Rating: 
Summary: Sheds Much New Light on the War in the East
Review: Although there are many books that cover the German invasion of Russia in 1941, few deal with the massive air operations in any detail. This book provides an excellent campaign narrative of the six-month struggle for air supremacy in Russia during June-December 1941. The authors are to be applauded for their attention to detail and their scrupulous objectivity. The book is organized in 31 short chapters, which generally cover a specific area and period in the campaign, like air operations over the Baltic States in July-August 1941. There are three introductory chapters that cover the doctrine, training, tactics and equipment of both the German Luftwaffe and the Soviet VVS. Numerous relevant photographs, many of which have not been published before, enrich each chapter. Additionally, there are six maps and six excellent appendices (Luftwaffe and VVS organization, orders of battle, rank structure and awards). Chapters usually begin with an operational overview of ground operations and objectives in a given area, followed by accounts of air actions in that area on a virtual day-by-day basis. First hand accounts are used to describe fighter engagements and bomber attacks. The first day of Operation Barbarossa is covered in great detail, much more than I have seen anywhere else. Although there are digressions on minor theaters of action, such as the Siege of Odessa and the Arctic Front, most of the focus is on the three main theaters of action, in north, central and south Russia. The authors skillfully weave together German and Soviet records to produce as objective an account of the air battles as possible. Some striking aspects of the book include the shockingly deficient level of Soviet pre-war flight training; many Soviet pilots went to front-line squadrons with only 10 flight hours accrued, versus an average of 250 hours for new Luftwaffe pilots. Soviet pilots were further disadvantaged by obsolete aircraft, faulty doctrine and lack of combat experience, whereas the German pilots had plenty of experience and flew excellent aircraft like the Me-109E. Anyone who wonders how the Luftwaffe could have so many pilots with 50 or more "kills" should read this books account of the slaughter of hundreds of Soviet bombers during the first weeks of war. The VVS seemed to have an endless supply of SB and DB-3 light bombers that it continued to send in broad daylight and without escort to attack German ground units. The Luftwaffe experten shot them down by the bushel. The VVS was also slow to disperse its aircraft and develop low-level defenses and consequently, Luftwaffe bombers continued to catch large numbers of Soviet aircraft on the ground even three weeks into the campaign. Other interesting aspects include details on the Soviet strategic raids on Berlin, the German strategic raids on Moscow and some industrial targets, and the Soviet predilection for "taran" (air-to-air ramming tactics). Soviet propaganda tended to exaggeration "taran" tactics, but the fact is that it was not unusual; on the first day of Barbarossa alone the Luftwaffe lost 14 aircraft to ramming. Between June and December 1941, the Luftwaffe destroyed about 17,000 Soviet aircraft at a cost to themselves of 2,000 aircraft, but the Soviets were able to rebuild their air power in a short period despite these horrendous losses. The authors conclude, "the predominant tactical doctrine of the Luftwaffe and the lack of equipment to undertake a strategic bomber offensive proved to be the fatal flaws of Operation Barbarossa." Additionally, the authors cite the role of airpower as particularly decisive in the Moscow campaign, where the declining strength of the Luftwaffe and its ability to contribute effective air cover or ground support contributed to the German ground offensive running out of steam. Massive Soviet air reinforcements to the Moscow sector then tipped the balance and allowed the Soviet army to roll up the over-extended Germans. Finally, the Luftwaffe shifted air reinforcements to this sector from other areas and helped to prevent the collapse of ArmeeGruppe Center. Black Cross/Red Star is an invaluable book for military historians and future volumes should add to its value. However this book is ill-suited for general readers who lack knowledge of the Eastern Front, since the book is loaded with German and Russian military jargon, and there is little discussion of wider aspects of the campaign (the participation of German allies such as Romania, Finland and Italy is mentioned only in cursory fashion). Readers familiar with the Eastern Front will find this book a feast of information which offers new perspectives on the Russo-German War.
