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Rating: 
Summary: A Non-Essential History
Review: John Haldon, a professor of Byzantine history at the University of Birmingham, misses the mark in Osprey's Essential History #33, Byzantium at War 600-14. Haldon violates the series format throughout the text and fails to deliver a historical narrative as readers of this series expect. Indeed, there is not one map of either a battle or campaign in this volume (e.g. Yarmuk, Manzikert). Nor do any Byzantine generals figure prominently in these pages. Byzantium at War 600-14 has some value for the miscellaneous topics covered by the author, but this is certainly not an "essential history." Rather, the author states that, "it is the imperial armies, the way that they were maintained and how they fought, that is the main theme of this volume." This might be suitable for Osprey's Warrior series, but not this series. Thus, Byzantium at War 600-14 fails to deliver a narrative history of the Byzantine Empire's wars during the selected period. Byzantium at War 600-1453 begins with a rather lengthy 11-page introduction (12% of the volume) and a chronology. In the next sections, the author addresses the political world of Byzantium, its neighbors and enemies, and how Byzantium fought its wars. These sections are overly generalized to a fault. The section entitled "the fighting" - which is usually the main narrative in these volumes - is only 13 pages long and covers topics like tactical administration, strategy and logistics. The section "portrait of a soldier" covers recruitment, discipline and the life on campaign of a typical soldier (note, there are no first person accounts or sources used). Final sections include war and peace in the empire, portrait of a farmer, death of the empire and conclusions. The bibliography is extremely thin given the large amount of material available on this subject, and the author provides only 14 references (including 4 by himself). An appendix lists all Byzantine rulers. The maps are a great disappointment and the eight provided merely depict the empire's boundaries between the 6th and 15th Centuries. There are no maps of Turkish or Islamic expansion, no battle maps and only three maps even depict key cities (forget about finding Yarmuk or Manzikert on these maps). Nor are the photographs in this volume much better, since the author apparently felt that wandering around modern-day Turkey and taking pictures of children playing in a street or oxen plowing a field would help the reader to understand Byzantine warfare. Amazingly, there is not one photo of any weaponry, armor or other military artifacts. Obviously, the Osprey series editor failed to ensure that this volume adhered to the series standard and the result is virtually a bric-a-brac approach to the subject. Professor Haldon's main points are that: (1) Byzantium was constantly at war because it was surrounded by enemies, (2) the empire's strategy was mainly defensive due to limited resources and (3) Byzantium successfully held off its enemies for eight centuries because of its superior logistical and financial base. Haldon suggests that the Byzantines suffered occasional tactical defeats due to incompetent leadership but that their long-term decline was due to a steady erosion of the resource base. Given that the author never discusses any battles or campaigns, it is hard to see how any of these conclusions are supported. There is no doubt that the author has some valuable things to say about Byzantine warfare, but his presentation is neither comprehensive nor even coherent. Important issues like naval transport and naval warfare ("Greek fire" saved the empire more than once) are never mentioned. If logistic and fiscal superiority were the Byzantine "center of gravity," why are no facts (or even estimates) about Byzantine military expenses provided? Instead, the author provides only a few lame and generalized examples of how various provinces were assigned to produce materials for the army, like arrows or pack animals. Surely the Islamic, Turkish and Bulgar armies could also draw on their various provinces for arrows and mules, so it is hard to see Byzantium's unique advantage in this context. The author never even bothers to mention how many troops Byzantium maintained in various periods, the approximate revenue of the empire or population. Since no such data is presented for either Byzantium or its enemies, how does Haldon know that the empire's resources were superior? Furthermore, the logistic/financial superiority argument is a weak one at best. If superior resources were Byzantium's key to survival, why did the West Roman Empire - which had even greater resources - fail to survive longer? Certainly the Islamic forces overrunning most of the Mideast in the 7th Century had resources equal to or greater than a Byzantine Empire that was losing province after province. Indeed, the author employs double-talk in stating that constrained resources forced a defensive strategy on the empire, but these resources were greater than the combined total of enemies attacking on two or even three fronts. The facts indicate that the Byzantine Empire never had a significant advantage in population or land area over its principal enemies, which means that the amount of troops, tax money, food and military supplies could not have been superior (indeed, if Byzantine had enjoyed a superiority it would have adopted a more offensive strategy). Byzantium always existed under threat of extinction and the real answer to its longevity lies in the superior melding of diplomatic, informational (the Byzantines were masters in propaganda, espionage and deceit), military and economic (particularly bribes) tools. Most of Byzantium's neighbors relied primarily on military muscle and in this narrow venue, they could often best the smaller Byzantine armies. However, the Byzantines were experts at deflecting and confounding aggressors with non-military means, and it is this cunning ability to exploit all means available that explains the incredible longevity of the Byzantine empire.
