Rating: 
Summary: Simply the best
Review: This is now the best one volume history of the German campaign on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. One of the authors is one of the leading specialists on the subject and has written a large number of volumes about different aspects of the war on the Eastern Front. The book is easy to read and has numerous maps that support the text.The reason for the book is that prior to the opening of the Russian archives most historians depended on German material for understanding the campaign. That material was seriously flawed in a number of respects. The first problem was that for the entire war the Germans had very poor intelligence about the size and disposition of Russian forces. The second problem was that a large number of the memoirs of German Generals were self serving and inaccurate. Early histories of the war have seen the reason for the failure of the Russian campaign as a result of operational failures. That is that certain mistakes were made in the conduct of the campaign. A common theme of histories during the 60's and 70's was a belief that if the Barbarossa offensive had been run differently or if the attacking forces in operation Blue had not been separated victory might not have been achieved. This book shows clearly that by the end of the campaign in 1941 the Germans were in serious trouble. They had suffered massive casualties and the forces they could muster in 1942 were far below the army that had started the campaign in both men and equipment. The Russians although they had lost close to three million men had by the end of 1941 built up a force equivalent to the Germans. From that time on they were able to edge ahead in production of equipment and achieve a material preponderance over the Germans. In fact it was probably the failure of the Russian Kharkov offensive that made it possible for any offensive operation in 1942 to succeed. In summary the reason for the failure of Barbarossa was not due to operational problems but due to problems with strategy. In 1941 Germany put into the campaign an army of about three million men. Its level of production of tanks and aircraft remained low. In 1944 it was able to increase its army to the level of ten million and to raise tank and aircraft production. By 1944 it was to late as the Russian forces had reached the top of their fighting potential. The forces put into the field in 1941 were not adequate and the Germans were to suffer from massive supply problems. The basis of the commitment of three million men in 1941 was something that the German armed forces felt adequate to complete the conquest of Russia in five weeks. It was only later in the war that the Germans began to realize the potential of their enemy. Again this is territory that Glantz has discussed in his excellent book Stumbling Colossus. This book lays to rest a number of old mistakes and historical errors. One of the authors has written another volume on Operation Mars so that the book is able to show that this was a serious defeat for the Russians, a defeat that had previously been written out of history. In addition there is a careful discussion of the Stalingrad campaign which explains in detail that the reason for the defeat are complex and involved the poor logistic situation of the sixth army. The levels of supply made the prospect of a break out from Stalingrad unrealistic. The book also contains an excellent appendix which outlines the level of troop commitment to the eastern front by the Germans and their casualty levels. It clearly shows the importance of the Eastern Front in the defeat of Germany. It is impossible to praise this work to highly as it is readable well organized and logical.
Rating:
Summary: A CLASSIC AND VERY INSIGHTFUL NARRATIVE
Review: This was an epic recounting of the momentous struggle that took place on the Eastern Front as seen from the Soviet perspective.It follows the history of the war from the initial fiascos of the 1941 to the gradual re-organization and growing military professinalism of the Red Army.Compelling as it is very insightful it is simply a great book.It is a must for any Eastern front enthusiasts.
Rating: 
Summary: A limited but interesting study of the Eastern Front
Review: With such anglo-centric popular discussion of World War II surrounding the British and Americans, this book brings to light the remarkable accomplishment of the Soviet armies in not only repelling the Nazi threat, but in severely mauling the Wermacht in a series of decisive offensives which surpassed the ability of the Germans as far as battles of encirclement.
The book only touches on some important components of the battle for Russia, but it creates a thirst for more details that are available in other books.
With the bulk of Germany's armies fighting on the eastern front, any discussion of World War II without an understanding of the disposition of Soviet armies creates an imcomplete picture. This book opens up to readers a compelling glimpse of the remarkable acheivement of the Soviet army.
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