Rating:
Summary: Sheds Much New Light on the War in the East
Review: Although there are many books that cover the German invasion of Russia in 1941, few deal with the massive air operations in any detail. This book provides an excellent campaign narrative of the six-month struggle for air supremacy in Russia during June-December 1941. The authors are to be applauded for their attention to detail and their scrupulous objectivity. The book is organized in 31 short chapters, which generally cover a specific area and period in the campaign, like air operations over the Baltic States in July-August 1941. There are three introductory chapters that cover the doctrine, training, tactics and equipment of both the German Luftwaffe and the Soviet VVS. Numerous relevant photographs, many of which have not been published before, enrich each chapter. Additionally, there are six maps and six excellent appendices (Luftwaffe and VVS organization, orders of battle, rank structure and awards). Chapters usually begin with an operational overview of ground operations and objectives in a given area, followed by accounts of air actions in that area on a virtual day-by-day basis. First hand accounts are used to describe fighter engagements and bomber attacks. The first day of Operation Barbarossa is covered in great detail, much more than I have seen anywhere else. Although there are digressions on minor theaters of action, such as the Siege of Odessa and the Arctic Front, most of the focus is on the three main theaters of action, in north, central and south Russia. The authors skillfully weave together German and Soviet records to produce as objective an account of the air battles as possible. Some striking aspects of the book include the shockingly deficient level of Soviet pre-war flight training; many Soviet pilots went to front-line squadrons with only 10 flight hours accrued, versus an average of 250 hours for new Luftwaffe pilots. Soviet pilots were further disadvantaged by obsolete aircraft, faulty doctrine and lack of combat experience, whereas the German pilots had plenty of experience and flew excellent aircraft like the Me-109E. Anyone who wonders how the Luftwaffe could have so many pilots with 50 or more "kills" should read this books account of the slaughter of hundreds of Soviet bombers during the first weeks of war. The VVS seemed to have an endless supply of SB and DB-3 light bombers that it continued to send in broad daylight and without escort to attack German ground units. The Luftwaffe experten shot them down by the bushel. The VVS was also slow to disperse its aircraft and develop low-level defenses and consequently, Luftwaffe bombers continued to catch large numbers of Soviet aircraft on the ground even three weeks into the campaign. Other interesting aspects include details on the Soviet strategic raids on Berlin, the German strategic raids on Moscow and some industrial targets, and the Soviet predilection for "taran" (air-to-air ramming tactics). Soviet propaganda tended to exaggeration "taran" tactics, but the fact is that it was not unusual; on the first day of Barbarossa alone the Luftwaffe lost 14 aircraft to ramming. Between June and December 1941, the Luftwaffe destroyed about 17,000 Soviet aircraft at a cost to themselves of 2,000 aircraft, but the Soviets were able to rebuild their air power in a short period despite these horrendous losses. The authors conclude, "the predominant tactical doctrine of the Luftwaffe and the lack of equipment to undertake a strategic bomber offensive proved to be the fatal flaws of Operation Barbarossa." Additionally, the authors cite the role of airpower as particularly decisive in the Moscow campaign, where the declining strength of the Luftwaffe and its ability to contribute effective air cover or ground support contributed to the German ground offensive running out of steam. Massive Soviet air reinforcements to the Moscow sector then tipped the balance and allowed the Soviet army to roll up the over-extended Germans. Finally, the Luftwaffe shifted air reinforcements to this sector from other areas and helped to prevent the collapse of ArmeeGruppe Center. Black Cross/Red Star is an invaluable book for military historians and future volumes should add to its value. However this book is ill-suited for general readers who lack knowledge of the Eastern Front, since the book is loaded with German and Russian military jargon, and there is little discussion of wider aspects of the campaign (the participation of German allies such as Romania, Finland and Italy is mentioned only in cursory fashion). Readers familiar with the Eastern Front will find this book a feast of information which offers new perspectives on the Russo-German War.
