Cannae

Rating:
Summary: Excellent Chronicle of Famous Battle
Review: Cannae by Adrian Goldsworthy is an excellent chronicle of one of histories most famous battles. In 216 B.C. a Carthaginian Army led by Hannibal annihilated a Roman Army of more than twice its size. The tactics that Hannibal utilized, what has been called a double envelopment, have been studied for the past centuries and were the basis for the German plan for the invasion of France in 1914 as well as Schwarzkopf's Desert Storm.

Goldsworthy, who has also written a superior history of the Punic Wars, does a remarkable job of taking a battle that occurred over two thousand years ago and making it come alive. He goes to great lengths to not only explain the thinking of the major players, but remarkedly brings to the pages the experience of the common soldier. This is especially true as it relates to the sheer physical endurance that was required to slaughter the tens of thousands of Roman soldiers that were killed by Hannibal's Army. This is not to say that Goldsworthy ignores the major players. His discussion of the tactics of Hannibal and the lengths that Hannibal went to in order to make the victory more certain are a lesson for any leader.

Where the book excels is in its discussion of the Roman Armies and explaining why they were so unsuccessful. The traditional thought is that the the Roman Army was simply out generaled by one of histories greatest military leaders. However, as Goldsworthy points out, the Roman Army that met Hannibal was one that had been depleted of its veteran soldiers by successive defeats by Hannibal and was made up mostly of new recruits. Even so, Hannibal's victory was not a forgone conclusion and had not Hannibal's center held out as long as it did Hannibal's defeat would have followed. It was only the firmness of the center that allowed the wings to turn and arrack the Roman flanks and the cavalry to attack the Roman rear. With Hannibal in command of the center, the Carthaginian victory had as much to do with the excellent subordinate commanders that were part of Hannibal's Army.

Cannae is similar to the Ospery Campaign Series, in organization, with an explanation of the leaders, the armies and the actual campaign. However, it is more expensive and includes more in its pages. The maps are one of the strongest parts of the book and make it easy to understand the ebb and flow of the battle.

All in all, the book is a more than worth while read. However, if one wants to know more, I would suggest Goldsworthy "The Punic Wars."

Rating:
Summary: Excellent Chronicle of Famous Battle
Review: Cannae by Adrian Goldsworthy is an excellent chronicle of one of histories most famous battles. In 216 B.C. a Carthaginian Army led by Hannibal annihilated a Roman Army of more than twice its size. The tactics that Hannibal utilized, what has been called a double envelopment, have been studied for the past centuries and were the basis for the German plan for the invasion of France in 1914 as well as Schwarzkopf's Desert Storm.

Goldsworthy, who has also written a superior history of the Punic Wars, does a remarkable job of taking a battle that occurred over two thousand years ago and making it come alive. He goes to great lengths to not only explain the thinking of the major players, but remarkedly brings to the pages the experience of the common soldier. This is especially true as it relates to the sheer physical endurance that was required to slaughter the tens of thousands of Roman soldiers that were killed by Hannibal's Army. This is not to say that Goldsworthy ignores the major players. His discussion of the tactics of Hannibal and the lengths that Hannibal went to in order to make the victory more certain are a lesson for any leader.

Where the book excels is in its discussion of the Roman Armies and explaining why they were so unsuccessful. The traditional thought is that the the Roman Army was simply out generaled by one of histories greatest military leaders. However, as Goldsworthy points out, the Roman Army that met Hannibal was one that had been depleted of its veteran soldiers by successive defeats by Hannibal and was made up mostly of new recruits. Even so, Hannibal's victory was not a forgone conclusion and had not Hannibal's center held out as long as it did Hannibal's defeat would have followed. It was only the firmness of the center that allowed the wings to turn and arrack the Roman flanks and the cavalry to attack the Roman rear. With Hannibal in command of the center, the Carthaginian victory had as much to do with the excellent subordinate commanders that were part of Hannibal's Army.

Cannae is similar to the Ospery Campaign Series, in organization, with an explanation of the leaders, the armies and the actual campaign. However, it is more expensive and includes more in its pages. The maps are one of the strongest parts of the book and make it easy to understand the ebb and flow of the battle.

All in all, the book is a more than worth while read. However, if one wants to know more, I would suggest Goldsworthy "The Punic Wars."

