Afghanistan Cave Complexes, 1979-2004: Mountain strongholds of the Mujahideen, Taliban & Al Qaeda (Fortress)

Rating:
Summary: Bomb Magnets
Review: It is extremely risky to write about an ongoing conflict, since many details remain either classified or obscure, but Osprey has waded into Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) with Afghanistan Cave Complexes 1979-2004. The author, a former enlisted US Army Ranger in the 1980s, relies primarily upon the earlier works of Lester Grau on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, newspaper accounts, and US DoD press releases. This volume has its pluses: immediate relevancy, all color photographs and coverage of a conflict that has become a "forgotten war." However, this volume is ultimately a synthesis product that relies too heavily on one source (Grau), lacks objectivity and fails to get a good handle on its subject. Readers expecting an in-depth look at the fighting around Tora Bora in 2001 are going to be disappointed and readers expecting to really gain an appreciate for the Soviet experience in Afghanistan should just read Lester Grau.

Afghanistan Cave Complexes 1979-2004 begins with a short introduction to Afghanistan and a chronology of the key military events in this period. The section on design and development notes that most of the Afghan caves are natural, but offers few details on the manmade variety (who made them, when, how). The following section, on weapons systems at war, lists a variety of US aircraft and munitions used in OEF. The section on offensive operations discusses Soviet procedures against the karez irrigation system and US tunnel/cave clearing procedures. The section on defensive operations discusses mujahidin, Taliban and Al-Qaeda tactics for defending cave complexes. On the other hand, the author provides a fairly extensive bibliography for such a recent subject, including numerous websites.

In a military sense, the author does not have a good handle on the significance of these cave complexes, although he clearly implies that they have been a major asset for the enemy against the Soviets and Americans. Unlike the Maginot Line or the West Wall, the cave complexes were built to protect logistic bases and enemy troops, not as actual fighting positions. The enemy in Afghanistan has been primarily a guerrilla force and fixed fortifications do not mesh well with this type of force. As Grau notes in his studies, the base complexes were a dubious asset at best since they robbed the insurgents of their key strengths - mobility and invisibility - and tied down many insurgents in protecting a fixed base, instead of attacking Soviet or American bases. Furthermore, this author fails to note that the cave complexes were never very secret and both the Soviets and Americans were soon aware of them and proceeded to bomb the heck out of them. Indeed, the cave complexes ended up being "bomb magnets" that caused heavier mujahidin casualties than if they had dispersed. Although difficult, both the Soviets and Americans proved that they could move into and seize these complexes.

Unlike Grau's works, this author appears to embrace media-derived biases. Given what's here, it's not clear if this author did any of his own thinking or analysis. It is clear that readers will gain a false impression of what is currently going on in Afghanistan if they accept this author's polemics. Early on, the author states, "the initiative was lost," that "Afghanistan is less safe" now and that "disgruntled Afghan warlords dominate the country." OK, this author apparently is very selective in his newsgathering, because he apparently missed reconstruction projects like the opening of the Kabul-Kandahar highway, political successes like the recent elections and the on-going disarmament program that has muzzled the warlords. The fact that the Taliban threatened to disrupt the Afghan elections and failed showed just who has the initiative. Unlike the war against the Soviets, the Afghan people do not want the Taliban back, which greatly reduces the ability of that insurgency to expand. Later on, the author claims that, "over the last two years [the Taliban] have regained much of their lost territories." Huh? I don't know of a single village or city in Afghanistan flying their flag, and when they do show up in the rural areas, it is to rob villagers of supplies. While the Afghan Government and Coalition forces do not claim to control the entire country, they have the ability to rapidly respond to Taliban resurgence anywhere within Afghanistan and crush it. The author's claim that "little has changed" in Afghanistan is ludicrous, and an insult to a people that are enjoying their first taste of democracy.

The author really goes off the deep end when he addresses the Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) and US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. The author states, "the implementation of the misguided 'Rumsfeldian theory of war,' the reduction of regular forces in favor of technology and an over-reliance on airpower, have placed severe restrictions on the battlefield commanders as seen in the failures at Tora Bora, Operation Anaconda and...Operation Iraqi Freedom....In none of these operations...have US forces been able to maximize the potential of combined arms. This has led to higher casualty rates and protracted campaigns." First, the author fails to appreciate the logistic and political constraints that imposed significant limitations upon the initial US ground force commitment in Afghanistan. When the US moved against Tora Bora, Kabul airport had just been opened and the logistic infrastructure in the region was extremely primitive - it is doubtful that a full division-size force could have been adequately supported in the Tora Bora area at that time. The author's understanding of US military doctrine and operations in OEF and OIF is faulty, since both operations were marked by excellent use of combined arms. Higher casualties due to Rumsfeld? The US seized Kabul, crushed Taliban military power and evicted their regime from all major population centers all within two months and at the cost of fewer than 50 US combat deaths. True, UBL was not caught, but OEF was overwhelmingly successful and at very light cost. The author's anti-Rumsfeld bias betrays an unwillingness to examine ground truth in Afghanistan.