Rating: 
Summary: A Semi-contrarian View
Review: Black Cross Red Star Vol. 1 seems to have become a relatively expensive out-of-print. I only recently finished my new-bought copy after it sat on the to-read list for a long time. If one is considering pursuing it in the second hand market: The material and perspective are unique. It is a serious attempt at a two sided account of the Soviet-German air war on the Eastern front in WWII, in contrast to previous detailed and even scholarly but still mainly one sided acccounts from the Axis perspective and excepting Soviet propaganda, a few post-Soviet Russian oral histories (eg. Loza's "Attack of the Airacobras"). The Soviet photo's, poor reproductions though they are, could alone make this an important book.
But I was somewhat disappointed given all the 5-stars. This book isn't comparable to the best air combat histories I've read, John Lundstrom's books on US-Japan carrier fighter combat in 1942, and falls short of other excellent WWII air combat accounts as well (Ford's "Flying Tigers", Bartsch's "Doomed at the Start", or the many works of Cull, Shores and Franks). Even though the authors promise, I believe, 6 volumes to tell the story of the Eastern Front air war, even June-Dec '41 is too much to cover in detail in the relatively short length.
The other authors I mentioned didn't have to deal with the massive scale of the Russo-German air war, and perhaps a 1000 page Volume 1 was not realistic, but still I could at least imagine a better way to address the large scope of the subject. Perhaps only some detailed accounts would be given for flavor (and perhaps this is the intention) but if so this would better have been done in the framework of more complete consistent and clearly presented aggregate statistics (changing orders of battle, strengths, claims and losses). Complete omission of the Finnish effort is another casualty of too much ground to cover.
The narrative seems to have a split personality sometimes, perhaps between the authors? Certain passages and accounts have a decidedly pro-Soviet tone somewhat at odds with expectation in a neutral account. It often seems important to establish at length that there were many brave and some highly skilled Soviet fighter pilots though that might be assumed, and the limited statistics given don't really challenge the conventional negative characterization of 1941 Russian fighter effectiveness. Where detailed accounts are given, it's not always clear that the claims especially of decorated Soviet pilots and elite Russian units are scrutinized as much as possible compared with available German loss records. The footnoting and source listing is limited if one would consider further independent research. One can better understand the book with previous knowledge or an accompanying source on the ground campaign. This is probably the best book to have appeared on its particular subject, I just hope it's not the last word. Based on V.1 I'll probably buy V.2, but not an immediate must-buy.
Rating:
Summary: Next volume? Aber bitte jetzt gleich!
Review: First I have to concede, that I am one of the local and personal supporters of Christer Bergströms and Andrey Michailovs work. So I am really partial on their first volume of their tremendous ongoing work. In the past, there were written lots of books about the war on the eastern front. Meanwhile we know (as special historical educated people) a lot about the main facts, which troups under which command of which Marshall or General fought against the other side. But we also have the expierience, that the former western enemies came together and are today good friends. Today the former opponents of the „Battle over Britain" meet since decades as friends, talking about the old tough times... The authors support with their work that kind the peaceful communication of the russian and german generations, because they explain, that one of the best skills of human beings, the possibility to fly, unifies the people all over the world. The work that the authors did today, was impossible to do until the early ninties, when the history of the lost and won WWII was occupied by the political systems. With the fall of the german border and later with the end of the USSR, there was a new chance to take a new look on that what happened 45-50 years before. The authors show, (by looking on the eastern theatre) that there was at least no really difference between german and russian pilots during the second worldwar: They all loved flying, they loved their native country. At least they did the same: They fought against each other, they killed each other under the same conditions. Bergström and Michailov acting in the a kind of the new „avantgarde" with their bookproject. Nearly no historian (Working on that „eastern-front-theme") did it in that way before: To take a look on personal or individual destinies of both sides during the SAME time. In that way, the eastern theatre (especially the airwar) is not longer an uppersurface-story with Hitler and Stalin, or Manstein and Shukov, who lost there 10.700 soldiers and at another place 5.800 soldiers. A small number of those soldiers (or especially pilots) now get names, even also not just the topscoring fighterpilots of both sides. To check the „eye to eye-enemies" is the most honourable intention of Bergström an Michailov , to bring light into that what happened. They do not just stop at the point of those 10.700 or 5.800 soldiers - they talk about the single human beings of both sides, who not really differed. So buy that book, because it is a really extented look on our common history. I am urging for the next volume. Günther Rosipal, Hannover, Germany
Rating:
Summary: Next volume? Aber bitte jetzt gleich!
