Rating: 
Summary: Armies, Corps and Generals
Review: A strategically complete text, one of the smallest in length that covers the entire Eastern Front including the Russo-Finnish War, with some pages devoted to the Japanese incursions into Manchuria. Small in length because one quarter of the text's pages relate to pure end notes, source origins and charts.Small can be good. However, it soon becomes apparent that the text forms a mere guide as to the movements of Armies, Corps and the names of the Generals commanding them. Therefore, for the reader looking for strategic OOB research material this book may assist you greatly. Yet, for the reader looking for the why's and wherefore's of the campaign - the how's as to the methods used to cram armies into 5 kilometer frontages, switching them from point to point, the logistics of supplying them and of fighting within the mud and snow, little is offered here. Readers are provided with a comfortable introduction as to the make-up and formation of the German and Red Armies leading to Barbarossa's start. Yet, repetition becomes a common trait and a few typos do creep in - mainly noticable to those making the effort to follow occurences across the various Soviet Fronts. On this point, whilst thankfully this text does provide maps, these are few and far between. To genuinely keep in pace with the narrative, a secondary map source is highly recommended. In summary, a mediocre text that provides an overview of the entire Russian Campaign but I'm inclined to suggest that for the novice to mid level historian/researcher, Osprey's Ost Front or similar such basic coverages, will provide an even greater insight. Experienced historians may find merit in this text's constant recitation of commanders' names. For those wishing to understand the suffering and daring of the war's participants, the grit of operational action - definitely look elsewhere. In this text the crucial, January 1942 to December 1943 flies by.
Rating: 
Summary: Gives an interesting new slant to the Eastern Front
Review: After reading many books on the subject I found "When Titans Clashed" provides far more detail on the battles during the Russian offensives post-Kursk to Berlin in 1945. These battles are covered sparingly in other books which concentrate heavily on the German victories of 1941/42 upto Stalingrad. It also dispels a lot of common misconceptions of vast Russian hordes, throwing vast manpower to be slaughtered and overrun German lines by explaining that it was common Russian military practice from 1943 onwards to feint an offensive against German strongholds and then attack with massive concentration against the most weakly defended German positions, giving the impression to the German troops and officers who faced these "human waves" that the scale of the offensives was the same across the entire front. While I have a great interest in the Eastern Front this book never really gave me an insight into how the war was fought. After reading the order of battle which consists of dozens of Russian officer's names and ranks, the endless list of regiments and armies involved in each battle you lose the sheer scale and picture of what was really taking place. Lists of casualty figures don't really tell the story. There is only a few sentences devoted to the atrocities commited (by both sides) and partisan involvement. The most frustrating part was right at the end of the book after 250 pages of explaining which Russian general was in charge of which army and of which front and against which panzer division he mentions that to the Germans war in the East was "unmitigating horror" and this is as far as he goes to giving any human element in the whole book and does not "waste" any words elaborating it. While you can read plenty of other books on the details and human aspect of the major battles I felt Stalingrad and Kursk were mentioned in far too little detail. However all of these gripes are more than made up by the detail of the "3rd period of the war" such the Bagration operation which is mentioned all too briefly in other books. If you want a purely militaristic and strategic outline of the Eastern Front, particularly from the Soviet point of view then this is a fantastic book. If you want a little more humanised or exhilarating account of the war then look elsewhere.
Rating:
Summary: excellent read
Review: At first glance, this book by Glantz may seem dry as dust and a wee bit technical. It is. However, the author manages to keep the reader intrested by shedding a new light on the "ostfront". A fascinating read for those who enjoy military history.
Rating: 
Summary: Excellent ! Very well researched.
Review: David Glantz is without a doubt the foremost expert on the Eastern Front (1941-45) especially after professor John Errickson passed away. Together with Jonathan House the have written a clear and extremely accurate account of the Russo-german War, with a well deserved emphasis on the soviet side (the Soviets were the victors after all!). The maps are very detailed but a little bit crowded with information. The text is excellent and blends the in depth knowledge of Glantz with the writing abilities of House. I found the appendices very useful, especially those wich cover the soviet losses during each campaign of the Great Patriotic War. One really wonders how a nation could withstand such tremendous losses and not only recover but beat desicively a hard, experienced, well armed and professional enemy like the Wehrmacht.