Rating:
Summary: Excellent Background info on current problems
Review: Contrary to another review posted here, this is an excellent work for describing the role and use of cave complexes in Afghanistan. The previous reviewer seems to feel that being critical of Rumsfeld's policy detracts from the content. The author is only presenting the situation as we know it today, including some of the misguided policies of the Sec of War. Although we may learn much more about what these cave complexes are like after the war, we will have a good view of what we thought and knew during the war when we look back at this book years from now. Some may be disappointed in how crude and unsophisticated these positions are after the media built them up before US troops went in.


Rating:
Summary: Solid
Review: Overall a solid book on a tough and politically volatile subject as can be seen by one of the reviews. Cetainly the author has provided an excellent bibliography and drawn conclusions based on his research. It seems one of the reviewers does not like anything critical of the current administration's flawed handling of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Certainly there are a number of recent military studies that lend weight to the argument that the US military does not have enough boots on the ground and that vital equipment was not availabvle for OEF because of the pending invasion of Iraq. The reviewer seemingly believes the hype that all is well in Afghanistan that has been broadcast repeatedly by the DoD and the White House when instead one ought to look at some of the major non governmental agencies' reports on the current situation in Afghanistan. A massive increase in opium trade, NGO's leaving the country because it is unsafe and a return of the Taleban. Even General Barno's excellent presentation on the difficulties encountered by the reconstruction teams reinforces the author's analysis.

Overall the book is a sound primer on the subject with an excellent bibliography, graphics and pictures. The criticism of Rumsfeld falls well within the scope of other professional studies. Regarding combined operations it seems only natural that the US military did not have all the resources it required in both theatres of operations and certainly there have been numerous after action reports that have indicated an inability to get proper support in place -- case in point, Op Anaconda where air assets were inadequate, field artillery missing and an over reliance on technology instead of infantry. Could the US have deployed a division to Afganistan on time? Certainly they should and could have but once again under Rumsfeld and Cheney the US Army had suffered in reduction while the Air Force's budget blossomed. Overall result -- an inability to bring a proper and complete combined arms action against the Taleban and al-Qaeda and an inability to wage a proper and fully supported war in Iraq. There are certainly enough reports available to support the author's assertions. And when an army is deprived of proper numbers and the plan is contrary to the army's recommendations then all casualties rest squarely on Rumsfeld's shoulders -- as well as the President's. Crushing an armed militia in Afghanistan and/or Iraq should be expected and not be praised. Coming up with excuses such as the reviewer does that political and logistical constraints hampered the invasion are abysmal. One does not invade a foreign country with a minimal force that relies on anti-Taleban militias as a major force as was the case in Tora Bora and Anaconda. Nor does one invade a foreign country with insufficient force as made painfully clear in Iraq. The USMC is the only integrated force in Iraq and they arguably were capable of using all assets to execute combined arms fairly well.

The author does rely heavily on Grau's excellent work and does credit him appropriately. Again, a good primer for anyone interested in OEF.

One could make the argument that the author sets higher standards for the US military and that might be misguided.

Rating:
Summary: Claustrophobic Warfare - Hunting Taliban Vermin
Review: This book gives you one of the only printed looks into this highly dangerous form of warfare. Some of the underground "sanctuaries" covered are primitive caves (Natural and man-made), water irrigation systems/wells (Karez), hides, caches and on to highly complex underground dwellings like Zawhar Kili, located three miles from the Pakistan border, which are underground villages, complete with repair shops, public relations office, garage and hotel for visiting journalists. This book goes into detailed tactics employed by the U.S. military ground forces, much of it very remnant of what the Tunnel Rats used against the Viet Cong and looks back at what the Russians failed to do 25 years ago: flush out, hunt and kill the enemy. The book also goes into detail on many of the modern weapons being employed currently to reduce the Taliban and al Qaeda's hideouts to rubble. The book is highly illustrated with diagrams, maps and photos, although the photo quality at times are not that good and very grainy. This book is highly recommended for any Grunt heading over to Afghanistan for a crash course in tunnel warfare. Over all it many not be a great book but again there is no other title out their on the subject. Bottom line, this book will make any old NAM Tunnel Rat out their proud to see their heritage continue!