Review: First I have to concede, that I am one of the local and personal supporters of Christer Bergströms and Andrey Michailovs work. So I am really partial on their first volume of their tremendous ongoing work. In the past, there were written lots of books about the war on the eastern front. Meanwhile we know (as special historical educated people) a lot about the main facts, which troups under which command of which Marshall or General fought against the other side. But we also have the expierience, that the former western enemies came together and are today good friends. Today the former opponents of the „Battle over Britain" meet since decades as friends, talking about the old tough times... The authors support with their work that kind the peaceful communication of the russian and german generations, because they explain, that one of the best skills of human beings, the possibility to fly, unifies the people all over the world. The work that the authors did today, was impossible to do until the early ninties, when the history of the lost and won WWII was occupied by the political systems. With the fall of the german border and later with the end of the USSR, there was a new chance to take a new look on that what happened 45-50 years before. The authors show, (by looking on the eastern theatre) that there was at least no really difference between german and russian pilots during the second worldwar: They all loved flying, they loved their native country. At least they did the same: They fought against each other, they killed each other under the same conditions. Bergström and Michailov acting in the a kind of the new „avantgarde" with their bookproject. Nearly no historian (Working on that „eastern-front-theme") did it in that way before: To take a look on personal or individual destinies of both sides during the SAME time. In that way, the eastern theatre (especially the airwar) is not longer an uppersurface-story with Hitler and Stalin, or Manstein and Shukov, who lost there 10.700 soldiers and at another place 5.800 soldiers. A small number of those soldiers (or especially pilots) now get names, even also not just the topscoring fighterpilots of both sides. To check the „eye to eye-enemies" is the most honourable intention of Bergström an Michailov , to bring light into that what happened. They do not just stop at the point of those 10.700 or 5.800 soldiers - they talk about the single human beings of both sides, who not really differed. So buy that book, because it is a really extented look on our common history. I am urging for the next volume. Günther Rosipal, Hannover, Germany
Rating: 
Summary: Very Good...But Needs to Examine Larger Scale
Review: First of all, this is probably the best book on a greatly neglected topic. The air battles along the eastern front were every bit as critical to the war as those in the west. As this book demonstrates, Luftwaffe losses during the summer/autumn of 1941 were as great as the much publicized Battle of Britain. Soviet losses in men and machines were astronomical, another factor ignored by most western historians who emphasize mainly U.S. and British contributions. This book discusses these issues in great detail. One aspect of the book which is both a plus and minus is the authors emphasize the microscale aspects of the Eastern Front air war. They provide great detail about the air operations of small scale units or individual pilots and what life was like to be a German of Russian flyer over Russia. But the effects of these operations on the larger scale are somewhat neglected. One wishes more discussions were directed as to how large scale bomber operations affected the ground battles. More could have been written concerning the German attempt to develop a strategic bombing campaign, especially against Moscow. In fact, I would have liked to see more discussions concerning the effects of German bomber and dive bomber operations in general since this is what proves most decisive in any offensive. The authors definitely have a pro-fighter bias, which is the main reason I did not give it 5 stars.
Rating:
Summary: Very good book
Review: I strongly recommend this book for anyone interested in aerial warfare and history in general. It deals with one of the less known aerial theatres of WWII: the eastern front.