Rating:
Summary: A Detailed Look at a Classic Battle
Review: Despite having been fought over 22 centuries ago, Cannae is still widely regarded as the most classic example of a battle of annihilation in military history. Several ancient historians - principally Polybius and Livy - addressed the battle in their time and several modern historians have attempted to tackle this subject, which is obscured by lack of documentation. Adrian Goldsworthy, an English scholar of ancient warfare, uses the methodology employed by John Keegan in the Face of Battle to attempt to unravel the details of the great Roman defeat at Cannae. Readers may not always agree with the author's interpretations, but he does succeed in bringing the battle to life and this volume is further proof of the high quality of Cassel's new Field of Battle series.

Cannae consists of five sections that cover the background to the Second Punic War, the opposing armies, the campaign of 216 BC, the Battle of Cannae and its aftermath. Certainly the best thing about Goldsworthy's Cannae is it's very high graphic quality. The fifteen full-color battle maps included in the volume are excellent and fully support the campaign narrative. Goldsworthy also includes two appendices with data on opposing strengths and casualties in the battle, a glossary and footnotes (but no bibliography).

The Roman Army that marched to disaster at Cannae was the largest ever deployed on a single battlefield by Rome. However, Goldsworthy notes the inherent weaknesses in this huge army, beginning with a divided command structure and inadequately trained legions. As Goldsworthy notes, the legionaries that were hastily mobilized in the summer of 216 BC lacked the training and discipline of later Roman armies, and their commanders lacked experience. Thus, Hannibal's professional army had a distinct qualitative edge over the larger Roman army. At Cannae, Hannibal's troops were capable of tactical flexibility and agility, but the Romans could only employ unimaginative brute-force linear tactics. On the other hand, Goldsworthy notes that the Roman Republic had enormous manpower reserves for an ancient state - about 700,000 males - and could better sustain combat losses. Another interesting feature that Goldsworthy highlights is the participation of the Roman elite in the campaign; between 25 and 30% of Rome's senators were killed or captured in the battle.

Goldsworthy's account is most interesting because he tries to analyze the campaign and battle in much greater detail that heretofore attempted. He rejects the popular notion that the Roman decision to seek battle at Cannae was foolhardy, since there is no evidence that the alternative "Fabian strategy" was capable of achieving victory. The Roman leadership knew that the only needed to win a single major victory over Hannibal to end the Carthaginian invasion and then went about amassing the means to achieve their ends. The Roman commanders were wary of Hannibal's tactical skill and they approached his army cautiously in the days before the battle, but once they decided to attack, they attempted to use constrictive terrain to minimize the Carthaginian advantage in cavalry. The Roman battle plan was simple but effective, and had a reasonable chance for success. However, the Roman cavalry collapsed far more quickly than expected and the Roman plan began to disintegrate. Although the Romans succeeded in breaking the Carthaginian center, the Roman infantry lacked the agility to deal with threats from their exposed flanks. Once surrounded, the Roman army was slowly hacked to death, making 2 August 216 BC one of the bloodiest days in military history.

One of the more interesting parts of the book is the aftermath section, where Goldsworthy addresses Hannibal's failure to exploit his victory and march on Rome. Goldsworthy notes Hannibal's "cultural assumption" that Cannae was a significant enough victory to bring Rome to terms, and therefore it was unnecessary to march upon the capital to deliver a coup de grace. This set of circumstances might remind readers of the situation facing General Schwarzkopf in 1991, when he decided not to march on the Iraqi capital after achieving a similarly one-sided battlefield triumph. Obviously, some things about warfare don't change over the centuries.

My only problem with Goldsworthy's methodology is the use of modern-day combat research to advance some of his pet theories. In particular, the use of Marshall's now-discredited statistics on combat participation to explain legionary tactics at Cannae is ludicrous; nowhere does the author mention that Marshall's analysis of American rifle squads in the Korean War was in no way comparable to Roman tactics 2,000 years before. For example, Marshall's famous statistic that only 17% of US infantrymen fired their weapon in combat is irrelevant to the Roman legionary who was in full sight of his enemy. A Roman legionary who would not fight could not run, hide or remain passive under such circumstances. Goldsworthy also fails to take into account the fact that the Roman soldiers had a great motivation to fight - after witnessing two years of enemy depredations in their native land - they were fighting on their own soil to drive out an invader. At Cannae, the Romans did not fail for lack of means or willpower, they failed due to lack of adequate training and experience. Yet defeat provided a catalyst for a Roman military revival and in the end, Hannibal's tactical masterpiece was for naught.