Rating:
Summary: Post Glasnost Study of the Russian Front
Review: David M. Glantz and Jonathan House argue that the Red Army defeated the forces of Nazi Germany because of the superior combat effectiveness of its forces. By adapting strategy and tactics and reforming existing command structures best suited to the nature of the war on the Eastern fronts, the Red Army instituted counter-measures that resulted in victory against the Germans. The authors refute some common theories concerning the Red Army's victory as well as Germany's defeat. The authors claim the vastness of the Russian frontier and the extreme weather conditions (a factor usually attributed to the German defeat) were equally detrimental to the Russian forces. The authors counter the theory that sheer numerical advantage the Russians enjoyed over the Germans attributed to their victory by claiming that by 1944, the Red Army too was suffering from acute manpower shortages.   The authors base their research on newly available Russian sources opened to the west in 1989. The authors conclude from these sources that the Soviet Union always held a military advantage over their western neighbors. The authors claim that during the inter-war years, the Soviet Union's doctrine consisted of an offensive strategy based on a concept known as "Deep Battle," This strategy was devised by the Russian strategists M.N. Tukhachevsky and V.K. Triandafillov. Glantz and House assert that the reason Germany enjoyed initial success in the summer of 1941, was because the Red Army was going through a transition period as a direct result of Stalin's purges of the Red officer corps in the 1930's. Contrary to previous accounts, the authors claim that the Soviets were prepared for a German invasion, yet tried to prolong a confrontation until this transition period was complete.   The authors claim to be the forerunners in taping the newly opened Russian archives (Before 1989, John Erickson always claimed to have inside access to Russian sources). They admit, however, that a vast amount of Russian material, "voluminous but fragmented in nature" still remains closed to western historians and that their research represents only the tip of the iceberg. Most of this primary material is military in nature such as: general staff reports and journals and directorates published by various members of the Russian high command structure. The authors also draw from German archival sources as well as a host of secondary literature.   In contrast to Overy, no oral histories or personal interviews were used in the research. This omission eliminates the human face to the struggle. While playing-up the advantages of the Russian archival material, the authors tend to down-play German sources a bit too much. For example, the authors overemphasize the blame it all on Hitler bias of such classic German memoirist and tacticians as Field Marshal Erich von Manstein (Lost Victories) and Major General F.W. von Mellenthin (Panzer Battles). Given the scope of the opposing political ideologies, the emphasis on military operations, to a certain extent, seem to dwarf the role of politics as if the military forces were operating in a vacuum, divorced from politics.   The then newly opened Russian archives does lend the book an important significance, however. The emphasis placed on the analysis of the evidence and the description of the archival material is a big help to the serious student of the conflict. Though the narrative is dry in places, the layout of the book with "conclusion" paragraphs at the end of each section makes the book and the argument easy to follow. The ample supply of maps, though dark in places is a plus. Arguably_When Titans Clashed_ may supersede John Erickson's two-volume standard for scholarly precision. Clark's _Operation Barbarosa_, Werth's _Russia at War_ and Overy's _Russia's War_, however, offer a far better read.
Rating:
Summary: Ok but not great.
Review: I was looking for something like David Irving's Seminal work Hitler's war but from Stalins perspective.
This book does give some good info from the Soviet perspective but does'nt answer many key questions.
How Did the Soviets go from a broken country in 1918 to having a state of the Art defense industry by 1942. Did Stalin have an inkling of Hitler when he started the massive industrialization from 1928 on. How was a communist system which despised open thinking and free thought yet still be able to industrialize and design stuff like the T-34.
In tactical terms Glantz does not explain the soviets defense system from 1943 on where the Soviets had some 25+ bridgeheads and could not be ejected from a single bridgehead. Whereas against the west the Nazi's almost broke their back in the Battle of the Bulge. What was the soviet techniques such that Nazi armored counterstrokes against infantry held bridgeheads were unsucessful.
Rating:
Summary: Who stopped Hitler?
Review: The Russians - is the answer of two American military historians. American and British contribution was large and important (and the authors correctly stress that), but the Russians would have been in Berlin anyway although after much longer and bloodier campaign (ending up probably in Atlantic beaches of France). But this conclusion was not important for me. As a Russian I always knew it. Anyone who read anything about Stalingrad battle would have realized that. Much more important and enlightening was to read about little ironies of Barbarossa and the rest of German - Russian 1941-1945 conflict. Some of these ironies were pointed out directly by the authors; others came to my mind while I was reading the book. The most important irony was the fact that Soviet Army ended up the war looking and acting like Wehrmacht in1941 in its mobility, strength and tactics, while the German army in 1944/45 increasingly looked like Red Army in 1941. Truly, we become what we fight the most! Second irony. Despite apparent Soviet/Russian internationalism and proclaimed by the Nazis superiority of the Germanic/Nordic race - by 1942/43 the main burden of war was carried by the Russian people, while the Germans depended more and more on auxiliary troops from places like Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. Plus Croatian regiments in Stalingrad, Latvian and Ukrainian "Galician" SS divisions - all were fighting against "godless Bolshevism" and for all practical purposes - the Russians. Third irony. As the war progressed the German army was increasingly becoming subject to ideological brainwashing from the Nazi party and Hitler direct meddling, while Stalin left Red army pretty much along after 1942/43. Not only he did left people like Zhukov and Vasilevskii along in their conduct of war, but also Stalin withdrew Bolshevist ideology, stressed Russian patriotism and after 1941/42 he stopped harassing Russian Church. Of coarse, it doesn't make Stalin an angel, but still it's important to remember these facts (which might or might not have been crucial to Russian victory). These are just some of my observations - you might end up with totally different ones (depending where you are coming from). For sure the authors seem sympathetic to the Russians but the book is not one-sided at all.