The book has his strong point in the fact that the narrative shifts from the german to the soviet points of view in a subject where the former approach are almost the unic source for the ocidental reader.
Rating:
Summary: Black Cross/Red Star : Vol. 1
Review: Interesting, balanced story of Barbarossa. Having read extensively about the WWII Airwar, found this book an excellent overview that put a lot of the pieces together for me. Would have enjoyed more detail. I found it interesting that many relatively obscure pilots were mentioned - some multiple times - and in considerable detail while H. Rudel was barely mentioned. I sensed a bias on the part of the authors. Made me want to do more reading in order to validate or disprove this feeling. Excellent read. Good reference book.
Rating:
Summary: Air war over the Russian steppes
Review: The beginning chapter states: "Although the largest air war in history was fought on the Eastern Front during World War II, this is one of the least known chapters of aviation history." An opening sentence never rang so true. Millions of pages have been written about the aerial conflict over Western Europe over the decades since the war. Given the number of units and aircraft involved over the Eastern Front, this part of aviation lore has been sadly neglected. Part of the reason has to due with the availability of the records. Only with the recent fall of the Iron Curtain have researchers been allowed more than limited access to Soviet records. Christer Bergstrom and Andrey Mikhailov are two such men who spent years interviewing the pilots who fought and suffered in the skies of Eastern Europe. The book begins with a comparison of the two air forces involved which includes their relative experience prior to June 22, 1941, training standards, tactical doctrine and aircraft. The effect of Stalin's purges on leading airmen and aircraft engineers and its effect on the Russian Air Force is also detailed. Of interest is the German fighter pilot's 'hunting' philosophy that stressed individual achievement through aerial victories. The beginning of the book takes the reader from the early morning dawn of June 22, 1941 to the first intense struggles for air supremacy during those first, fateful weeks. Testimonials and first-hand accounts from participants, on both sides, give humanity to the plentiful and detailed facts and figures. Many future and high scoring aces of the Luftwaffe and VVS describe their first missions during the opening battles. One of the overall strengths of this work is that information from the antagonists is presented. Most of what we now of the air war on the Eastern Front are from the Luftwaffe point of view. Rarely did a reader know what was happening on the "Other Side of the Hill". Bergstrom and Mikhailov have made it a point to give a balanced account and include as much detail about the VVS and its pilots, as with the Luftwaffe. After the initial stages of the air war, the authors walk the reader through the intense battles in the Ukraine, Kiev, and the desperate defense of Moscow and Leningrad. Interestingly, the VVS air raids against Berlin are documented. This is just another example of the obscure events of the war above the Eastern Front chronicled in this book. A weakness of the book is the quality of the maps. Most of the geographical place names are blurred, making them difficult if not impossible to read. Several of the photographs have the same problem with blurring. Overall, the quality of the maps and photos do not detract significantly from the work. I would recommend this book to anyone with even the slightest interest in the battles between the Luftwaffe and VVS. The book closes a large gap between the air war on the Eastern Front and the other theaters of war that have been heavily documented.
Rating: 
Summary: Black Cross, Red Star - Contrarian View
Review: The dust cover states "for the first time, a true balance between the German and Soviet accounts" Balanced? Not in my humble opinion. I find this book to be written from the Soviet point of view. The Russian pilots are all heros and the Germans are either deluded or barely mentioned. Most of the narration is also done from the Soviet point of view. I'd split the narrative point of view to be about 80% Soviet, 20% German I find the number of footnotes and source citing in general to be miserly and not up to the standard of a major break through work of history. Assertions are many, such as stating the Romanian claims over Odessa were inflated...maybe so, but there isn't a footnote there... On the positive side, there is new data and photographs, if you can read past the cheerleading. Modelers: Pass this one by....no color plates, no 3D views The lack of neutrality turned me off in the first chapters of this book. I won't be buying the next three, based on my experience with volume one
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