1944. Battle of the Ardennes (I) begins in standard Osprey format with a short section on the origins of the campaign and a chronology (up to 24 December 1944). There are three sections discussing opposing plans, opposing commanders and opposing armies. The section on opposing plans is quite good and includes a section on weather and terrain, both of which had a decisive impact on the German offensive. Zaloga notes that Patton's G-2 accurately predicted a German counteroffensive in the Ardennes and this gave Third Army a big edge in responding to the attack. The section on opposing commanders, as usual with Zaloga, is the weakest section due to its over-emphasis on high-level commanders at the expense of the junior officers who actually fought the actions discussed in this volume (why is Jochen Peiper not in this section?). The eight-page section on opposing armies is useful and notes the low quality of German replacements in even their supposedly elite Waffen SS and Fallschirmjäger units. Indeed, Zaloga demonstrates that despite better equipment, many of the German units had to employ much less sophisticated tactics than in previous years. On the other hand, the US Army's neglect of cold weather gear and the placement of the corps boundary in the Losheim Gap ("a traditional invasion route") were serious mistakes. The order of battle provided is too bare-bones, listing only division-level units, and in light of Osprey's Order of Battle series on this campaign Zaloga could have listed more of the vital engineer, artillery and tank destroyer units. Battle of the Ardennes (I) has three 3-D maps (Battle for Krinkelt & Rocherath, Kampfgruppe Peiper's route and the Battle at Dom Butgenbach); these maps are only so-so and the one on Peiper is practically useless since it covers too large an area. The five 2-D maps are fine (strategic situation, German planned routes, initial attacks of 6th Panzer Army, destruction of the US 106th Division, and defense of St Vith) but the maps do not fully portray the US defense of the Elsenborn Ridge and even Peiper's route is difficult to follow with these maps. The three battle scenes are: Panzer graveyard at Krinkelt, Kampfgruppe Pieper and the rearguard at St Vith. The photographs throughout the volume, culled primarily from the National Archives, are excellent - particularly if one enjoys photos of burning Panther tanks. The photographs of the American 99th Infantry Division's reinforced log bunkers with overhead cover are impressive examples of fieldworks. Zaloga is particularly adept at demonstrating the relative combat efficiency of the American and German forces at this time. In one notable action on the first day of the German offensive, an American scout platoon from the 1/394th Infantry held off the German 5th Fallschirmjäger Regiment at the village of Lanzerath for the bulk of a day. Zaloga notes that both regiments of this worn-out airborne division mounted repeated frontal attacks across open ground in broad daylight and were mown down by US machine guns, which speaks volumes for the decline of German tactical competence. Although the US scout platoon was eventually overwhelmed and captured, this rearguard action unhinged the German timetable for the 1st SS Panzer Division's intended exploitation to the Meuse River, and this platoon became the most decorated American unit of the war. Zaloga also notes the huge difference in artillery capabilities. While the German preliminary artillery bombardment was relatively ineffective, time and again the Americans were able to mass huge amounts of artillery fire to smash or disrupt German forces preparing to attack (many accounts tend to portray US ground forces as helpless with air support - this was the German perception of US forces - which ignores the vital, all-weather contributions of US artillery). On the other hand, the loss of most of the US 106th Division - the biggest American surrender in the ETO - was due to a combination of inexperience and bad luck. Zaloga does not delve deeply enough into the personal factors involved at St Vith, including the relationship between MGN Alan Jones of the 106th Division and BGN Bruce Clarke of the 7th Armored Division, which go a long way toward explaining the situation there. Zaloga does cover the German special operations Grief and Stosser, but his coverage of the defense of St Vith is rather brief. In conclusion, Zaloga points to many factors for the failure of the German operation: (1) Dietrich, commander of the 6th Panzer Army, under-estimated the US defenses, (2) the preliminary German artillery barrage was ineffective but alerted the US troops of imminent attack, (3) the German infantry units in the first wave assaulting units lacked sufficient armor support and (4) the Germans tried to push too many units down a few main roads, without using the numerous forest trails. These points are all valid, but they only explain how the Germans lost the battle, not how the Americans won it. In short, the US Army won in the Ardennes due to increased tactical competence, which enabled US forces to adapt and improvise ad hoc defenses with whatever was at hand, until overwhelming reinforcements arrived from the northern and southern flanks.
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