Rating:
Summary: A Detailed Look at a Classic Battle
Review: Despite having been fought over 22 centuries ago, Cannae is still widely regarded as the most classic example of a battle of annihilation in military history. Several ancient historians - principally Polybius and Livy - addressed the battle in their time and several modern historians have attempted to tackle this subject, which is obscured by lack of documentation. Adrian Goldsworthy, an English scholar of ancient warfare, uses the methodology employed by John Keegan in the Face of Battle to attempt to unravel the details of the great Roman defeat at Cannae. Readers may not always agree with the author's interpretations, but he does succeed in bringing the battle to life and this volume is further proof of the high quality of Cassel's new Field of Battle series.

Cannae consists of five sections that cover the background to the Second Punic War, the opposing armies, the campaign of 216 BC, the Battle of Cannae and its aftermath. Certainly the best thing about Goldsworthy's Cannae is it's very high graphic quality. The fifteen full-color battle maps included in the volume are excellent and fully support the campaign narrative. Goldsworthy also includes two appendices with data on opposing strengths and casualties in the battle, a glossary and footnotes (but no bibliography).

The Roman Army that marched to disaster at Cannae was the largest ever deployed on a single battlefield by Rome. However, Goldsworthy notes the inherent weaknesses in this huge army, beginning with a divided command structure and inadequately trained legions. As Goldsworthy notes, the legionaries that were hastily mobilized in the summer of 216 BC lacked the training and discipline of later Roman armies, and their commanders lacked experience. Thus, Hannibal's professional army had a distinct qualitative edge over the larger Roman army. At Cannae, Hannibal's troops were capable of tactical flexibility and agility, but the Romans could only employ unimaginative brute-force linear tactics. On the other hand, Goldsworthy notes that the Roman Republic had enormous manpower reserves for an ancient state - about 700,000 males - and could better sustain combat losses. Another interesting feature that Goldsworthy highlights is the participation of the Roman elite in the campaign; between 25 and 30% of Rome's senators were killed or captured in the battle.

Goldsworthy's account is most interesting because he tries to analyze the campaign and battle in much greater detail that heretofore attempted. He rejects the popular notion that the Roman decision to seek battle at Cannae was foolhardy, since there is no evidence that the alternative "Fabian strategy" was capable of achieving victory. The Roman leadership knew that the only needed to win a single major victory over Hannibal to end the Carthaginian invasion and then went about amassing the means to achieve their ends. The Roman commanders were wary of Hannibal's tactical skill and they approached his army cautiously in the days before the battle, but once they decided to attack, they attempted to use constrictive terrain to minimize the Carthaginian advantage in cavalry. The Roman battle plan was simple but effective, and had a reasonable chance for success. However, the Roman cavalry collapsed far more quickly than expected and the Roman plan began to disintegrate. Although the Romans succeeded in breaking the Carthaginian center, the Roman infantry lacked the agility to deal with threats from their exposed flanks. Once surrounded, the Roman army was slowly hacked to death, making 2 August 216 BC one of the bloodiest days in military history.

One of the more interesting parts of the book is the aftermath section, where Goldsworthy addresses Hannibal's failure to exploit his victory and march on Rome. Goldsworthy notes Hannibal's "cultural assumption" that Cannae was a significant enough victory to bring Rome to terms, and therefore it was unnecessary to march upon the capital to deliver a coup de grace. This set of circumstances might remind readers of the situation facing General Schwarzkopf in 1991, when he decided not to march on the Iraqi capital after achieving a similarly one-sided battlefield triumph. Obviously, some things about warfare don't change over the centuries.

My only problem with Goldsworthy's methodology is the use of modern-day combat research to advance some of his pet theories. In particular, the use of Marshall's now-discredited statistics on combat participation to explain legionary tactics at Cannae is ludicrous; nowhere does the author mention that Marshall's analysis of American rifle squads in the Korean War was in no way comparable to Roman tactics 2,000 years before. For example, Marshall's famous statistic that only 17% of US infantrymen fired their weapon in combat is irrelevant to the Roman legionary who was in full sight of his enemy. A Roman legionary who would not fight could not run, hide or remain passive under such circumstances. Goldsworthy also fails to take into account the fact that the Roman soldiers had a great motivation to fight - after witnessing two years of enemy depredations in their native land - they were fighting on their own soil to drive out an invader. At Cannae, the Romans did not fail for lack of means or willpower, they failed due to lack of adequate training and experience. Yet defeat provided a catalyst for a Roman military revival and in the end, Hannibal's tactical masterpiece was for naught.