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Rating: 
Summary: A lot to be desired
Review: One of the few books on the Great War published in Osprey's Campaign series, Verdun 1916 is, at most, no disappointment. Recounting the worst battle possibly fought in the First World War, Malcolm Brown succeeds in detailing and recounting the battle sufficiently enough for newcomers to the history of the Great War to be able to know a thing or two about this clash of arms.
While being filled with photographs and excellent battlescene plates painted by Howard Gerrard, the book lacks analysis of the battles and most details concerning the battles in and around Verdun, which would be a dissapointment to Great War historians and miniature wargamers alike.
Still, it is a good read and should be bought as a supplement to other works on the Battle (or should I say Slaughter?) of Verdun, most notably Horne's classic account, The Price of Glory.
Rating: 
Summary: Essentially a TV Documentary, on Paper
Review: Verdun 1916 by Malcolm Brown joins the thin ranks of English-language books written about the horrific Battle of Verdun. Although well written, Brown's book certainly does not surpass Alistair Horne's classic, the Price of Glory, which was written forty years ago. Indeed, Verdun 1916 is essentially a TV documentary on the great battle, merely committed to paper instead of the small screen. Brown, a freelance historian noted for his TV documentaries in association with the Imperial War Museum, approaches this subject with the intent of painting a portrait of war at its worst for the enlightenment of modern Europeans who are beginning to forget the awfulness of full-scale warfare. While the author follows closely in Horne's well-worn footsteps in recounting the battle itself, he does succeed in inserting new and interesting material about human facets of the battle. Verdun 1916 is not much as a campaign narrative, but it does help to put a human face on one of the worst scenes of carnage in the 20th Century. Verdun 1916 consists of twenty short chapters, beginning with sections covering background to the battle and opposing preparations. The account of the battle itself is fairly succinct at only 118 pages and readers will get just the basic facts, with little embellishment or analysis. Indeed, the lack of any detail concerning the underground fighting in Fort Vaux or the seesaw battles in the villages around the fort are serious omissions. Certainly the greatest weakness of the book is the presence of only a single map - and a map that does not depict important villages like Fleurus, where thousands of troops died. Military readers will also note that few specific units are mentioned, that there is little or no mention of the corps and division level leaders on either side, and that few specific dates are given; as military history, this lack of specific detail just doesn't cut it. On the plus side, there are eighty photographs in the book, some of which depict interesting sidelights, such as the effect of shelling upon the city of Verdun. Scholarly readers will note the brevity of the bibliography and the over-reliance on English language sources; apparently the author made little effort to utilize French or German archival material. The first half of Verdun 1916 covers the initial dramatic stages of the battle pretty much as Horne did, with the emphasis on the capture of Fort Douamont and Fort Vaux. Compared to Horne's dramatic prose, Brown is sparing in detail and seems intent to invoke a somber pathos. However, Brown does a wonderful job weaving together eyewitness accounts from both sides that put the battle into a better human context than Horne delivered. Whereas Horne focused on dramatic individuals at dramatic moments, in Brown's version of Verdun we read more about the fears of ordinary men expecting to be blasted into bloody pulp at any moment. One could even say that there are no heroes in this account, only victims. At the mid-point of the book, Brown inserts a considerable amount of fresh material and perspectives on neglected aspects of the battle, such as medical units and civilians. Of particular interest is the British Urgency Cases Hospital at Revigny, which handled many of the French wounded from Verdun, and which was an early forerunner of modern combat surgical hospitals. Brown's discussion of the effect of the German bombardment upon the city of Verdun (some spots, like the Cathedral, were almost untouched) and the involvement in the battle of American pilots from the Lafayette squadron are also quite interesting. One recent American revisionist historian, John Mosier, claims that the Germans won the battle of Verdun. Brown's book helps to dispute such assertions by demonstrating that the French army did better at Verdun that is frequently portrayed. Certainly the greatest French success was their ability to sustain their defense by means of a motorized logistic pipeline along the "Sacred Way." Indeed, Brown asks, "the success of the Sacred Way raises an important question. Why did the Germans let it happen?" Brown notes that, "the Germans had three squadrons [of aircraft] for bombing, each capable of dropping a 200-pound bomb. But they used them with little imagination." Furthermore, "not one of the thirty-four bridges in the area was destroyed by bombing...and they never troubled the Sacred Way." Thus, the German inability to seriously interfere with the French lines of communication was a major mistake. Brown also notes that while the Germans introduced some tactical innovations at Verdun - like small storm trooper units, flamethrowers and phosgene gas - that most of the ordinary German infantry still attacked in conventional battalion-size masses. The other major French success at Verdun was their ability to recover lost ground in set-piece battles. In a one-week period in the fall of 1916, the French recaptured Fort Douamont and Fort Vaux at relatively low cost. The French army was able to mount these successful attacks after months of bloody attritional fighting, proving that the Germans had failed to achieve their objective of smashing the French fighting spirit. Brown's conclusions that there were "no winners, only victims" at Verdun glosses over the importance of the French army's ability to absorb the worst that the Germans could throw at them, and survive to launch counterattacks.