Rating:
Summary: A Non-Essential History
Review: John Haldon, a professor of Byzantine history at the University of Birmingham, misses the mark in Osprey's Essential History #33, Byzantium at War 600-14. Haldon violates the series format throughout the text and fails to deliver a historical narrative as readers of this series expect. Indeed, there is not one map of either a battle or campaign in this volume (e.g. Yarmuk, Manzikert). Nor do any Byzantine generals figure prominently in these pages. Byzantium at War 600-14 has some value for the miscellaneous topics covered by the author, but this is certainly not an "essential history." Rather, the author states that, "it is the imperial armies, the way that they were maintained and how they fought, that is the main theme of this volume." This might be suitable for Osprey's Warrior series, but not this series. Thus, Byzantium at War 600-14 fails to deliver a narrative history of the Byzantine Empire's wars during the selected period. Byzantium at War 600-1453 begins with a rather lengthy 11-page introduction (12% of the volume) and a chronology. In the next sections, the author addresses the political world of Byzantium, its neighbors and enemies, and how Byzantium fought its wars. These sections are overly generalized to a fault. The section entitled "the fighting" - which is usually the main narrative in these volumes - is only 13 pages long and covers topics like tactical administration, strategy and logistics. The section "portrait of a soldier" covers recruitment, discipline and the life on campaign of a typical soldier (note, there are no first person accounts or sources used). Final sections include war and peace in the empire, portrait of a farmer, death of the empire and conclusions. The bibliography is extremely thin given the large amount of material available on this subject, and the author provides only 14 references (including 4 by himself). An appendix lists all Byzantine rulers. The maps are a great disappointment and the eight provided merely depict the empire's boundaries between the 6th and 15th Centuries. There are no maps of Turkish or Islamic expansion, no battle maps and only three maps even depict key cities (forget about finding Yarmuk or Manzikert on these maps). Nor are the photographs in this volume much better, since the author apparently felt that wandering around modern-day Turkey and taking pictures of children playing in a street or oxen plowing a field would help the reader to understand Byzantine warfare. Amazingly, there is not one photo of any weaponry, armor or other military artifacts. Obviously, the Osprey series editor failed to ensure that this volume adhered to the series standard and the result is virtually a bric-a-brac approach to the subject. Professor Haldon's main points are that: (1) Byzantium was constantly at war because it was surrounded by enemies, (2) the empire's strategy was mainly defensive due to limited resources and (3) Byzantium successfully held off its enemies for eight centuries because of its superior logistical and financial base. Haldon suggests that the Byzantines suffered occasional tactical defeats due to incompetent leadership but that their long-term decline was due to a steady erosion of the resource base. Given that the author never discusses any battles or campaigns, it is hard to see how any of these conclusions are supported. There is no doubt that the author has some valuable things to say about Byzantine warfare, but his presentation is neither comprehensive nor even coherent. Important issues like naval transport and naval warfare ("Greek fire" saved the empire more than once) are never mentioned. If logistic and fiscal superiority were the Byzantine "center of gravity," why are no facts (or even estimates) about Byzantine military expenses provided? Instead, the author provides only a few lame and generalized examples of how various provinces were assigned to produce materials for the army, like arrows or pack animals. Surely the Islamic, Turkish and Bulgar armies could also draw on their various provinces for arrows and mules, so it is hard to see Byzantium's unique advantage in this context. The author never even bothers to mention how many troops Byzantium maintained in various periods, the approximate revenue of the empire or population. Since no such data is presented for either Byzantium or its enemies, how does Haldon know that the empire's resources were superior? Furthermore, the logistic/financial superiority argument is a weak one at best. If superior resources were Byzantium's key to survival, why did the West Roman Empire - which had even greater resources - fail to survive longer? Certainly the Islamic forces overrunning most of the Mideast in the 7th Century had resources equal to or greater than a Byzantine Empire that was losing province after province. Indeed, the author employs double-talk in stating that constrained resources forced a defensive strategy on the empire, but these resources were greater than the combined total of enemies attacking on two or even three fronts. The facts indicate that the Byzantine Empire never had a significant advantage in population or land area over its principal enemies, which means that the amount of troops, tax money, food and military supplies could not have been superior (indeed, if Byzantine had enjoyed a superiority it would have adopted a more offensive strategy). Byzantium always existed under threat of extinction and the real answer to its longevity lies in the superior melding of diplomatic, informational (the Byzantines were masters in propaganda, espionage and deceit), military and economic (particularly bribes) tools. Most of Byzantium's neighbors relied primarily on military muscle and in this narrow venue, they could often best the smaller Byzantine armies. However, the Byzantines were experts at deflecting and confounding aggressors with non-military means, and it is this cunning ability to exploit all means available that explains the incredible longevity of the Byzantine empire.
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