To sum up, I think this is an impressive book. Despite its relatively short length, obviously much scholarship and archival research went into it. Great maps! I give four stars only because the book could use some help with correction of Russian personal and geographical names. For example - map on page 164 shows city of Opel instead of correct Orel; Marshal Timoskenko on page 13 should be correctly Timoshenko; General Voronev on page 141 is really Voronov, etc.
Rating:
Summary: Who stopped Hitler?
Review: The Russians - is the answer of two American military historians. American and British contribution was large and important (and the authors correctly stress that), but the Russians would have been in Berlin anyway although after much longer and bloodier campaign (ending up probably in Atlantic beaches of France). But this conclusion was not important for me. As a Russian I always knew it. Anyone who read anything about Stalingrad battle would have realized that. Much more important and enlightening was to read about little ironies of Barbarossa and the rest of German - Russian 1941-1945 conflict. Some of these ironies were pointed out directly by the authors; others came to my mind while I was reading the book. The most important irony was the fact that Soviet Army ended up the war looking and acting like Wehrmacht in1941 in its mobility, strength and tactics, while the German army in 1944/45 increasingly looked like Red Army in 1941. Truly, we become what we fight the most! Second irony. Despite apparent Soviet/Russian internationalism and proclaimed by the Nazis superiority of the Germanic/Nordic race - by 1942/43 the main burden of war was carried by the Russian people, while the Germans depended more and more on auxiliary troops from places like Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. Plus Croatian regiments in Stalingrad, Latvian and Ukrainian "Galician" SS divisions - all were fighting against "godless Bolshevism" and for all practical purposes - the Russians. Third irony. As the war progressed the German army was increasingly becoming subject to ideological brainwashing from the Nazi party and Hitler direct meddling, while Stalin left Red army pretty much along after 1942/43. Not only he did left people like Zhukov and Vasilevskii along in their conduct of war, but also Stalin withdrew Bolshevist ideology, stressed Russian patriotism and after 1941/42 he stopped harassing Russian Church. Of coarse, it doesn't make Stalin an angel, but still it's important to remember these facts (which might or might not have been crucial to Russian victory). These are just some of my observations - you might end up with totally different ones (depending where you are coming from). For sure the authors seem sympathetic to the Russians but the book is not one-sided at all.
To sum up, I think this is an impressive book. Despite its relatively short length, obviously much scholarship and archival research went into it. Great maps! I give four stars only because the book could use some help with correction of Russian personal and geographical names. For example - map on page 164 shows city of Opel instead of correct Orel; Marshal Timoskenko on page 13 should be correctly Timoshenko; General Voronev on page 141 is really Voronov, etc.
Rating:
Summary: Personal Thoughts of Ian Foulkes on "When Titans Clashed"
Review: This book is an absolute must for any serious student of the Second World War on the Russian front. At last here is a meticulously researched book from Russian Primary Source material. This book was only made possible by the collapse of Communism allowing the authors access to material previously off limits to western researchers. This sober and well balanced account covers the changes of the Red Army under Stalin, his mismanagement that so nearly lead to defeat, to the Rise of brilliant Red Army Generals such as Marshal Georgi K Zhukov. David Glantz and Jonathan House are to be congratulated on this superb book. At last we have a book to counter balance the previously unopposed mostly early war German Account of war on the Eastern Front. Very Highly Recommended.
Rating:
Summary: Great book but some wrong facts
Review: This is in one word an excellent work shedding light on the Russian (Soviet) contribution to the defeat of fascism. However the authors claim that a significant number of Ukrainians sided with the Nazis. This view is probably true of Western Ukraine (Ukraine formerly ruled by Poland, Rumania, and Hungary). As a Ukrainian who had three relatives killed in the Red Army and seven noncombatant relatives murdered by the Germans, this is just plain wrong. Also the authors say the UPA guerilla army came out on top in Ukraine, this is only true of Western Ukraine. In other parts of Ukraine the Soviet guerillas were on top. Also the authors misspell names of generals, places, etc. in some places of the book. In other areas, excellent book.
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