Rating:
Summary: Essentially a TV Documentary, on Paper
Review: Verdun 1916 by Malcolm Brown joins the thin ranks of English-language books written about the horrific Battle of Verdun. Although well written, Brown's book certainly does not surpass Alistair Horne's classic, the Price of Glory, which was written forty years ago. Indeed, Verdun 1916 is essentially a TV documentary on the great battle, merely committed to paper instead of the small screen. Brown, a freelance historian noted for his TV documentaries in association with the Imperial War Museum, approaches this subject with the intent of painting a portrait of war at its worst for the enlightenment of modern Europeans who are beginning to forget the awfulness of full-scale warfare. While the author follows closely in Horne's well-worn footsteps in recounting the battle itself, he does succeed in inserting new and interesting material about human facets of the battle. Verdun 1916 is not much as a campaign narrative, but it does help to put a human face on one of the worst scenes of carnage in the 20th Century. Verdun 1916 consists of twenty short chapters, beginning with sections covering background to the battle and opposing preparations. The account of the battle itself is fairly succinct at only 118 pages and readers will get just the basic facts, with little embellishment or analysis. Indeed, the lack of any detail concerning the underground fighting in Fort Vaux or the seesaw battles in the villages around the fort are serious omissions. Certainly the greatest weakness of the book is the presence of only a single map - and a map that does not depict important villages like Fleurus, where thousands of troops died. Military readers will also note that few specific units are mentioned, that there is little or no mention of the corps and division level leaders on either side, and that few specific dates are given; as military history, this lack of specific detail just doesn't cut it. On the plus side, there are eighty photographs in the book, some of which depict interesting sidelights, such as the effect of shelling upon the city of Verdun. Scholarly readers will note the brevity of the bibliography and the over-reliance on English language sources; apparently the author made little effort to utilize French or German archival material. The first half of Verdun 1916 covers the initial dramatic stages of the battle pretty much as Horne did, with the emphasis on the capture of Fort Douamont and Fort Vaux. Compared to Horne's dramatic prose, Brown is sparing in detail and seems intent to invoke a somber pathos. However, Brown does a wonderful job weaving together eyewitness accounts from both sides that put the battle into a better human context than Horne delivered. Whereas Horne focused on dramatic individuals at dramatic moments, in Brown's version of Verdun we read more about the fears of ordinary men expecting to be blasted into bloody pulp at any moment. One could even say that there are no heroes in this account, only victims. At the mid-point of the book, Brown inserts a considerable amount of fresh material and perspectives on neglected aspects of the battle, such as medical units and civilians. Of particular interest is the British Urgency Cases Hospital at Revigny, which handled many of the French wounded from Verdun, and which was an early forerunner of modern combat surgical hospitals. Brown's discussion of the effect of the German bombardment upon the city of Verdun (some spots, like the Cathedral, were almost untouched) and the involvement in the battle of American pilots from the Lafayette squadron are also quite interesting. One recent American revisionist historian, John Mosier, claims that the Germans won the battle of Verdun. Brown's book helps to dispute such assertions by demonstrating that the French army did better at Verdun that is frequently portrayed. Certainly the greatest French success was their ability to sustain their defense by means of a motorized logistic pipeline along the "Sacred Way." Indeed, Brown asks, "the success of the Sacred Way raises an important question. Why did the Germans let it happen?" Brown notes that, "the Germans had three squadrons [of aircraft] for bombing, each capable of dropping a 200-pound bomb. But they used them with little imagination." Furthermore, "not one of the thirty-four bridges in the area was destroyed by bombing...and they never troubled the Sacred Way." Thus, the German inability to seriously interfere with the French lines of communication was a major mistake. Brown also notes that while the Germans introduced some tactical innovations at Verdun - like small storm trooper units, flamethrowers and phosgene gas - that most of the ordinary German infantry still attacked in conventional battalion-size masses. The other major French success at Verdun was their ability to recover lost ground in set-piece battles. In a one-week period in the fall of 1916, the French recaptured Fort Douamont and Fort Vaux at relatively low cost. The French army was able to mount these successful attacks after months of bloody attritional fighting, proving that the Germans had failed to achieve their objective of smashing the French fighting spirit. Brown's conclusions that there were "no winners, only victims" at Verdun glosses over the importance of the French army's ability to absorb the worst that the Germans could throw at them, and survive to launch counterattacks.
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